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This thesis empirically investigates how well the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) ensures value for money (VfM) in its exploitation of 
Nigeria’s oil resources. This focus on VfM distinguishes the study from other 
researches carried out on the performance of national oil companies (NOCs) 
where the common approach in the literature has been to assess performance 
using the metrics applicable to private oil companies. The rationale for the new 
approach is that the NNPC is a quasi-public sector organisation and thus its 
performance should be measured in the same way as that of public sector 
bodies and state owned enterprises (SOEs). Informed opinions on NNPC’s 
management roles in Nigeria’s oil and gas upstream sector were sought from a 
range of relevant experts in twelve stakeholder groups involved in oil and gas 
upstream operations. Data were collected through the use of questionnaire and 
interview surveys, and further subjected to statistical analysis to determine and 
assess significant differences in views between respondent groups. The 
empirical results obtained from the questionnaires were used to draw a 
conclusion on the hypotheses formulated for the study. Furthermore, the 
findings of the interview survey were used to validate the conclusions drawn. 
The study revealed that the NNPC was perceived to be deficient in keeping its 
mandate of adding value to Nigeria’s hydrocarbon resources. In specific terms, 
the respondents were of the view that NNPC has not been able to ensure VfM 
in its operations because of defects in its organisational structure, 
administrative system, and accountability. External factors such as political 
interference, instability and an inappropriate legal framework against which 
NNPC operates have also been perceived to impede the corporation’s 
performance. The main conclusions were: firstly, it is argued that the use of 
conventional private sector metrics to evaluate the performance of NOCs 
makes it difficult to form an appropriate view on their performance. Secondly, 
NOCs with numerous conflicting roles as is the case with NNPC are unlikely 
to achieve satisfactory performance. Thirdly, the NNPC lacks the capability 
required to ensure multinational oil companies’ (MOC) conformity with 
operational provisions and best practice. Finally, the thesis concludes that 
establishing a standardised performance/benchmarking framework is an 
essential requirement to ensure value addition, VfM and accountability in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas operations. 
 
Keywords: efficiency, effectiveness, economy, performance, value adding, 







1.1 Background to the Study 
Since independence in 1960, the Nigerian State has been greatly concerned 
with the industrial and socio-economic development of the country; often 
utilising state ownership of assets as a direct means to accomplish public 
objectives
1
. The government significantly uses its ownership status to establish 
its presence in the agriculture, energy services, banking, transportation and 
telecommunication industries with the aim of promoting industrialisation and 
improving the welfare of its citizens (Imhonopi and Urim, 2010; Omoleke, 
2010). 
In tandem with other OPEC members
2
, the control of the oil and gas resources 
was considered strategic for the economic wellbeing of Nigeria, and key to its 
development of a welfare society (Nwokeji, 2007). This desire of Nigeria, to 
participate in the exploitation of its oil and gas resources, led to the emergence 
of its national oil company in 1971, the NNOC, pursuant to the Petroleum Act 
of 1969 (Umar, 2005). The NNOC was created to serve both the roles of a 
public enterprise as well as an implementation agency for government policies 
relating to the oil and gas (Atsegbua, 1999).  
However due to its unsatisfactory performance, in 1977, the NNOC was 
replaced with the NNPC and assigned the overall responsibility of 
implementing the government’s participation policy3 (Gboyega et al., 2011). In 
so doing, the NNPC was designed to serve as a quasi-public sector vehicle to 
obtain optimal value from the country’s hydrocarbon resources for the benefit 
of the Nigerian people, and indeed all stakeholders (Nwokeji, 2007). In other 
                                       
1
 Even before 1960, Public Enterprises otherwise referred to as State Owned Enterprises were 
created to address socio-economic imbalance that resulted due to market imperfection and 
capital shortfall, as well as to boost domestic economic activities (Basu, 2007). 
2
 Through its Policy Declaration of 1968 (resolution 90), OPEC enjoined its members to create 
state oil companies as a condition for state participation in the oil and gas industry (Atsegbua, 
1999). 
3
 The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree was enacted in 1972 to encourage local 
participation in the Nigerian economy. It specified that certain businesses can only be 




words, the NNPC was established as an ultimate device for securing national 
interest in both the upstream and downstream sector of the oil and gas industry. 
This has been through the pursuit of both commercial and socio-economic 
development objectives of the government
4
 (Pargendler et al., 2013). In the 
course of upholding its mandate, the NNPC has undergone different phases of 
development (Nwokeji, 2007; Makeri, 2009; Okoye, 2010). 
Clearly, therefore, sound management of NNPC was a prerequisite condition if 
the government’s desired commerciality goals, and the NNPC’s role as vehicle 
for Nigeria’s socio-economic development, were to be achieved. The NNPC 
has, however, been highly criticised for its performance in this respect (see 
Umar, 2005; Nwokeji, 2007). 
As the NOC of the country; the remit of the NNPC like any other NOCs, 
centres on managing the country’s oil and gas resources particularly those 
relationships that exist between the country and MOCs relating to oil and gas 
resources exploitation. Other responsibilities, as stated by the NNPC Act 
(1977:2) include “exploring and prospecting for, working, winning or 
otherwise acquiring, possessing and disposing of petroleum” as well as 
“generally engaging in activities that would enhance the petroleum industry in 
the overall interest of Nigeria”. 
In general terms, the NNPC’s role includes implementation of government 
policy objectives, relating oil resources’ exploitation through effective 
participation, investment, and acquisition of technical and managerial skills.  
And the aim was for the country to derive maximum benefits for the 
sustenance of economy as well as to meet its social needs (Atsegbua 1999; 
Nwokeji, 2007; Hosman, 2009). 
And, recently, the aspiration of the government relating to its oil resource 
exploitation were: (a) increase oil reserves to 40 billion barrels by the year 
                                       
4
 It is asserted that when besides maximising profit, a company also pursues socio-economic 





2010; (b) achieve zero gas flaring; (c) achieve local content value of 45% by 
2006 and 70% by 2010; and (d) achieve domestic self-sufficiency. 
From the proceeding analysis, it is generally accepted that the remit of NNPC, 
as a national oil company, is the promotion of oil resources’ exploitation and 
utilisation for the benefit of the country. As an NOC, as well as a quasi-public 
sector organisation, it would not be out of place to raise questions on how well 
it has fared in both its roles, especially from the perspective of VfM 
(efficiency, effectiveness and economy). Consequently, this study aims to 
empirically and critically investigate: 
1. How well the stakeholders view the efficiency of oil and gas resources 
exploitation in Nigeria. 
2. How well the stakeholders view the effectiveness of oil and gas 
resources exploitation in Nigeria. 
3.      How well the stakeholders view the economy of oil and gas resources 
exploitation in Nigeria.  
As stated above, these issues are in line with the VfM concept commonly used 
by public sector organisations. The concept is concerned with improving the 
way public sector organisations are managed, based on the concepts of 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy (Metcalfe and Richards, 1990; Andrew 
and Boyne, 2009). 
The VfM concept is associated with a paradigm shift in public sector 
management from which emerged the new public management (NPM) or new 
managerialism (Pollitt, 1993; Hood and Peters, 2004). It is involved with 
phenomenal structural and management changes of public sector organisations, 
due to the view that public sector organisations in Nigeria were wasteful, 
corrupt, and low in accountability. This suggests that the public sector 
organisations failed to pursue and ensure VfM from the resources available 
(Pollitt, 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). 
4 
 
NPM evolved from a neo-liberal ideology that aligned public sector efficiency 
to managerial ability and accountability by introducing and adopting business-
like management into public sector organisations (Hood and Peters, 2004). The 
NPM emphasis relates to a cocktail of strategies that include cost reduction and 
control, devolution of management responsibilities, financial transparency, 
autonomy, enhanced accountability and quasi-market mechanisms (Ferlie et 
al., 1996). It also encompasses opening up to competition, citizen satisfaction, 
strategic planning, performance-oriented management, business-style 
accounting and reporting - all of which are geared towards ensuring VfM 
(Pollitt, 1993; Hood and Peters, 2004; Bourgon, 2007). 
Generally, it is expected that an organisation will establish a mission statement 
that should define the purpose of its existence, which in effect will help to 
determine the strategies to be used in achieving its purpose. This raises a 
challenge given that the aims, objectives and action plans that are strategically 
important for fulfilling a public sector organisation’s mission (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996) are not usually clearly defined and quantifiable (Joyce, 2000). 
Thus, the efficiency, effectiveness and economy matrix of the VfM concept 
was developed to address this challenge (Sevic and Rebrenovic, 2000; Andrew 
and Boyne, 2009). In consequence, the NPM managerial reform has been 
reported to have helped public sector organisations to achieve significant 
growth, improved skills, capability and management culture (Ferlie et al., 
1996; Talbot, 2005). 
The forgoing analysis provides a strong argument for pursuing a study that will 
investigate how well the NNPC has ensured VfM in its mandate of oil 
resources’ exploitation for the benefit of Nigeria. In addition, the NNPC is an 
ideal organisation for this study considering that it is a quasi-public sector 
organisation that has undergone several reforms, which supposedly are in line 
with the NPM approach. Also important is the consideration of the role the 
NNPC plays as the nexus of the Nigerian oil and gas industry
5
 (Ayoade, 2009). 
 
                                       
5
In 2012, oil accounted for more than 80% of the Nigerian government earnings, 95% of export 
earnings and 37% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).   
5 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to empirically and critically investigate how well the 
NNPC ensures VfM in its utilisation of Nigeria’s oil resources. To achieve this 
aim the more specific objectives are:   
1. To critically investigate the factors that add value to Nigerian hydrocarbon 
resources stated in the mission statement of NNPC. 
2. To critically investigate how well the NNPC has efficiently exploited 
Nigerian oil and gas resources. 
3. To critically investigate how well the NNPC has effectively exploited 
Nigerian oil and gas resources. 
4. To critically investigate how well the NNPC has ensured economy in the 
exploitation of Nigeria’s oil and gas resources. 
1.2.1 Hypothesis 
To systematically address the objectives and questions of the study, and 
following a critical literature review and engagement with the underpinning 
theoretical framework, it became expedient to derive five hypotheses (see 
Section 5.6.2). Accordingly, it was on this basis that the following null 
hypotheses were tested in the study. 
HO1 – NNPC’s value adding objectives do not meet the global standard for 
hydrocarbon value creation. 
HO2 –Environmental factors associated with the Nigerian upstream 
sector have, on balance, not had a positive influence on adding 
value to hydrocarbon resources. 
HO3 – NNPC’s management of upstream petroleum activities has not 
been efficient. 




HO5 – NNPC has not ensured economy in the management of the 
upstream sector. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework, Research Methodology and Methods 
Hopper and Powell (1985) posited that a framework is a map used to navigate 
one’s way through the wealth of research. It is based on this that Srivastava and 
Mock (2000) describe the process of choosing a framework as that of choosing 
a “formal language” or “semantics” to express the uncertainties in analysing a 
task. Furthermore, they state that the context and domain of a problem 
determines the language appropriate for use. 
Gray et al. (1996:38) defined the term accountability as “the duty to provide an 
account or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible”. In 
this context, the study adopts the accountability framework which involves the 
monitoring, evaluation and control of organisational agents to ensure they act 
in the interest of stakeholders (Keasey and Wright 1993); this underpins the 
principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the VfM concept 
(Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). As well, the framework has a wider scope of 
application when compared to a decision-usefulness-based framework (Ijiri, 
1983), and it is the most utilised basis for analysis of accounting information 
transmission (Gray et al., 1988). 
In addition, according to Sihotang (2003), the accountability framework 
provides a suitable basis for researching the petroleum industry of developing 
countries. Given that the focus of this research is on the NNPC and the oil and 
gas industry, the framework may help in accessing the flow of relevant 
information by parties involved (Laughlin, 1996). On this premise Russell 
(2002) reported that the flow of information will be used to access financial 
accountability of the agent, as well as for process accountability, performance 
accountability, policy accountability, public accountability and contractual 
accountability. Furthermore, accountability is known to play a significant role 
in mitigating agency costs in modern contractual relations and provide an 
avenue for dissemination of information (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith 
and Warner, 1979). 
7 
 
In order to clarify the philosophical assumptions on the nature of reality and 
the position to be adopted for seeking knowledge in connection with this 
research (Gall et al., 1996), the interpretive paradigm was chosen for this study 
in consistence with the Burrell and Morgan (1979) paradigmatic framework 
stated in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.6.1. In addition, nominalism, anti-positivism and 
voluntarism were the positions taken for ontology, epistemology and human 
nature respectively. The study also adopted Laughlin’s (1995) “middle range” 
idea which advocates the radical change dimension that is suitable for 
explaining the human involvement in the accountability relationship in the oil 
and gas industry.  
Furthermore, the research data were collected and analysed to arrive at 
empirical evidence through the mixed methods of questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews. The study adopted this mixed approach that was based 
on the perceptions of relevant stakeholders to strengthen and validate its 
findings. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
The research is significant for the following reasons: 
Firstly, oil and gas is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy in that it 
contributes over 80% of the country’s revenue. Therefore, investigating the 
efficiency and effectiveness associated with NNPC oil and gas resources 
exploitation is of particular interest to policy makers, legislators, regulators, 
and the citizens. 
Secondly, because of the potential of accountability standards and practices, 
the study provides channels of improving operations among stakeholders in the 
Nigerian oil industry. This may be achieved by promoting acceptable 
procedures with regards to accounting, auditing, operational and financial 
disclosures and VfM assessments. 
Thirdly, the literature on the performance of NOCs is limited, particularly in 
the case of the NNPC. Therefore, in this respect, this thesis makes a 
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contribution to the body of knowledge and contributes to the existing literature, 
especially with regards to oil producing developing countries. 
Finally, with the effort being made by the Nigerian government to privatise the 
NNPC through the yet-to-be passed PIB, the study makes recommendations 
that will shift the focus of government towards a structure consistent with the 
NPM’s quasi-market ideologies. It has been argued that the performance of 
SOEs such as NNPC can be improved without privatising them; by 
organisational reform, increased competition and political administrative 
reforms (Chang, 2007). 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters (as depicted in Figure 1.1). The 
present chapter briefly explained the governance issues relating to NNPC and 
the need for the current research. Also discussed in this chapter were the aim, 
objectives and significance of the study. Furthermore, the chapter referred to 
the theoretical framework, methodology and methods used in carrying out this 
research. 
Chapter Two contains the literature review on SOEs, also called NOCs. The 
review includes the motives for creating the NOCs, governance structure, 
objectives and their roles in the upstream sector. Other issues discussed in the 
chapter are those that concern NOC’s performance and VfM.   
Chapter Three examines the state-owned NNPC. The chapter begins with the 
historical overview of the Nigerian oil and gas industry and the evolution of 
NNPC. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the duties, powers and 
organisational structure of NNPC; after which, the corporation’s participation 
arrangements for the upstream sector and its transformation efforts are 
discussed. Finally, the chapter relates these governance issues to the VfM 
concept in order to have an understanding of its performance. 
Chapter Four discuss the accountability theoretical framework adopted for the 
study. Also discussed are the underpinning principal-agent relationship and the 
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VfM model. The chapter reviews the suitability of the framework for this 
thesis. Other alternative frameworks that could be used are also discussed, 
while justification for adopting the accountability framework is provided. 
In chapter Five, a methodological review is conducted and, as a result, the 
philosophical assumptions; the mixed research methods and the instruments 
(questionnaire and interviews) employed for gathering and analysing data for 
the study are presented. Also explained in the chapter, are the formulations of 
the hypotheses tested in the study. Finally, the chapter explains the role of the 
Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) in data management and 
analysis. 
Chapter Six presents the analysis and findings of the questionnaires 
administered to twelve, relevant stakeholder groups in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. The rationale for the chapter is to find out how well NNPC has 
performed in the upstream sector, using the VfM concept. In Chapter Seven, 
the analysis and findings of the follow-up interviews conducted are presented. 
Finally, Chapter Eight summarises the thesis and suggests the 
recommendations. Furthermore, conclusions drawn from the study are 
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A REVIEW OF STATE OWNED PETROLEUM ENTERPRISES 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to review the generic literature on State Owned Petroleum 
Enterprises otherwise referred to as NOCs. In particular, the review should 
help to determine if NOCs act as quasi-public sector organisations with the 
remit to further the good of the societies they represent.  If, as suspected that is 
the case, then the performance of the NOCs can be legitimately assessed using 
the metrics associated with VfM concepts, such as efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy (Boyne, 2002). 
The sequence of the chapter is as follows. Sections 2.2 to 2.4 discuss the 
meaning and evolution of SOEs. Other issues discussed include the motives for 
setting up SOEs, their characteristics, objectives, governance and performance. 
The discussion in Section 2.5 focuses on NOCs as state enterprises. The section 
also discusses the nature of NOCs, the governance of NOCs and their dual 
objective. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 The Meaning of State Owned Enterprises  
In a pure free market concept where markets operate costless and friction free, 
the role of state participation in the economy is assumed not to exist or it is 
limited to regulation (Estrin et al., 2012). However, market as a powerful 
mechanism for promoting economic development “often fails to produce the 
economic dynamism and the social justice that a sustainable economic 
development requires” (Chang, 2007:6). Thus, there is a role for government to 
correct the deficiencies of the market through the employment of “state 
capitalism”. In this respect, usually the government establish public financed 
organisations to respond to the varying transaction cost and market failures 
(MacAvoy et al., 1989; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2012). These public sector 
organisations have been referred to with various terminologies, but the most 
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commonly used is state owned enterprise (SOE)
6
 (Roper and Schoenberger-
Orgard, 2011). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the SOE is adopted.    
The term SOE, as observed in the literature, does not have a globally accepted 
definition due to the bewildering nature of their composition and differences in 
ideology, values, circumstances, rationales and period of setting them up 
(Adeyemo, 2005). However, Mazzolini (1979) describes SOE as a business 
enterprise, effectively controlled by government, and in which the state owns 
majority of the equity. Aharoni (1986) refers to SOE as a corporate entity 
wholly or substantially owned and controlled by government. Similarly, 
Efange (1987:5) defined public enterprise, in other words SOE, as “an 
institution or organisation which is owned by the state or in which the state 
holds a majority interest, whose activities are of a business in nature and which 
provides services or produce goods and have their own distinct management”. 
The SOEs are vital providers of essential public and commercial goods and 
services. They are important policy tools for both developed and developing 
countries (Toninelli, 2000), and they have assumed an increasingly significant 
role in the regional, national and global economy. They represent some of the 
largest companies and major movers of economic activities in many countries, 
and are amongst the highest revenue earners, asset owners and strategic 
industry players in the world (OECD, 2005). There are dominant in the areas of 
transportation, infrastructure, water, health care and mineral resources 
(Aharoni, 1986; OECD, 2005). For example, the success of the Indian 
Railways has been evidenced in literature, as it is the largest non-military 
employer in the world after Wal-Mart (Tordo et al., 2011). 
In practice, there are different SOEs ranging from those whose operation is 
separate, but not legally distinct from government to those who are 
incorporated. Nevertheless, as shown in the definitions, the overriding features 
of an SOE are state ownership and control (Aharoni, 1986). 
 
                                       
6
 In the literature, the public owned organisations have also been referred to as State owned 
companies, government business enterprise, government link companies, public enterprise and 
government parastatal (Roper and Schoenberger-Orgard, 2011). 
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2.3 Emergence of SOEs 
To have a clear understanding of the SOE concept, it is important to look back 
into the history of their emergence. Different reasons have been cited for the 
evolution of SOEs with the socio-political and economic reasons being the 
most common. Fernandes (1986) identified the broad reasons for the evolution 
of SOEs and categorised them into five, namely; (i) inheritance; (ii) historical 
accident; (iii) nationalisation; (iv) state entrepreneurship; and (v) take over. 
These points are briefly discussed in the next paragraphs.  
In developed countries such as the United Kingdom, the nationalisation of 
private enterprises prevailed in the 1950s as a result of economic problems 
caused by the Second World War (Stevens, 2008a). Nationalisation was sought 
during this period to make the troubled private enterprises more efficient, 
effective and economical, and to generally provide economic and social 
benefits (HM Treasury, 2004). 
In the developing countries, however, the first SOEs were those inherited from 
the colonial powers at independence. They were part of the administrative and 
political legacy inherited and utilised to foster development during the early 
stage of independence (Ayee, 2008). Simply put, Nellis (1986:11) referred to 
them as “institutions and pre-dispositions inherited from centralised 
interventionist colonial regimes”. Closely related to inheritance of SOEs are 
those enterprises that arose not through deliberated public policy but through 
unforeseen historical situations. Instances of such were the assets left behind in 
Algeria by colonial France (Bala, 2006). 
Some SOEs originated during the era of nationalisation. Primarily, the reason 
for nationalisation was for government to control the economy (Stevens, 
2008a). During this period strategic industries initially run by foreign business 
companies were taken over by governments of the home countries, either due 
to the ideological belief that the foreign companies were agents of imperialism 
(McPherson, 2004) or under the guise of controlling the vital resources that are 
used to run the economy (Stevens, 2008a). It is further argued that foreign 
companies cannot and will not protect the national interests of the home 
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countries; hence, it was necessary for government to intervene. Government 
intervention is mostly done by setting up SOEs to maximise revenue; pursue 
social objectives and protect national interests (Stevens, 2008a; Tordo, et al., 
2011). Symbolism, pride and sovereignty are some other reasons presented in 
the nationalisation argument (Stevens, 2004; Falola and Genova, 2005). 
An additional argument for the evolution of SOEs is state entrepreneurship. 
The government establishes SOEs to kick start economic development when 
there is capital scarcity and lack of incentive for private sector involvement 
(Omoleke and Adeopo, 2005). A notable example of such is the establishment 
of the New Nigerian Development Company Limited by the northern Nigerian 
government in 1949 (Omoleke, 2010). 
Unlike nationalism which entails the takeover of established business, state 
entrepreneurship involves  the creation of state enterprises with the aim of 
adding value to economic resources (Tordo et al., 2011), and achieve economic 
linkages and development (Fossum, 1997; Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011). Most 
developing countries, in their early stages of independence, felt that state 
entrepreneurship was a necessary strategy for economic development 
(Omoleke and Adeopo, 2005). Supporting this point, Adamolekun (1983 cited 
in Omoleke, 2010:112) remarked that, “to achieve economic objectives, it is 
obvious that government in the Nigerian polity must assume the role of 
entrepreneurs”. 
Evidence from the literature shows that some SOEs evolved through takeover 
of private businesses that were in difficulties or on the verge of bankruptcy. In 
this case, governments’ intervention may be attributed to market failure 
(Stevens, 2004), or to safe guard employment and sustain economic activities 
(Omoleke and Adeopo, 2005). This motive is in line with the Keynesian legacy 
which argues for government intervention to provide social services and 
economic development (Stevens, 2004; Omoleke and Adeopo, 2005). A typical 
example of this can be drawn from the takeover of some banks in Nigeria as a 




2.3.1 The Motives for the Creation of SOEs 
Generally, government interventions in an economy are due to a variety of 
intertwined reasons that can be placed within socio-economic and political 
realms. As well, the government intervenes in the economic process by 
controlling and regulating established private enterprises or by the formation of 
SOEs that undertake economic activities (Bala, 2006). The motives are 
discussed below: 
(1) Motives for the creation of SOEs are diverse and intertwined, but the most 
mentioned economic reason for setting up an SOE is the market failure 
(Stevens, 2008a). Market failures necessitate government’s intervention; 
especially for those in the developing countries who use the SOEs as vehicles 
for stabilising and sustaining productivity (Stevens, 2004). Also, the SOEs are 
given the role of promoting industrialisation, growth and economic 
development (Nunnenkamp, 1986; Stevens, 2004).  
Additionally, evidences drawn from Gillis (1980) and Chang (2007) showed 
that some SOEs were created to mitigate information asymmetry between the 
home government and their partners, who are mostly foreigners. Another 
reason, from the economic perspective, is the reluctance of private 
entrepreneurs to get involved in economic activities in areas of high risk or 
those of low returns. Also, Venon and Aharoni (1981) advanced that SOEs can 
be used as agent of industrial policy; where the government intends to kick 
start a lagging sector of the economy. In a related manner, the SOE can be used 
to increase national self-sufficiency by import substitution and the promotion 
and expansion of exports (Nunnenkamp, 1986). 
For the purpose of maximising revenue and social welfare in strategic sectors 
such as transportation, the SOE can be utilised as a monopoly with the aim of 
the reinvesting abnormal profits derived back into the economy in the form of 
welfare. The SOE can, as well, be used to prevent the private sector from 
forming a monopoly in certain strategic sectors (Todaro, 1989; Omoleke and 
Adeopo, 2005).  
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A notable motive for setting up SOEs in developed countries is to allow the 
government control of huge, highly technological and security related projects 
that are either beyond the means of the private sector, or too risky to entrust 
with them. This argument is consistent with the tradition of laissez-faire 
capitalism, where government is mostly restricted to defence, administration, 
justice and infrastructure (Bala, 2006). 
Alternatively, the Keynesian argument prevailed in the developing countries, 
as SOEs were used to correct the economic system and maintain employment. 
Especially after independence, the economic justifications for SOEs are often 
linked to government aims of controlling important enterprises previously 
owned by foreigners; the acquisition of technological, managerial skills and 
national capacity building (Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011; Tordo et al., 2011).  
(2) The political motives for the creation of an SOE can be attributed to its use 
as an instrument for bargaining and soliciting for financial, political or military 
support in the international sphere (Gidado, 1999; Tordo et al., 2011), and for 
bilateral trade arrangements (Vernon, 1979). In a situation where a private 
enterprise is in difficulty or on the verge of bankruptcy, it may be politically 
necessary for government to intervene in order to save jobs (Aharoni, 1981). In 
addition, there is evidence that, in some cases, SOEs were created by 
government for political patronage and vote seeking. They could be used to 
create and sustain employment in order to achieve social and political 
objectives (Aharoni, 1986). 
(3) The social motives stems from the SOE’s pursuit of non-commercial 
objectives in corporate decision-making. This is often linked to the socialist 
ideology of state control and ownership of resources (Stevens, 2008a). Herein, 
the aim is social equity, welfare, national development and stakeholders value 
maximisation - contrary to the profit maximisation objective of the private 
enterprise (Aharoni, 1986; Bai and Xu, 2005). It is further argued that 
irrespective of ideology and level of development, the SOEs are needed in 
some sectors to get things going (Omoleke, 2010). 
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Arguments have been advanced for SOEs on the basis of national strategy. It is 
argued that some strategic sectors of the economy are too important to be left 
in private hands due to their importance for national security. A notable 
example of this is the national defence sector (Bala, 2006). Closely related to 
this argument is the notion of controlling the commanding heights, where it is 
advanced that certain strategic sectors of the economy are critical for national 
survival and development. In this case, the SOE is deployed as a ‘National 
Champion’ with the aims of creating a strong national industry and retaining 
high degree of value-added within national territory (Mazzolini, 1979; Venon 
and Aharoni, 1981). The oil and gas sector is a good example in this respect, 
especially in oil rich developing countries (Stevens, 2004).  
Furthermore, an argument is advanced for SOEs in areas where there is 
tendency for natural monopoly. In order to prevent a single, private monopoly, 
the SOE is deployed to moderate price in relation to the cost of production, as 
well as ensure social equity (Omoleke and Adeopo, 2005). Additionally, it is 
strategically important to use SOE as an investment instrument in areas where 
the private enterprises are reluctant to invest in or where exploitation is 
difficult. A notable case is the British National Oil Corporation whose primary 
role was to further the national interest in development and utilisation of the 
United Kingdom’s oil and gas resources (Mazzolini, 1979). A similar situation 
may arise when the capital required to run businesses in a particular strategic 
sector is beyond the reach of private investors, or when the expected profit is 
too low and unattractive for private investors (Aharoni, 1986; Omoleke and 
Adeopo, 2005). The SOEs may be used when a domestic private sector is 
absent or immature. 
Mazzolini (1979) postulates that the SOEs enjoy some special advantages over 
private enterprises, which include that: the SOEs are less under pressure to pay 
dividends; the SOEs have preferential access to state finances; they enjoy 
preferential procurement conditions; they have implicit government backing; 
and have a quasi-captive market at home. 
Despite these varying motives, Hertog (2010) advanced that many existing 
SOEs do not conform to the reasons presented above. They contribute 
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insignificantly to revenue generation, employment and national development. 
They operate inefficiently and are ineffective in carrying out government 
policies towards achieving national development. 
2.3.2 The Characteristics of SOEs 
The characteristics of SOEs are greatly influenced by cultural, political and 
economic factors. For instance, Statoil’s celebrated success may be attributed 
to the environment in which it operates when compared with NNPC’s assumed 
failure due to lack of technology and corruption (Eller et al., 2007; Nwokeji, 
2007). In view of this, the following paragraphs will attempt to address the 
general characteristics of the SOEs.  
Aharoni (1986) presented three distinct characteristics of an SOE. Firstly, SOE 
is distinguished as an entity that is part of the public sector, and therefore must 
be owned by government. However, they are not in the mould of government 
entities that provide public services such as the police. Secondly, the SOE is an 
enterprise, thus it must participate in the production and selling of goods and 
services. Thirdly, the revenue derived by the SOE should bear some relation to 
cost. This suggests that an SOE has mixed characteristics. Basically, the SOE 
combines both commercial and non-commercial features which are economic 
(private) and social (public) in nature (Hertog, 2010). Hence, these evidently 
suggest that the SOE must be conceptualised and assessed differently from a 
solely private company. 
Similarly, Gillis (1980) presents three criteria to be met by SOEs: Firstly, 
government is the principal owner of the enterprise and, therefore, has the 
ability or capability to exercise control over activities of the board of the 
enterprise, as well as the power to appoint and remove members of the 
enterprise’s management. Secondly, the enterprise produces goods and services 
to be sold to the public, or other private and public enterprises. Thirdly, 
revenue derived by the enterprise should bear some relation to its costs. 
According to IFAC (1989), the characteristics of the SOE entails that it: (i) 
ordinarily operates to meet political or social interest objectives; (ii) is 
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normally required to operate commercially to make profits or to recoup a 
substantial proportion of their operating costs; (iii) unless there are not subject 
to specific legislation, they usually take the same legal form as private sector 
business enterprises; (iv) owned or controlled by government; (v) sells goods 
and services to individuals as well as other public sector entities; (vi) have the 
financial and operating authority to carry on with the business. 
Shepherd (1976) presents three distinct types of SOEs, namely: conventional 
public corporation; financial public enterprise; and social enterprise. It is 
claimed that conventional public corporations are generally located in heavy 
industries with high capacity intensity. They are funded from the treasury and 
have some level of formal autonomy, even though greatly influenced by 
government policies. On the other hand, the financial public enterprises are 
public banks, created by government with the sole aim of protecting national 
sovereignty. The social enterprises are of different ranges and they engage in 
activities that may require subsidy and they are directly controlled by 
government. 
In a related way, Ramanadham (1984) states the two distinct features of an 
SOE as “public” and “enterprise”. With regards to its public features, the 
decision making process of the SOE is mainly led by government. Also, the 
benefit to be derived from the operation of the SOE, either in form of profit or 
economic development, belongs to the public. Additionally, being state owned, 
the SOE is accountable to the public. Regarding the enterprise features, 
Ramanadham (1984) advanced that the SOE should be run in a business-like 
manner, where the enterprise is financially viable and prices its product in 
relation to its cost of production. In sum, the SOE is expected to pursue profit 
as in market capitalism as well as pursue social welfare, in line with 
government policies. 
In reality, it is difficult to place the degree to which SOEs operate on the basis 
of their enterprise features and public features. On the one hand, some SOEs 
align more towards the economic dimensions of profit making, taxation and 
dividend payment. In this case, decision-making structure is autonomous, and 
they are exposed to market competition and regulation (Hertog, 2010). A 
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classic example of this type of SOE is Petrobras of Brazil, which is quoted in 
the stock market and is funded partly from private sources. On the other hand, 
some SOEs align more towards the social dimension of state welfare where 
they are expected to pursue government policy objectives. In such instance, the 
SOE is mainly dependent on state funding (Bala, 2006). 
With respect to the control of SOEs, Omoleke (2010) postulates that the 
control system depends on certain criteria, namely; (i) the ownership of capital; 
(ii) the degree of competition in the context within which the SOE operates; 
(iii) the legal form of the SOE; (iv) the type of activities of the SOE; (v) the 
origin of the SOE; and (vi) the degree of profit expected from the SOE. 
From the legal dimension, Omoleke (2010) stated that SOE are commonly 
created by statute and they are legal entities who can sue and be sued, and 
engage in contractual relationships. Based on this view, Aharoni (1986) 
identified three categories of SOEs. The first category includes those SOEs 
who are part of government and whose employees are a part of the civil 
service; they derive their funding through government as appropriated in the 
state budget. A typical example of these SOEs is a postal agency, such as the 
Royal Mail in the United Kingdom. The second category of SOEs may derive 
all or some of their funding from government but differ from the first category 
because they are specifically established through Acts or statutory laws. The 
structure and employees of such SOEs are different from those in the civil 
service. The Nigerian Port Authority fits the description of this kind of SOEs. 
Finally, the third category involves those SOEs that are registered as 
companies under the companies Act of their home country and are regulated as 
such. 
2.3.3 The Objectives of SOEs 
The objectives of SOEs have always been conflicting as is shown in the 
motives for creating them. However, Aharoni (1986) postulates three 
categories of objectives. Firstly, being that the SOEs are governments’ tools for 
achieving national goals; their major objective is to maximise social benefits. 
Therefore, this infers that social benefits can be taken as a measure for 
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effectiveness. Secondly, Aharoni stated the SOE’s objective of maximising 
efficiency. Thus, efficiency is suggested as a yard stick for performance. Third, 
the SOE’s are to serve and meet the expectations of different stakeholders. 
Regarding the objective of maximising social benefits, it includes provision or 
maintenance of employment; generation of foreign exchange; an instrument for 
acquiring new technology; the development of domestic skilled labour and the 
creation of employment in an untapped area. The objectives that relate to 
maximising efficiency focus on production and the profit generated thereafter 
for the benefit of the stakeholders. Simply put, these strands of objectives are 
value adding or creating, and they are wholly referred to as national interest 
objectives or national mission (Tordo et al., 2011). 
The objective of serving different stakeholders may involve the appointment of 
the representatives of workers, civil societies and government to the board of 
the enterprise. This objective may also include the redistribution of wealth and 
other privileges. Regarding the last objective, Aharoni (1986) asserts that it is 
subject to abuse as it may lead to favouring a group of stakeholders over 
others, or used for political patronage. 
However, Garner (1984) postulates that there are instances where SOEs are not 
assigned set objects by governments. In such a case, governments adopt the 
SOEs and have model objectives set by regional and international agencies 
such as the African Development Bank and the World Bank. 
The various objectives of the SOEs cause problems for the management of the 
enterprises, as one group of stakeholders may feel decisions are taken in favour 
of another group of stakeholders. In this respect, Cameron (1992) relates that 
managements are usually faced with the some problems of conflicting 
objectives; a lack of monitoring performance measures and compliance to 
regulations; a lack of accountability, transparency and decision-making 
autonomy. These problems challenge the management’s ability to respond to 
the dynamic business and social environments. Aharoni (1986) argues that the 




Additionally, Aharoni (1981) relates that the various objectives of SOEs may 
likely cause conflict, given that the SOEs are expected to achieve economic 
goals and as well pursue various activities in the public interest. As such, 
conflict may also arise in reconciling the interest of the various stakeholders, 
for instance, in the areas of profitability, public accountability and consistency 
with social goals. Another challenge is that the SOEs objectives are usually not 
explicitly stated thereby making monitoring and measurement of performance 
difficult. 
2.3.4 The Governance of SOEs 
The governance of a corporate body indicates how the body/organisation is 
owned, managed and controlled. The corporate governance concept is 
concerned with the right way of controlling the behaviour of managers of an 
organisation, and it is operated on a good structure of governance that 
motivates managers to act in the best interest of the shareholders and 
stakeholders. In essence, good corporate governance is an essential mechanism 
for taking appropriate financial, budgetary and investment decisions (Tordo et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, good governance have been reported to significantly 
correlate to enhanced accountability and transparency (Islam, 2003; Wong, 
2004); timeliness and effectiveness (Tordo et al., 2011); low corruption and 
economic growth (Kaufmann and Bellvar, 2005). However, governance entails 
an entwined relationship between various parties. 
With regards to SOEs, their governance structure is largely determined by 
government; the legal system and the form of SOE. This is not surprising 
considering that the SOEs are public owned and established by public 
legislation to primarily provide goods and services to citizens or clients. The 
governance structure differs from country to country, but there is general 
acceptance that the governing structure is arranged in a hierarchical form 
headed by a government ministry or ministries, while down along the hierarchy 
are the board of directors and management (Khan, 1987; Bozec et al., 2010). 
The government, as representative of the public, produce the policy to be 
pursued; the board serves as decision-makers for the SOE and the management 
run the day-to-day affairs of the SOE towards achieving policy objectives. 
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According to Vagliasindi (2008), the governance structure
7
 may be of 
centralised, decentralised or dual arrangements. 
In addition, a corporate governance mechanism is needed to help the 
shareholders and stakeholders control and monitor the affairs of the 
management. Corporate entities with separated ownership and control are 
likely to encounter agency problems
8
. This is so as the managers may be 
inclined to pursue personal objectives that conflict with those of the 
shareholders and stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chang, 2007). 
Therefore, to avoid the destruction of corporate wealth, it is important for the 
owner of the SOE - which is the public, represented by government - to ensure 
that the SOEs operate efficiently, effectively and based on sound decision-
making structure. 
Other arguments posit that the independence of a board reduces agency 
problems and increases the efficiency and effectiveness of an organisation 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gailmard and Patty, 2012). However, independence 
of a board that consists of outside non-expert politicians or insiders who are 
loyal to management may reduce efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organisation (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). The size of the board can also 
influence performance. In this respect, Jensen (1986) argued that a big board 
reduces the flow of communication and coordination and thus provides; 
managers with the opportunity to pursue activities of personal benefit to 
themselves. 
2.4 The Factors Affecting the Performance of SOEs 
Evidence gathered from the literature suggests that the performance of most 
SOEs have often been reported negatively, and the successful ones are usually 
underreported (Chang, 2007; Hertog, 2011). This builds on the erroneous and 
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The governance structure refers to the ownership organisation and holding structures of the 
SOEs. In a centralised structure the SOE is placed under the responsibility of a single Ministry 
or Agency, while in the decentralised structure responsibility for the SOE lies with several 
Ministries, Agencies and Offices. The dual arrangement involves responsibility being under 
two Ministries.  
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implicit assumption on the part of the market that private companies perform 
better than SEOs.  
Furthermore, in assessing the performance of SOEs, there is an obvious lack of 
consideration for their intersecting objectives, which results in assessing them 
like private companies. It is therefore worth noting that the problems faced by 
both large private companies and large SOEs are often similar, and are of the 
principal-agent form (Chang, 2007). However, since these companies pursue 
different purposes and their nature of employing resources may differ, the 
SOE’s form of assessment and rendering accountability should not be in 
relation to their private counterparts (Capalbo and Palumbo, 2013). 
One of the most debated reasons for government intervention is market failure. 
However, the market failure argument has been highly criticised, in that the 
management of the SOEs are more likely to promote their own interest rather 
than national interest. The SOE managers may expand production beyond 
optimal levels for reasons that are not of national interest, but rather for 
increasing personal income, prestige and political leverage (Nunnenkamp, 
1986).  Most often this behaviour leads to loss of capital, and reduces the level 
of efficiency and effectiveness. 
In addition, Pirie (1988) listed ten reasons for SOE’s failure to achieve its 
objectives: high production cost, inefficiency, high labour cost, high capital 
cost, low input, lack of innovation and flexibility, dependent decision-making 
process, obsolete equipment, external interference and bad cost control. Kamal 
(2010) stated conflicting objectives, agency issues and lack of transparency as 
the major problems of SOEs. Considering the listed reasons, the SOEs are 
unlikely to be efficient and profitable, which are prerequisites for the delivery 
of social benefits.  
Additionally, Aharoni (1986) and Kamal (2010) attributed poor performance of 
SOEs to their vague and conflicting objectives; their unclear guidance on how 
to achieve both commercial and non-commercial objectives; their 
management’s lack of autonomy, and deficient structures for monitoring 
performance and ensuring compliance to regulations. Other reasons given are 
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staff incompetence, corruption, political interference and patronage (Bienen 
and Waterbury, 1989; Perotti, 2003).  
While postulating the reasons for inefficient use of resources in the developing 
countries, Belkaoui (1994) mentioned poor production, inadequate education, 
ill health, ineffective institutions, traditions, customs and cultural attitudes. 
Likewise, Shirley and Nellis (1991) attributed SOEs poor performance in the 
developing countries to: (i) mismanagement which results to inefficiencies in 
the areas of productive capital, control, cost and maintenance of assets which in 
turn weakens the prospect for achieving social benefits; (ii) ineffective funding 
structure; inappropriate investments; (iii) government interference in 
management decision-making processes; (iv) bureaucratic hindrances; (v) 
inappropriate selection and appointment of management and board members; 
(vi) frequent replacement of managers; (vii) poor managerial motivation and 
accountability
9
; (viii) lack of motive to perform as well as lack of benchmark 
for performance; (ix) insufficient training and development.  
Examining the effect of SOE’s poor performance as a result of non-commercial 
objectives, Shirley and Nellis (1991) mentioned budget deficits; overstaffing; 
subsidising of goods and services; establishing production plants in 
uneconomic locations, and even keeping such plants opened at a loss
10
. 
Accordingly, Jackson and Palmer (1992) linked some of SOE’s problems to 
staff’s ill-defined tasks and responsibilities; unclear goals and objectives; 
unclear lines of responsibility and accountability; inadequate information on 
expended resources and targets achieved, and disproportionate compensation in 
terms of pay and promotion.  
In the African context, Omoleke (2010) outlined some inadequacies that hinder 
SOEs organisational goals and in effect heaps serious social problems on the 
public. They include conflicting objectives; excessive control and interference 
of operational decisions by supervising Ministries; politicisation of 
                                       
9
 Since the management and the board are appointed by politicians and in most cases are 
composed of politicians rather than expert, their loyalty does not lie with SOE but their 
political godfathers and this greatly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the SOE. 
10
 This is often related to political reasons as the government do not want to close such as to 




employment; poor choice of products and assets; non-optimal choice of 
location for the enterprises; absence of competitive environment; rigid 
bureaucracy; corruption and redtapism; inadequate techno-managerial capacity; 
inadequate and late release of funding. Imhonopi and Urim (2010) attributed 
SOEs inefficiency to the environment in which they operate. 
2.5 National oil companies 
The oil and gas industry is arguably the most strategic sector of the world 
economy, and the NOCs are well positioned within the industry. For instance, 
it is evident that of the twenty top oil producers in the world, fourteen are 
NOCs (Chen, 2007). Furthermore, the NOCs dominate the world oil market 
since they control approximately 77% of the world’s crude oil reserves and 
73% of overall production (Victor, 2007). In consequence, the relevance of 
NOCs to the economic, political and social affairs of their respective countries 
and the world cannot be overemphasised. 
The extensive generic discussion from Sections 2.1 to 2.4 that covered SOEs, 
from evolution to performance, includes the NOCs. However, being that the 
NOCs operate in the oil and gas sector, which is mainly the most strategic 
sector of oil rich countries, they have some issues worth discussing that may 
differ from other SOEs. These issues are discussed in the following sections. 
2.5.1 The Nature of NOCs 
Unlike other SOEs whose relevance is only mainly for the development of their 
countries economy, the NOCs relevance extend beyond that to the 
development of the economies of consuming countries (Pirog, 2007). Also, the 
performance of NOCs is crucial to the transformation of petroleum reserves to 
production; thereby, making it relevant to the stability of the world oil and gas 
market (Tordo et al., 2011). 
Oil and gas operation is divided into the upstream, midstream and downstream 
sectors. The operations of the NOCs within these sectors vary according to the 
mandate bestowed on them by their respective governments. While some 
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NOCs operate only in the upstream or downstream sectors, others integrate 
their operations across the sectors (Wright and Gallun, 2008). An example of 
such NOC is the NNPC. 
There appear to be little consistency in how the NOCs participate and operate 
in the oil and gas industry; as such, Hartshorn (1993) related that NOCs are as 
diverse as their different governments. As evident in the literature, the mode of 
participation and operation of an NOC is designed to suit the socio-political 
and economic objectives set for the NOC by government (Rodriguez-Padilla, 
1991; Hartshorn, 1993; Linde 2000; Mommer, 2000; McPherson, 2004; 
Stevens, 2004; Wainberg and Foss, 2007; Nwokeji, 2007; Stevens, 2008a; 
Stevens, 2010; Nolan and Thurber, 2010). 
Although NOCs widely vary in form and legal status from country to country 
(Bentham, 1988; Hartshorn, 1993), they have some certain basic 
characteristics. Several observations in the literature describe the ideal 
attributes of the NOCs as separate legal entities that are independent from Civil 
Service bureaucracy, with an autonomous management and decision-making 
structure (Khan, 1987). There are responsible to government and their funds 
are sourced from the treasury mostly after appropriation by the parliament. The 
financial activities of the NOCs are expected to undergo periodic auditing 
(Stevens, 2008b). The NOCs are best suited and mostly used in a mixed 
economic model. 
2.5.2 The Objectives of NOCs 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, SOEs often have multiple objectives that are not 
clear or may conflict with each other. With regards to NOCs, the unclear and 
diverse objectives are in a large scale given the multidimensional differences in 
their history, organisation, endowment and the financial, economic and 
political conditions of their operating environment (Al-Naimi, 2004; Wainberg 
and Foss, 2007). Notwithstanding, Wainberg and Foss (2007) generally 
categorised the objectives of NOCs into two groups: (i) effective development 
of hydrocarbon resources, and (ii) contribution to the overall socio-economic 
development of the producing country. Table 2.1 depicts some of the 
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objectives of NOCs drawn from their mission statements and arranged 
according to the two categories mentioned.  
Table 2.1: Some Objectives of NOCs 
No. Effective development of hydrocarbon resources 
1. Increase production while replenishing with increased  reserves 
2. Attain/maintain petroleum self sufficiency 
3. Modernise productive infrastructure and operations 
4. Increase upstream investments 
5. Reduce lifting costs and meet targeted  returns on capital employed  
6. Use advance business practices to improve operating efficiency  
7. Rationalise labour expenses 
8. Operate successfully and transparently  
9 Achieve internationally competitive business and technical expertise levels 
10. Improve health, safety, and environmental performance 
No. Contribute to the overall socioeconomic development 
1. Make a significant fiscal contribution to the state 
2. Provide the state with a reliable cash flow, of maximum value, from 
diversified business interests 
3. Maximise the benefits from operations and place those benefits at the service 
of the country 
4. Leverage petroleum resources to expand the economy 
5. Maximise the creation of economic value 
6. Maximise employment 
7. Contribute to social, cultural and economic programmes 
8 Contribute to the country’s overall development 
Source: Adapted from Wainberg and Foss (2007) 
The two categories of objectives shown in Table 2.1 can also be referred to as 
commercial and non-commercial objectives. While the characteristics of the 
first set of objectives concentrates on profitability, the second set of objects 
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emphasises on maximising the social welfare of the nation (Mitchell and 
Stevens, 2008). Similar to other SOEs, the social welfare aspect of NOC’s 
objectives is to achieve public interest, national interest or national mission 
(Lahn et al., 2007; Wainberg and Foss, 2007; Stevens, 2008a). 
Explaining further, Lahn et al. (2007) posited that the ‘national mission’ is an 
integral part of an NOC’s goals which guides and influences their decision-
making. Despite the importance of the commercial objectives, the producing 
governments attest to them mainly because they are means to optimizing the 
value of petroleum resources to maximise societal benefits (Al-Naimi, 2004).  
Nevertheless, most often the poor performance of NOCs is linked to the burden 
of achieving non-commercial objectives. Yet, a contrasting view argues that 
the objectives and operational requirements of NOCs differ from those of 
MOCs; thus, their assessment should be objective based (Baker Institute 
Report, 2007). Accordingly, Bruns (1998) argued that in spite of the 
importance of profit in organisational performance, assessment should be based 
on management measures that reflect what organisations have to manage in 
order to make profit.  
From another perspective, Lahn et al. (2007) argued that the extent to which 
the NOCs are expected to achieve the national mission depends on the level of 
their countries’ socio-economic needs as well as their dependence on 
petroleum revenue. For instance, the reliance on Statoil to achieve some 
strands of the national mission will be lower than NNPC’s because Norway has 
a well-developed domestic industry which Nigeria doesn’t have (James, 2011). 
Lahn et al. (2007) presented some list of NOC’s objectives that are not 
mutually exclusive: (i) maximisation of revenue for the state; (ii) national 
control of petroleum resources; (iii) implementation of economic development 
policy; (iv) promoting social welfare; (v) providing domestic energy; (vi) 




Given that one of the main priorities of producing governments is to provide 
social welfare to its citizens, it is vital that revenue is maximised as a means to 
achieve this objective. This view is, however, subject to the government policy 
on depletion, development and production (Mitchell and Stevens, 2008). 
Therefore, of central importance are the efficient and effective manners in 
which the process is managed and the kind of technology utilised (Lahn et al., 
2007). 
The goal of controlling petroleum resources may be attributed to the history of 
the formation of NOCs. The aim is to reduce the influence of MOCs and their 
home countries on the producing countries, and to achieve self-sufficiency 
(McPherson, 2004). While some NOCs are solely in charge of their petroleum 
sectors, others are in cooperative arrangements with MOCs. Therefore the 
NOCs require a robust administrative system, qualified manpower and 
professionalism to achieve the national objective of resource control (Lahn et 
al., 2007). This involves the internal and external monitoring of compliance 
and performance. 
With regards to the objective of implementing development policy, the NOC’s 
focus can be divided into two categories. The first relates to economic linkages, 
as the NOCs are expected to integrate within the petroleum value chain and as 
well link up with other aspect of the economy (Stevens, 2008b). The second 
part of policy development may concern education, training and building of 
infrastructure. This is more or less the same as the provision of social welfare 
and the effect of this practice is that it reduces the chances of achieving the 
objective of revenue maximisation. 
One of the mandates of the NOCs is to secure the supply of petroleum to the 
domestic market. This objective is a downstream objective which may not be 
within the scope of this study, but is very relevant to the effectiveness of the 
upstream sector. The high cost of subsidising petroleum in the developing 
countries affects the NOC’s ability to reinvest in the upstream sector (Baker 
Institute Report, 2007; Wainberg and Foss, 2007). Also, the NOCs strive to use 
their petroleum wealth as a political bargaining tool in the international stage 
for the benefit of its government and people (Lahn et al., 2007). 
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2.5.3 The Governance of NOCs 
Like other SOEs, the governance of NOCs is concerned with the ownership, 
organisational structure, and the channel of decision-making. Other areas of 
concern are autonomy, authority, sources of funding, accountability and 
transparency, and the quality and capacity of human resources (Tordo et al., 
2011). Since governance ultimately leads to efficient utilisation of resources, it 
is of importance to NOCs whose aim is value addition (Jones, 1991).  
The ownership structure is one of the mechanisms used to add value and it can 
be discussed in the context of the NOCs from two dimensions, namely, 
ownership types and ownership concentration (Pedersen and Thomsen, 1996). 
The types of ownership indicate the identity of the shareholders and how the 
decision-making process is influenced. In other words, the type of ownership is 
a major determining factor for the efficiency and effectiveness of NOCs. 
According to Bohren and Odegaard (2001), the ownership structure influences 
value creation, as it involves the control and appointment of the board and 
management who carry out the activities that result in value creation or 
destruction. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Relevance of Ownership on Value Creation 
 
 
Source: Author (Adopted from Bohren and Odegaard, 2001) 
On the other hand, concentration of ownership implies the level of 
shareholding and the proportionate distribution of power rights. The pattern of 
shareholding greatly influences the decision-making process, and the 
monitoring
11
 and control systems of NOCs (Tordo et al., 2011).  Furthermore, 
it is a vital determinant of performance given that it is the basis for the 
composition of the board of directors. The board is responsible for important 
decision-making and monitoring. Therefore, corporate value could be reduced 
                                       
11
 Agency problems such as principal-agent and free-riding problems arise where the managers 
misuse the power they have by pursuing personal interest. Where the minority owners lack the 
incentive to bear the cost of monitoring the managers, then the free-riding problem is likely to 
surface, or the coalition of majority owners can lead to a principle-principle problem. 
Owners Board Management Value Creation 
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or destroyed if the board is weak in controlling and monitoring the activities of 
the management.  
In this respect, most NOCs are wholly owned by government. There are, 
however, instances where NOCs are partially owned by government either with 
the majority or minority
12
 shareholding (Marcel and Mitchell, 2006). For 
example, Statoil and Petrobras were privatised to some level, but their 
government maintain control over them (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: State-ownership, reserves and production of some NOCs 




1 Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia 100 265.4 
2 NIOC Iran 100 151.2 
3 PDV Venezuela 100 297.6 
4 Petro China China 90 - 
5 NNPC Nigeria 100 37.2 
6 Petronas Malaysia 100 5.9 
7 INOC Iraq 100 143.1 
8 Gazprom Russia 73 - 
9 Statoil Norway 67 6.9 
10 ONGC India 95 5.7 
Source: Adapted from PIW (2012) and BP (2012) 
The NOCs have been known to adopt different organisational structures. For 
instance, Khan (1987) related that the Arab OPEC NOCs adopt a hierarchical 
form which places the Minister on the board. In this kind of arrangement, the 
NOC is closely attached to a supervising Ministry which the Minister oversees, 
while policies for the petroleum industry and approval for projects are 
exercised by the Council of Ministers. The Minister serves as the link between 
government and Council. This kind of structure has been well criticised, 
arguably due to the multiple role of the Minister in the structure and the likely 
political influences that may lead to inefficient operations (Falola and Genova, 
2005). 
Another form of structure is the one in which the NOC is run by a board of 
directors who are mostly experts in oil and gas matters. Given that the NOC is 
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 The government may have a minority shares and maintain a significant control over 
operations if it is in possession of golden shares. The golden shares allow the government to 




an instrument of government policy; the board is vested with the power to 
drive the policy of government while the management team strategize towards 
achieving the objectives of the policy. The broad range of interest is 
represented in the board. An interesting example is the case of Pemex of 
Mexico where the Workers Union appoints five representatives to the board 
(Khan, 1987). 
The NOCs could also be classified into those that only operate domestically 
within their territory like NNPC of Nigeria and those that have expanded 
beyond their territory such as Petro China, Petrobras and Statoil. While the 
former is still dependent on MOCs to operate passively within its territory, the 
latter have been able to climb the learning curve through acquisition of the 
necessary technology and skills for upstream operation (Khan, 1987; Vivoda, 
2011). Another basic difference between these two groups of NOCs is that the 
former is government invested, managed and highly dependent on public 
funds. On the other hand, the latter group is partially government invested, 
corporately managed, less dependent on government funds and open to 
competition (Gordon and Stenvoll, 2007). 
2.5.4 The Commercialisation of NOCs 
The 1980s and 1990s were a challenging periods for the NOCs because of 
difficulties encountered as a result of increased supply of oil to the market by 
non-OPEC producers and the collapse of the OPEC fixed price system (Al-
Moneef, 1998; Fattouh, 2007). During this period, information asymmetry 
between governments and their NOCs worsened, and they became difficult to 
control. Drawing from the notion that greater control requires greater 
information, governments’ interest was undermined because of the NOC’s 
influence and power on the limited financial resources (Stevens, 2008b). The 
resultant increase in corruption and patronage; high cost of operations and low 
return on investment led to unfavourable political developments (Eller et al., 
2007; Nwokeji, 2007). 
Subsequently, this unfavourable economic situation ushered in a shift in 
economic ideologies that support free market implementation called for reform 
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in the international oil and gas industry. Specifically, in consistence with the 
NPM, the NOCs adopted business-like style of management that reduced direct 
government intervention and ushered in deregulation and commercialisation 
(Helm, 2004). For instance, in 1985, the Norwegian government introduced a 
petroleum policy centred on competition and efficiency, and in which Statoil 
ceased to hold the right to access 50% of any developed field as well as its veto 
right (Gordon and Stenvoll, 2007). Similarly, privatisation of NOCs was 
witnessed in Argentina, Russia and the United Kingdom (McPherson, 2004, 
Wolf and Pollitt, 2008). 
Furthermore, due to the bad financial position of the Pertamina, the Indonesian 
government granted the commercial status required for the development of oil 
field to encourage MOCs and in a way boost competition (Oon, 1986). As well, 
the Nigerian government restructured the NNPC to better serve commercially 
through the creation of business units (Nwokeji, 2007). Likewise, in the 1990s 
the Brazilian government adopted a neoliberal policy which led to the 
privatisation of Petrobras (Nem Singh, 2012). Even the highly dependent oil 
producing countries of the Arab world such as Saudi Arabia who did not 
privatise their NOCs significantly, reduced government interference and 
encouraged commercial operations of the NOCs (Marcel and Mitchell, 2006).  
The debt crisis in the 1980s and the oil price collapse in the 1990s put 
governments in tight financial positions. As a result, there was underinvestment 
in all the value chain of the petroleum sector because the NOCs were often 
starved of investment funds with the belief that such funds will be diverted in 
rent seeking (Stevens, 2008b). This situation created a window for the MOCs 
to increase their participation in the international oil sector, and as well 
pressured the NOCs to operate in a more commercial basis and extend their 
operations overseas (Marcel, 2005).  
In a nutshell, the outcome of this period was the adoption of the concepts of 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which were then undisputable 




2.5.5 Socioeconomic Issues 
According to Marcel (2005), one of the basic rationales for the creation of 
NOCs is to secure national interest efficiently than it could be done using 
private initiatives. The reasoning is that the NOCs will be under government’s 
control; therefore it can easily be used in all or some part of the petroleum 
value chain to achieve national objectives (Stevens, 2004; 2008a). In sum, it is 
postulated that the NOCs are set up to be efficient and profitable, but their 
decision-making is driven by a prevailing obligation to national welfare (Khan, 
1987; Robinson, 2009). This non-commercial goals and obligations of the 
NOCs is the major characteristic that differentiates the NOC from other 
petroleum companies (Tordo, et al., 2011).  
Some of these objectives include the generation of employment, development 
of local capacity in the technical and commercial aspects of petroleum 
operations, in some instances provision of social infrastructures and income 
redistribution (Stevens, 2004; McPherson, 2004; Marcel, 2005). For instance, 
Jaffe and Elass (2007:68) reported the role of Saudi Aramco of building 
schools and awarding scholarship to citizens. Another socioeconomic rationale 
for the creation of NOC is to maximise the net present value of the economic 
rent derived from petroleum exploitation. Other socioeconomic concerns are 
promotion of developmental linkages and self-sufficiency. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Generally, the review in this chapter discussed the characteristics, objectives, 
governance and performance of SOEs and aligned them to the NOCs. This was 
done to demonstrate that the NOC is a quasi-public sector organisation, and as 
such the main motive of creating it is to protect the interest of the people. In 
specific terms, the following issues emerged from the review. 
Firstly, it was revealed that the NOCs, like other SOEs, are established to 
correct market deficiencies that otherwise could distort citizen’s satisfaction 
and reduce socio-economic development. Secondly, it was established in the 
review that NOCs like other SOEs, are mandated to pursue both commercial 
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and non-commercial objectives. Based on this, it was shown that unlike private 
companies whose performance is assessed on how well profit is maximised, the 






















OVERVIEW OF THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION (NNPC) 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the historical background of the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. Further discussion is aimed at examining and understanding the role 
of NNPC as a quasi-public sector organisation and to form a view on its 
performance using the VfM concept (i.e. efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy). Section 3.2 discusses the evolution of NNPC, and its duties, powers 
and organisational structure. Section 3.3 examines the objectives and 
aspirations of NNPC’s participation in the upstream oil and gas sector. 
Furthermore, the roles of NNPC’s subsidiaries in achieving its upstream 
objectives were examined. In section 3.4, the discussion is focused on the 
participatory arrangements NNPC utilises to develop oil and gas with the aim 
of adding value to the resources for the benefit of the Nigerian people. Section 
3.5 examines the upstream performance of NNPC and discusses the challenges 
involved. The efforts of NNPC in reforming and transforming itself are 
discussed in Section 3.6; while Section 3.7 provides a conclusion to the 
chapter. 
 3.2 The Nigerian Oil and Gas industry: Historical Perspective 
It is important to give an overview of the Nigerian oil and gas industry in order 
to understand the genesis of NNPC and the role it is meant to undertake. The 
exploration for crude oil started in Nigeria in 1908, by the Nigerian Bitumen 
Corporation, a subsidiary of a German company (Bello and Butt, 2004). 
Thereafter, in 1938, the British colonial government granted a sole 
concession
13
 to a consortium of Shell-BP, which proceeded to discover oil in 
                                       
13
 The concession was granted pursuant to the Mineral Act of 1914 which ceded Nigeria’s 
mineral rights to the British Crown and reserved exploration and production rights to only 
British companies. The basis for this concession is to pursue British colonial economic policies 
(Ayodele-Akaakar, 2001; Akinrele, 2003; UNCTAD, 2006). However, subsequently the 
Mineral Oils (Amendment) Act of 1958 was enacted to undo the sole concession and pave way 
for other interested MOCs. The MOCs that came in includes Gulf, Mobil, Agip, SAFRAP, 
Tenneco and Texaco. In 2008, the top four: Shell, ExxonMobil, Total and Chevron accounted 
for 83% of Nigeria’s total production which confirms dominance by a few MOCs (Iledare and 
Suberu, 2010).  
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1956 at Oloibiri, Bayelsa state (Akinrele, 2003; UNCTAD, 2006). 
Subsequently, commercial production began and 5100 barrels of crude oil was 
exported in 1958 (Thurber et al., 2010). 
However, despite the potentials of oil and gas in helping government to meet 
the socio-economic and political needs of Nigeria, the country lacked the 
capital, technology, manpower, market and regulatory capacity to run the oil 
and gas industry (Omoleke and Adeopo, 2005; Nwokeji, 2007). The 
government’s capacity was limited to minimal regulation and collection of 
taxes
14
, royalties and leases from the MOCs for oil produced. Along with these 
was an ineffective
15
 oversight carried out by a one man unit in the mines’ 
division of the Ministry of Mines and Power (Atsegbua, 1999; UNCTAD, 
2006; Gboyega et al., 2011). 
The quest of the government to be self-reliant and enhance control of the oil 
and gas industry steadily increased after the passage of United Nations 
Resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources (Omoregbe, 
2001; Nwokeji, 2007). This was in addition to the inspiration the government 
got due to the establishment of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in 1961; and the OPEC’s Resolution XVI, Article 90 of 
June 1968
16
. The organisation enjoined its members to embrace participation in 
their oil and gas sector to enable them control their resources
17
 (Nwokeji, 
2007). The landmark Petroleum Act of 1969 and its subsidiary the Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulation of 1969 were thus enacted in this spirit 
(Omoregbe, 2001; Nwokeji, 2007). These legislations formed the basis of 
subsequent regulatory administration of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
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 At inception the MOCs were paying pittance but afterwards there was renegotiation based on 
the Petroleum Profit Tax ordinance which provided a fixed rate of 50% as profit tax, and 
royalties at between 8% and 12.5% of valued petroleum at the extraction stage (Atsegbua, 
1999; UNCTAD 2006). 
15
 The government’s control was very ineffective as it was evident that the MOCs were 
manipulating the output figures and exaggerating the cost of extraction; transportation and 
storage (Falola and Genova, 2005).  
16
 The OPEC Resolution provides that: (1) Petroleum had become too critical to the well-being 
of producing nations to be left completely in the hands of private companies of foreign nations. 
(2) To control petroleum resources is in the interest of the national security of producing 
nations. (3) To obtain a fair share of the proceeds of extraction from the MOCs whose 
activities in the industry are shrouded in secrecy (Orife, 1987).  
17
 Although Nigeria was not yet a member of OPEC during this period, she was an observer. 
Nigeria attended OPEC meetings as an observer for four years before it joined in 1971. 
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Accordingly, the Petroleum Act of 1969 changed the governance of the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry by ending the traditional concessions held by the 
MOCs, and vested all rights to ownership and control of oil and gas in the 
Federal Government of Nigeria (Hosman, 2009). Thus, the Petroleum Act 
introduced new licensing
18
, fiscal and contractual regimes to enhance 
government’s participation in the oil and gas industry and protect the interest of 
the Nigerian people (Akinrele, 2003). The Act also focused on maximising 
hydrocarbon value, acquiring technology, improving local managerial skills 
and protecting the environment. However, one significant development that 
arose from the Act has been the creation of a national oil company (Nwokeji 
2007), to manage and regulate the oil and gas industry, as well as address 
information and agency asymmetries (Usman, 2007). 
3.2.1 The genesis of NNPC 
Being a prerequisite for joining OPEC in 1971, and pursuant to Decree 18 of 
1971, Nigeria established an integrated oil company named Nigerian National 
Oil Corporation (NNOC) (Ayoade, 2009; Gboyega et al., 2011). Also, in line 
with a new Four Year Nigerian Economic Development Plan, the NNOC was 
mandated to participate
19
 in all areas of the oil and gas industry, including the 
upstream, midstream and downstream sectors. Furthermore, the corporation 
was expected to aspire to be self-reliant and provide economic linkages 
between the oil and gas industry and other sectors of the Nigerian economy 
(Nwokeji, 2007; Iledare and Suberu, 2010). 
Nevertheless, Nwokeji (2007) and Gboyega et al. (2011) reported that the 
NNOC was not able to efficiently and effectively carry out these functions due 
to its lack of finance; technical know-how; control mechanism and unnecessary 
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 Petroleum Act prescribed three types of grants to regulate oil and gas operations and serves 
as the first form of policy to introduce participation in the petroleum industry. The Act 
provides for the Minister of Petroleum Resources to grant licences and leases in the categorised 
forms of Oil-exploration licence (OEL), Oil-prospecting licence (OPL) and Oil-mining lease 
(OML) (Hosman 2009; UNCTAD, 2006). 
19
 In its effort to participate in the petroleum industry, between 1971 and 1975  the NNOC 
acquired up to 55% stakes in Shell-BP, Mobil, Gulf, Agip, Phillip, Texaco and Safrap. In 1973 
it entered into a production-sharing agreement with Ashland Oil. Participation was further 
boosted by the enactment of the Indigenization Decree of 1977, as the NNPC had increased its 
stake to 60% in all participation agreements. 
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administrative interference by the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
(FMPR)
20
. Consequently, the government, through the NNPC Act of 1977, 
merged the FMPR with the NNOC in 1977 to form the NNPC, and assigned it 
the responsibility of managing and regulating the upstream and downstream 
sectors of oil and gas industry (Nwokeji 2007). The NNPC took over all assets 
and liabilities that belonged to the two merged bodies, and combined the 
commercial and operational functions of the NNOC with the policymaking and 
regulatory functions of the FMPR (Nwokeji, 2007; Ayoade, 2009). 
3.2.2 The Duties and Powers of the NNPC 
As a SOE that is in charge of the mainstay of the economy, the NNPC is 
significant to the Nigerian socio-economic development. As such, the 
government through the NNPC Act of 1977 mandated the NNPC with various 
duties and legal powers, to enable it protect the interest of Nigeria in both the 
upstream and downstream sectors of the oil and gas industry. Being that the 
focus of this study is the upstream sector; the upstream duties that are relevant 
are drawn from UNCTAD (2006) and highlighted as follows: 
(a) Exploring and prospecting for, working, winning or otherwise 
acquiring, possessing and disposing of petroleum; 
(b) Carrying out research in connection to petroleum or anything 
derived from it and promoting activities for the purpose of turning 
to account the results of such research; 
(c) Doing anything required for the purpose of giving effects to 
agreements entered into by the Federal Government with a view to 
securing participation by the Government or the corporation in 
activities connected to petroleum; 
(d) Generally engaging in activities that would enhance the petroleum 
industry in the overall interest of Nigeria. 
 
According to Gidado (1999), the duties assigned to NNPC are in line with 
Nigeria’s strategic plan of self-economic independence and Nigerianisation, 
which emanated from OPEC’s Resolution XVI of 1968 (Nwokeji, 2007). 
                                       
20
 Specifically, Nwokeji (2007) mentioned the unnecessary interference in the running of the 
NNOC by the Permanent Secretary of the FMPR, who was also the designated chairman of the 
board. It suggests administrative conflict and dearth of control which eventually led to 
operational inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the oil and gas industry. 
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Being a quasi-public corporate enterprise, the NNPC Act of 1977 provided the 
NNPC powers that are meant to be exercised appropriately to enable it grow 
into a “world class oil and gas company driven by shared commitment and 
excellence” (NNPC, 2014c). The corporation can sue and be sued. 
Furthermore, the NNPC is empowered to adopt a business-like management 
style and acquire necessary technical capability in managing Nigeria’s oil and 
gas resources. However, since the NNPC is financially and technically 
deficient, the Act also provided that it can enter into contracts or partnership 
with any company to facilitate the discharge of its duties for the benefit of 
Nigerians (Gidado, 1999; UNCTAD, 2006).  
Indeed, the national obligation and powers possessed by NNPC are not only 
associated with public sector institutions, there are also consistent with the 
NPM ideology. The NNPC Act provides a basis for NNPC to carry out 
independent operation and innovation. For instance, the NNPC has been able to 
integrate its minimal managerial force to run a decentralised structure. 
Furthermore, the corporation utilises contractual partnership to exploit its oil 
and gas resources (Thurber et al., 2010; Gboyega et al., 2011). Therefore, it can 
be argued that NNPC’s quasi-public sector status is demonstrated, and the 
corporation is provided the means to design and adopt the structure that will 
best fit its strategies. 
Another plausible reasoning can be drawn from the infant industry argument
21
. 
The NNPC Act seem to have provided the NNPC commercial and regulatory 
privileges due to its limitations in the oil and gas industry to enable it catch up 
with the MOCs who are experienced participants in the oil industry. Evidence 
of NNPC’s limitations is well documented in the areas of finance, technology, 
managerial skills and marketing (see Omoleke and Adeopo, 2005; Hosman, 
2009). 
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 According to Krueger and Tuncer (1982), the basic arguments of the infant industry case are: 
(a) newly established activities are of relative high cost and require time to be competitive; (b) 
it is required that a temporary period of protection or assistance during which its cost will fall 
enough to permit it to survive competition without assistance.  
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3.2.3 The Organisational Structure of the NNPC 
An organisational structure is a pattern of relationships and recipe for managers 
to achieve organisational goals through planning, directing, organising and 
controlling (Mullins, 1999; Mabey et al., 2001). Thus, its importance to any 
value adding process cannot be overemphasised. Therefore, regarding the 
NNPC, it can be deduced that a good structure designed to fit the corporation’s 
core values
22
 will enhance its performance, and subsequently help it achieve 
the objectives of its mission statement
23
. On this premise, the succeeding 
paragraphs would discuss the organisational structure that the NNPC relies on 
to exercise its powers and perform its duties. 
Gidado (1999) reported that from 1977 to 1988, the NNPC operated a 
centralised system in which duties were performed through two broad sections, 
namely Commercial Section
24
 and the Petroleum Inspectorate Unit (PIU) - a 
unit that covers the regulation, enforcement and supervision of the oil and gas 
industry. However, the overly centralised administration and management 
structure was restructured in 1985 into five semi-autonomous sectors
25
 each 
headed by a Chief Executive officer. Afterwards, in 1986, Petroleum 
Inspectorate was removed and reorganised as the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) - the body with the official responsibility for the regulation of 
the oil and gas industry (Akinrele, 2003). The removal was well-commended, 
as its existence within NNPC created “the untenable situation of the regulator 
being subordinate to the industry’s largest player (Gillies, 2009). 
Consequently, in 1988, pursuant to the Commercialisation and Privatisation 
Decree of 1988, the Nigerian government reorganised and decentralised the 
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 The NNPC states its core values as: (1) Respect for the individual; (2) Staff development and 
growth; (3) Integrity, transparency and accountability; and (4) Professional excellence. 
23
 NNPC is an integrated Oil and Gas Company, engaged in adding value to the nation’s 
hydrocarbon resources for the benefit of all Nigerians and other stakeholders. 
24
 According to Gidado (1999), during the period between 1977 and 1988, the activities of 
the commercial section of NNPC can be grouped into three sectors: (1) Operational sector 
(2) Service sector; and (3) General Management sector. The three sectors are operated 
within a centralised structure.   
25
 The sectors include: Oil and Gas; Petrochemicals; Refineries; pipelines and Products 




organisational structure of the NNPC. Even though there was a slight change in 
2013, the structure for executing corporate business remained decentralised 
with the Head office at the top. Following in the strata are eight directorates 
and twelve strategic business units (SBUs) that are otherwise referred to as 
subsidiaries. The NNPC is headed by a Group Managing Director (GMD) and 
subordinated by eight Group Executive Directors (GEDs) who are responsible 
for the directorates of Exploration and Production; Commercial and 
Investments; Corporate Services; Finance and Accounts; Gas and Power; 
Engineering and Technical; Refineries and Petrochemicals; and Business 
Development (NNPC, 2014b). 
Accordingly, with regards to decision-making, the NNPC has a nine member 
board of directors
26
 while the NNPC’s legal adviser serves as the secretary. 
The members include the Minister of Petroleum Resources,
27
 who chairs the 
board and five external members. The GMD and two other GEDs represent the 
NNPC on the board (NNPC, 2014a). NNPC’s twelve wholly or jointly owned 
subsidiaries are limited liability companies with their own separate boards of 
directors that include the Chairman, the Managing Director (MD), two 
Executive Directors and other external representatives (Nwokeji, 2007).  
The decentralised structure adopted by NNPC is a repositioning strategy aimed 
at making the corporation a commercially integrated and financially 
autonomous corporation (Nwokeji, 2007). The structure indicates the shift 
from the traditional management style to the business-like NPM, which is 
expected to help NNPC attain efficiency, profitability and competiveness 
(Akinrele, 2003). It is evident in the literature that high performing NOCs like 
Statoil and Petrobras operate in a decentralised structure and within the realm 
of the NPM (James, 2011). With regards to NNPC, Gidado (1999) reported the 
articulate expression of this view as stated by a former GMD of the NNPC: 
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 The members of the NNPC board of directors are: Minister of Petroleum Resources, Mrs 
Diezani Alison-Madueke (Chairman); Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance, Mr 
Danladi Kifasi; GMD, NNPC, Mr Andrew Yakubu; Alhaji Abdullahi Bukar; Mr Steven 
Oronsaye. Others are: Professor Olusegun Okunnu; Mr Daniel Wadzani; GED, Finance and 
Accounts, NNPC, Mr Bernard O.N. Otti; and GED, Corporate Services, NNPC, Dr Dan Efebo.  
27
 The Presidents of Nigeria had often served as his administration’s Minister of Petroleum, 




“The objective of the reorganisation is to reduce rigid central control and allow 
subsidiaries the flexibility necessary to optimise their businesses and operate 
commercially in the best interest of the corporate body”. 
As earlier stated, the activities of NNPC’s subsidiaries cover all the 
spectrum of the oil and gas industry, from exploration to marketing. A 
view of NNPC’s twelve subsidiaries are depicted in Figure 3.1 below and 
outlined in Appendix A. 














Source: NNPC (2014a) 
3.2.4 The Objectives and Aspirations of the NNPC 
The NNPC, like other NOCs, is incorporated to participate in the oil and gas 
industry in line with government policies and regulatory framework
28
. Similar 
to other NOCs, the corporation is also mandated to pursue both commercial 
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and non-commercial objectives (Nolan and Thurber, 2010; Sarbu, 2011). 
However, the non-commercial objective is considered most vital because it 
embodies the provision of the socio-economic needs of the society. Yet, it is 
worth mentioning that the commercial objective is equally important because it 
serves as a prerequisite for achieving the non-commercial objectives (Tordo et 
al., 2011). Therefore, it is plausible to state that achieving both objectives is 
essential to improve the welfare of Nigerians. In this vein, Gidado (1999) 
highlighted and summarised the basic objectives the Nigerian government 
intends to achieve in the upstream sector as: 
(a) Satisfaction of national aspiration of public participation as of right with 
the MOCs in the ownership of petroleum rights and in decision making 
on important matters affecting the conduct of petroleum operations 
(b) Increased revenue to government through profit-sharing and sales of 
government share of crude oil, produced from the joint operations 
(c) Acquisition of requisite technology, managerial and technical skills by 
the state owned company which participates in the operation 
(d) Supply of internal needs of petroleum and its products, and 
(e) Gaining an inside knowledge of the methods, techniques and patterns of 
petroleum operations necessary for an effective Government regulation 
in the industry. 
In addition, the NNPC stated its main aspiration in the upstream sector to 
include the exploration of 40 billion barrels proven oil reserve, and the oil 
production of 4.5 million barrels per day by 2010 (Iledare and Suberu, 2010). 
Other aspirations include a 70% target for local content utilisation; increasing 
capable manpower; acquiring technological know-how and improving the 
environment through the stoppage of gas flaring (Gboyega et al. 2011). 
Nevertheless, NNPC have not been able to achieve these aspirations. Arguably, 
this is as a result of bad governance and ineffective coordination of the fiscal 
regimes; the operating conditions and the geology and materiality. Yet the 
failure may be the consequence of an unfavourable political environment 
which is beyond the control of NNPC (Boscheck, 2006).  
In conclusion, NNPC’s upstream objectives cut across commercial and non-
commercial areas. Furthermore, it can be deduced from the objectives that the 
upstream sector is very important to the sustenance of the Nigeria economy, 
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and public participation in the sector was considered to safeguard the interest 
of the people. Thus, it is imperative that NNPC’s management processes are 
efficient and effective enough to enable it to participate successfully in the 
upstream sector. 
3.3 NNPC’s Participation in the Upstream Sector of the Oil and Gas 
Industry 
As earlier discussed in Chapter Two, oil and gas activities cover both the 
upstream and downstream sectors; however, the focus of this research will be 
on the NNPC’s participation in the upstream sector. The sector represent the 
initial stage of the oil and gas value chain that involves searching and 
exploration of potential oil and gas fields, the development, the production and 
the maintenance of production (Pillai et al., 2010).  
In the upstream oil and gas sector, expensive auxiliary activities that demand 
the expertise and technology of geologists and geophysicists are carried out to 
exploit oil reservoirs
29
. These activities are capital intensive and the costs of 
executing them are classified as capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating 
expenditure (OPEX) (Wright and Gallun, 2008). It is therefore desirable that 
VfM is attained in the course of carrying out these activities considering their 
significance to the determination of oil and gas reserves, production volume 
and crude oil price (Sarbu, 2011). 
In the light of this, the government decided to participate in the oil and gas 
industry both directly and indirectly through direct exploitation as well as 
through concessions and contractual arrangements with MOCs. The NNPC was 
mandated the role of managing oil and gas assets so as to ensure VfM and 
safeguard the interests of Nigerians (Hosman, 2009; Gboyega et al., 2011). 
Figure 3.2 depict how government (through the NNPC) participates in the 
upstream sector. 
                                       
29
 The activities and process of the upstream sector are capital intensive. They involve the 
supply of expensive equipment and engineering projects in the stages of exploration, 
appraisals, development and production. 
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Source: Lawal (2008) 
Source: Lawal (2008) 
Specifically, the NNPC’s participation and operations in the upstream sector 
are mainly executed through four of its subsidiaries, namely: the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS), the Nigerian 
Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), Integrated Data Services Limited 
(IDSL) and National Engineering and Technical Company Limited (NETCO). 
The roles of these subsidiaries are briefly discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The functions of NNPC’s indirect participation in the upstream sector are 
assigned to NAPIMS, the subsidiary responsible for the efficient management 
of government investments in the sector. These investments are in the form of 
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participatory interests the government has in venture collaboration with MOCs. 
There will be further discussion on this in Section 3.3.1. Nevertheless, the 
government’s gradual acquisition of participatory interests is illustrated clearly 
in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Government (NNPC) Participatory Interest in Nigerian Oil and 
Gas Concessions with MOCs 
MOC (Operator) Participation Interest of 
Government (%) 











































Source: Lawal (2008) 
The role of NAPIMS is to optimise the benefits accruing to Nigeria from its 
upstream investments. Specifically, its mandate is to gain a good margin on 
investments by employing cost reduction strategies that maximise Petroleum 
Profit Tax (PPT) (Iledare and Suberu, 2010). Achieving this entails effective 
monitoring and control of their various contractual agreements (JV, PSC, SC). 
These include ensuring compliance to industry best practices, rules, regulations 
and processes, such as budgeting and funding, in upstream project execution 
(NAPIMS, 2013b).  
Also of concern to NAPIMS are the promotion of local content input through 
the development of in-country technological capability; the utilisation of local 
manpower and materials; the maintenance of safety and environmental 
protection standards and maximising cooperation within oil and gas producing 
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communities (Hosman, 2009; Gboyega et al., 2011). NAPIMS is also pursuing 
the strategic objectives of increasing national oil reserve base and production 
capacity per day to 40 billion barrels and 4.5 million barrels respectively 
(CRES, 2008). 
While NAPIMS participate indirectly in the upstream sector, the NPDC was 
created as the flagship of Nigeria in direct upstream operations. It is mandated 
to professionally and efficiently undertake direct upstream exploration, 
appraisal, development, production and abandonment activities, both nationally 
and internationally (NNPC, 2014b). Similar to NAPIMS, the main objectives 
of the NPDC are to improve proven oil and gas reserve and production as well 
as develop a capable local manpower (NNPC, 2014b). This places an 
obligation on NPDC to show leadership; do things right; be cost efficient, and 
deliver value to its stakeholders using industry best practices. Specifically, the 
company is required to be effective in the processes of designing work 
programmes, budget preparation, control, monitoring and budget execution 
(Penda, 2009). 
The NPDC has varied equity and non-equity interests in 23 concessions located 
in the onshore, swamp and offshore terrain of the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. The company also has an international concession in Equatorial 
Guinea (Ibrahim, 2009; NPDC, 2012). Despite its initial resolve for direct 
participation, the NPDC also has indirect operations in which it is involved in 
strategic alliances with MOCs and other upstream operators
30
. The NPDC 
participates as operator in only nine of its twenty three concessions (Ibrahim, 
2009). The detail of NPDC’s concessions and participating interests is 
presented in Table 3.2. 
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 The NPDC has several partners involved in Joint Ventures and Service Contract 
arrangement. Some of them are: ExxonMobil; ConocoPhillips; Ashbert; AENR; and SINOPEC 
(NNPC 2013). Recently, in the spirit of aggressive expansion, the NPDC took over 
operatorship of a Shell divested asset that is expected to increase its production level 
significantly (Eboh and Nwokpoku, 2013). 
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Table 3.2: NPDC’s concessions and participating interests 
NPDC Business Portfolio 
Onshore Swamp Offshore International 
Assets (%) Assets (%) Assets (%)  
OML 4 55 OML 64 100 OPL 214 15 1 concession 
OML 26 55 OML 66 100 OPL 223 10  
OML 30 55 OML 119 100 OPL 242 25  
OML 34 55   OPL 244 10  
OML 38 55   OPL 251 15  
OML 40 55   OPL 256 5  
OML 41 55   OPL 318 20  
OML 42 55   OPL 325 20  
OML 65 100   OPL 332 10  
OML 111 100      
Source: NPDC (2012) 
The IDSL and NETCO, unlike the other two subsidiaries earlier discussed are 
service companies. The IDSL is the subsidiary of NNPC that was created to 
provide the oil and gas industry geophysical and petroleum engineering 
services. Specifically, the subsidiary offers services that include: seismic data 
acquisition; seismic data processing; seismic/engineering services; and data 
storage and management. The company has been the foremost indigenous oil 
service company that enjoy patronage from various upstream operators 
(NNPC, 2014b). 
Similarly, NETCO was established in 1988 as a joint venture between NNPC 
and American Bechtel incorporation. Since it became wholly owned by NNPC 
in 1997, it has maintained its status as the premier indigenous engineering 
company whose main objective is to fulfil NNPC’s strategic vision of 
developing in-country oil and gas engineering capability (NETCO, 2014b). 
NETCO has executed many significant projects and was awarded the 
prestigious ISO 9001 Quality Certificate in May 2000 by Bureau Veritas 
Quality International (BVQI) (Adebola et al., 2006). 
Amongst the subsidiary’s mandate is the facilitation of Nigerian content and 
provision of an effective and reliable procurement, engineering and project 
management services. It services include: feasibility studies; conceptual 
engineering design; basic and detailed engineering; project planning and 
scheduling; cost estimation and cost engineering; computerised project 
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management; procurement of engineering equipment and material; 
construction management  and supervision; commissioning and start-up; and 
management of the maintenance of operating plants (NETCO, 2014b). 
3.4 The Nigerian Government’s (NNPC) Participation Agreements 
As earlier stated in Section 3.2, the OPEC Resolution No 90 of 1968 greatly 
motivated the oil and gas producing countries and enhanced their bargaining 
status (Al-Emadi, 2010).  In this spirit, relevant laws, rules and regulations 
were put in place to hasten the processes of participation (Umar, 2005). In 
consequence, after the abolition of the traditional concessions, the government 
(NNPC) has pursued its participating interests in the oil and gas industry using 
three types of arrangements, namely: joint ventures, production sharing 
contracts and service contracts (Atsegbua, 1999).  
Thus, in the succeeding sections, the role of NNPC in using the aforementioned 
arrangements will be discussed with a view to understanding their 
consequences to VfM (efficiency, effectiveness and economy). 
3.4.1 The Nigerian Joint Venture Arrangements 
Generally, joint venture arrangement in the oil and gas industry connotes the 
coming together of two or more partners (one of whom is usually a NOC) with 
working interests to engage in oil and gas exploration, development and 
production (Al-Emadi, 2010). The details of the operations and the rights, 
obligations and limitations of the partners are drawn from a legal framework 
called the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA)
31
 (Wright and Gallun, 2008). 
Specifically, the JOA entail details on the sharing of cost, production and 
revenue; how equipment and materials will be managed (Umar, 2005). 
However, because the JOA can be of different forms, Wright and Gallun 
(2008) highlighted the following as its common areas of responsibilities that 
the partners come to consensus: (1) the operator; (2) the operating committee; 
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 The term JOA also refers to the Joint venture agreement. Therefore, they will be used 
interchangeably in this research work. 
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(3) work programmes and budgets (4) abandonment; and (5) general provisions 
and accounting procedures. 
Usually, the JOA vests the mandate of providing technical and financial capital 
on the operating partners. Consequently, the operating partners of the JVs are 
responsible for the day to day control and management of upstream projects, 
even though the NOC has the option of participating in different aspects of the 
projects (Al-Emadi, 2010).   
The JV arrangements in Nigeria involve the joint control of oil and gas 
concessions by MOCs and NAPIMS, the subsidiary of NNPC that is 
responsible for managing, controlling and regulating JV activities as stipulated 
in the JOAs and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
32
 (Gboyega et al., 
2011). The JV is funded by the partners according to their participating equity 
interests and the same interest applies in the sharing of profit. However, in 
addition to this, the government receive its entitlement of royalty on gross oil 
production, alongside income taxes and fiscal obligations as provided by the 
laws and regulations of Nigeria (Thurber et al., 2010). While the JV partners 
(MOCs) that operate the ventures are entitled to lift crude oil or a monetised 
equivalent of it as commensurate to their working interests (Gidado, 1999). 
With regards to the operations and management of the JVs, Tanimu (2008) 
reported that the JV operators are responsible for preparing and presenting their 
yearly work programmes
33
 and budgets proposals to NAPIMS for review and 
concurrence. Initially, a Sub-Committee (SUB-COM) proposes the upstream 
projects along with the expertise input of a Technical Committee (TECOM). 
Thereafter, the details of the overall work programme is analysed, packaged 
and processed for presentation at the Joint Operating Committee (JOPCOM) 
meeting headed by NAPIMS (Ezenwosu, 2009).  
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 The MOU is a binding document which defines the fiscal incentives meant to encourage 
investment in exploration and new development between NNPC and the JV partners (MOCs). 
It provides the MOCs a minimum profit margin of $2.30 /barrel, after tax and royalty on 
MOC’s equity crude (NAPIMS, 2013a).  
33
 The work programme contains all the upstream project activities to be carried out in a year. 
This includes CAPEX and the OPEX. 
53 
 
As stipulated in the JOA, the JOPCOM is mandated to provide an orderly 
overall supervision, control and direction on all matters pertaining to the joint 
operation. This includes the CAPEX and OPEX of the JV projects (Al-Emadi, 
2010). Therefore, in this vein, the NAPIMS presents the government share of 
the JV budgets and work programmes to the NNPC corporate office for 
consideration and further process to government for approval. Subsequent to its 
approval, the government then forwards the work programme and budget 
proposals to the National Assembly for appropriation (Jibrin, 2006; Ezenwosu, 
2009). The schematic presentation in Figure 3.3 illustrates the processes 
involved from conception to the execution of upstream JV projects in Nigeria. 










Source: Jibrin (2006) 
Following the same trend, the JV partners (MOCs) also present their share of 
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of the government share of JV operations is processed as shown in Figure 3.3, 
except for the appropriation process. 
Table 3.3: Nigerian Oil and Gas Joint Ventures and Working Interests 
Operator (% interest) Other partners (% interest) NNPC (% interest) 
Shell (30%) Elf (10%) Agip Oil (5%) 55% 
ExxonMobil (40%) None 60% 
ChevronTexaco (40%) None 60% 
Agip Oil (20%) ConocoPhillips (20%) 60% 
TotalFinaElf (40%) None 60% 
Panocean (40%) None 60% 
Source: Al-Attar and Alomair (2005) 
Currently, there are six JV agreements in Nigeria, of which the NNPC holds an 
average of 57% working interests and funding obligations (see Table 3.3). The 
upstream JV operations which are onshore have been consistent in accounting 
for the majority of Nigeria’s crude oil production as they accounted for about 
70% in 2012 (NNPC, 2013). Under these arrangements, the NNPC (through 
NAPIMS) reserved the right to serve as operator, although the MOCs have 
always been the operating partners. Arguably, this is because of the NNPC’s 
low technical, managerial and financial abilities (Nwokeji, 2007; Hosman, 
2009). 
The efficiency and effectiveness of the upstream processes will greatly 
determine the success of upstream projects. Thus, in line with its monitoring 
role, NAPIMS has multidisciplinary project teams for upstream projects so as 
to ensure cost effectiveness; enhancement of local content; project controls and 
time delivery, and compliance with due process. Along with these are separate 
multidisciplinary audit teams that carry out periodic audits in all upstream 
projects. The aim is to verify expenditure and the system of internal control; to 
generate asset registry and create data bank for benchmarking and cost 
estimation. Likewise, periodically, external auditors are commissioned to carry 
out VfM audits so as to advise on the monitoring, compliance and 
benchmarking processes in the upstream sector (NAPIMS, 2013b). 
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3.4.2 The Nigerian Production Sharing Contracts 
Next to the JV arrangements is the government’s participation in the upstream 
sector using production sharing contracts (PSCs), otherwise referred to as 
production sharing agreements or production sharing arrangements. The PSC, 
according to Gidado (1999), is a contractual agreement under whose terms the 
MOCs, as contractor utilises its technical and financial resources until oil is 
discovered in commercial quantities. Subsequent to discovery, the MOCs’ 
costs are recoverable from oil produced (cost oil) each year to a certain limit, 
and the balance of the produced oil (profit oil) is divided in the net profit 
royalty ratio. Thereafter, corporate tax is applied to the MOCs’ split of the 
profit oil.  
Two distinguishing features of the PSC are: firstly, the MOCs carry the entire 
exploration risk; if no oil is found, the company receives no compensation. 
Secondly, the host government owns both the resources and the installations 
(Bindemann, 1999). Furthermore, if oil is found, the MOCs will be responsible 
for the execution of operations in accordance with the terms of the contract 
signed with the NOC. Important amongst the terms are the submission of 
annual work programmes and budgets; management control by NOC and the 
sharing of oil based on production not profit (Johnston, 2007).  
The aforementioned features are generally evident in the Nigerian PSCs
34
even 
though the contracts have different fiscal terms. This is because the terms of 
the contracts were determined by the bargaining power of the NNPC as at the 
time of signing the contracts. However, the concepts
35
 of royalty oil, cost oil, 
tax oil and profit oil is applied as provided in the contract and the laws and 
regulations of Nigeria. 
                                       
34
 The first PSC in Nigeria was signed between NNPC and Ashland Oil Nigeria in 1973. Other 
PSC round of licencing were signed in 1993, 2000 and 2005 (Gboyega et al., 2011). 
35
 Royalty oil connotes the quantity of available oil allocated to pay the concession rental; Cost 
oil is the oil that is sold to recover the preproduction, capital and operating costs; Tax oil means 
the oil allocated to cover the Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) payable; and Profit oil is the 
remaining oil left after the aforementioned have been allocated. It is shared between the 
partners according to pre-agreed percentages. 
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Generally, the legal backing for PSC operations is derived from the enacted 
“Deep Offshore Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts” Decree No. 9 of 
1999 (amended) (Ameh, 2007).
36
 Virtually all Nigeria’s PSCs are on Deep 
Offshore and Inland Basin contract areas, although there are no legal 
restrictions against Onshore or Shallow Water PSCs (Umar, 2005). Table 3.4 
shows the lists of all PSCs companies, as at 2004. 
Table 3.4: List of PSC companies operating in Nigeria as at 2004 
No. Name Oil Blocks Effective date  Remarks 
1.1 Addax  OPLs 98/118 06-May-98  
1.2 Addax   OPLs 90/225 06-May-98  
2.1 Statoil  OPL 217 18-May-93  
2.2 Statoil  OPL 218 18-May-93  
3.1 Texaco  OPL 213  01-May-93  
4.1 Conoco  OPL 220  02-Jul-93  
5.1 Elf  OPL 222  01-Apr-93  
5.2 Elf  OPL 223  01-Apr-93  Relinquished in 
year 2000 
5.3 Elf  OPLs 803/806/809 01-Apr-93 Relinquished in 
year 2000 
6.1 SNEPCO  OML 118  01-Apr-93  
6.2 SNEPCO  OPL 219  01-Apr-93  
6.3 SNEPCO  OPLs 803/806/809 01-Apr-93 Relinquished in 
year 2001 
7.1 NAE  OPL 211  01-Jul-93  
7.2 NAE  OML 125  01-Jul-93  
7.3 NAE/NPDC  OPL 244  20-Dec-01  
8.1 Esso  OPL 209  01-May-93  
8.2 Esso  OPL 214  13-Jun-02  
9.1 Chevron  OPLs 
801/805/810/812/814 
02-Oct-94  Relinquished in 
year 2000 
9.2 Chevron  OPL 250  28-Nov-01  Relinquished in 
year 2000 
10.1 Mobil  OPL 221  01-May-93  
11.1 Petrobras  OPL 324  20-Dec-01  
12.1 Phillips  OPL 318  14-Feb-02  
13.1 Oranto  OPL 320   
14.1 Ocean Energy  OPL 256  24-Jan-03  
Source: Lawal (2008) 
Similar to the JOC in JV arrangements, the PSC is governed through a ten 
member Management Committee that comprises five members each from the 
contractual partners (NAPIMS and the contractor). The Management 
Committee and other various Sub-Committees are designed to provide orderly 
direction on all matters pertaining to petroleum operations. The NNPC through 
                                       
36
 The PSC law amends both the general petroleum Act of 1969 and the Petroleum Profit Tax 
Act, in general terms, the pre-existing petroleum laws are to be read in conformity with the 
PSC law (Umar, 2005). 
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NAPIMS monitors and controls the PSC operations through the Management 
Committee. Duties of the committee among others include: the revision and 
approval of all work programmes and budgets, ensuring the contractor 
implements the provisions of the accounting procedure (Umar, 2005; Ameh, 
2007). 
Also, Umar (2005) reported that the PSC contractor (MOC) is responsible for 
preparing work programmes and budgets for projects on a yearly basis. In 
addition, the contractor also provides the required funds for the execution of 
the work programme as approved by the Management Committee. The work 
programme shall also be secured by performance bond, covering the entire 
budget of the work programme. 
Several national interest provisions have been highlighted as the main 
motivations for adopting PSC. The provisions include the quest for technology 
transfer; the inability of NNPC to meet its cash call obligations under its 
various JVs; the recruitment and training of Nigerians in the oil and gas 
industry as well as to encourage investments in offshore acreages (ESMAP, 
2004; Umar, 2005; Gboyega, et al., 2011). 
3.4.3 The Service Contracts in Nigeria 
Smith et al. (2000) explained the Service Contract (SC)
37
 as a strategic 
arrangement where MOCs agrees to provide technical services, know-how and 
to supply materials. Under this kind of arrangement, the service contractor 
(MOC) has no control over operation and has no equity interest in the venture. 
This suggests that both ownership and control lies with the government (NOC); 
however, Al-Emadi (2010) argued that it is not so in reality due to the technical 
and financial incapability of the NOCs in carrying out sole operations. The 
reward for the services rendered can either be in kind (oil) or cash. However, 
where exploration risk is assumed by the service contractor, the discovery of 
oil is the determinant for remuneration. 
                                       
37
 There are two types of service contracts namely; Pure Service Contract and Risk Service 
Contracts. The difference between the two is the burden of risk involved and the type and kind 
of remuneration (see Johnston, 2003). 
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The service contract arrangement is relatively new to the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry being that the first of such contracts was signed in 2000 between the 
NPDC and Agip to develop two fields (Okono and Okpoho) in OML 119. 
Under this arrangement, the NPDC assumes the role of a joint operator while 
Agip contributes the overall project managers for five years in a 70/30 sharing 
formula. Similarly, Sinopec signed a service contract with the NPDC to 
develop OML 64 and 66 as operator. However, the NPDC engineers are to take 
over after three years of commencement of the contract (Eluozo, 2008). The 
service contract arrangements accounted for 0.48% (8,398 barrels) of the oil 
produced in Nigeria in the year 2012 (NNPC, 2013). 
3.5 The Transformation programmes in the NNPC 
Over the last three decades, the various leaderships of the NNPC have 
embarked on transformation programmes to primarily actualise the vision and 
mission of NNPC. This entails adding significant value to Nigeria’s 
hydrocarbon assets; striving to be a world class profit-oriented NOC driven by 
shared commitment to excellence (NNPC, 2014c). Despite this, when 
compared with some of its peers like Petrobras, Petronas and Statoil who have 
been able to transform to major players in the global oil and gas business, the 
NNPC can be termed as a failure. Nevertheless, NNPC’s various efforts of 
transformation are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Although the NNPC adopted a divisional structure in 1979 and created five 
semiautonomous sectors in 1985 (Nwokeji, 2007), the real effort at 
transforming the NOC commenced with the Commercialisation, Re-
organisation and Capitalisation (CRC)
38
 initiative of March, 1988. The 
initiative which was carried out with the consultancy aid of Arthur Anderson 
and Co. conceptualised NNPC’s structure into twelve SBUs and corporate 
service units (CSUs) under two directorates: Operations and Services (Makeri, 
2009). 
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 The mandate given for the CRC initiative was to carry out a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats) analysis, the recommendation of which would align NNPC to its 
vision and mission. 
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Furthermore, the corporation adopted a Total Quality Management (TQM) 
culture in 1995 with the focus on quality management and customer 
satisfaction at the lowest cost (Okoye, 2010).  This effort at transformation 
failed in most of NNPC’s subsidiaries due to: the lack of a conducive business 
environment; ineffective leadership; large staff population; short awareness 
period; fear of the unknown; cultural environment; low morale; inadequate 
training; customer dissatisfaction; and inactive corporate steering committee 
(Omoregie, 2001). Although the general conclusion relating to the adoption of 
TQM by NNPC is that it failed to make the desired impact, with respect to one 
subsidiary of NNPC, namely NETCO, it has been deemed to be a success.  
In 2004, the NNPC also embarked on the first phase of Project PACE - an 
acronym for Positioning, Aligning, Creating and Positioning. Specifically, 
Ikoko (2006) highlighted that the key objectives of the project was to ensure 
that the NNPC evolves as a high performing NOC by developing world class 
capabilities, systems, processes, and structures. This, in turn, is expected to 
bring about efficient operation and improved performance in the generation of 
value from hydrocarbon resources; oil reserves and production; secure higher 
OPEC quota; local content; capacity building in NAPIMS and NPDC, 
information technology transformation; and to establish a petroleum market 
place. 
According to Makeri (2009), the first phase of Project PACE carried out a 
diagnostic assessment of the NNPC in order to redirect it to become an 
efficient and effective NOC like its peers, Petrobras and Petronas. The 
diagnosis identified some of the problems of the corporation as lack of focus; a 
weak culture of accountability; a non-capitalisation and absence of 
execution/commercial mind-set; inadequate leadership; inadequate managerial 
capacity and weak enabling processes (NNPC, 2012a). Figure 3.4 illustrates 




















Source: Makeri (2009) 
Thereafter, in 2005, the second phase of the Project PACE commenced with a 
focus on the implementation of change initiatives. According to NNPC (2010), 
during the inauguration of the second phase, the GMD stated that the NNPC 
was rebranding
39
 with a commitment to six key attributes defining high 
performance: strategy, technology, operational excellence, leadership, 
organisation and governance, and people and culture.  
Consequently, Kupolokun (2006) highlighted the following as some of the 
achievements of Project PACE: (1) the laying of foundation for corporate 
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 The GMD disclosed that  NNPC’s “NNPC’s cultural brand would be professionalism and 
excellence, teamwork and open communication, ownership and consequence management, 
safety, innovation, performance empowerment and entrepreneurship, respect and” (NPDC, 
2013). 
Cultural Attributes 
-Government work ethic and culture 
-No clear measurable goals 
-Communication is mainly top down 
-Change resistant 
 
NNPC AS-Is Culture  
Stories/Myths 
-‘It will not work’ 
-Why change 
-Time on job = promotion 
-We do not follow things through 
-Grapevine is alive and thriving 
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performance through the revision of organisational structure and the 
institutionalisation of the performance culture in NNPC; (2) savings in 
contracting and procurement through the Nigerian Petroleum Exchange’s 
(NIPEX), Joint Qualification System (JQS)
40
, a technology solution developed 
under the petroleum market place; (3) re-engineering key levers for improving 
the effectiveness of NAPIMS
41
; (4) implementing an enhanced Management 
Information System in the NPDC and possible increase in operational 
effectiveness; (5) the re-engineering of human resources function to effectively 
play the role of a business partner and support a high performing NNPC; and 
(6) the definition and commencement of the implementation of the information 
technology needed to enable and support a high performing, world class 
NNPC.  
In 2009, in its quest to improve efficiency and effectiveness, and gain the status 
of a world class oil company, the NNPC flagged off a new twelve point 
transformation agenda.
42
 The transformation initiative was aimed at reforming 
the NNPC and transforming it from a cost-center to a profit-center (Okoye, 
2010). The initiative was designed to be the fore-runner to the PIB, as it 
envisages the migration of the NNPC from its passive investor and onlooker 
status to a major participant in the class of other performing oil and gas 
companies (NNPC, 2012a). 
In addition, this transformation drive emerged at the time that the NNPC was 
practically insolvent, in that its operation had only been sustained by sovereign 
guarantees provided by government (Igbikiowubo, 2010). This suggests that all 
the effort made in the past to transform NNPC were not successful. 
 
 
                                       
40
 NIPEX’s JQS is a procurement system where transaction is carried out in the electronic 
market. It was developed to improve transparency, efficiency, cost effectiveness and 
competition. 
41
 For instance, due to the difficulty of cash calling the JVs, an alternative funding arrangement 
was developed. In addition, a Nigerian Content Division was created. 
42
 The transformation agenda emerged from the recommendation of the Oil and Gas Sector 
Reform Implementation Committee (OGIC) report. The committee was set up by government 
to reform and restructure the oil and gas sector. 
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3.6 The NNPC’s Value for Money (VfM) concerns 
The previous sections discussed the duties, objectives, aspirations, activities 
and efforts of the NNPC in the upstream sector of the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. This section will examine these duties, activities and the corporate 
resources available, with the aim of understanding how well they are allocated 
to achieve the NNPC’s objectives. The discussion will be based on the concept 
of VfM (efficiency, effectiveness and economy) which involves obtaining the 
maximum economic, social and environmental benefits possible from activities 
for the lowest overall cost. Figure 3.5 illustrates the mixture of the activities, 
resources and expected value addition. 









Even though there are other spectrums to efficiency in the literature, this study 
is limited to the understanding of efficiency from the perspective of the 
classical school of management. In this vein, Murshid (1988) described 
efficiency as the result of appropriate application of administrative principles 
that direct and control the internal performance of an organisation. It is 
concerned with the organisational structure, the administration system and 
























other essential inputs that ensure that work is done appropriately to achieve 
maximum efficiency (Richard et al., 2009). 
The organisational structure is vital for the mobilisation, allocation and 
utilisation of corporate resources (Obiwuru et al., 2011); the reason for which 
Goodman and Pennings (1977:3) referred to it as “a rational set of 
arrangements oriented towards achieving certain goals”. Therefore, together 
with a sound administrative system, the structure is used as a vehicle to make 
and implement policy decisions and strategies adopted by an organisation to 
achieve its desired goals and objectives. 
With regards to NNPC, the structure has been restructured several times in the 
past to its relative decentralised form in 1988. However, despite its 
involvement in the diverse spectrum of the oil and gas industry, Yisa (2005) 
stated that the NNPC’s operational decision-making is centralised at the top. 
Furthermore, the process is said to be exceedingly slow and highly 
bureaucratised, such that it leads to a delay in transiting necessary information 
and other essential inputs required for implementing organisational functions. 
Further, Ibrahim (2009) reported that the delay creates a defect in the system, 
because users of information are inadequately fed with it, thus, the resultant 
lack of administrative synergy
43
. It is evident that this situation will impact 
negatively on efficiency. 
At the top of the NNPC structure is the board of directors which is responsible 
for decision-making. However, the composition of the board of the NNPC is 
alleged to be largely based on ethno-political consideration rather than 
expertise and professionalism (Nwokeji, 2007; Gboyega et al., 2011). 
Therefore, it is assumed that decisions taken by the board will be unsound, and 
the judgement of which is based on patronage, rent seeking and self-interested 
short term strategies (Hosman, 2009; Thurber et al., 2010). Arguably, these 
impeding factors are associated with the constant meddlesome behaviour of 
government as a result of which the NNPC has had five GMDs in seven years. 
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 In respect of this, Eluozo (2008) reported that the department that drill and complete wells 
do not have appropriate linkage with those that supply materials.  
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Also of importance to the success of an organisation is the appropriate 
allocation and utilisation of human resources in the middle and lower cadre. It 
is reported that the NNPC’s best employees have good expertise and culture of 
working in the oil and gas industry but, on a generally note, the corporation is 
deficient in human capacity (Thurber et al., 2010). The inadequacy of this vital 
human input, along with the lack of equipment, have hindered the NPDC and 
NAPIMS’ work programme and budget review exercises (Yisa, 2005; Penda, 
2009). A similar view has been given on the negative impact of incompetent 
personnel in monitoring MOCs operating the JVs and PSCs (Madubuike, 1999; 
Ugwu, 2006).  
Even though NNPC has made reasonable effort in training its staff in line with 
its core value of ‘staff development and growth’, Edu (2000) attributed the 
aforementioned problem to the lack of proper orientation and exposure to the 
right training. In effect, this creates challenges in communication and 
feedbacks with the consequences of reduced productivity and inefficiency.  
The functions of mobilising, allocating and utilising financial capital resources 
are of high significance in determining organisational efficiency and value 
addition (Wang and Berman, 2001; Dekker, 2004). However, the application of 
these functions in the NNPC is in contrast with a real commercial entity, given 
that the NNPC’s board of directors is not independent of government and, as 
such, does not have the financial autonomy to source for funds
44
 (Nwokeji, 
2007). Due to this anomaly, the NNPC generates income it cannot retain, 
which as a consequence earned it the ironic caption of “a formally commercial 
NOC that can never make profit” (Thurber et al., 2010).  
Despite this circumstance, the management of the NNPC have devised other 
ways of pursuing business goals even though performance may not be as 
expected
45
. Thus, it can be suggested that the NNPC is one NOC that lacks 
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 However, it should be noted that the MOCs source for funds on NNPC’s behalf to operate 
the JV operations. This is an alternative funding arrangement that arose as a result of 
government’s inability to contribute its share of the participating interest. 
45





, which is an important measure of corporate efficiency 
and effectiveness (Ellis, 1999). This condition of continuous insolvency 
“explains and helps to reinforce the absence of clarity in NNPC’s budgeting 
processes” (Thurber et al., 2010).  
Considering the dynamic nature of the oil and gas business, timeliness in 
payment for contracts and execution of projects is essential. Even in this 
respect, the NNPC has been reported to be slow in the vital processes of 
approving contracts and making payments due to its excessive bureaucratic 
bottlenecks. For instance, Edu (2000) stated that the NNPC’s processes of 
approving contracts and making payments, delays the execution of project as 
planned. Another example was given by the KPMG (2010), when it reported 
the link between the late processing of marketing clearance to load oil vessels 
to delay in receipt of Letters of Credit (LC) from NNPC. 
Consequently, Thurber et al. (2010) attributed this to the rigorous procedures 
of approval and payment at the NNPC’s headquarters that could take months to 
complete. Similarly, Ezenwosu (2009) related the cause of the delay to the 
stipulation of the JOA that approval and payment of contracts that exceed the 
$500,000 and N10, 000,000 authority limit of JV operators (MOCs) for foreign 
and local contracts respectively, will have to be forwarded to NNPC. It is 
argued that the JOA needs to be reviewed so as to amend such provisions to be 
in line with modern day oil and gas businesses. 
Penda (2009) stated the effects of the delay in payment and inadequate funding 
to include loss of goodwill; shifts in delivery dates; high cost of production and 
reduction in contractors’ commitment to add value. In this regard, instances 
were reported when, at different times, contractors (Cledop and Baker Hughes) 
had to abandon operations due to non-payment, which led to man-hour loss. 
While expressing shock at NNPC’s apathy towards its upstream projects, 
Amanze-Nwachuku (2012) noted that delay and inadequate funding constitute 
a major setback to the government’s aspiration of increasing oil and gas 
reserves and production; to undermine the development of local content. 
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 The GMD of NNPC once acknowledged that they were challenges with solvency, while 
another source said that their survival was based on sovereign guarantee. 
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However, Penda (2009) acknowledged that the NNPC/NPDC has guidelines 
for approved budget implementation that demands for accountability, 
transparency, budget discipline, and provides control and feedback 
mechanisms  such as Authority for Expenditure (AFE), auditing and periodic 
performance reports
47
. Despite this, it is further asserted that these mechanisms 
have not had positive effect.  
For instance, while Abutudu and Garuba (2011) acknowledged the importance 
of auditing to improve the NNPC’s systems and processes, they reported that 
audit functions have been inefficiently run due to lack of adequate trained staff 
who are versed in areas such as well and product costing and project 
management. In addition, Penda (2009) related this as one of the causes of 
delay in budget reviews; approval and release of funds, as well as the 




As reviewed in Chapter Two, effectiveness is generally defined as the extent to 
which an organisation can achieve its predetermined goals/objectives (Aktas et 
al., 2011). For an organisation like the NNPC, this can be determined by how 
well it has achieved its operational targets, mission targets, national aspirations 
and citizens’ expectations. Therefore, based on this, the operational 
performance of the NNPC in its upstream activities is reviewed. 
Drawing from the exploration data shown in Table 3.5, it is evident that in the 
area of seismic data acquisition, the NNPC in collaboration with other oil 
companies could only meet its target once in ten years between 2001 and 2010.  
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 The AFE procedure is to ensure that expenditures are rational and based only on planned 
activity (Penda, 2009). Similarly, proper transmission of budget information and feedback 
leads to effective decision making.  
48
 The problem of delays in approval and release of funds, and inadequate budget provisions 
has consistently been an issue of concern given that proceeds from NPDC are paid directly to 
NNPC who in turn approves and releases funds for NPDC operations. The process usually 
takes a long time since NNPC itself have to wait for appropriation from the National Assembly 
(Penda, 2009). The approval limit of the MD of NPDC is $5 million and N10 million, while he 
acknowledged that foreign invoices usually take an average of 150 day to process for payment 
(Ibrahim, 2009). Also, NAPIMS involvement in contract management from the tendering 





However, over 70% performance level was attained in seven of the ten years 
and only twice was performance below 50%. In the related data processing and 
reprocessing activities, the NNPC’s performance was better as it surpassed its 
target in three of the ten years presented and did not record below 50% 
performance. Although the NNPC was not wholly effective in exploration, it 
can be argued that its level of performance was close to being effective. 
Table 3.5: Data on NNPC’s Upstream Activities 2001-2010 








/reprocessed (Sq. km) 
Performance  
 level 
 Plan Actual % Plan Actual % 
2001 2070.00 901.00 43.53 13926.00 7024.00 50.44 
2002 4402.35 4394.69 99.83 9833.00 6379.40 64.88 
2003 4305.00 3854.86 89.54 22277.00 11232.00 50.42 
2004 1328.38 1131.35 85.17 11468.00 13583.00 118.44 
2005 2344.00 1802.03 76.88 13576.50 11165.69 82.24 
2006 14290.60 10622.08 74.33 27441.00 18855.05 68.71 
2007 11520.00 5200.00 45.14 15945.40 8763.15 54.96 
2008 18307.00 10212.16 55.78 6670.00 7831.00 117.41 
2009 5000.00 4560.76 91.22 9492.00 5842.00 61.55 
2010 2057.00 2700.00 131.26 6490.00 14862.65 229.00 




Crude oil production 
 Plan Actual % Actual Volume 
2001 - 218 - 43  
2002 - 254 - 41 729,190,940 
2003 - 172 - 26 831,775,504 
2004 - 168 - 24 910,156,489 
2005 272 179 65.81 27 918,966,736 
2006 367 183 49.86 36 869,196,506 
2007 439 200 45.56 32 803,000,708 
2008 236 110 46.61 27 768,745,932 
2009 197 129 65.48 27 780,347,940 
2010 68 96 141.18 25 896,043,406 
Source: Author (based on information from NNPC, 2013) 
As shown in Table 3.5, the NNPC’s development activities in the upstream 
sector have not been so impressive. Of the six years presented, the performance 
target for the development of wells was met once, while less than 50% 
performance was recorded for three years. Even though production is guided 
by OPEC quota allocation, the overall ineffectiveness shown may arguably be 
a contributing reason for the dip of almost 20% in crude oil production. With 
this trend over a number of years, it is not surprising that the aspiration of 
adding reserve value and boosting production was not met. This, in effect, will 
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reduce a generation of revenue upon which Nigeria’s socio-economic 
development depends. 
Also, the effectiveness of budget execution and funding is an essential 
ingredient for organisational success (Owle and Brown, 1992). It implies that 
budget execution entails ensuring that investments in projects are appropriately 
carried out to add value to an organisation in order to achieve objectives. In 
this vein, Penda (2009) assessed the NNPC/NPDC budget execution and found 
it ineffective. Further, the illustration in Table 3.6, showed that between 2005 
and 2008 the highest level of budget performance was 37.57% while in 2006 
there was a dismal low performance of 6.43%. 
Table 3.6: NPDC Capital Budget Execution from 2005 - 2008 
Year Plan N (Billion) Actual N (Billion) % 
2005 14.659 1.924 13.13 
2006 20.213 1.299 6.43 
2007 34.986 13.145 37.57 
2008 35.518 2.676 7.53 
Source: Penda (2009) 
Subsequently, Eluozo (2008) discussed the ineffective execution of budget. He 
stated that CAPEX has continuously declined, while operating cost OPEX has 
always been overrun. Correspondingly, this decreases NNPC/NPDC’s value 
addition, and subsequently affects the fortunes of NNPC. Penda (2009) linked 
NNPC/NPDC’s ineffective budget execution to its inability to attain its 
intended aspirations
49
 in upstream operation. Similarly, Bako (2006) also 
argued that budget implementation in JV operations is primarily focused on the 
expenditure of sums set out in the budget, as little or no attention is usually 
given to ensure that goals set out in the budget are correspondingly attained.  
Various reasons have been attributed to this failure. For instance, as illustrated 
in Table 3.7, funding for upstream projects are not usually provided as 
budgeted. It can be seen that between 1999 and 2003, the highest funding that 
the NNPC was able to secure from government for upstream projects was 
83.82% of planned funding while the lowest was 55.61%. 
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  For instance, that the NPDC’s reserve target for 2010 was reviewed from 750 million 
barrels to 550 million barrels attest to its unimpressive performance. 
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Table 3.7: JV jointly recommended budget and funding performance for 
1999-2005 
Year Planned funding  
($000) 





1999 7,166,517 3,985,621 3,180,896 55.61 
2000 6,470,625 3,841,413 2,629,212 59.34 
2001 6,496,305 5,060,912 1,435,393 77.90 
2002 7,475,466 4,961,116 2,514,350 66.37 
2003 6,808,347 5,707,000 1,101,347 83.82 
Source: Author (based on information from Ezenwosu, 2009) 
The performance level suggests NNPC’s ineffectiveness in securing funding 
for projects. Thurber et al. (2010) attributed the inadequacy to government’s 
commitment to other socio-economic needs and their lack of technical 
capability to critically evaluate budget proposals. According to Ezenwosu 
(2009), Mr Kupolokun while serving as the GMD of NNPC gave a better 
expression of this view when he said: 
“Nonetheless there is a limit to the amount of resources that government can 
commit to the industry on account of competing national needs. This resulted in 
budgetary constraint that is affecting the industry to the extent that the JV 
companies have tended to skew their operation in favour of production, while 
compromising exploration activities.” 
According to Tanimu (2008), the inadequacy in funding leads to budget 
realignment and misalignment, which in turn provides the MOCs an avenue to 
manipulate the budget  by ignoring exploration projects that will not return 
investments in the short run. In addition, Ibrahim (2009) linked the inadequacy 
to creation of wider communication gap in the system and problems of 
accountability. Consequently, achieving operational and policy targets 
becomes unrealistic. 
Also, the NNPC/NAPIMS has the mandate of developing the Nigerian local 
content
50
 in the oil and gas industry as provided by the Petroleum Act of 1969
51
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 According to Atsegbua (2012), local content is defined as “the quantum of composite value 
added to or created in the Nigerian economy by a systematic development of capacity and 
capabilities through the deliberate utilisation of Nigerian human, material resources and 
services in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.” It involves the acquisition of technology, skilled 
manpower, procurement and use of local raw materials, increased participation of local 
companies and provision of economic linkages to other sectors of the economy (Nwaokoro, 
2011a). 
51
 The petroleum Act of 1969 provides that: operators in Nigeria shall give preference to 
Nigerian contractors provided there is no significant differences in price and quality;  that  work 
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and other subsequent development policies (Maliki, 2009). Specifically, the 
Nigerian government’s aim as expressed in the NNPC’s dedicated vision for 
Nigerian content is to: 
“Transform the oil and gas industry into the economic engine for job creation 
and national growth by developing in-country capacity and indigenous 
capabilities. In this way a greater proportion of the work will be done in Nigeria 
with active participation of all sectors of the economy and ultimately Nigeria 
will be positioned as the hub for services within the West African sub-region 
and beyond”. 
Therefore, in its quest to foster the development of local content by the 
domiciliation of economic work in Nigeria, the NNPC created the Nigerian 
Content Division (NCD) as well as established a Nigerian Content Consultative 
Forum for the industry. Furthermore, up to 23 directives were issued to MOCs 
to enhance content level in order to attain the aggregate target of local content 
value of 45% by 2005 and 70% by 2010 (Ovadia, 2013b). The details of the 
NNPC’s targeted 70% are shown in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8: NNPC’s Projected Nigerian Content Value Contributions 
Sectors Average Annual 
Spend ($m) 
Value Contribution ($m) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Engineering 900 270 340 495 605 720 
Installation 1,100 220 233 263 295 330 
Construction 1,100 330 465 528 625 770 
Fabrication 1,500 500 610 705 850 1,000 
Procurement 5,400 475 600 1,000 1,700 2,500 
Others  105 320 650 1,150 1,480 
TOTAL 10,000 1,900 2,568 3,631 5,225 6,800 
Source: Ariweriokuma (2009) 
However, in contrast, the NNPC have largely failed to build and improve its 
own capacity (Thurber et al., 2010). Similarly, the NNPC has not adequately 
ensured that the MOCs carry out their obligations on local content. Currently, 
Ovadia (2013a) estimated local content achievement to be between 30 and 
40%, which despite being an improvement on the less than 5% domiciliation in 
                                                                                                     
done in Nigeria shall use, as far as practicable, indigenous human and material resources; 
where it is not practicable, then the work shall be carried out by a subsidiary of the foreign 
company based in Nigeria;  that  fabrications whenever practicable shall be done locally 
provided standard is not jeopardised; and that there shall be plans and programmes for the 
training and education of Nigerians in all job classifications (Etrikerentse, 2004).  
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2002 (Nwaokoro, 2011b), has not met the aspired target. Table 3.9 provides the 
details of the NNPC’s performance in terms of local content. 
Table 3.9: NNPC-NCD Gap Analysis 






Engineering In-country engineering person-hours 1.5 million 5 million 
Skill discipline engineers 1,000 3,600 
Engineering companies (500,000 
person-hour minimum capacity) 
None 5 or 6 
Fabrication Annual tonnage of fabrication 
including FPSO modules and LNG 
25,000MT 150,000MT 
Certified welders/fitters 2,000 10,000 
Integrated fabrication yards 
(25,000MT-30,000MT min capacity) 
none 6 
Deep sea port and facilities for FPSO 
integration 
none 2 
Manufacturing Annual tonnage of steel pipes nil 1 million MT 
Annual tonnage of Portland Cement 2.23 million 
MT 
11.8 million MT 
Shipping and 
Logistics 





180 million bbls 
(worth $900M) 
Lighters and medium sized vessels 
for coastal services 
25 Over250 
Qualified Nigerian ship captains, 
crewman and divers 
220 Over 4000 
Source: NNPC-NCD (2008) 
Yisa (2005) stated that the NNPC/NAPIMS has control mechanism for 
monitoring the compliance of MOCs to local content directives, through the 
provisions of upstream contracts, rules, regulations and best practice; by 
utilising tools such as training plans, work programmes, budgets, periodic 
review of invoices, work orders/LPOs and auditing. Though, Thurber et al. 
(2010) is of the opinion that this mechanism may have helped in creating 
substantial number of positions for local personnel in the oil and gas industry, 
it is argued that key management functions are performed largely by 
expatriates. 
In concurrence, Bako (2006) stressed that the NNPC has not been able to 
develop the capability to manage Nigeria’s oil and gas resources by itself, 
given that almost all the crude oil produced is by MOCs. Furthermore, Ibrahim 
(2008) stated that the MOCs were not following the directives on local content 
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as well as the provisions and laws that relate to local content - given that the 
NNPC lack the capacity to enforce compliance. In this respect, Ovadia (2013a) 
attributed the NNPC’s ineffectiveness to its deficient database for the available 
local human capacity and other resources necessary for the local content 
project. Similarly, Nwaokoro (2011b) reported that the NNPC is not adequately 
staffed and equipped to monitor the MOC’s local content compliance. 
3.6.3 Economy 
According to Flynn (2012), economy infers the minimising of cost of human, 
financial and material resources used for an activity while having regard to 
appropriate quality. In order words, the concept of economy in the VfM frame 
requires that an organisation combine the relevant factors of production to 
minimise cost or, rather, be cost efficient (Andrew and Boyne, 2009). 
One area where economy is captured in the NNPC performance literature is 
that of budget under or overruns. As shown in Table 3.10, the JV operators 
have overrun the budgets approved in four of the five years presented; thereby, 
signifying the likeliness that cost was not minimised. 
Table 3.10: Actual Budget Approval/Expenditure Performance for  
1999-2003 










1999 3,985,621 4,005,855 -20,234 0.51 
2000 3,841,413 3,634,751 206,662 5.38 
2001 5,060,912 5,183,882 -122,970 2.43 
2002 4,961,116 5,094,458 -133,342 2.69 
2003 5,707,000 5,754,016 -47,016 0.82 
Source: Ezenwosu (2009) 
This may have arisen due to NNPC’s inability to monitor the implementation 
of the budget. Contrary to the provisions of the JOA, the JV operators 
unilaterally incur expenditure by deleting, omitting and even adding new 
budget line items without the approval of the OPCOM (Abdullahi, 2006). As a 
result, because approved budgets usually do not tally with work programmes, 
there is an issue of mistrust between the MOCs and the NNPC/NAPIMS 
(Okonkwo, 2005; Ezenwosu, 2009). Furthermore, the Realignment of budgets 
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and frequent overrun makes control and monitoring more difficult for the 
NNPC/NAPIMS. This in effect leads to wastage and lack of economy in the 
allocation of inputs (Kallamu, 2001). 
Being that economy entails the minimisation of the cost of input, it is apparent 
that the cost of contracts that are unilaterally implemented without approval 
and due process is suspect, and may likely be over-priced (Bako, 2006). In 
relation to NNPC, such issues on the economy of performance were evident 
about the JV operators’ authority limit in awarding contracts. Edu (2000) 
reported that there are cases of highly priced contracts that were awarded by 
the JV operators without the NNPC/NAPIMS’ input and knowledge. It is 
further alleged that the costs of the contracts are inflated for fraudulent reasons 
or to cover for the costs of funding in other areas of operations. Ezenwosu 
(2009) provided the value of such unauthorised contracts for 2005, as detailed 
in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11: Summary of Contracts Awarded without NAPIMS Approval 
in 2005 
JV Operators Amount ($) Amount (N) 
SPDC 196,548,000 - 
Chevron 11,886,000 - 
Total 4,146,053 120,277,083 
NAOC 128,232,891 369,385,000 
  Source: NAPIMS cited in Ezenwosu (2009) 
3.7 The NNPC’s Transparency and Accountability Issues 
Transparency and accountability are two central and interlinked pillars of good 
governance (Hondeghem, 1998). While transparency entails the unrestricted 
access by the public to timely and reliable information on organisational 
decisions and performance; accountability is concerned with the obligation on 
an organisation to give account on its usage of resources and be held 
accountable for failure to meet targeted performance objectives (Armstrong, 
2005). 
Therefore, in line with the principal-agent theory, transparency bridges the 
information gap between managers and owners through the provision of 
74 
 
accurate and coherent high quality data that promotes optimal decision-making 
and, thus, creates value in the organisation’s and other stakeholders’ best 
interests (Khan, 2007). This provides the basis for accountability to play its 
role of measuring performance and ensuring compliance (Bavly, 1999), which 
thereby increases efficient and effective management practices and 
competitiveness (Pitkin and Farrelly, 1999). 
In this regard, the Nigerian government focuses on improving transparency and 
accountability by endorsing the ideals of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI). In relation, the NNPC was identified as the 
focal point because of its reputation for patronage (Thurber et al., 2010; 
Gboyega et al., 2011). In its effort of tackling these issues and transforming to 
achieving its set objectives, the NNPC included transparency and 
accountability amongst its core values (NNPC, 2014c). The electronic portal 
and data base, NIPEX, was created to provide enough transparency and self-
monitoring among competing companies’ procurement processes (Gboyega et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, the NNPC’s GMD, MR Andrew Yakubu, stated the 
importance of stakeholders’ engagement by ensuring transparency and 
accountability in the corporation’s operations (NNPC, 2012a).  
However, the National Assembly’s probes of NNPC have always portrayed it 
as an organisation that does not have the exact record of production and 
revenue earnings (Sanusi, 2014). This concurred with the numerous 
shortcomings discovered in physical, financial and process audits carried out 
by the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NIETI). In 
addition, the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
(RMAFC), the agency constitutionally responsible for monitoring Nigeria’s 
revenue, has on numerous occasions complained about the lack of access to 
information from the NNPC and its non-remittance of accurate revenue 
(Gboyega, et al., 2011). 
3.8 Conclusion  
The review in this chapter focused on NNPC’s quasi-public organisation status 
as demonstrated in its evolution, duties, powers and participatory roles in the 
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oil and gas upstream sector. Drawing from the mission, the review discussed 
NNPC as a government agency whose mandate is to pursue social objectives 
that will benefit the people, while it is also required to operate efficiently as a 
commercial entity with the objective of maximising profit for the benefit of its 
shareholders. Considering these conflicting objectives, the review focused on 
the performance of NNPC in its upstream sector activities using the concept of 
VfM as a basis for critical review.  
In the course of the review, a number of issues were revealed. Firstly, the 
purpose of establishing the NNPC was to control the oil and gas industry in 
order to maximise revenue for the benefit of Nigerians. In this quest, a mixture 
of petroleum arrangements are utilised by the NNPC depending on how 
economical and cost effective they are. Secondly, the NNPC is regarded as the 
local content vehicle whose responsibility is to prevent capital flight by 
domiciling technology and skilled manpower, as well as increase local 
participation and economic linkages. 
Thirdly, it is revealed that the roles of the NNPC in the oil and gas industry are 
conflicting in that it assumes the roles of a manager, policy maker and 
regulator.  
Fourthly, it is evident from the review that the NNPC’s participation in the 
upstream sector is passive despite its majority equity. Therefore, it is implied 
that the MOCs are still in control of the upstream sector of the oil and gas 
industry. 
Fifthly, the review also showed that NNPC has undergone several reforms to 
enhance its performance. The corporation aims to lay more emphasis on its 
commercial role and become a world class NOC. Sixthly, the NNPC is 
burdened with governance problems that are attributed to both internal and 
external sources. 
Seventhly, the NNPC’s efforts to ensure transparency and accountability were 
discussed, and although these efforts have not been entirely successful they, 




ACCOUNTABILITY AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF A NATIONAL OIL COMPANY 
4.1 Introduction 
A theoretical structure is an essential component of every empirical research, 
as it provides a basis for explaining or contemplating phenomena (Ennis, 
1999). This chapter discusses the accountability theoretical framework adopted 
for this study. It is underpinned by the principal-agent theory which has widely 
been used as a paradigm for analysing both private and public sector 
accountability. Specifically, Sihotang (2003) and Lawal (2008), in different 
perspective, conceptually used the accountability framework to match and 
analyse principal-agent relationships in national oil industry settings.  
Furthermore, the accountability framework has been linked to performance
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assessment and analysis (Talbot, 2005). Similarly, there are evidences that the 
framework is relevant to the management of public enterprises that have both 
commercial and social effects on different facets of society, and to whom the 
society seeks answers for their actions or inactions (Sinclair, 1995; Hooks et 
al., 2002). Thus, the accountability framework is adopted to analyse the role of 
the NNPC in the upstream sector of the Nigerian oil and gas industry.   
The remaining part of the chapter is organised into eight sections. Section 4.2 
discusses the various approaches to the definition of accountability; while in 
Section 4.3, the different types of accountability are addressed. In Section 4.4, 
the concept of accountability is presented in a principal-agent setting. Section 
4.5 discusses the concept of accountability from the viewpoint of SOEs and 
VfM. The subject of Section 4.6 is the application of the accountability 
framework in the oil and gas sector; while Section 4.7 demonstrates how 
accountability framework underpins this study. Section 4.8 presents some other 
theories which could underpin this study. And Section 4.9 concludes the 
chapter. 
                                       
52
 Performance here applies on the basis of Value for money (VfM). Talbot (2005) linked 
accountability to performance management through three distinguished levels: (1) Individual or 
groups; (2) programme, processes and policies; and (3) organisations. 
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4.2 The Concept of Accountability  
As the concept of accountability means different things to different people, it is 
difficult to define (Sinclair, 1995; Robinson, 2002; Bovens, 2007; Demirag and 
Khadaroo, 2008; Akpanuko and Asogwa, 2013). Different authors have argued 
that the concept is complex, multi-faceted, abstract, elusive and difficult to 
define. However, the general view was that it involves responsibility (Mulgan, 
1997); control and monitoring (O’Loughlin, 1990); accounting for resource use 
(Ballentine et al., 1998; White, 2005 ); social
53
 and institutional mechanism for 
assessing performance (Mulgan, 2003; Bovens, 2007 ) and ethical 
considerations (Dubnick, 2005). Looking at these views regarding 
accountability, it might be right to say that it focuses on the flow of 
information between relevant actors.  
Further, the concept of accountability might also be viewed differently with 
respect to ideologies, motifs, language and disciplines. To this end, Sinclair 
(1995) posited that “auditors discuss accountability as if it is a financial or 
numerical matter; political scientists view accountability as a political 
imperative and legal scholars as a constitutional arrangement, while 
philosophers treat accountability as a subset of ethics. Having mentioned these, 
this study will concentrate on accountability from a public sector perspective 
with specific emphasis on state owned public enterprises, rather referred to as 
NOCs. 
According to Schlenker (1997), accountability can be viewed as “being 
answerable to audiences for performing up to prescribed standards that are 
relevant to fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations and other charges”. 
Similarly, Jackson (1982:220) described accountability as the process of 
“explaining or justifying what has been done, what is currently being done, and 
what is planned”. According to him, accountability arises from a set of 
established procedures and relationships of varying formality and it involves 
the giving of information. This implied that accountability involves the “giving 
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 Mulgan (2000, 2003) definition of accountability focuses on the externality of the accountee 
to whom the accountor gives account. This involves social interaction and exchange in terms of 
rectification and sanctions. 
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and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts and Scapens, 1985:447), 
which compels individuals and organisations to explain and accept 
responsibility for their actions or inactions (Parker and Gould, 1999:116).  
In support of this, Patton (1992) referred to accountability as a process that 
involves the reporting of control and use of resources between those 
accountable and those to whom they are accountable. This concurs with 
Hurst’s (1970:58) statement that “an institution which wields practical power – 
which compels men’s wills or behaviour - must be accountable for its purposes 
and its performance by criteria not in the control of the institution itself”. The 
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (cited in Iyoha and 
Oyerinde, 2010), further described accountability as the “obligation of persons 
or entities entrusted with public resources to be answerable for the fiscal, 
managerial, and program responsibilities that have been conferred on them and 
to report to those that have conferred responsibilities”. Similarly, Inanga 
(1991:5) opined that accountability is “a process in which individuals and 
organisations are compelled to be answerable for their actions/conducts and 
responsibilities”. These definitions suggested that it is imperative for those 
entrusted with resources to account and report their usage and the results 
achieved. 
A broader perspective was presented by Gray et al. (1987, 1988, 1991, 1996, 
and 1997) who cogently argued that whilst ensuring that proper accountability 
was present to protect the interests of shareholders, it was of great importance 
to also ensure accountability is present to protect the needs of society and the 
general public. Mulgan (2000) and Bovens (2007) argued that accountability 
has expanded beyond the traditional perspective to include facets such as 
control, professionalism, reporting and disclosure of results
54
. Therefore, 
beyond the provision of information to the users, it is argued that those that 
have a right to information should have easy access to it
55
 (Gray et al., 1988; 
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 Accountability ranges more freely over space and time, focusing as much on future potential 
as on past accomplishment, connecting and consolidating performance reports to plans and 
forecasts (Hoskin, 1996). 
55
 Included in this category of users are passive users who have a right to know even though 
they might not use the information (Burchell, et al., 1985). The Management Improvement 
Committee to the Australian Commonwealth Government’s Management Advisory Board 
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1991). This argument related accountability to social relations; public interest 
and fairness, thus forming an ethical basis for accounting
56
 (Williams, 1987; 
Pallot, 1991; Roberts, 1991; Dubnick, 1998). 
With emphasis on individual behaviour and social relations, accountability is 
viewed as a means for dealing with potential/actual problematic situations that 
necessitate excuse-making, justifications, rationalisations and other forms of 
account-giving (Benoit, 1995 cited in Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). In this 
context, Bovens
57
 (2005) considered accountability to be “the methods by 
which the actor may render an account (i.e. justify their actions and decisions) 
to the stakeholders
58
 and by which the stakeholders may hold the actor to 
account (i.e. impose sanctions or grant permission)”. Gray et al., (1991) also 
advanced the view that accountability is a necessary step for developing any 
democratic process. It is a fundamental component of governance required in 
judging and monitoring the performance of the governor by the governed 
(White, 2005). 
In an organisational context, Lloyd et al., (2007:11) defined accountability as 
“the process through which an organisation makes a commitment to respond to 
and balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision making processes and 
activities, and delivers against this commitment”. Also, Ebrahim (2003:194) 
                                                                                                     
advocates that the concept of accountability does not simply imply providing information or 
answering questions, but extends to activities including setting goals, providing and reporting 
on results and the visible consequences for getting things right or wrong (Core, 1993). 
56
 Williams (1987) argued that, while decision making usefulness unavoidably involves 
implicit judgements about fairness, accountability allows fairness to be made explicit. It allows 
the inclusion of moral cognitions in the development and understanding of accountability 
system. Augmenting this view, Lehman (1996) introduced ethical dimension into the 
accountability equation. 
57
 Bovens (2005) noted that the accountee can be an individual, an agency or even an 
accountability forum such as the general public. Also, Bovens (2005) defined the social 
process of ‘account giving’ in terms of three elements: the accountor’s obligation to give 
account to the accountability forum, the forums ability to interrogate the accountor, and the 
forums ability to pass a judgement and impose sanctions. 
58
 The recognition of the rights of the stakeholders and the duty of organisations to be 
accountable to them has been a subject of debate among scholars. However, among others, 
Freeman (1984) proposed a general theory that incorporated corporate accountability to a broad 
range of stakeholders. The basic argument of his proposition is that the role of business 
organisations in the society is large and their impact is widespread, therefore rather than being 
accountable only to shareholders accountability should also be discharged to diverse 
stakeholders. This is supported by Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) acknowledgement that within 
an agency framework a contractual consideration could ensue between the firm and various 
primary interest groups of the firm. 
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defined accountability as “the means through which individuals and 
organisations are held externally to account for their actions and as the means 
by which they take internal responsibility for continuously shaping and 
scrutinising organisational mission, goals, and performance”. Furthermore, in a 
more explicit way, the Royal Commission on Financial Management and 
Accountability (1979:9-10) broadly described accountability as such: 
“Accountability, like electricity, is difficult to define, but possess qualities that 
make its presence in a system immediately detectable... [It] relies on a system of 
connecting links—a two-way circuit involving a flow of information that is 
relevant and timely, not only for managers but for those who must scrutinize the 
decisions and deeds of managers.... In simple terms, accountability is that 
quality of a system that obliges the participants to pay attention to their 
respective assigned and accepted responsibilities, to understand that it does 
matter”. 
The definitions of accountability earlier cited that encompassed the narrow and 
broad views of accountability, provided a common ground regarding 
accountability’s involvement in giving and demanding information or 
providing reasons for conduct (Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Bovens, 2007). 
However, this is further expanded to include the notion of stewardship
59
 to 
accountability, where a party is entrusted with responsibility and obliged to 
give account (Ebrahim, 2003; Bovens, 2005). 
The review of accountability literature in the public sector (including SOEs) 
suggested that accountability has expanded to include participation; concerns 
of various stakeholders, civil societies and the general public (Parker and 
Gould, 1999; Mulgan, 2000; Bovens, 2007). Drawing from the UK Department 
for International Development’s White paper (2006:20), accountability is 
described as “the ability of citizens, civil societies and the private sector to 
scrutinise public institutions and governments and hold them to account”. 
Additionally the Performance-based Management Special Interest Group 
(PBM SIG, 2001:1) posited that “accountability refers to the obligation a 
person, group or organisation assumes for the execution of authority and/or the 
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 Gray and Jenkins (1993) described stewardship in accountability as the relationship between 
two parties; where the steward or accountor presents an account for the responsibilities 
entrusted to him, to the party who entrusted the responsibilities (i.e. principal or accountee). 
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fulfilment of responsibility”. The group further explained that the obligation 
includes: answering for the execution of authority and the fulfilment of 
responsibility; reporting on the results of the execution; assuming liability for 
the results.  
Accountability, in this context, involves openness or “rendering of account for 
matters of public interest, i.e. an accounting that is performed with a view to 
the judgement to be passed by the citizens” (Bovens, 2005:9). This concurred 
with the notion that accountability requires agents to answer to the citizenry- to 
justify the sources of resources, and the efficient and effective utilisation of 
public resources (Inanga, 1991). 
Similarly, Romzek and Dubnick (1987:228) argued that “public administration 
accountability involves the means by which public agencies and their workers 
manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside the 
organisations. In order words, public sector accountability is strongly related to 
checking and preventing the abuse of delegated power, and ensuring that power 
is directed towards the achievement of broadly accepted national goals
60
 (The 
British Royal Commission of Financial Management and Accountability in 
Tower, 1993). 
Despite the varying forms in which accountability is applied, there is a 
common consensus that accountability is concerned with accounting for 
actions and inactions, transparency, openness, responsiveness and 
responsibility (Bovens, 2007). Therefore, accountability can be summarised as 
“the presentation and communication of evidence about performance in 
relation to goals previously set and agreed by relevant parties” (Iyoha and 
Oyerinde, 2010). This is reflected in the manner in which actors comply and 
the level of governance and institutional accountability (Romzek, 2000). As 
such, it can be justified that accountability rightly fits the assessment of the 
performance of SOEs, including NOCs. 
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 Given the multiple objectives of public sector agencies and enterprises, value for money 




4.3 Types of Accountability 
According to Willmott (1996), the process of accountability can be viewed 
from a universal aspect, which provides a platform for our participation in any 
social world. As human beings, we are continuously involved in relationships 
where we are expected to give account to others, as well as ourselves, 
regarding our being and actions (Willmott, 1996). These universal processes of 
accountability involve the historical and cultural characteristics of 
accountability. 
The PBM SIG (2001) categorised accountability in five key aspects. That 
accountability is a relationship; is result-oriented; requires reporting; is 
meaningless without consequences; and improves performance. 
Similarly, Stewart (1984) identified different forms of accountability that can 
be used to achieve an entity’s objectives along a ladder of accountability. He 
argued that the higher the movement along the ladder, the more accountability 
moves from that of standards to that of judgement (Gray and Jenkins, 1993). 
The forms of accountability comprise accountability for probity and legality; 
accountability for process; accountability for programme; accountability for 
performance and accountability for policy.  
While accountability for probity and legality is concerned with appropriate use 
of resources and malfeasance, process accountability is related with ensuring 
efficiency and appropriate procedures in carrying out activities for which 
accounts
61
 have to be given. Performance accountability is concerned with 
meeting the required standards as well as the achievement of outcomes of 
activities for which accounts have to be given. Programme accountability is 
related to the achievement of goals and objectives while policy accountability 
deals with the appropriateness of policy goals and objectives. 
Roberts and Scapens (1985) explained accountability in a formal and informal 
complementary basis, which was further referred to by (Roberts, 1991) as 
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 Stewart (1984:15) argued that accounts have to be given in the form or language that can be 
understood. This may be in financial, legal or policy forms. 
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hierarchical and socialising forms of accountability respectively. The 
hierarchical form of accountability is related to the accounting and financial 
functions that are carried out among individuals in a hierarchical form. This 
form of accountability regards the individual as an economic unit with whom 
other individuals compete and can be compared. In contrast, the argument for 
the socialising form of accountability emphasises on communication among 
people, which will eventually create humane relations, understanding, 
dissolves barriers and draws a strong reciprocal sense of obligation (Roberts, 
1991). 
Similar to the above, Laughlin (1990) presented a dichotomy of accountability 
as communal and contractual. The communal accountability involves a less 
formal, structured and defined relationship amongst givers and seekers of 
information on actions and conducts. Communal accountability focuses on 
meeting stakeholders’ needs through consultation and seeking their 
involvement in the decision-making process. On the other hand, the process of 
contractual accountability is more formal, structured and defined. It involves 
entering into legally binding agreements with expected standard of 
performance and explicitly provides the liabilities and obligations to comply 
through judicial process (Demirag et al., 2004). 
From a different dimension, Sinclair (1995) argued that defining accountability 
is dependent on the ideologies, motifs, and language meanings. In this vein, 
Sinclair (1995) split accountability into five typologies, namely: political, 
public, managerial, professional and personal accountability. And two 
discourses: a structural and a personal discourse. 
Political accountability is related to power and authority; how authority is 
exercised by elected representatives on behalf of the people to whom they are 
accountable
62
. Public accountability is viewed as an informal but direct access 
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 Heald (1984:155) presented three subtypes of political accountability namely: constitutional, 
decentralised and consultative. Furthermore, he divided managerial accountability into 
commercial, resource and professional accountability; while legal accountability includes 
judicial, quasi-judicial and procedural accountability. 
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utilised by the public to be informed on administrative activities
63
. Sinclair 
(1995) explained that the political and public forms of accountability are 
complementary. Managerial accountability
64
 also referred to as administrative 
or bureaucratic accountability is involved with individuals’ delegated duties, 
and their superiors’ demand of performance within a hierarchy. Mulgan (2000) 
referred to this as ‘responsiveness’ which basically is concerned with 
efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources. Professional accountability 
“invokes a sense of duty that one has as a member of a profession or expert” 
(Sinclair, 1995:229). In order words, it deals with compliance to professional 
codes, conducts and ethics while personal accountability is concerned with 
personal commitment to basic values such as ethics, conscience and other 
moral values. 
Regarding Sinclair’s (1995) discourse of accountability, the structural 
discourse placed emphasis on clear, demarcated formal roles and relationships; 
accountability in the personal discourse is confidential, anecdotal, and 
ambiguous as it provides an “emotional dimension to accountability as felt by 
those involved in its processes” (Wood, 2002:5). In this vein, accountability is 
described as a ‘matter of judgement’ that is associated with a sense of morality 
(Sinclair, 1995). 
Light (1993 cited in Bavly, 1999) viewed accountability from the perspective 
of performance and compliance. He asserted that performance accountability is 
concerned with the evaluation of effectiveness and bench marking; while 
compliance accountability is involved with the detection of violations and the 
enforcement of sanctions. Other classifications of accountability are 
transparency, liability, controllability; responsibility and responsiveness 
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 Accessing information administrative activities concerning the public may be sourced 
through the newspapers, public hearings, legislative committees etc. However, according 
Glynn (1985:143) public accountability refers that “those who are charged with drafting and/or 
carrying out policy should be obliged to give an explanation of their actions to their electors”.  
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 Robinson (1971) classified managerial accountability into three: fiscal accountability, 
process accountability and programme accountability. 
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(Koppell, 2005).There are also dichotomies of accountability in prescriptive, 
descriptive, operational and longitudinal nature
65
 (Blind, 2011).  
However, a comprehensive classification of accountability was advanced by 
Bovens (2007) on the basis of the natures of forum, actor, conduct and 
obligation. With regards the nature of forum, accountability is divided into 
political, legal, administrative, professional and social accountabilities. 
Accountability on the basis of the nature of actors is categorised as corporate, 
hierarchical, collective and individual. Concerning the nature of conduct, 
accountability is given financial, procedural and product considerations. Lastly, 
relating to the nature of obligation to render account, accountability is 
described in vertical, diagonal and horizontal forms. Bovens classification of 
accountability is shown in Figure 4.1. 







Source: Adapted from Bovens (2007) 
The different types of accountability earlier discussed give the normative 
understanding of accountability and, extends to social, moral and ethical 
dimensions of accountability. In sum, the different types of accountability 
relations provide a basis for transparent and accountable organisations (Gray et 
al., 1996). According to Bovens (2010), the accountability relation is derived 
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 Blind (2011) posits that “these categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. 

























on the basis of three classifications of questions: To whom is account to be 
rendered? Who should render the account? Why does the actor feel compelled 
to render the account? In relation, Scott (2000) categorised the range of values 
for which accountability is rendered into three: economic values (including 
financial probity and value for money); social and procedural values (such as 
fairness, equality and legality); and continuity/security values (such as social 
cohesion, services and safety). 
Furthermore, Bovens (2010) placed emphasis on the importance of 
accountability in organisations, and argued that the following are the results 
derived by an organisation that is accountable: (1) it increases public trust and 
confidence, and provides legitimacy to public organisations since 
accountability entails transparency, responsiveness and responsible 
governance; (2) it gives the public the voice to collectively monitor, identify 
and address failures, injustices, corruption and obligations, in order to put 
things right; (3) accountability in an organisation serves as a tool to induce 
reflection and learning. In this case, it serves as a feedback mechanism that can 
help achieve and maintain organisational effectiveness. 
However, the wider literature has shown that implementation of accountability 
is not without its own problems. For instance, Tricker (1983) argued that if the 
accountee is not in a position to enforce accountability, then accountability is 
not due. In other words, that despite the disclosure of information that meets 
the demand of accountability by the accountor, the accountee may not be in a 
position to enforce it. 
Nonetheless, Gray (1992) argued differently. He postulated that even if 
accountability cannot be enforced, it can be due. In addition, Roberts and 
Scapens (1985) contend that accountability reflects a social process whereby an 
accountee holds the power that can be used to influence or impose certain 
values on the accountor. As such, they further argued that the accountability 
relationship can possibly be exploitative. While in response, Gray (1992) stated 
that the accountability framework involves stakeholders who cannot enforce 




4.4 Accountability in a Principal-agent relationship 
The previous sections dealt with the accountability concept in different 
perspectives. This section discusses in detail the accountability relationship in a 
principal-agent setting. As previously discussed, accountability involves the 
dual roles of giving and demanding reasons for conduct (Roberts and Scapens, 
1985). 
Laughlin (1996:90) argued that the principal-agent relationship is based on “a 
hierarchical model which assumes that some individual, small group or 
organisation, called the principal, has certain “rights” to make demands on the 
conduct of an agent as well as to demand reasons for the conduct undertaken 
by that agent”. Furthermore, Broadbent et al. (1996) argued that the principle-
agent relationship surpasses the principal’s demand for the agent’s conduct and 
action, and extends to also define the nature of professional activities of the 
agent. Gray and Jenkins (1986) described the accountability relationship in this 
context as one established when one party, called the principal, entrusts another 
party, called the steward, with resources and responsibilities. 
However, the principal-agent relationship is basically founded on the 
assumptions that (1) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and 
(2) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is doing 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).
66
 The resultant conflicts that arise in this relationship are 
referred to as agency problems. As such, the principal-agent model is 
challenged to determine the most efficient and effective governing mechanism 
to mitigate the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this respect, Shankman 
(1999) advanced that the expected outcome and behaviour in the relationship 
should be articulated. 
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 Laughlin (1996) explained that within the context of the principal-agent relationship, in each 
base of accountability the agent’s supply of information can either be on the basis of what he is 
going to do (ex ante ), or what he has done (post ante). 
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Source: Laughlin (1996) 
In Figure 4.2, Laughlin (1996) illustrated the accountability relationship as 
embedded in a principal-agent relationship. It is specifically shown that the 
agent undertakes actions to utilise resources or take responsibilities on behalf 
of the principal. On the other hand, the principal demands reasons for conduct 
to which the agent is expected to provide reasons. Simply put, the relationship 
is focused on how the principal can hold the agent accountable for performance 
that meets the principal’s expectations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This process 
of demand and expectation of reasons in either formal or informal form reduces 
the information asymmetry experienced by the principal (Broadbent et al., 
1996; Gray et al., 1997; Gailmard and Patty, 2012).
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 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the major problem that arises in a principal-agent 
relationship is information asymmetry. Under conditions of incomplete information and 
uncertainty, Broadbent et al., (1996) assert that two categories of information asymmetry arise: 
(1) hidden information also referred to as adverse selection; and (2) hidden action otherwise 
referred to as moral hazard. On the one hand, it is argued that hidden information asymmetry 
exist ex ante and become available after transaction is completed, it involves how the agent 
uses available resources to achieve the principal’s goals; while on the other hand, hidden action 
asymmetry exist ex post as the actions and behaviour of the agent can influence outcomes 
without the principal observing or knowing. To overcome this, the principal may need to 
arrange a contract that will discourage the agent from misbehaving. 
Context and underlying structure of accountability relationships (e.g. 
contractual/communal, bond/link of accountability; signification, 
legitimation, domination) 

















Supply of information on actions, 
activities... Bases and types of 
accountability relationships (e.g. 
probity/process/performance/progra
mme/policy, ex post/ex ante 
Transfer of resources or 
responsibilities with expectations 
as to actions, activities etc. 
89 
 
Additionally, as shown in Figure 4.2, Laughlin (1996) illustrated the 
principal’s unquestioned rights to control the conduct and behaviour of the 
agent. This implied that the principal has a legitimate right to exercise control 
over the agent’s behaviour when it deviates from expectations. Furthermore, 
Laughlin (1996) explained that the formality of these expectations provides an 
implicit contract upon which there are consequences for the principal’s demand 
and agent’s supply of information; and the bases and types of accountability 
relationships which may result. 
Based on Stewart’s (1984) accountability ladder, the strata of accountability 
seek to supply detailed information on the actions undertaken by the agent. For 
instance, the probity and legal accountability is mainly concerned with 
information related to the pattern and legality of expenditure. While, under 
process accountability, information is sought about the means adopted for 
actions and activities; the performance, programme and policy accountability 
seek information that will provide the principal a precise view of the results 
achieved by the agent in comparison to the set goals and objectives of the 
principal. All this supply of information is either ex ante or ex post, and they 
provide the principal the opportunity to exercise control on the agent’s 
behaviour and actions (Laughlin, 1996). 
Figure 4.2 also shows the accountability relationship between principal and 
agent in communal and contractual contexts. Laughlin (1996) argued that in 
both contexts of accountability, reporting expectations and control intentions 
can be achieved. Laughlin (1996) advanced that, while the formalised, defined 
and written form of command associated with contractual accountability 
depicts some significant channel of information and control, as well, the 
informal and unwritten information expectations associated with communal 
accountability relationships has been proven to be strong control tools. 
Differently, Stewart (1984:16) identified this accountability relationship as the 
“bond of accountability” and the “link of account”. Stewart (1984) advanced 
that the bond of accountability depicts a formalised and contractual 
relationship, while the link of account portrays an accountability relationship 
based on obligation or tradition to account.   
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Subsequently, Macintosh and Scapens (1990) advanced that every 
accountability relationship underpinned by the principal-agent relationship is 
driven by the structures of significance, legitimation and domination. This 
signifies the meaning, morality and power involved in the relationship. As 
well, it concurs appropriately with Laughlin’s (1996:228) position that, “there 
is a moral relationship involved, whereby an individual or small group is 
exercising domination over another to ensure that something, meaningfully 
defined, is done by that person or persons”. 










Source: Gray et al. (1996) 
The model in Figure 4.3, above, illustrated within the frame of a social 
contract, the responsibilities of an organisation and the perceived 
accountability (Gray et al, 1996). The model showed that the sets of 
relationships between the parties (principal and agent) provided a basis for the 
responsibilities and rights to information attached to the relationships. Gray et 
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these relationships are determined by compliance with laws
68
 and quasi laws, 
such as tax, labour, health and safety laws and environmental legislations. 
However, it is posited that there is the possibility of accepting natural and 
moral responsibilities to these rights and responsibilities. Therefore, Gray 
(1992:413) further asserted that this concept of accountability can be used as 
“an emancipatory concept, helping to expose, enhance and develop social 
relationships and social contracts through a re-examinations and expansion of 
established rights to information”.  
This concept concurs with the idea of recognising the rights of stakeholders
69
 
to access information and the duty of organisations to be accountable. In 
relation, Solomon and Solomon (2004) related the principal-agent relationship 
to the sphere of stakeholders and organisations. They opined that business 
organisations play an important role in the society with pervasive impact; 
therefore, their discharge of accountability should not be restricted to their 
shareholders. In a different manner, Broadbent and Laughlin (2003:24) argued 
that the rights transferred to government to “exercise control and steer societal 
institutions and organisations can be intensified through multiple pressures that 
can question the legitimacy of their decisions”. 
Similarly, Lawal (2008) argued that the principal- agent relationship in an 
organisational context is not limited to the explicit contract, responsibilities and 
the perceived accountability between the principal and agent, but encompasses 
the implicit contract, responsibilities and the perceived accountability to the 
society. This ensues from the assumption that the organisation receives its 
permission to operate from the society.  
Correspondently, Crowther (2002) attested to the perceived need to report 
organisations’ conduct and activities within the context of the society. 
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 In the context of a social contract, the explicit terms of the contract is provided in the law 
where the responsibilities of organisations and the related perceived accountability are stated  
while other non-legislated societal expectations of the society represents the implicit part of the 
social contract.   
69
 Stakeholders in this sense include shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, partners, 
communities and general public. 
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Furthermore, Lehman (2002) argued that accountability entails reporting of 
organisation’s activities to a wider range of stakeholders and the public, as it 
can be seen as a commitment to exposing and explaining corporate effects and 
its significance on the society. 
4.5 Accountability in the Context of SOEs and Value for Money (VfM) 
In the SOE setting, the concepts of accountability and VfM are related. While 
accountability is concerned with the discharge of information to stakeholders 
on how well resources are utilised (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010), VfM entails the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the processes and institutions that 
utilised the resources (Day and Klein, 1987). Therefore, it is from this 
spectrum that this study examines the operations of SOEs, including NOCs. 
Although SOEs are not homogenous in functions (Jones and Pendlebury, 
2000), they are established by government on behalf of the society, and with 
public funding, to serve as tools for influencing, fulfilling and maximising 
political and socio-economic benefits (Bertero and Rondi, 2002). It is therefore 
imperative that SOEs report their activities and performance to their 
stakeholders, such as the parliament, civil societies, and the general public. 
Jones and Pendlebury (2000) argued that rendering accountability by SOEs 
should not be limited to stewardship accounting or financial/asset 
accountability, but also accountability for the performance of the assets. 
In a similar vein, Indreswari (2006) advanced that accountability, transparency, 
openness and the rule of laws, are the pillars of the sound governance of public 
enterprises. They are the major apparatuses that will lead to effective economic 
decision-making; which, in turn, will improve the performance that will meet 
the expectations of the society. Thus, effective accountability in an 
organisation is greatly dependant on the effective communication of 
information to external stakeholders (Tricker, 1994). Furthermore, external 
accountability is vital to increase efficiency and competitiveness, without 
which there will be no incentive for efficient and effective management 
practices (Pitkin and Farrelly, 1999).  
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In situations where the social contract that exists between the society and SOEs 
is weakened, accountability recedes or ceases; less VfM is derived and agency 
problems are developed (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In such situations, instead 
of the management of SOEs to operate efficiently and effectively towards 
maximising social welfare, the absence of accountability may afford them the 
opportunity to engage in political patronage, corruption, fraud and pursue other 
personal economic interests. 
Accountability has been examined differently within the sphere of public 
enterprises; however, few assessments were in the context of SOEs. For 
instance, Stewart (1984) and Thynne and Goldring (1987) focused on political 
or upward accountability, which in a Westminster style seeks that agents 
(government agencies) should be accountable to an executive or parliament 
represented by and for the people. Mulgan (1997) examined public or outward 
accountability, where it was considered as an informal variant of accountability 
involving various stakeholders and the general public. Similarly, from an 
outward perspective, Romzek and Dubnick (1987) considered professional 
accountability on the basis of compliance with standards and regulations that 
exists within an industry. It is further argued that professional accountability 
helps in maintaining credibility and professional status (Gray and Jenkins, 
1993). Also, Palmer (1988) and Taggart (1992) discussed SOEs’ accountability 
in a legal perspective, subject to legislations and contractual agreements. 
Focusing on ethics, Corbett (1992) focused on the personal conscience of 
individuals running public agencies. 
Robinson (1971) assessed accountability from the perspective of managerial 
accountability, which he classified into three subtypes, namely: fiscal, process 
and programme accountabilities. Fiscal accountability is concerned with 
whether monetary resources have been used as agreed or budgeted. Process 
accountability involved monitoring whether laid down processes has been 
deployed and followed; programme accountability measures whether defined 
results have been achieved. In Collaboration, Day and Klein (1987) described 
managerial accountability in a hierarchical form and developed a model based 
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on conventional and conceptual dimensions of managerial accountability (see 
Table 4.1). Day and Klein (1987) stated that: 
“At the top is political accountability which sets the policy objectives and 
generates the criteria used in neutral technical process of managerial 
accountability, running from the relatively simple fiscal/regularity 
accountability to the more complex programme/effectiveness accountability, 
from inputs to outcomes”. 
Day and Klein’s (1987) dimensions of managerial accountability is presented 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Dimensions of Managerial Accountability 
Dimensions Conventionally Conceptually 
Fiscal/ 
regularity 
Making sure that money has 
been spent as agreed, 
according to appropriate rules; 
legal accountability can be 
seen as a counterpart to this, 
insofar as it is concerned to 
make sure that the procedures 
and rules of decision-making 
have been observed. 
Checking that the appropriate 
inputs, whether of resources 
or administration, have gone 




Making sure that a given 
course of action has been 
carried out, and that value for 
money (VfM) has been 
achieved in the use of 
resources. 
Checking that the appropriate 
outputs have been produced 
and that the relation between 
inputs and outputs 




Making sure that a given 
course of action or investment 
of resources has achieved its 
intended results. 
Checking whether the 
intended outcomes have been 
produced, whether the 
desired impact has been 
made. 
Source: Day and Klein (1987) 
Having considered ethics, public expectations and social consensus as some of 
the various interrelated dimensions of accountability in the public sector, Luke 
(2010) also developed a model of dimensions and directions of accountability 
that are relevant to SOEs. Luke (2010) divided accountability into internal and 
external dimensions, upon which accountability can be directed upward, 
outwards and inward. Luke argued that SOEs are accountable upward to 
government on a managerial and political basis. Public, professional and legal 
accountabilities are directed outwards to the public, while personal 
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accountability is expected within the SOE. The model is illustrated in Figure 
4.4. 








Source: Luke (2010) 
Consequently, the application of accountability and VfM to the public sector 
scenario, in this perspective can be viewed as a strategy for the management of 
expectations (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991), and for coping with the demands of 
answerability (Hatch, 2013). In relations, Demirag and Khadaroo (2011) 
indicated that a transparent appraisal process will not only lead to better 
management and VfM, but will also increase accountability. As it is presumed 
that improving accountability will increase VfM, and perhaps VfM 
improvement will develop accountability (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008). 
Therefore accountability can be regarded as a useful analytical tool for 
managing and enhancing the VfM perceptions of stakeholders, as it applies to 
this study. 
Demirag and Khadaroo (2011) developed a framework that shows the 























Premised on the concept of intelligent accountability
70
, the framework 
examined the socio-psychological and socio-cultural mechanisms
71
 that foster 
or hinder the development and implementation of intelligent accountability 
processes alongside the attainment of VfM. Also, the framework, as presented 
in Figure 4.5, identified appropriate cultures of accountability and 
accountability processes (mechanisms) based on the argument that different 
accountability cultures and processes impact on VfM.  
Demirag and Khadaroo’s (2011) accountability and VfM framework is 
grounded on Dubnick’s (1998; 2005) conceptual framework for accountability 
and culture; and premised on two main perspectives of accountability cultures 
that are based on the works of social psychologists, ethno-methodologist and 
political scientists. 
According to Dubnick (1998; 2005), the first perspective of the accountability 
cultures is related with the accountability of conducts. This emphasises the 
functional and emergent properties of account giving behaviour. It entails the 
description, excuses and rationalisations of individuals’ and organisations’ 
behaviour and the expectations of accountability to some individuals or group 
of individuals in a psychological and social context. The second perspective is 
related to conducts of accountability. It focuses on institutional structures, rules 
and procedures through which accountability is achieved; how individuals and 
organisations are brought to account, and the institutional obligations of 
accountable actors.  
In sum, the issue of accountability is viewed and stressed from a sociological 
perspective as forms and functions of accountability “processes (mechanisms) 
that impact on social actor as situated pressures for account-giving behaviour”. 
In light of this, Demirag and Khadaroo’s (2011) framework identified four 
accountability cultures that demand account-giving responses, namely: 
answerability, blameworthiness, liability and attributability. 
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 The concept of intelligent accountability is concerned with good governance, independent 
inspection and careful reporting (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). 
71
 Accountability is termed as a social mechanism on basis that social processes have 
designated consequences for designated parts of the social structure (Merton, 1968, cited in 
Bergsteiner, 2012). Thus, accountability can be viewed as social process pressures that impact 
on the social actors’ account giving and ethical behaviour. 
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Answerability, according to Dubnick and Justice (2002), involve the obligation 
of government, its agencies and public officials to give information about their 
decisions and actions, as well as justify them to the public and the institutions 
tasked with overseeing them. Expectations, in this case, are derived from the 
agents’ institutional roles or organisational positions (Dubnick, 2003). The 
answerability culture is reflected in a setting where individuals or organisations 
are perceived as responsible for reporting, justifying and giving account of 
their actions. In sum, the roles and social identities of the agents determine 
their expectations (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). This concurs with the 
principal-agent theory which assumes that the inherent moral hazard and 
selection problems faced by the principal relying on the agent can be overcome 
through answerability mechanisms and contractual relationships (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
While accountability is often viewed in terms of answerability where roles and 
contractual obligations are specified, Dubnick and Justice (2002) and Dubnick 
(2003) asserted that accountability can take the form of blameworthiness when 
there is a shift of focus to the agents’ relative social position and identity with a 
group. In order words, referring to the agent, Dubnick (2003) advanced that 
“you are held accountable because you are regarded as socially, if not 
organisationally blameworthy”. Therefore, Demirag and Khadaroo (2011) are 
of the view that the blameworthiness culture is strongly related to moral 
responsibility, where expectation is focused on the status of the agent in the 
community or organisation, rather than the agents’ specific task or authority. 
The accountability culture of liability arises in a setting where the agents 
(either individuals or organisations) are bounded to a system of rules and laws 
that provides for rewards, compliance and sanctions (Dubnick and Justice, 
2002). Expectations in this case are highly structured, but not within the 
organisation. Rather, they are based on external and larger social and legal 
frameworks in which the organisation functions (Schuck, 1999; Demirag and 
Khadaroo, 2011). Hence, the liability culture can be placed within the sphere of 
the ethics of obligation (Dubnick, 2003). The liability culture of accountability 
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is similar to that of attributability, being that there are both focused on the 
structure of situations in which the actors operate. 
Figure 4.5: Accountability processes and VfM mechanisms 
 
Source: Demirag and Khadaroo (2011) 
Finally, attributability as an accountability culture entails the roles individuals 
play in organisations and the expectations associated with those roles (Demirag 
and Khadaroo, 2011). Accordingly, the attributability culture comes into play 
where the non-work behaviour of public workers influences their job, not on 
the basis of accountability performance at work, but on the basis of the 
importance of their jobs to the public and its associated expectations (Dubnick, 
99 
 
2003).  Furthermore, standards are set by other external social actors (people) 
who attribute actions or behaviours to individuals or organisations upon which 
accounting is demanded or expected. Simply put, attribution is subject to 
ideological, cultural and stereotypical bias (Al-Zahrani and Kaplowitz, 1993) 
and situational determinism (Dubnick, 2003). 
Having discussed the different cultures of accountability identified in their 
framework, Demirag and Khadaroo (2011) also presented four strands of 
accountability whose associated processes and mechanisms within an agency 
framework help in achieving VfM. Figure 4.5 shows the four strands of 
accountability as: contractual, managerial, communal, and political; they have 
been adequately discussed in section 4.3. 
4.6 The Application of Accountability in the Oil and Gas Industry 
There are evidences on the increasing popularity of public accountability in the 
oil and gas sector. For instance, Chen (2007) posited that the demand for public 
accountability has transformed the social relationship between host 
governments, the NOCs, the MOCs, civil societies and the people. He further 
argued that the accountability relationship in the petroleum industry has helped 
reshape many petroleum companies’ core values and their conduct of doing 
business. 
The accountability framework has been used in the petroleum industry. For 
instance, Lawal (2008) employed the accountability framework to assess 
decommissioning in the Nigerian petroleum industry, while Sihotang (2003) 
used accountability theoretical basis to deal with economic and managerial 
issues in the Indonesian petroleum industry. In relations, Boele et al. (2001; 
cited in Naimi, 2011) adopted the accountability framework to assess Shell’s 
sustainability performance in their Nigerian operation. 
Furthermore, the Natural Resource Charter (2012) advocacy document set out 
elements of good practice in extractive industry underpinned by an 
accountability frame. Similarly, Lahn et al. (2007), in their report on Good 
Governance of National Petroleum Sector, showed that accountability of 
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decision-making and performance is an essential requirement of good 
governance in any petroleum industry. This concurred with the EITI initiative 
that emphasised the relevance of an accountability framework in the extractive 
(including the petroleum industry). As stated by Chen (2007), the focus of EITI 
is premised on enhancing good governance and curbing corruption in the 
extractive industries of natural resource rich countries. This view is 
appropriately expressed below. 
The EITI supports improved governance in resource rich countries through the 
full publication and verification of company payments and government 
revenues from oil, gas and mining. Many countries are rich in oil, gas and 
minerals, and studies have shown that when governance is good, these can 
generate large revenues to foster economic development and reduce poverty. 
However, when governance is weak, they may instead cause poverty, corruption 
and conflict-the so called “resource curse”. The EITI aims to defeat this “curse” 
by improving transparency and accountability. 
Consequently, Lahn et al. (2007) expressed the importance of accountability to 
the performance of NOC by positing that the provision of transparent corporate 
information encourages transparency through external benchmarking. This in 
effect helps decision makers to ensure objectives are met, as well as give 
stakeholders a platform to hold decision makers accountable for compliance 
and performance. As a result, for instance, it is argued that the effective 
oversight of accountability institutions (part of stakeholders) is crucial for 
stemming inefficiency, ineffectiveness and corruption in Nigeria (Gillies, 
2009). 
A good example of the acknowledgement of the relationship between 
accountability, performance and social responsibility in a NOC setting can be 
deduced from Statoil’s report that “openness about financial transactions is an 
effective method of combating corruption and helps to achieve greater security 
and predictability” (Statoil and sustainable development). 
Consequently, Lahn’s et al. (2007) view that NOC’s promotion of social 
welfare is strongly related to transparency and accountability in revenue 
generation and spending. Similarly, Accenture (2011), in their leadership 
framework for NOC executives, attributed amongst other major factors, the 
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success of the NOC’s mission to the capability of the leadership to create and 
manage accountability. In their assessment of the Angolan petroleum sector, 
KPMG (2004) attributed the weaknesses uncovered in the management of 
petroleum sector to lack of a developed mechanism that will improve 
transparency and accountability. This concurred with Norad Report’s (2012) 
view that there is bound to be weak accountability in petroleum industry if 
there is low transparency, responsiveness and capability. 
The review above attested to the applicability of the accountability framework 
in petroleum studies, and it can be used to assess organisational performance 
relating to both internal and external stakeholders. However, the specific 
reasons for adopting the accountability framework for this study are related 
below. 
Firstly, the accountability framework is adopted having considered that this 
research enquiry focuses on the analysis of relationships between diverse 
parties who claim legitimate interest in knowing how the principles of VfM is 
applied in running NNPC. Secondly, being that this study is focused on 
assessing performance; the accountability framework is valuable for analysing 
the transmission of accounting information. Finally, the framework is most 
favourable for the analysis of organisation’s performance in vital areas of a 
country’s economy. This can be applied to analysis of the performance of the 
NNPC who manage Nigeria’s petroleum resources as a mainstay to the 
country’s economy. 
4.7 Accountability as a Theoretical Framework for Assessing NOC’s      
Performance 
In the context of this research, the accountability framework shown in Figure 
4.6 is underpinned by the principal-agent relationship as characterised by 
Laughlin’s (1996) principal-agent model presented in Figure 4.2. The 
relationship depicts the exchange of information, obligations and expectations 
between various actors (stakeholders). 
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The principal side of the accountability relationship consists of two 
components. The first component assumes the role of the chief principal, and it 
represents the society, which can otherwise be referred to as the people. This 
component is premised on the fact that the people own the hydrocarbon 
resources vested in the country as provided in the constitution. A moral 
relationship exists where the principal is assumed to dominate the agent with 
the intent of pressurising the agent to do the right thing. 
In the second component, the civil societies and the government, represented 
by various relevant government bodies, assumes the role of minor principals. 
Therefore, in line with this study, the minor principals are the stakeholders who 
affect or are affected by the outcome of resources the agent manages. As such, 
the principals include the NA, the CS, the FMPR, the DPR, the NEITI, the 
AGF, the CBN, the RMAFC and the PAF. Furthermore, the cost for running 
these bodies can be referred to as the agency cost the society will have to bear 
to ensure minimal agency problems. 




































On the other hand, the rights of ownership and control of the resources is held 
by government on behalf of the people, and subsequently transferred to an 
executing organisation (agent). This is done with the view that the agent will 
efficiently and effectively explore and develop for the mutual benefit of the 
society. Therefore, in this study the NNPC assumes the role of the agent with 
the view that the VfM expectations of the society will be achieved.   
However, in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, exploration and development 
activities are mostly operated by the MOCs and the LOCs in venture 
arrangements involving the NNPC as non-operator. This shows the existence 
of another strand of principal-agent relationship where the NNPC assumes the 
role of a principal, while the MOCS and the LOCs serve as agents. In this 
relationship, information is expected to be exchanged between the actors, and 
the principal is expected to monitor and ensure compliance in order to attain 
targeted performance. The relationship is bounded by legitimation and 
obligation. 
Therefore, on the one hand, it can be concluded that the relationship between 
the various stakeholders representing the society and the NNPC illustrates the 
existence of a social contract. The assumption is that the NNPC received its 
permission to operate from the society with an attached expectant level of 
performance. This is reflected in the mission statement of NNPC whose aim is 
to add value to the Nigeria’s hydrocarbon resources for the benefit of the 
people. 
On the other hand, the assumption is that the relationship between the MOCs, 
the LOCs and the NNPC illustrates the existence of a legal contractual 
agreement. The contractual agreement binds the relationship, and in the context 
of this study, the NNPC is expected to ensure the attainment of performance 
targets through monitoring compliance of processes. 
Overall, it is important for the NNPC to render accountability and transparency 
because they help organisations to increase efficiency, effectiveness and 
competitiveness (Indreswari, 2006); communication of information (Tricker, 
1994), and performance of assets (Pendlebury, 2000). It is also argued that in 
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both communal and contractual accountability settings, positive organisational 
performance is achieved when there is an effective control and reporting 
mechanism on policy, process, financial and managerial activities (Stewart, 
1984; Laughlin, 1996; Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). 
Therefore, it can be seen that both the main and minor principals have the 
rights to receive information from the agent regarding performance. As well, 
the principal-agent model can be used to assess the performance of the NNPC’s 
oil and gas operation while aligned to the concept of efficiency, effectiveness 
and economy (value for money). This is illustrated in Figure 4.7 in the context 
of this study. 
In view of Demirag and Khadaroo’s (2011) model shown in Figure 4.5, a VfM-
accountability model for NOCs was designed. Presented in the model, are four 
types of accountability and culture, upon which VfM can be attained when 
paired to certain behavioural and institutional activities and processes. 




Citizen’s charter, mission, added value: 
revenue, local content, economic 
linkages, feedbacks, benchmarking, 
disclosure and transparency of 
operations, revenue, output, funding, 
media, monitoring compliance, 
consultation etc. 
Mechanisms: 
Effectiveness of petroleum contractual 
and fiscal regimes, legal framework, 
compliance with contractual provisions: 







Mission, policy goals, cost effectiveness 
and VfM audits, political interference, 
board appointment and staffing, legal 
system, fiscal regime, monitoring 
compliance, oversight from parliament, 




Operational and strategic processes, 
commercial expertise, administrative, 
funding and budgetary systems, internal 
audits appropriate staffing, monitoring 
and compliance functions, procurement 





Firstly, answerability focuses on demanding and giving accounts, based on role 





context of this study, answerability can be applied to the managerial roles of 
the NNPC, as it is assumed it will help the principals overcome the inherent 
moral hazard problems associated with the principal-agent relationship. 
Answerability can provide the platform for the principals to demand the NNPC 
(agent) to give account of its various roles and operational processes. It 
includes control, utilisation of funds, budgeting, procurement, communication 
and compliance monitoring. This is based on the assumption that adequate 
reporting and rendering of account will ensure VfM and in effect enhance 
performance. For instance, if the NNPC funds are not utilised as budgeted, it 
can be concluded projects’ management will not be efficiently and effectively 
implemented.  
Secondly, as earlier stated in Section 4.5, accountability in the form of 
blameworthiness has a strong link with moral responsibility, and it involves 
that an agent can be blameworthy within a social setting as a result of its status.  
This can be contextualised to the role of the NNPC as manager of Nigeria’s oil 
and gas resources, and in effect a leader in oil and gas industry. The principals, 
especially the parliament, civil societies and media can perceive the NNPC to 
be blameworthy on some issues, such as environmental pollution, political 
patronage and nepotism, based on its social position. 
Thirdly, liability stresses the requirement of a structure situation as the actions 
of the parties are guided and assessed according to laws and rules that have 
sanctions for non-compliance. The expectations of the principals and 
obligations of the agents are restricted to the legal frame and contracts. Thus, 
being that most of the NNPC’s involvement in the oil and gas industry is 
through the MOCs operations, the liability concept  serves as an instrument  for 
maintaining order and control. The principals can assume that VfM will be 
attained if the NNPC (agent) complies and ensures that the MOCs comply with 
rules, regulations, standards and contractual agreements. 
Fourthly and finally, the culture of attributability is paired with communal 
accountability. Attributabilty concerns the non-work expectations and moral 
obligations attached to the roles of individuals or organisations within a social 
setting. Dubnick (2003) explained it as the accountability where non-work 
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behaviour of an individual or organisation affects its professional work, not 
based on work performance, but on its role in public life and its associated 
expectations. In other words, attributability emerges when suspicious or 
negative perceptions are attributed to social actors based on the actions they 
take. For instance, the personal non-work behaviour of the GMD of NNPC can 
create a perception upon which the public can call the organisation to account. 
Such issues may be related to conflict of interest or corruption. 
4.8 Alternative Theories that could be used to Assess Performance of SOEs 
As earlier stated, this study adopted the accountability theory underpinned by 
the principal-agent relationship for the assessment of NOC’s performance on 
the basis of VfM. However, there are several other theories such as the 
stewardship theory, the legitimacy theory, the institutional theory and the 
resource dependence theory (Davis et al, 1997; Chen and Roberts, 2010; 
Summerhays and De Villiers, 2012) that could be adopted. Two of these 
theories, namely, the stewardship theory and the legitimacy theory, are 
discussed in the subsequent subsections. 
4.8.1 The Stewardship Theory 
The idea of stewardship theory stems from sociologists’ and psychologists’ 
views on the principal-agent relationship (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The 
stewardship theory, assumes that the top management of a business corporation 
is a steward, who will act in the best interest of the corporation and principal. 
Therefore, the theory portrays a relationship in which the interests of the 
manager (steward) are perfectly aligned with that of the principal (Caers et al., 
2006). It is assumed that the steward has a pro-organisational behaviour, and 
places higher value in cooperation than defection (Kluvers and Tippett, 2011). 
It is also assumed that there is no conflict of interest between the steward and 
the principal, since the steward always seeks to maximise the principal’s 
interest. It is assumed that even if a conflict of interest arises, the steward will 
endeavour to align or solve the problem in the best interest of the principle 
(Van Slyke, 2006). This stemmed from the view that the steward is always 
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motivated by a need to achieve; to gain intrinsic satisfaction through 
successfully performing inherently challenging work; to exercise responsibility 
and authority, and thereby gain recognition from peers and bosses (Davis et al., 
1997). As such, there is no need for any incentive for performance or costs for 
monitoring performance (Pastoriza et al., 2008). 
In order words, the steward is assumed to have a fiduciary duty, and always 
seeks to achieve organisational goals and objectives (Tricker, 1996). This is 
based on the premise that, in maximising the principal’s wealth, the steward 
will gain more than if he had pursued his own personal interest (Arthurs and 
Busenitz, 2003). 
The stewardship theory is closely related to the agency theory, but differs 
because it questions the assumption that a principal-agent relationship will 
always be characterised by agency conflicts (Caers et al. 2006). While the 
agency theory characterised human beings as individualistic, opportunistic, and 
self-seeking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the stewardship theory characterised 
human beings as having higher needs for collectivism, self-esteem, self-
actualisation, growth and achievement (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). Indeed, 
this cooperative and trustworthy relationship between the steward and the 
principal as advanced in the stewardship theory is, opined to have positive 
correlation with performance (Tian and Lau, 2001).  
Within the context of SOEs such as NOCs, the principal-steward relationship 
stated above can apply. On the one side, the relationship is premised on the fact 
that the petroleum resources vested in the country belongs to the people (chief 
principal), and on whose authority the government (principal) and its agencies 
are established. On the other side, the NOC acts as the steward who is expected 
to efficiently, effectively and economically utilise the petroleum resources for 
the benefit of the people and other stakeholders, as a result of which the 
steward will maximise his utility. 
In the petroleum industry setting, the government established NOC is saddled 
with the responsibility of extracting the resources, either alone or in partnership 
with the MOCs.  The NOC is therefore expected to be cost-efficient and 
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effective in carrying out its activities. If the stewardship theory is employed, it 
is assumed that the NOC and its management shall act in the best interest of the 
people and other stakeholders on the premise that they stand to gain more in 
benefit. 
However, while stewardship theory is appropriate to be engaged in the context 
of NOC’s performance and value creation, it was not employed for the 
following reasons. Firstly, the underlying assumption that the manager 
(steward) will always advance the interests of principal may be difficult to 
apply in the real world. Secondly, the assumption that monitoring and control 
is based on the self-discipline of the steward may likely lead to the abolishment 
of the governance system (Al-Zumai, 2007). Thirdly, the extent to which the 
stewardship theory can be applied successfully to the Nigerian petroleum 
industry is arguable, given the industry’s bad reputation for corruption. Indeed, 
this suggests that the notion of accountability underpinned by the principal-
agent relationship is more appropriate. 
4.8.2 The Legitimacy Theory 
The Legitimacy theory proposition is value system centred and premised on the 
notion of a social contract between the public (otherwise known as 
stakeholders) and social institutions (Yi et al., 2011). Legitimacy, in this 
respect, is derived from the perceptions of stakeholders in the larger 
environment in which the organization is rooted (Brown and Jagadanada, 
2007). The reasoning of the theory is about an organization fulfilling its social 
contract with the society. 
As explained by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), the legitimacy theory is founded 
on the concept of organisational legitimacy which owes its existence to 
“congruence between an entity’s value system and that of the society in which 
it operates”. This refers that the perceptions of stakeholders on the existence, 
activities and impact of the organisation should be justifiable and appropriate 
in terms of central social values and institutions (Oliver, 1991). Further explicit 




Any social institution-and business is no exception- operates in society via 
a social contract, expressed or implied, whereby its survival and growth 
are based on: 
  (1) the delivery of some socially desirable ends to society in general, and 
(2) the distribution of economic, social or political benefits to groups from 
which it derives its powers. In a dynamic society, neither the sources of 
institutional power nor the needs for its services are permanent. 
Therefore, an institution must meet the twin tests of legitimacy  and 
relevance by demonstrating that society requires its services and that the 
groups benefitting from its rewards have society’s approval.  
Furthermore, the legitimacy theory assumes that any perceived disparity 
between an organisation’s social value and societal values characterise a 
threat
72
 to the organisation’s legitimacy and a breach of their social contract 
(Summerhays and De Villiers, 2012). As a result, the lack of congruence that 
develops, otherwise referred to as legitimacy gap can lead to the withdrawal of 
support by stakeholders, which in effect may endanger the survival of the 
organisation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Therefore, the concern of the legitimacy theory is linked to the basis on which 
an organisation operates; that is, the lawfulness, admissibility and justification 
for the organisations course of action (Edwards, 2000). It encourages corporate 
sustainability by guaranteeing the access to capital, labour and other resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh et al, 1986); while it mitigates against any 
possible threat to corporate existence (Elsbach, 1994). Therefore, depending on 
the situation, the relevance and survival of an organisation involves 
consistency in gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy (Adenibi, 2005), 
through chosen public disclosure tactics
73
 (Suchman, 1995). 
In the petroleum industry’s performance study, the legitimacy theory is 
applicable as evidenced by Deegan et al. (2002). In the context of this study, it 
could be considered that the NOC is the agent, while other stakeholders 
represent the principal. The applicability of the theory can be justified, given 
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 Legitimacy threats can be referred to as threats of access to resources, such as the 
government increasing regulatory and reporting requirements, reduced customers patronage 
and shareholders unwillingness to invest (Deegan et al, 2000).  
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 Adenibi (2005) pointed out that organisations may respond to legitimacy gap, for instance 
through lobbying, advertisement and voluntary disclosure of corporate information. 
110 
 
that the agent’s perception of the level of the principal’s satisfaction largely 
depends on the agent’s reaction to the legitimacy gap. Furthermore, the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the agent is considered a function of the agent’s 
status and the way he is perceived (Kassim and Menon, 2003). 
However, the legitimacy theory was not used in this study due to certain 
reasons. Firstly, the disclosure of information by the agent is voluntary and 
mostly in reaction to negative perception; not based on obligation to the 
stakeholders. Secondly, the theory implies that acceptability is mainly based on 
an organisations’ disclosure strategy to the public. There are insinuations that 
the organisations could easily sway public opinion in their favour through 
misinformation (Adenibi, 2005). Thirdly, in practice, gauging the level of 
managerial response to legitimacy threat is difficult (Deegan, 2002). Finally, 
the theory will not be able to form a view on the efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy of NNPC operations - which is the objective of this study. 
4.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the literature on accountability was reviewed. The principal-
agent concept was adopted to explain and assess the performance of the NOC. 
The concept involves the accountability relationships that exist between actors 
that are referred to as principals and agents. For instance, in the context of the 
Nigerian oil and gas sector, the existence of the accountability relationship can 
be explained in two ways: (1) between the people represented by government 
(principal) and the NOC (agent); (2) between the NOC (principal) and the 
MOCs and the LOCs (agents).  
The relationships connote a transfer of responsibility from the society and 
government (principals), to the NOC (principal/agent); the MOCs and the 
LOCs (agents) who are expected to execute oil and gas activities. In return, it 
expected that the stakeholders and principals will be discharged implicit and 
explicit information that will help them form a view on how efficient, effective 
and economical resources are utilised. 
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Thus, this study will use the model of accountability underpinned by the 
principal-agent relationships between the NOC and other stakeholders. In the 
model, the notion of accountability reflects on NOC’s VfM issues and concerns 
in its oil and gas operations. The model will be used to interpret data derived 
from stakeholders’ perceptions on the VfM entailed in the processes used by 
the NOC to handle resources, with the view to test the hypothesis of the study. 
The following chapter will address the methodology and methods to be 



















RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the theoretical background upon which this 
study is based. The aim of this chapter is to review some of the methodological 
approaches that this study could adopt, and provide justification for the method 
employed to conduct the study. 
The chapter begins with the identification of various methodological 
approaches, and discusses the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions that underpin them. Sections 5.3 to 5.5 present a broad view on 
research approaches and the research methods data analysis. Section 5.6 
explains the position of the research regarding philosophical assumptions, 
research approaches and methods and data analysis. Section 5.7 concludes. 
5.2 Research Methodology 
A research methodology is the operational framework or the protocol within 
which the facts, as known, are placed so that their meaning may be seen more 
clearly (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). It relates to the reasoning and the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning a research work which in effect 
explains the researchers’ position on how to seek knowledge and clarify the 
nature of reality (Gall et al., 1996). The assumptions are not entirely objective 
or value free and, therefore, should be influenced by the researchers’ social 
characteristics (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986). As well, these 
assumptions are based on the perspectives of the researcher on which they 
influence the way knowledge is interpreted and studied; they are collectively 
referred to as a paradigm
74
 (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). 
Bogdan and Biklen (1998:22) defined the term paradigm as “a loose collection 
of logically related assumptions, concepts, or propositions that orient thinking 
and research". Relatedly, Guba (1990) described a paradigm as “a set of beliefs 
                                       
74The term “paradigm” has been subjected to different interpretation by different researchers. 
Kuhn (1970: viii) stated that “paradigms are universally recognised scientific achievements 
that for time provide model problems and solution to a community of practitioners. 
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and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied", 
while Burrell and Morgan (1979:23) used the term as a “commonality of 
perspectives which binds the work of a group of theorist together”. Denzin and 
Lincoln (2003) described the set of beliefs as ontology, epistemology and 
methodology; as ontology relates to the philosophy of reality; epistemology 
refers to how we come to know that reality; while methodology ascertains the 
processes to use to attain the knowledge of reality (Ryan et al, 2002; Krauss, 
2005; Tuli, 2010). 
There have been debates regarding the issues of paradigm over the past 
decades between various philosophical schools of thought (see for example: 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Scapens, 
1990; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996; Remenyi et al, 1998; ; Saunders et al., 
2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Kakkuri-
Knuuttilla et al, 2008; Tuli, 2010). However, Lowe, (2001) stated that the 
paradigmatic framework, introduced by Burrell and Morgan (1979), has been 
the most cited and widely used in management and sociological research 
literature. 
5.2.1 The Burrell and Morgan Framework 
The analytical framework developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979) was 
constructed from two independent philosophical dimensions. The two-
dimensional matrix is based on assumptions related to the nature of social 
science (also referred to as the subjective-objective dimension) and the nature 
of society (also referred to as the regulation-radical changes dimension). 
Relatedly, Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework developed an abstract 
analytical binary schema to align four mutually exclusive assumptions, namely: 
ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology - with the various 
methods of enquiry in the social sciences. Thus, regarding the nature of social 





Figure 5.1: A Scheme for Analysing Assumptions about the Nature of 
Social Science Research 












Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
In social sciences, there are possibilities of several realities of the social world, 
which are interpreted and investigated from the perspective of the social 
scientists’ assumptions (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Chua, 1986). Figure 5.1 
shows the two major philosophical dimensions in social science, which are 
aligned to their respective assumptions and their related terminologies. They 
are discussed below.  
The ontological assumption concerns the nature of reality of the phenomena 
under investigation (Hopper and Powell, 1985). It probes what things, if any, 
have existence or whether reality is the product of one’s mind (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). The researchers’ ontological assumption can be termed the 
corner stone to other assumptions as it predicates the other assumptions (Chua, 
1986). From the ontological debate, nominalism assumes that social reality is 
relative; as the existence of reality is based on an individual’s consciousness 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). On the other hand, realism assumes that the social 
world is real and has a hard, intangible structure that can be transmitted in 
tangible form; it exists, irrespective of an individuals’ perception of it. 
Epistemology consideration concerns the study of the nature of knowledge. It 
addresses the questions of how to know a phenomenon, and the verification of 
what we know and refer to as truth (Carter and Little, 2007:1317). It 
emphasises on the possibilities of gaining knowledge of the world (Hughes and 
The subjectivist approach 
to social science 
The objectivist approach 
to social science 
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Sharrock, 1992) and the “nature, validity and limits of inquiry” (Rosenau, 
1992:109). Additionally, Chua (1986) relates that the epistemological beliefs of 
a researcher depends upon the researchers’ ontological beliefs, as 
“epistemological assumptions decide what is to count as acceptable truth by 
specifying the criteria and the process of accessing truth claims” (p.604).  
Regarding the debate on epistemology, the positivists - otherwise referred to as 
objectivists - assume that the social world can be predicted and explained 
through the search for patterns and relationships between people. They believe 
that knowledge is a cumulative process that can be tested from developed 
hypotheses (Dunne, 2003). The positivists view reality as an object to be 
discovered and measured through scientific methods. On the other hand, the 
anti-positivists or subjectivists assume reality to be a social construct, as they 
believe that participation and experience, rather than observation, is what can 
help to understand the happenings in the social world (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). 
The assumption about human nature addresses the relationship between 
humans and their environment. Being that human life is the subject or the 
object of inquiry, Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified two extreme 
perspectives that relates to humans’ response to the environment. Determinism 
assumes that humans and their experiences are mostly the product of their 
environment and as such are conditioned by the circumstances of the 
environment. It is possible to interpret voluntarism as having the consequence 
that humans are the creators of their environment, and their behaviour and 
experiences are a result of their free will (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This 
view, however, is an extreme position, and the analysis in this study allows 
some flexibility in interpreting the association between environment and free 
will. 
Connecting to methodology, Burrell and Morgan (1979) argued that the social 
scientists’ choice of methodologies is influenced by their perspective on 
ontology, epistemology and human nature. The methodologies range from 
those referred to as scientific, where the social world is treated like the natural 
world; to those referred to as naturalistic, where the social world is treated 
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softly with more subjective quality. Thus, the nomothetic methodology is 
adopted by the proponents of former while the proponents of the later adopt 
idiographic methodology. 
The assumptions about the nature of society are argued based on the 
regulation-radical change dimension. In connection, Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) distinguished between the theories of ‘order’ and ‘conflict’75. The 
theories explained the society either in terms of social order and equilibrium 
(sociology of regulation) or in terms of change, conflict, and coercion in social 
structures (sociology of radical change). 
Having consolidated the ideas about the nature of science and nature of society, 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) despite some limitations, established matrices of 
four paradigms as a ‘frame of reference’ for analysis of social phenomena, 
namely: functionalist, interpretive, radical human and radical structuralist. This 
is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
The functionalist paradigm rest upon the premise that the social world is 
composed of relatively concrete objects that are identifiable and can be 
systematically measured and verified; as well it has concerns for order and 
regulation (Hassard, 1991; Ryan et al, 2002). Consequently, the paradigm 
identifies with realism as its ontological position combined with the 
epistemology of positivism. It takes a deterministic stand on the issue of human 
nature and a nomothetic methodology. This paradigm advocates a scientific 






                                       
75
 The explanation on the nature of society is known as the ‘order-conflict debate’. 
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Figure 5.2: Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory 







THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
The interpretive paradigm also identifies with the tenets of order and regulation 
but, in contrast with functionalism, it approaches the analysis of the social 
world based on subjectivism. It views “the social world as emergent social 
process which is created by individuals concerned” (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). According to Hassard (1991), interpretive researchers tend to 
“deconstruct the phenomenological processes through which shared realities 
are created, sustained and changed”. In other words, they are interested in 
making meaning of the characters of our daily activities (Ryan et al, 2002). The 
paradigm aligns with nominalist ontology, anti-positivist epistemology, 
voluntarism for human nature and an ideographic methodology. 
In respect to the sociology of social change, Burrell and Morgan (1979) states 
that both radical humanism and radical structuralism accepts the existing 
assumptions of the interpretive and functionalist paradigms, but substitute the 
interpretive and functionalist’s assumption of consensual society with 
conflicting society. While radical humanists advocate radical change from a 
subjective perspective, the radical structuralists tend to views it from an 
objective stand. The radical humanists’ approach has a “perspective which tend 
to be nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic”, and radical 
 







structuralists’ perspective leans towards “realist, positivist, determinist and 
nomothetic” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It is committed to emancipation and 
emphasises on structural change. 
Despite the wide acceptance of the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework in 
the management and sociological field, it has also received its fair share of 
criticism. This is particularly more with respect to the framework’s strict use of 
mutually exclusive dichotomies; the implications of its assumptions on the 
relativity of reality, and the unclear justification given for the separation 
between radical humanist and radical structuralist paradigms (Hopper and 
Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Shultz and Hatch, 1996). The framework has also 
been referred to as too simplistic (Willmott, 1993). 
Notwithstanding the criticism, the usefulness of the Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
is enormous. It is regarded as the foundation for many frameworks in the social 
sciences (Chua, 1986), and it as well reminds researchers of the need to 
critically consider the various important assumptions underlying any research 
work and their connection to the methodology and methods to be employed. 
5.2.2 The Research Paradigms in Accounting 
In the previous section, there was a discussion on the assumptions a researcher 
can embrace with regards to the nature of social science and the nature of 
society. Additionally, the four paradigms that can be utilised for the analysis of 
various social phenomena were explored, as presented by Burrell and Morgan 
(1979). 
Building on the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), accounting researchers 
have gone further to classify accounting research into the mainstream 
(functionalist), the interpretive and the critical accounting researches (Hopper 
and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1999; Ryan et al, 2002). An 
illustration of the classification is shown in Figure 5.3. 
The assumptions of the mainstream, accounting research premise on the 
objective social world and the deterministic human behaviour, thus this in other 
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words is referred to as a functionalist approach (Ryan et al, 2002). In addition, 
the functionalist approach has been sub-categorised into the sphere of 
positivism, realism, instrumentalism and conventionalism (Laughlin, 1995). 
Some of the main assumptions of this approach include views that “reality is 
objective and external to subject, humans are passive objects; humans are 
rational actors who pursue their goals; the independence of observations to 
subject; and generalisation of findings using quantitative data (Chua, 1986). 








Source: Ryan et al (2002) 
In a different manner, the interpretive accounting research assumes that “social 
reality is emergent, subjectively created and objectified through human 
interaction, and that the role of a theory is to explain human actions in a society 
which is deemed to be stable, where any existing conflicts are resolved through 
shared meanings” (Chua, 1986:615). The interpretive approach shed light on 
particular meanings and uses of accounting in specific settings. It seeks to 
explore the ways in which “…the social, or the environment, as it were passes 
through accounting. Conversely, accounting ramifies, extend and shape the 
social” (Burchell et al, 1985: 385 cited in Maxfield, 2013). When used in the 
accounting context, it has been argued that the interpretive approach enables 
“researchers to examine metaphorical dimensions of accounting and thereby 















Radical Structuralism Radical humanism 
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gain an understanding denied by the more limited scope of the mainstream 
research perspective” (Baker and Bettner, 1997). 
Interpretive theorists are of the view that accounting and organisational 
objectives are interdependent, considering that “objectives are influenced by 
the knowledge of potential accounting” (Swieringa and Weick, 1987) and 
objectives are bound to be reformulated on the basis of new accounting 
information (Preston et al., 1992). Further, proponents of the interpretive 
accounting approach argue that accounting is a “system of thought” designed 
by human beings to assist human beings to make decisions, and influence 
human behaviour. Thus, they argue that social constructionist ontology would 
seem to be the most appropriate basis of conceptualising accounting (Gaffikin, 
2006). 
Laughlin (1999:73) defined critical accounting as “a critical understanding of 
the role of accounting process and practices and the accounting profession in 
functioning of society and organisations with an intention to use that 
understanding to engage (where appropriate) in changing these processes, 
practices and profession”. The critical accounting research shares some 
common features of interpretive research in that it assumes that social reality is 
a creation of social actors and it embraces radical change.  
However, the critical accounting research is distinct, in that it recognises 
accounting as a human endeavour that has social, political and economic 
consequences (Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1999). It advocates engagement in other 
to change or improve accounting practice. Furthermore, it is interdisciplinary 
and concerned at individual, organisational, societal and professional levels 
(Gaffikin, 2006; Laughlin, 1999). Although critical accounting research agrees 
with interpretation, it emphasises that interpretation should consider “the 
material conditions of domination that influence the process” (Chua, 
1986:621). 
There has been vast discussion on the classification of accounting research in 
the literature which confirms the opinion that there are alternative accounting 
research approaches (Ryan et al, 2002). In this respect, Laughlin (1995) argues 
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for a “middle range alternative”. He presented an alternative three dimensional 
schema for classifying empirical accounting research which circumvents the 
subjective-objective debate. 
Comprising the Laughlin (1995) framework is based on three dimensions of 
theory, methodology and change that can be analysed along range of low, 
medium and high. It is argued in such a way that the mainstream accounting 
research is categorised by a high level of theorisation and methodology and a 
low level of change. The interpretation of the low level of change, in this 
instance, is that the researcher assumes that the world requires no change, 
while the high level of theorisation and methodology suggests the researcher’s 
assumption that the role of the observer is limited to the application of the pre-
determined methods. In contrast, the interpretive perspective is characterised 
by a low level of methodology; a low level of prior theorisation and medium to 
low levels of change. In this instance, the researcher assumes that the world is a 
projection of the mind and the observer is free to get involved in the 
observation process.  
Alternatively, the “middle range” approach argues for taking a mid-point on 
each of the three continuums (theory, methodology and change). It suggests 
possibility of ‘skeletal’ generalisation and theory, human involvement, method 
of data collection and change. In his submission, Laughlin (1995) argues that a 
more realistic image of the social and technical nature of accounting system 
can be presented from the “middle range” position. 
5.3 The Research Approach   
Traditionally, there are basically two broad types of approaches used in 
conducting research, namely: quantitative (extensive) and qualitative 
(intensive) research. While the former views reality objectively and places 
consideration on numbers to form an opinion, the latter emphasises on words 
and observations to describe reality in their natural setting. Although the 
virtues of these differing assumptions vary from the perspectives of different 
authors, there is substantial agreement about their key features and their 
relevance to the conduct of research, as illustrated in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Features of Quantitative and Qualitative Methods 
Quantitative Qualitative 
 Inquiry from the outside. 
 It is underpinned by a 
completely different set of 
epistemological foundations 
than in qualitative research. 
 Are simply different ways to 
the same end? 
 Involves the following of 
various states of the scientific 
research. 
 The results are said to be 
‘hard’ generalizable data. 
 Inquiry from the inside. 
 An attempt to take account of 
differences between people. 
 Aim at flexibility and lack of 
structure, in order to allow 
theory and concepts to proceed 
in tandem. 
 The results are said to be, 
through theoretical 
generalisation, ‘deep, rich and 
meaningful’. 
 Inductive-where propositions 
may develop not only from 
practice, or literature review, but 
also from ideas themselves. 
 An approach to the study of the 
social world, which seeks to 
describe and analyse the culture 
and behaviour of humans and 
their groups from the point of 
view of those being studied. 
Source: Adapted from King (1994) 
Consequently, due to the endless debate
76
 over the suitability of both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, a complementing approach with 
pragmatic perspective was introduced to the body of research literature. These 
approaches have been referred to in various terms, including multi-strategy 
(Bryman, 2004); hybrids (Ragin et al., 2004); mixed-methods (Creswell, 
2003); multi-methods (Brannen, 1992); and methodological triangulation 
(Morse, 1991). The mixed method approach has been outstanding for its 
practicality, in the sense that all methods can be combined to answer a 
question. The data sets of both quantitative and qualitative approaches are 
either converged to provide more comprehensive evidence for studying a 
research problem, or having to build one set of data on the other to strengthen 
the validity and reliability of findings (Creswell, 2003). In sum, the appropriate 
approach for a particular research depends on its suitability with the research 
question (Locke et al, 2010). 
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 The debate over the suitability or compatibility of the combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods and paradigms in a single study is described as the “paradigm wars” 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
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5.4 Research methods 
Research methods refer to the variety of ways data can be collected and 
analysed. In conducting research, the appropriateness of which research 
method to employ is to be considered before data collection. This is so because 
it depends mainly upon the research objectives; research hypotheses and 
characteristics of population (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Several research 
methods can be employed for collecting survey data, including participant 
observations, case studies, interviews and self-administered questionnaires. 
Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages (Collis and Hussey, 
2003; Remenyi et al., 1998; Sekaran, 1992). Bearing in mind the objectives of 
this study, a questionnaire survey and interviews were employed to collect 
data. 
5.5 The Methods of Data Analysis  
Data analysis consists of examining, categorising, tabulating, or otherwise 
recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study (Yin, 
1994). As asserted by Miles and Huberman (1994), data analysis involves re-
arranging the data into manageable units in defined patterns and summarising 
the data with the intent to extract useful information about a research question 
and arrive at a meaningful conclusion. A clear instance of this is the coding 
process that it is essential in both quantitative and qualitative research. 
Yin (1994) presented pattern matching; explanation building and time series 
analysis as analytical techniques for investigations. In connection, Miles and 
Huberman (1994:11) relate that the data analysis process consists of three 
streams of interactive activities, namely: data reduction, data display and 
conclusion drawing and verification. The three streams of activities are 
intertwined prior to, during and after data collection. The activities therein are 









Source: Miles and Huberman (1994) 
The processes, illustrated above, are concerned mainly with qualitative 
research. From the perspective of quantitative data, its organisation, pattern and 
interpretation, there are mainly two statistical techniques: descriptive and 
inferential - used for analyses of data. The descriptive techniques relate to the 
transformation of raw data into a formalised pattern for easy understanding and 
interpretation, and the reorganisation, ordering and manipulation of the data to 
provide descriptive information. On the other hand, the inferential technique 
makes inference on observations based on estimated parameters. While the 
descriptive statistics are based on calculations such as mean, median and 
frequency distribution, ranking, standard deviations; the inferential techniques 
estimate parameters and test for significance (Pallant, 2001). 
This can be achieved using statistical estimates of population parameters in the 
form of a parametric test or a non-parametric statistical test. These are 
otherwise referred to as hypothesis tests. While the parametric test considers 
certain assumptions
77
about the underlying population distribution of the data 
on which they are used, the non-parametric test does not consider 
assumptions
78
 about the distribution of the population (Neideen and Brasel, 
2007). The non-parametric procedures are preferred when certain assumptions 
of parametric procedures are grossly violated. Further, some of the statistical 
techniques used for analysis are illustrated in Table 5.2. 
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The assumptions considered by a parametric test are mainly: (i) normal distribution of data; 
(ii) equal variance; and (iii) the variables are continuous. 
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The non-parametric test does not require measurement on an interval scale neither does it 












Table 5.2: Commonly Used Statistical Tests 
Parametric test Nonparametric test Purpose of test 
t test for independent 
sample 
Mann-Whitney U test; 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Compares two independent 
samples 
Paired t test Wilcoxon matched pairs 
signed-rank test 




Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient 
Assesses the linear 
association between two 
variables 
One way analysis of 
variance (F test) 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis of 
variance by ranks 
Compares three or more 
groups 
Two way analysis of 
variance 
Friedman Two way 
analysis of variance 
Compares groups classified 
by two different factors 
Source: Dallal (2000) 
5.6 Situating the Thesis 
Considering the various theoretical assumptions, approaches and methods that 
can be utilised in a social science research, as described in the previous section, 
this section presents the methodology and methods adopted in this study. The 
section discusses the research paradigm, the methods and the data analysis 
techniques used for this study. 
5.6.1 The Research paradigm for the Thesis 
The survey methods employed in the course of carrying out this study attempts 
to find out the reality of the performance of the NNPC as it is constructed in 
the minds of the respondents who are widespread across the upstream sector of 
the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Being that a researcher is required to 
understand the various paradigms and adopt the appropriate one after due 
consideration of the research questions, objectives and audience (Creswell, 
2007); the researcher employed the views of the interpretive paradigm. The 
paradigm was adopted in consistency with the Burrell and Morgan framework. 
This research views ‘reality’ as a subjective construction of the human mind 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979), although clearly the degree to which such a view 
is valid imposes some limitations on the interpretation of the findings. Thus, 
the researcher aligns with the nominalist ontology. This is justified considering 
that this study seeks the perception of stakeholders on the performance of the 
NNPC in the upstream sector. 
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Closely related to ontology is the epistemological assumption which entails the 
nature of knowledge and its investigation. In this respect, the researcher is 
looking for the reality of knowledge based on human interaction, experience 
and perception of the subject of study. Additionally, of interest to the 
researcher is to “obtain an understanding of the subjectively created social 
world ‘as it is’ in terms of an on-going process” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Thus the epistemological assumption employed is anti-positivism.  
Regarding the assumption concerning human nature, this research adopts the 
voluntarist point of view which advocates that man has a certain degree of 
latitude with respect to his actions. This view is consistent with human actions 
being mostly unconditioned and human beings being able, in the main, to 
express free will (Silverman, 1970:134 cited in Goles and Hirschheim, 2000). 
In other words, great emphasis is placed upon human consciousness as it is the 
assumption of the researcher that human beings play a role in the creation of 
their environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:6). In the context of the NNPC, 
the behaviour of individuals is a contributing factor in the creation of the 
setting of this research. 
The choice of nominalist ontology, anti-positivist epistemology and a 
voluntarist assumption for human nature influenced the adoption of 
ideographic methodological approach. This implies that the understanding of 
the world is best done by analysing subjective accounts of a situation or 
phenomena. This places this study within the realm of interpretive paradigm in 
consistence with Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework. 
Regarding the dimensions of “regulation” and “radical change” advanced by 
Burrell and Morgan (1979), the research leans towards radical change. The 
justification for this choice relates to the advocacy of the radical humanist 
paradigm regarding emancipation of people from social constraints that limit 
their potentials for growth and development. The view fits the context of this 
research. However, the Laughlin’s (1995) argument on “middle range” 




5.6.2 The Formulation of Hypotheses 
Drawing from the literature reviewed, hypotheses are formulated to empirically 
and critically determine the position of the NNPC with regards to its efficiency 
and effectiveness, cost effectiveness and value addition. A hypothesis is 
important for executing empirical research (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 2008); therefore, five null hypotheses were formulated for this 
research, as discussed below. 
Firstly, worldwide, the oil and gas industry covers a range of activities and 
processes that transforms the trapped oil and gas resources into usable products. 
The combined effort of this range of activities and processes creates value 
along the chain (Tordo, et al., 2011). Still, the objectives for value creation may 
not be clearly defined and may vary according to countries and companies due 
to different historical, organisational, financial and socio-economic conditions 
(Wainberg and Foss, 2007). Therefore, for the assessment and monitoring of 
performance to be achieved, the goals and objectives of the organisations 
seeking to add value will have to be properly identified (Wholey et al., 2010). 
In Section 2.7 and as illustrated in Table 2.2, objectives drawn from the 
literature were categorised into two broad groups
79
, namely; i) development of 
hydrocarbon resources; ii) socio-economic development (Wainberg and Foss, 
2007; Robinson, 2009). Adding value to hydrocarbon resources for the benefit 
of Nigerians and other stakeholders (NNPC, 2014c), as stated in the mission 
statement of the NNPC is a vague expression of its objectives. As a result, it 
seems desirable to find out if the commonly attested objectives in the literature 
apply to the Nigerian oil and gas industry. If so, understanding how value is 
created in consonance with the set objectives will provide a basis for measuring 
the performance of the NNPC.  
Also, the Nigerian government set objectives for the NNPC. In the main, these 
objectives help add value to the oil and gas resources of the country. For 
example, the government aspire to participate and control the oil and gas 
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industry, increase revenue, and acquire requisite technology and managerial 
skills (Gidado, 1999). The NNPC, on the other hand, acts in a managerial role 
over the MOCs with respect to exploration and production activities; thus, the 
MOCs report to the NNPC on the success or otherwise of their operations in 
Nigeria. This reporting again is relevant to adding value to the oil and gas 
resources. Therefore, the role of NNPC as accountor to the government
80
 and 
accountee, with respect to the MOCs, helps form an accountability framework, 
at the heart of which lies value adding objectives.  
Despite the vagueness of the NNPC’s mission, it is assumed that the aspirations 
of government, as earlier stated, form the basis of the NNPC’s mission. It is not 
unexpected that countries like Nigeria, which are highly dependent on oil and 
gas, will give relevance to revenue generation, acquisition of requisite 
technology, local content and economic linkages. These value adding indicators 
are well-acknowledged in the literature with the spirit of balancing the NOC’s 
commercial and non-commercial objectives. As well, the indicators have come 
to be regarded as tools for communication and reporting performance 
(MacGillivray and Zadek, 1995). This justifies the basis for forming hypothesis 
H11 below. 
H11: NNPC’s value adding objectives meets the global standard for hydrocarbon 
value creation. 
However, the rentier status of Nigeria and the centrality of oil and gas in its 
national politics provide the basis for argument that there are other personal and 
political objectives impeding the value adding ones set for the NNPC. For 
example, Thurber et al. (2010)
81
 reported that the presidency have often used its 
power over the control of oil and gas for patronage and settling political scores. 
Whilst the MOCs have also been alleged to collaborate with government to 
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 It is assumed that the government represent the people in ensuring effective management of 
the oil and gas resources. However, the people may feel unrepresented, when as often alleged, 
the government and other institutions delegated the responsibility of managing resources are 
unaccountable to the ordinary people. This in effect may become an avenue for patronage, 
misappropriation, fraud, corruption and social disorder that can impede the value adding 
expectations of the people (Schloss, 2008). 
81
 Thurber et al. (2010) stated that “Indeed, the implicit government goal for the oil sector 
appears to be the maximization of patronage opportunities; government policies have been too 
inconsistent to allow discernment of any more explicit objectives”. 
129 
 
subvert the value adding objectives in order to help government to keep power 
or for their own personal gains (Frynas, 1998). In consistence with the resource 
curse theory, this leads to political and economic instability which, in the long 
run, undermines the expectation of the people (Nwokeji, 2007).  
Based on the above, it can be argued that in reality the objectives of the 
government and the value adding mission of NNPC are not in congruence with 
the norm in other oil and gas industries. Generally, the basic aim for creating 
NOCs is to maximise revenue from which socio-economic problems will be 
solved. From the commercial point of view, emphases are placed on the 
discovery of reserves; the increase in production and scientific/technological 
development. The socio-economic point of view is concerned mainly with the 
distribution of the revenue; local content contribution and the linkages of the 
oil and gas industry with other sectors of the economy (Wainberg and Foss, 
2007). Other less emphasised objectives of the NOCs are diplomacy and 
environmental sustainability (Stevens, 2008a). As such the null hypothesis H01 
is formed that: 
HO1: NNPC’s value adding objectives do not meet the global standard for 
hydrocarbon value creation. 
Being the most emphasised in the literature, the null hypothesis H01 is tested 
through: i) discovery of new oil and gas reserves; ii) level of production; iii) 
level of revenue generation; iv) development and application of results from 
scientific research; v) increase in local content capacity; and increase in 
economic linkages to other aspects of the national economy.  
Secondly, according to Wainberg and Foss (2007) the operating environments 
(both endogenous and exogenous) for oil and gas businesses across producing 
nations are known to influence the NOCs’ ability to create value. Tordo et al. 
(2011) referred to the operating environments as drivers for value creations and 
grouped them into two categories of variables that describe the initial 
conditions and context and those that describe human and organisational 
agency. Cameron (1986) classified the environments into controllable and 
uncontrollable factors.  
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Overall, the operating environments restrict and influence the actions taken by 
the NOCs, along with the structures and processes used for accomplishing the 
outcome of the actions taken (Iles and Sutherland, 2001). Therefore, the level 
of an NOC’s achievement is greatly linked to its relationship with the operating 
environment (Aktas et al., 2011). Examples of these environments include 
policies, organisational culture, and governance of oil and gas sectors, political, 
fiscal/contractual and legal, underpinned by transparency and accountability 
(Tordo et al., 2011).  
In specific term, endogenous and exogenous environmental factors may have 
different effects on the operations of the NOCs, which on the balance will 
reflect in the performance of the NOCs. A factor may have a positive impact 
on one NOC while the same factor may impact negatively on another NOC 
(Tordo et al., 2011). For instance, the good performance of Statoil has been 
attributed to Norway’s separated oil and gas industry governance structure. 
Nevertheless, the same separated structure failed in Nigeria because of the 
difference in institutional and political environment (Thurber et al, 2010). This 
shows that what obtains elsewhere may not fit the Nigerian context and vice 
versa. 
Notwithstanding, the NNPC has been able to increase its reserves and 
production levels by retaining the services of the MOCs through offering 
favourable fiscal/contractual regimes. The interconnected effect of this to the 
NNPC’s objectives of value creation in effect has enhanced the NNPC’s 
performance in raising revenue for Nigeria and meeting its OPEC obligations 
(NAPIMS, 2013a). Therefore, it can be argued that despite deficiencies in 
some areas, on balance, the NNPC has been positively influenced in adding 
value to oil and gas resources. Thus hypothesis H12 is formed on this basis. 
H12: Environmental factors associated with the Nigerian upstream sector have, 
on balance, had a positive influence on adding value to hydrocarbon 
resources. 
Nevertheless, the literature has revealed the impeding effect of the legal 
environment in which the NNPC operates, as it has been argued to be outdated. 
The effort to change the existing legislation through the PIB has also been 
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greatly opposed by the MOCs (Gboyega et al., 2011). The uncertainty that 
ensues has reduced investments in the upstream sector which affects NNPC’s 
value adding objectives. Along with this are the excessive meddlesomeness of 
government in NNPC’s affairs and the alleged non-transparency; the lack of 
accountability and the corruption attributed to the NNPC (Iledare, 2008; 
Thurber et al., 2010; Iledare and Suberu, 2010). This makes it desirable to 
empirically test the effects of the various environmental factors on the 
performance of the NNPC through null hypothesis H02 stated below. 
HO2: Environmental factors associated with the Nigerian upstream sector have 
not, on balance, had a positive influence on adding value to hydrocarbon 
resources. 
In the management and organisation literature, the notion of VfM is commonly 
accepted as the yardstick for measuring the performance of public enterprises. 
The performance indicators, in this respect, are generally drawn and examined 
from the interrelated components of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
(3Es) (Boyne, 2002); that are based upon an input, process and output model of 
organisation (Boland and Fowler, 2000). In order words, the VfM concept is 
concerned with the assessment and accountability of outcomes, along with the 
means and processes used to achieve them (Jackson, 1993).  
In this respect, the concept of VfM is applied to the operations of the NNPC, a 
public enterprise whose activities are largely relied upon for the sustainability 
of Nigerians, and to whom public resources are allocated to create value. For 
this reason, there is the need for the NNPC to demonstrate accountability and 
VfM in its operations so as to justify the use of resources allocated to it and 
demonstrate its relevance and level of performance in adding value to Nigeria’s 
oil and gas resources. In this vein, three more hypotheses are formulated in line 
with the three components of VfM.  
Thirdly, efficiency which is one of the components of VfM is described as the 
appropriate utilisation of inputs to achieve maximum results (Richard et al., 
2009); it entails the responsiveness of an organisation’s operations or activities 
to public preferences (Jackson, 1982). The efficient utilisation of resources is 
very important because it generates surpluses, which can be reinvested in 
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creating and developing other capabilities (Jones, 1991). Relating this to public 
enterprises, especially those of developing countries where such enterprises 
constitute a significant proportion of the country’s aggregate value-added is 
very essential, since the fortune of the country is inseparably linked to the 
performance of such enterprises. 
The scenario above describes the dominant role of the NNPC within the 
Nigerian economy. Thus, the efficiency of the NNPC is very important because 
it will demonstrate the usage of resources and the freeing of funds for 
government to provide other socio-economic needs. Considering its 
importance, over the years, the NNPC have carried out transformation 
initiatives that involved restructuring, commercialisation and TQM with the 
intent of enhancing its structures, processes, operating system and performance 
(Ikoko, 2006; Okoye, 2010). That these efforts earned NNPC/NETCO an 
international award (Omoregie, 2001) can be taken as evidence of progress 
made by NNPC in its operational and value creation roles. Furthermore, it 
gives a perception that NNPC is efficiently managed and provides the basis for 
the view that the hypothesis H13, below, reflects.  
H13 – NNPC’s management of upstream petroleum activities has been efficient. 
Conversely, the literature also suggested inefficiency in several aspects of the 
NNPC’s operations - given its deficiencies in mobilising, allocating and 
utilising resources for value addition (Nwokeji, 2007). For instance, 
inefficiency has been demonstrated from the delays and lack of administrative 
synergy in project implementation due to the centralised nature of the NNPC’s 
structure (Yisa, 2005; Ibrahim, 2009). It can also be assumed that strategic 
decisions derived from a board majorly composed of non-experts, like that of 
the NNPC, will be inefficient (Thurber et al., 2010; Gboyega et al., 2011). 
Likewise, it is stated that the quality and the quantity of the staff utilised for the 
NNPC’s operations, along with its funding processes, are deficient (Nwokeji, 
2007; Penda, 2009).  
Having considered the relevance of roles within the NNPC in the sustainability 
of the NNPC, it can be concluded that the mixed reportage on its effectiveness 
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will only lead to further speculations. It is therefore pertinent to empirically test 
how well NNPC utilises its inputs and processes to derive optimum output. The 
variables to be tested will include the administrative system, staffing, financial 
processes and control mechanisms; since they are greatly responsible for 
achieving any organisations underlying management objectives of productivity, 
cost minimisation and performance (Boland and Fowler, 2000). As such, the 
null Hypothesis H03 is formulated. 
HO3 – NNPC’s management of upstream petroleum activities has not been 
efficient. 
Fourthly, organisational effectiveness, which is another component of the VfM 
concept, is described as the extent to which an organisation fulfils its mission 
target or objectives (Aktas et al., 2011). Within the realm of VfM, effectiveness 
can serve as a performance measurement tool through the assessment of how 
well resources, actions and processes are utilised to achieve objectives (Rainey 
and Steinbauer, 1999). In relation to public enterprises, an organisation’s 
effectiveness is argued to have a great influence on the quality of lives and 
sustainability (Rainey 2003), so it is bound to generate interest from the public. 
In this regard, the operations of the NNPC and its performance in achieving its 
set objectives have generated a lot of media hype, upon which the public and 
other stakeholders speculate and give their perception. For instance, while the 
NNPC acknowledges that it needs to enhance its performance, it has claimed 
success in most of its endeavours despite its funding constraints. The reserves’ 
base of crude oil has increased from 17 billion barrels in 1990 to 37 billion 
barrels in 2012, and the production level has surged from 1 million barrels per 
day in 1970 to over 2 million barrels in 2010. Also, NNPC claims success in its 
upstream engineering activities (NNPC, 2014b), and its seismic activities - as 
shown in Table 3.5. It can therefore be hypothesised that the NNPC has been 
effective in its operations. 
H14 - NNPC’s management of upstream petroleum activities has been effective. 
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On the contrary, the literature also presented the view that the NNPC has been 
ineffective as none of the aspirations set by government has been achieved. For 
example, the NNPC is still far away from its 4.5 million barrels per day target, 
local content development is still at about 35% and a high percentage of gas is 
still flared (Thurber et al., 2010; Gboyega et al., 2011). Other actions, 
processes and activities examined in the literature showed that the 
budget/project execution and funding targets are rarely met, while the control 
mechanism available is weak (Eluozo, 2008; Penda, 2009; Thurber et al., 
2010). Therefore, these negative opinions have influenced the forming of the 
null hypothesis H04, which will test the actions, processes and procedures that 
aids the NNPC in achieving its desired objectives.  
HO4 - NNPC’s management of upstream petroleum activities has not been 
effective. 
Fifthly, ensuring economy in the operations of an organisation is the third 
component of obtaining VfM. As earlier discussed in Section 3.6.3, economy 
involves the allocation of the minimum cost possible for human and material 
resources to achieve the optimum result without compromising on quality 
(Flynn, 2012). Therefore, economy is focused on the appropriateness of 
allocation and utilisation of resources for organisational activities and projects. 
It is also concerned with cost efficiency and benchmarking as a basis for 
evaluation (Boland and Fowler, 2000). 
As earlier stated, the NNPC have used various forms of oil and gas contractual 
arrangements to ensure economy. For instance, the adoption of the PSC 
arrangement in the early 1990’s can be argued to be the most economical 
option considering NNPC’s dearth of funding (Agoro, 2001). In addition, it can 
be argued that these decisions have helped in increasing the reserve base and 
production from the offshore oil fields. Furthermore, the NNPC has also 
demonstrated economy through the establishment of NIPEX, a procurement 
exchange that encourages competition, cost effectiveness and improves 
transparency and accountability (Kupolokun, 2006). These are views that 
suggest that the NNPC’s decisions for adding value considered minimal cost 
and quality and, as a result, hypothesis H15 is formed. 
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H15 – NNPC has ensured economy in the management of the upstream sector. 
On the other hand, the NNPC’s performance has been shown to be incapable of 
ensuring economy. Ezenwosu (2009) reported issues concerning the MOCs’ 
budget realignment, overrun and unilateral execution of unapproved projects. 
Other issues raised by Okonkwo (2005) and Abdullahi (2006) are the abuse of 
the authority limit for contracts; over pricing and lack of due process in 
tendering and other contract procedures. This can result in frauds and a 
wastage of resources that provides evidences of the NNPC’s weakness in its 
control monitoring roles (Kallamu, 2001).  
Based on these views, it can be assumed that there is a weak manifestation of 
economy in the activities of the NNPC. This provides the basis for the 
formation of null Hypothesis H05 to find the level NNPC’s ability to ensure 
cost performance in its different oil and gas contractual arrangements. 
HO5 – NNPC has not ensured economy in the management of the upstream 
sector. 
5.6.3 The Research Approach for the Study 
This research emphasises the use of the qualitative approach, being that it is 
based on human interaction; experience and perception of the respondents as 
regards to the NNPC and its upstream performance. Further reasons for 
adopting the qualitative approach include its emphasis on process and 
meanings (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Regarding data collection, both 
qualitative and quantitative methods triangulated to provide “useful and novel 
way to communicate meaning and knowledge”; and consolidate the advantages 
of having the “reliability of count with the validity of lived experience and 
perception” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Sandelowski et al. (2009) argues that counting numbers often involves 
qualitative judgments, and that numbers are often related to context. This 
collaborates the views that the “qualitative-quantitative debate is philosophical 
not methodological” (Trochim, 2006); the use of quantitative method to help 
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assess the perception of respondents in an interpretive study is acceptable 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
5.6.3.1 Population and Sample of the Study 
A population connotes a defined group of persons, objects, items or places 
from which samples can be drawn for measurement. According to Sekaran 
(1992:225), the population of a study refers to an “entire group of people, 
events, or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate”. 
Similarly, it is defined “as an aggregate or totality of all objects, subjects or 
members that conform to a set of specification” (Polit and Hungler, 1999:37). 
Furthermore, they relate that the process of selecting a portion of the 
population to represent the entire population is known as sampling. Thus, in 
order to achieve the objectives of a study, it necessary to identify a suitable 
population from which appropriate data can be drawn (Sekaran, 1992). 
The total population upon which this study relied upon, includes the staff of the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR); the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
(FMPR); the Multinational Oil Companies (MOC); the Local Oil Companies 
(LOC); the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
(RMAFC); the Auditor-General’s office (AGF); the Nigerian Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI); the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN); 
the National Assembly (NA); the Professional Accounting Firms (PAF); the 
Civil Society (CS).  
Following the review of the literature regarding the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry, it can be argued that the listed institutional bodies are authentic 
stakeholders who have experience and knowledge of the petroleum upstream 
sector. A judgemental sampling
82
 technique was used to pick the potential 
respondents, based on their schedule of duty, knowledge and experience in the 
petroleum upstream sector. The researcher utilised personal contact to consult 
relevant people within the stakeholder groups; as such, the number of potential 
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respondents varies among the groups. Further justifications for the choice of 
the listed respondent populations are discussed as follows. 
The NNPC is an important part of the respondent populations being the main 
subject of this study and based on its role as the Nigerian NOC. The NNPC has 
the responsibility for managing the interests of the Nigerian government and 
citizens in the oil and gas industry. From within the NNPC, fifty potential 
respondents from the National Petroleum Investment and Management 
Services (NAPIMS); the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC); 
the Directorate of Exploration and Production; the Directorate of Commercial 
and Investment; and the Directorate of Finance and Accounts were identified 
and included in the population frame. The employees included are those whose 
schedule of duty relates to the upstream sector and the four arms picked are 
those that have direct involvement in the upstream sector. 
The regulation of the Nigerian oil and gas industry is officially the 
responsibility of the DPR. It is an extra-statutory department in the FMPR, 
which is the petroleum ministry. There are both well-placed within the 
governance structure of the Nigerian oil and gas industry; while the DPR is 
officially the regulator of the industry, the FMPR is responsible for 
policymaking. Fifteen potential respondents from the DPR and twelve potential 
respondents from the FMPR were included in the population frame after due 
consideration of their upstream background. 
The NEITI, the AGF and the PAF were included primarily because they all, in 
one form or another, partake in the auditing of the NNPC. Fifteen potential 
respondents were identified and included in the sample from the NEITI, being 
that the agency that serves as a watchdog of oil and gas industry. In an effort to 
instil the culture of transparency and accountability in the industry, the NEITI 
carries out periodic physical and financial audits on petroleum production and 
revenue remitted to government by the MOCs. Also, eight employees working 
with the oil and gas section of the AGF’s office were included. Adding the 
AGF’s office to the population is justified being that it is constitutionally 
invested with the responsibility of auditing all government bodies including the 
NNPC. With regards to the PAF, they are professional firms involved in joint 
138 
 
venture auditing and as such fifteen potential respondents were identified and 
included in the population frame.  
The MOCs and the LOCs are included as part of the population based on their 
role as explorers and producers of Nigerian oil and gas. While the MOCs are 
credited with over 90% of production, the performance of the LOCs has 
improved over the years. Twenty and ten potential respondents are included 
from the MOCs and the LOCs respectively. The perception of these groups is 
important because they deal directly with the NNPC in the upstream sector 
through various contractual agreements. 
The RMAFC and the CBN are included in the population because they are 
involved in the safekeeping and distributing revenue derived from petroleum 
taxes. In addition, the CBN nurtures and monitors the growth of the Nigerian 
economy and petroleum is the dominant factor. In this regard, ten potential 
respondents each are included in the sample from the CBN and the RMAFC; 
they all work in departments that have relationship with the upstream sector of 
the oil and gas industry. 
Besides its oversight function in the oil and gas industry on behalf of the 
people, the NA is included in the population of the study because of its roles in 
legislation and in the appropriation of funds. The NA is responsible for making 
laws in Nigeria, and this includes those related to the oil and gas industry. 
Furthermore, the NA through its oil and gas committees appropriate the funds 
needed for developmental projects in the upstream sector. As such, fifteen 
legislators who serve in the upstream committee and their supporting 
employees were included in the sample. 
The civil societies are included due to its active participation in debating and 
monitoring of oil and gas activities. The civil societies are represented in the 
National Stakeholders Working Group of NEITI. Therefore, with the help of 
the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, fifteen potential respondents 
were considered as part of the sample. Table 5.3 presents the summary 
population for the study. 
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Table 5.3: Summary of Respondents 
No Place of Work Population 
(%) 
1 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 50 (25.6) 
2 Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI)  15 (7.7) 
3 Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 15 (7.7) 
4 Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources (FMPR) 12 (6.2) 
5 Multinational oil companies (MOC) 20 (10.2) 
6 Local oil companies (LOC) 10 (5.1) 
7 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 10 (5.1) 
8 Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
(RMAFC)  
10 (5.1) 
9 Auditor-General’s Office (AGF) 8 (4.2) 
10 Professional Accounting Firms (PAF) 15 (7.7) 
11 National Assembly (NA) 15 (7.7) 
12 Civil Societies (CS) 15 (7.7) 
 Total 195 (100) 
Source: Author 
5.6.3.2 Method of Data Collection Used in this Study 
As stated earlier, the methods of data collection refers to the channel used for 
collecting data, and it greatly depends on the nature of the data. In this study, 
the questionnaire and interviews were employed to collect data with the aim of 
satisfying the objective of the research using a qualitative approach. Also the 
section discussed the piloting and administration of the questionnaire and 
issues relating to reliability and validity. 
5.6.3.2.1 Questionnaire 
Considering the nature of this study, a questionnaire was designed with 
questions asked in line with the objectives of the study. The questionnaire 
aimed to collate empirical evidence upon which a view can be formed 
regarding NNPC’s performance (efficiency, effectiveness and economy) in the 
Nigerian oil and gas upstream sector from a stakeholders’ perspective. 
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In view of this, and with the aim of encouraging the respondents to answer the 
questions and increase the response rate, an accompanying covering letter (see 
Appendix B) was designed considering the characteristics recommended by 
several authors (Sekaran, 1992; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008). 
These characteristics include an introduction on the Robert Gordon University 
formal letterhead; the purpose and importance completing of the survey; an 
assurance of confidentiality regarding the information being sought; an offer to 
provide the respondents the results of the survey if they so wish.  
Furthermore, the principles of designing a questionnaire discussed in 5.4.1.1 
through to 5.4.1.1.3 which includes wording, type, sequence and scaling of 
questions were considered for the questionnaire in this study. As postulated by 
Sekaran (1992) and Oppenheim (1992), a careful choice of wording in a 
questionnaire is important in order to avoid jargons, duplications, double 
barrelling, leading questions and ambiguity. The wording can also have 
positive influence on the simplicity and the length of a questionnaire. All these 
were carefully taken into consideration when designing the questionnaire for 
this study under the able guidance of my supervisory team. 
It took four months to put the questionnaire in order, having gone through a 
series of meetings, rewording and rewriting the questions to be understandable 
and to convey the intended meaning to respondents. This effort was justified as 
no respondents requested for further explanation or clarification. Further, the 
questionnaire was primarily designed to be closed-ended with some space left 
at the end to enable the respondents to make relevant comments. In this 
respect, and as discussed in 5.4.1.1.2, the closed questions were employed 
because through it respondents’ answers can be meaningfully compared, coded 
and easily analysed. 
Again, the questions were sequenced to “facilitate smooth progression of 
respondents through the questionnaire” (Sekaran, 1992:208). The questionnaire 
was arranged in a logical order with questions progressing from the general to 
the specific. Some space was provided at the end of the questionnaire (in an 
open ended format) for the respondents who may want to make further 
comment in their own words. 
141 
 
Regarding scaling, an appropriate measuring rule was considered, as it is a vital 
aspect of designing a questionnaire (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008). 
This is to enable the researcher have an instrument that will efficiently and 
effectively capture and reflect the opinions’ of respondents; provide optimum 
validity; reduce the respondents’ burden and the researchers’ cost of collecting 
data (Krosnick, 1999). A nominal scale was considered for the first part of 
questionnaire where respondents’ personal information was requested. The 
respondents were asked to indicate their place of work by ticking the 
appropriate box. In the second part comprising of four sections, a standard five 
point Likert scale (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, and 
5=strongly disagree) was used to ascertain the respondents’ perceptions on the 
issues raised. 
The design of questionnaire has two parts, consisting of five sections. In the 
first part, personal information was sought regarding the respondents’ places of 
work. This information was used to examine and compare the pattern of 
opinions from different respondent groups regarding the NNPC’s value 
addition, efficiency, effectiveness and economy. Other demographic 
information such as age, nationality, position was not sought because there 
were not relevant to this study. 
Section One of the second part of the questionnaire sought respondents’ 
opinions regarding what is expected of NNPC to add value to hydrocarbon 
resources and what the constraints are. The aim of this was to determine what 
“value adding” entails as stated in NNPC’s mission and examine its 
performance and constraints. Generally accepted value adding indicators were 
identified and presented to respondents for their perceptions on NNPC’s 
performance. Similarly, opinions were sought on how some factors such as 
political interference, transparency, accountability, fiscal policies and 
legislations have influenced the performance of the NNPC (either positively or 
negatively). This is important to enable the researcher to form a view on how 
well the NNPC is doing in achieving mission objectives. 
Section Two of the questionnaire sought the views of the respondents 
regarding the issues related to the efficiency of the NNPC in carrying out its 
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upstream petroleum operations. Questions were asked regarding the processes 
of operations; the robustness of administration; the quality and quantity of 
staffing; finance; monitoring and control tools - such as budgeting. This is 
important to enable the researcher have an empirical basis to form a view 
regarding the efficiency of the NNPC. 
In Section Three, six strands of questions were asked of the respondents 
regarding the NNPC’s effectiveness in its upstream operations. Particularly, 
questions were asked on whether targets are met in respect of crude oil 
reserves, production, development of skills, and transfer of technology. In 
addition, opinions were sought about the NNPC’s effectiveness regarding cost 
control processes; effective monitoring compliance to various upstream 
operational rules and regulations as well as effective communication. 
Finally, the fourth section concerns NNPC’s choices and economic decisions 
for the petroleum upstream sector. Questions were asked to determine the 
economic appropriateness of the petroleum contractual arrangements that the 
NNPC employ, as well as the cost effectiveness of the NNPC’s monitoring 
roles in the upstream sector. Relatedly, the views of the respondents were 
sought regarding the capability of the NNPC to identify problematic cost areas, 
to benchmark and to improve performance. 
5.6.3.2.1.1 Pilot Study 
The pre-tests and pilot surveys are important approaches to avoid or minimise 
limitations of questionnaires. They address the issues of clarity, wording, 
scaling, validity, layout, instructions and the time it takes to complete the 
questionnaire. They also save the researcher time, money and effort that can be 
lost if the shortcomings of the questionnaire are not detected in time. Many 
authors have discussed the importance of a pilot survey. For instance, 
Sarantakos (2005) related the need for pre-testing and piloting as “to discover 
possible weaknesses, inadequacies, ambiguities and problems in all aspects of 




Furthermore, the pilot survey has been acknowledged as an important process 
of improving the validity and reliability of each question included in the 
questionnaire, as the respondents involved in the piloting stage are similar to 
those in the main survey (Oppenhiem, 1992). In addition, the pilot survey 
offers the opportunity of gathering information through non-verbal behaviour 
regarding the wordings or contents of the questionnaire that may embarrass or 
cause some discomfort to the respondents (Sarantakos, 2005).  
In this study, two stages of tests were conducted. In the pre-test stage, seven 
research students and three academic staff of the Aberdeen Business School, 
Robert Gordon University and Glasgow Caledonian University were involved. 
The pilot respondents were requested to comment on any ambiguities, 
omissions and areas of improvement. Their comments and recommendations 
focused on wordings; length of the questionnaire and the length of time to 
complete the survey. Thereafter, the questionnaire was revised in line with 
their comments and recommendations. 
In the second stage, the pilot test involved three Nigerians working in the oil 
industry in Aberdeen and six pilot participants from across the selected 
stakeholder groups in Nigeria. The researcher applied judgemental selection in 
this process. Their valuable comments focused mainly on the length of the 
questionnaire. After taking into account their comments, the researcher with 
the support of the supervisory team revisited and revised the questionnaire as 
recommended and developed a final version. 
5.6.3.2.1.2 Administration of Questionnaire 
The researcher made pre-notification contact with relevant officers in the 
various stakeholder organisations before proceeding to the field. As a result, 
the researcher was fortunate to be invited to attend the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Conference, 2012, in Abuja, Nigeria. This enabled the researcher to meet a 
cross-section of key stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, including 
the NNPC; the DPR; the FMPR; the MOC; the LOC; the RMAFC; the NEITI; 
the CBN; the NA. Appointments with the heads of research units of the various 
groups were arranged since they knew those most qualified who could 
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understand the issues highlighted and make a useful contribution. In particular, 
the top management of the NNPC and the DPR supported the administration of 
the survey. 
The questionnaires were personally delivered to the PAF; the AGF; and the CS 
after necessary enquiries were made about the relevant officers to meet. The 
Director, Internal Audit of the AGF emphasised that the questionnaires would 
be distributed to officers in their Oil and Gas unit. The whole exercise of 
administering questionnaires was carried out over the period of two weeks; 
whereby, all of the stakeholder organisations were given both hard and soft 
copies of the questionnaires. 
After distribution of the questionnaires, the researcher constantly followed up 
through personal visits to the organisations, and by frequently phoning the 
main contacts. Using the approach of persuasion, the researcher was able to 
collect the answered questionnaires from all of the organisations either through 
hand delivery and electronic mails. This collection process was done over a 
period of three weeks. 
5.6.3.2.2 Interview 
The second method employed for this empirical study was the semi-structured 
interview, and it was patterned in line with the questionnaire. Interviewing is a 
common qualitative approach for data collection that allows interviewees the 
time and scope to relate their opinions about a subject within the framework to 
be explored. The aim of this is to retrieve more in-depth information about the 
phenomena under study (Hussey and Hussey, 1997) and to further investigate 
the responses of the questionnaire (McNamara, 2009). 
The interview was arranged according to the five themes of the questionnaire: 
Adding value to hydrocarbon resources; environmental factors that influence 
NNPC’s performance; efficiency; effectiveness; and economy. The researcher 
sought to explore further by amplifying the themes in the questionnaire to 
ascertain why certain things happen or why not, which enabled the results of 
the questionnaire to be better understood. 
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As earlier stated, the interviews conducted were in a semi-structure form. The 
researcher assured the interviewees of the confidentiality of the outcome of the 
interviews. Additionally, notes were taken during the interviews to ease the 
process of analysis, and to serve as a back-up in case of ‘machine’ malfunction. 
This helped in the accurate transcription of the interview. 
The researcher conducted the interviews after considering and applying the 
principles recommended by McNamara (2009) which include: (i) choosing a 
setting with little distraction; (ii) explaining the purpose of the interview; (iii) 
addressing terms of confidentiality; (iv) explaining the format of the interview; 
(v) indicating the usual length of the interview; (vi) telling them how to get in 
touch afterwards - if they want to; (vii) asking them if they have any questions 
before the interview commences; (viii) making sure all instruments are in place 
so as not to rely on memory in order to recall their answers. 
Regarding the actual conduction of the interviews, the researcher identified, 
selected and arranged with the potential interviewees during the Nigerian Oil 
and Gas Conference, 2012, held in Abuja, Nigeria. Two interviewees each 
were identified for the twelve respondent groups stated in the questionnaire. 
However, the plan could not be implemented due to the non-availability of 
some of them as arranged or because they are no longer willing to grant the 
interviews. Despite this setback and time constraints, a total of sixteen 
interviews were conducted. Ten were conducted in Abuja and six were 
conducted on telephone from Aberdeen. 
The interviews conducted involved interviewees from: (i) the NNPC; (ii) the 
DPR; (iii) the MOCs; (iv) the NA; (v) the CS; (vi) the NEITI. All of the 
interviews were audio taped with the exception of one who declined to be 
taped for fear that his anonymity may be compromised. In this situation, a full 
note of the responses was taken. The duration for the interviews ranged 
between forty-five minutes to one hour, and the language of communication 




5.6.4 Data Analysis 
This research went through a series of processes: from data collection to data 
analysis. The concept of 3Es (efficiency, effectiveness and economy) was 
adopted to carefully design questions for the surveys. Accordingly, the right 
groups of respondents were identified, and the responses received were coded. 
At this stage, no conclusions were made. Thereafter, the data collected and 
coded were subjected to statistical tests, analysed and concluded in line with 
the objectives stated for the study. 
The statistical processes undertaken for analysing the data collected for the 
study are descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistical tests. The 
descriptive statistics entails the use of frequencies, mean, median, and cross-
tabulation. These cover the analysis of personal information of respondents’ 
groups as well as their perceptions regarding each of the tested variables. 
Furthermore, the non-parametric test of Mann-Whitney was employed to 
identify and discuss the differences between the respondents’ groups. The non-
parametric test was used because the data gathered does not meet the normality 
requirement for a parametric test. Accordingly, the five per cent level of 
significance was chosen for this study, as it is the conventionally accepted 
significance level for business research. 
Analysis of the data collected from the interviews, was based on the processes 
of data reduction, display and conclusion. A thematic analytical method was 
adopted, whereby the common themes and patterns of the interviews were 
identified (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008). Also, as recommended 





; (iii) and forcefulness
85
.The technique of ‘quote research’86 was 
also utilised in the course of analysis. 
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Recurrence refers to instances where at least two parts of the interviews reflect the same 
meaning, even if they were present using different words.  
84
Repetition refers to instances where key words, phrases, sentences are repeated in at least two 
parts of the interview. 
85
Forcefulness refers to instances where there are significant changes in volume or inflection or 
positioning during the interview. 
86
 Quote research refers to the use of quotes from interviews conducted in the research work. 
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5.6.4.1 Data Coding 
The term ‘coding,’ in both qualitative and quantitative research concerns the 
arrangement of data in a systematic order to enable make meaningful 
conclusions. Coding has been defined as“ a systematic way in which to 
condense extensive data set into smaller analysable units through the creation 
of categories and concepts derived from the data” (Lockyer, 2004). Thereafter, 
the coded data can be easily inputted into computers for analysis. 
After consulting with a statistician at the Robert Gordon University, codes 
were allocated to each variable in the questionnaire in a coding sheet (see 
Appendix C), and eventually the data was entered into the computer. Each 
respondent group was allocated a code ranging from 1 to 12, in this form: 
1(NNPC); 2(NEITI); 3(DPR); 4(FMPR); 5(MOC); 6(LOC); 7(CBN); 
8(RMAFC); 9(AGF); 10(PAF); 11(NA); 12(CS). Regarding the responses, 
each variable in the questionnaire was allocated its code and the completed 
questionnaires were entered according to the codes. The entries were rechecked 
to make sure that there were no mistakes. 
After considering various statistical packages that are used for data analysis, 
the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) was chosen for the data 
analysis. It is one of the most comprehensive statistical packages used for 
social science studies. It is user friendly, saves time and fits the purpose of this 
research (Bachman and Schutt, 2007). 
5.6.4.2 Missing Data Analysis 
The issue of missing data is a common problem in all kinds of research. This 
problem usually arises as a result of respondents’ unwillingness to answer a 
question; due to lack of clarity of the question, due to lack of time or if data are 
not properly recorded. The problem of missing data if not properly treated - 
threatens the validity of a study (Croninger and Douglas, 2005). 
According to Little and Rubin (1989), missing data are defined in this 
taxonomy: (i) Missing completely at random (MCAR); (ii) Missing at random 
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(MAR); (iii) Not missing at random (NMAR).  Firstly, data are said to be 
MCAR when the probability that responses are missing is unrelated to either 
the value of specific values that, in principle, should have been obtained or the 
set of observed responses. Secondly, data are MAR when the probability that 
responses are missing depends on the set of observed responses, but is 
unrelated to the specific missing value that should have been obtained. Thirdly, 
data are NMAR when the probability that responses are missing depends on 
both the set of observed responses and the specific missing values that, in 
principle, should have been obtained. 
In view of this, overcoming the problem of missing data can be dealt with 
through four main ways: (i) ignorable response - whereby only available data 
are analysed; (ii) Data replacement - whereby researchers impute missing data 
with a replacement value and consider them as observed data; (iii) by imputing 
missing data based on certainty; (iv) model based method - which use 
multivariate relationship between variables to handle missing data. However, a 
researcher can only use one of the ways suggested above, having considered a 
technique for tackling the missing data problem. Buhi et al. (2008) suggested 
three general categories of techniques: case deletion, direct estimation and 
imputation.  
Firstly, case deletion entails the exclusion of all cases that have missing data 
during analysis. Case deletion can be effected either through listwise deletion 
and pairwise deletion. These approaches are commonly used; can be used for 
any kind of statistical analysis and require no special computational method. 
However, the drawback of case deletion is that it substantially reduces the size 
of data which in effect can yield biased estimates. Secondly, direct estimation 
concerns the use of all available data, including those cases with missing value 
to produce parameter estimates and standard errors. There are several direct 
estimation techniques amongst which the Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) is probably the most pragmatic. Thirdly, the logic of the 
imputation technique which is further divided into single and multiple 
imputations are “to substitute some reasonable guess (imputation) for each 
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missing value and then proceed to do the analysis as if there were no missing 
data” (Allison, 2002:11). 
The single imputation technique replaces incomplete observations with 
complete information based on an estimate of the true value of the unobserved 
variable. Although it allows the inclusion of all cases, the single imputation 
cannot reflect sample variability. It is, however, widely used in practice 
because of its straightforwardness, and the most popular of the single 
imputation techniques is the mean estimation (Nakia and Ke, 2011). On the 
other hand, the multiple imputation technique replaces missing items with two 
or more acceptable values, representing a distribution of possibilities. The 
technique is sophisticated in that it requires several imputations. 
Having reviewed the various missing data mechanisms, it was noted that the 
handling of missing value is determined by the type of ‘missingness’; that is 
whether the data is MCAR, MAR or NMAR. In view of this, this study 
determined that the missing data is MCAR and employed the mean estimation 
technique to fill the missing values. The mean estimation technique was 
considered because it is widely used and can easily be employed through the 
SPSS. 
5.6.5 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability and validity are two concepts that are important to social scientists 
because of their significance in ensuring that conclusions derived from a study 
are relevant, accurate and usable to other researchers. The two concepts are 
related in a lop-sided manner. Potter (1996) postulate that a test can be reliable 
without being valid, but it cannot be valid unless it is reliable. The two 
concepts are most favoured in quantitative studies and by researchers with 
positivistic paradigm (Charmaz, 2000). Notwithstanding, researchers aligned to 
the interpretive paradigm also stress the significance of reliability and validity 
during the entire research process, and call on researchers to ensure proper 
management of threats (Morse et al, 2002). Therefore, both reliability and 
validity are considered through the processes of this study. 
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Reliability is defined as “a measure that indicates the stability and consistency 
with which the instrument is measuring the concept and helps to assess the 
‘goodness’ of a measure” (Sekaran, 1992:173). Reliability is vital in any 
research work to ensure that the appropriate measuring instruments are 
employed to get results. The degree of reliability is the most used measure for 
evaluating a research instrument and its compatibility with the variables or set 
of variables it intends to measure (Hair et al, 2006). The evaluation of 
reliability requires that the processes employed are repeatable, and other 
researchers can arrive at the same results at different periods (Drucker-Godard 
et al, 2001). 
The goal of reliability is to minimise biases and errors in a research work. In 
view of this, Saunders et al. (2003) identified the biases and errors as: 
participant error; participant bias; observer error and observer bias. The 
participant error reveals the attitudes of respondents regarding the time it takes 
to fill the questionnaires and the expected time of returning them. This may 
influence the way they answer the questions due to stress and the surrounding 
environment. Considering this threat, it was determined, during the pilot 
survey, that fifteen minutes is the maximum time it could take to fill the 
questionnaire. Relatedly, a period of three weeks was given to the respondents 
to fill the questionnaire. Therefore, it is assumed that the issues of stress and 
distortion of answers were addressed. Regarding participant bias, which 
happens as result of personal relationship with respondents, this study ensured 
that the respondents were nameless and unidentifiable. In this aspect, it can 
also be assumed that the reliability of the questionnaire was not threatened. 
Observer error relates to the manner questions are presented in a questionnaire. 
Being that the questionnaire for this study employed a standard format; the 
appropriate principles of designing a questionnaire were adhered to, it is 
assumed that the threat to reliability is very minimal. Relating to observers 
bias, the researcher was as objective as possible to set out transparent processes 




Validity in a related manner has been defined as “the correctness or credibility 
of a description, conclusion and explanation, interpretation, or other sort of 
account” (Maxwell, 1996:87). Similarly, Collis and Hussey (2003:186) 
referred to research validity as “the extent to which findings and conclusions 
accurately represent what is really happening in the situation”. Validity 
concerns how the accurately a variable or variables are compatible with a 
concept used and the confidence other researchers may have in the findings. In 
other words, it concerns the relationship between the measuring instruments 
and the results derived. 
Validity has been classified into different type. Firstly, Sekaran (1992) stated to 
two types, namely: internal validity and external validity. The internal validity 
refers to the extent of drawing accurate and legitimate samples studied; 
external validity refers to the extent of making a wide generalisation from the 
findings. 
Secondly, in another form, Sekaran (1992:172) identified three types of 
validity namely: content, construct and criterion-related validity. Content 
validity concerns the effectiveness of delineating the dimensions and elements 
of a concept. It proposes that the items that make up the content of the study 
include everything needed and does not capture anything that is not needed. 
Construct validity refers to the meaningfulness of the survey instrument, in 
relation to the context in which it being used. Its assessment is usually based on 
the track record of the instrument in, the context it is being used. Criterion-
related validity refers to how well one instrument of measurement is compared 
to another one which acknowledge as the standard of judgement. 
Considering the issues related to content validity, as stated earlier, the pilot 
tests conducted in this study provided insight and recommendations that 
ensured accuracy and relevance of the content. The standard format adopted for 
the questionnaire ensured that the threats related to participants’ influences, 
such as beliefs, sex, and health, were greatly minimised.  Furthermore, based 
on the pilot test, appropriate wordings were used and the reduction of the 
length of the questionnaire did not leave out any important content. 
Additionally, the instruments used are common in studies on efficiency; value 
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for money of performance; hence it can be assumed that validity was not 
threatened. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the types of research; the philosophical assumptions; 
methodology and methods considered for the study were discussed. In 
consistence with the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework, earlier defined, 
this study adopted the interpretive paradigm because of its suitability for a 
descriptive and explanatory research. 
The study also considered the Laughlin’s argument on “middle range” thinking 
- given the subjective nature of human beings and then the appropriateness of 
the anti-positivist methodological approach. These thoughts influenced the 
mixed methods of the questionnaire survey and interviews employed for the 
study. In the succeeding two chapters (six and seven), the analysis of the data 
collected and the findings are presented, with a view to determining how well 
stakeholders perceived the NNPC to have performed in ensuring value adding 













ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE-BASED SURVEY 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the analysis of the data collected 
based on the questionnaire designed and administered for the study. For easy 
interpretation, the chapter is structured into four sections. Section 6.2 involves 
the analysis of questionnaire responses and personal information of the 
stakeholder groups. This is followed by the statistical analysis of the responses 
of the major issues addressed by questionnaire, as in Section 6.3. And, lastly, 
Section 6.4 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Questionnaire Response Rate 
A total of 195 questionnaires were distributed in paper form to 12 stakeholder 
groups, and 126 completed questionnaires were returned (see Table 6.1). It 
therefore means that the survey achieved an overall response rate of 65%.  The 
high response rate achieved can be ascribed to the following reasons: 
(1) The contact that the researcher had with relevant officers of the various 
stakeholder groups. 
(2) An introductory letter written by my supervisor introducing the 
researcher and the importance of the topic under investigation might 
have contributed to the high response rate (see Appendix B). 
(3) The attractive format in which the questionnaire was designed. As 
shown in Appendix D, the questionnaire was carefully worded and 











Table 6.1: Responses Received Analysed by Stakeholder Group 
No Organisations Issued Returned Response Rates Percentage 
1 NNPC 50 24 48% 19.0 
2 NEITI 15 13 87% 10.3 
3 DPR 15 8 53% 6.3 
4 FMPR 12 10 83% 7.9 
5 MOC 20 12 60% 9.5 
6 LOC 10 7 70% 5.6 
7 CBN 10 8 80% 6.3 
8 RMAFC  10 10 100% 7.9 
9 AGF 8 6 75% 4.8 
10 PAF 15 8 53% 6.3 
11 NA 15 12 80% 9.5 
12 CS 15 8 53% 6.3 
Total 195 126 65% 100 
Source: Author 
Note:  NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
6.2.1 Missing Data 
The data files were inspected for missing data, after which the missing value 
analysis in SPSS was employed to determine the number of values missing for 
each of the cases and variables. It was found that 17 cases have empty cells 




Table 6.2: Cases with Missing Value 
A 3 13 16 20 24 34 39 53 54 57 61 65 67 81 85 89 91 
B 1 1 1 2 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Source: Author  
Note: A= Cases; B=Missing values 
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 There were a total of 126 respondents and 68 variables. This indicated 7276 expected 




The Little’s MCAR test was utilised to determine the randomness of the 
missing values. The result indicated a Chi-square = 143.467 (DF=134, Sig = 
.272). Further, the result revealed significant value (0.272) that is greater than 
the alpha value (0.05). The interpretation of this is that no identifiable pattern 
exists to the data missing. Consequently, the mean estimation technique was 
utilised to fill the missing gaps. 
6.2.2 Respondents’ Stakeholder Groups 
As illustrated in Table 6.1, the respondents were classified into 12 different 
stakeholder groups. The high ranking respondents in the sample were from the 
NNPC (19.0%), the NEITI (10.3%) and the MOC and the NA with 9.5% each. 
They were followed by 7.9% respondents each for the FMPR and the RMAFC; 
whilst the low ranking respondents groups were the LOC (5.6%) and the AGF 
(4.8%). In between these two groups were respondents from the DPR, the 
CBN, the PAF and the CS, each with a 6.3% representation. In addition, except 
for the NNPC which has a 48% response rate, responses from all the 
stakeholder groups is above 50% (see Table 6.1). 
6.3 Statistical Analysis of Questionnaire Responses 
This section is designed to test five hypotheses
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 developed for the study. 
Analyses of the 68 variables employed for the study were based on a 
descriptive analysis of the frequency of distribution of group respondents’ 
responses with the aim to determine their overall perception on each of the 
variables. 
Furthermore, as explained in Section 5.6.4, the non-parametric test of Mann-
Whitney is employed to facilitate the statistical analyses based on 5% level of 
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 According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008:435), the process of testing 
hypothesis comprises of four steps: “ i) formulate a null hypothesis and a research hypothesis; 
ii) choose a sampling distribution and a statistical test according to the null hypothesis; iii) 
specify a significance level and define the region of rejection; and iv) compute the statistical 





. Accordingly, the cross-tabulation tests are employed to analyse 
the differences that emerge. 
6.3.1 The NNPC and Value Addition 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, the primary aim of creating the NNPC is to obtain 
optimum value to Nigeria’s hydrocarbon resources in the best interest of the 
country (Nwokeji, 2007). It is further expressed in its mission statement that 
the “NNPC is an integrated Oil and Gas Company, engaged in adding value to 
the nation’s hydrocarbon resources for the benefit of all Nigerians and other 
stakeholders” (NNPC, 2014c). Thus in this regard, this section sought the 
perception of stakeholders as to: i) what indicators signify adding value to 
hydrocarbon resources; ii) the value drivers (internal and external factors) that 
affect the performance of NNPC. 
6.3.1.1 Perception of Stakeholder Groups on Value Adding Indicators 
The research sought the views of respondents on their understanding of the 
NNPC’s mission as a basis for evaluating the NNPC’s performance. However, 
the term ‘adding value’ as expressed in the NNPC’s mission statement does not 
clearly indicate the requisite functions and outcomes of value addition. Hence, 
forming a view on the NNPC’s performance requires knowing what value 
adding entails. As such, the null hypothesis HO1 is designed to test the 
perception of respondents in relation to six value adding indicators generally 
cited in the literature (see Section 2.5.2): 
HO1 - NNPC’s value adding objectives do not meet the global standard for 
hydrocarbon value creation. 
The recognition of the value adding objectives is indeed the first requisite for 
measurement of organisational performance (Glendinning, 2002). In this 
regard, and in the context of the research, Al-Naimi (2004) and Tordo et al 
(2011) asserted that NOCs should be evaluated based on their own objectives. 
Accordingly, hypothesis HO1 above was drafted to determine the NNPC’s 
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 The decision to select a level of significance is quite arbitrary. However, it is customary to 
set the level of significance at 0.5 or 0.1 (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008:438). 
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value adding indicators and assess the extent to which they have helped the 
NNPC in adding value. 
Results derived from descriptive statistics and as presented in Table 6.3 were 
used to test the null hypothesis HO1. 
Table 6.3: Indicators for Adding Value to Hydrocarbon Resources 
Note: SA=strongly agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Disagree; and %=percentage 
Table 6.3 showed the perception of respondents on six different indicators 
generally cited in the literature, in relations with the NNPC’s value addition to 
hydrocarbon resources. A total of 126 responses were recorded for each of the 
indicators. From the descriptive statistics, all six indicators revealed mean 
scores of less than 2.00 and median score of 2.00 for each variable. This 
suggests that the majority of the respondents agreed with the view that the six 
indicators add value to hydrocarbon resources and, as such, can be considered 
as yardsticks for measuring the NNPC’s performance. 
Nevertheless, Mann-Whiney tests were conducted in order to determine 
whether there is any statistically significant difference between the views of the 
respondent groups at 5% level of significance. The result of the tests, as shown 
in Table 6.4, indicate differences of opinion in two group cases on the issue of 
discovery of new oil reserves; five group cases on development and application 




















































































































Table 6.4: Mann-Whitney Tests Value Adding Indicators 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Discovery of new oil reserves 
Groups  NNPC NEITI 
RMAFC  .044 .019 
ii) Development and application of scientific research 
Groups  MOC LOC RMAFC PAF NA 
NEITI  .041 .049 .035 .047 .016 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; and 
NA=National Assembly. 
At 5% level of significance, the result of the Mann-Whitney tests indicated that 
there were statistically significant differences in the responses of the RMAFC 
and those of the NNPC and the NEITI, in relation to the suggestion that the 
discovery of new oil reserves is a significant aspect of adding value. However, 
these differences were due to the strength of agreement to the suggestion. In 
order to ascertain the cause of differences among the groups, a cross tabulation 
test showed that while 70% of the RMAFC’s respondents agreed with what 
was put to them, the NNPC and the NEITI’s respondents agreed with higher 
scores of 87.5% and 92.3% respectively. The RMAFC’s slightly lower score of 
70% can be attributed to its concern with revenue generation and distribution. 
However, in sum, the groups’ responded with high levels of agreement as 
reflected in the mean score of 1.74. 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney tests indicated differences in the responses of six 
groups in relation to development and application of scientific research. The 
differences are based on the groups’ strength of agreement. The majority of the 
NEITI’s respondents strongly agreed with 92.3%, while the views of the 
majority from the MOCs, the LOCs, the RMAFC, the PAF and the NA simply 
agreed with 75%, 100%, 80%, 62.5% and 75% respectively. 
The possible reasons for the majorly positive responses for the six value adding 
indicators are further discussed. With regards to the discovery of new oil 
reserves and growth in oil production, their value adding status can arguably be 
linked to oil producing countries’ desire to control and derive economic power 
from oil reserves (Stevens, 2008a). Therefore, both indicators are considered as 
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important value drivers that are essential for operational performance (Tordo, 
et al., 2011), and a bargaining tool for OPEC quota allocation (Alsalem et al., 
1997). 
In addition, discovery of new oil reserves is a requisite for the growth of oil 
production; which, in turn, may increase oil revenue through sales, taxes, 
royalties and fees (Frynas and Paulo, 2007; Nwokeji, 2007). This may also 
open up investment opportunities in the upstream sector with resultant healthy 
economy and a stable polity (McPherson, 2004). Therefore, it may be argued 
that it was on this basis that the NNPC aspired to boost it oil reserves to 40 
billion barrels and grow oil production to 4.5 million per day by 2010 
(Gboyega et al., 2011). Although this was not achieved, the expected effect of 
these aspirations is to achieve government’s socio-economic objectives. 
These may have informed the positive perceptions of the respondents regarding 
development and application of scientific research for the upstream sector; the 
increase in local capacity for upstream activities and the creation of stronger 
economic linkages. The three variables are all related to the economic concerns 
of oil producing countries (Taverne, 1999). With oil being the mainstay of the 
Nigerian economy, the activities of the NNPC are expected to expand and 
create opportunities in other productive sectors of the economy. In addition, the 
daunting technological challenges that hinders most oil producing countries’ 
aim of self-sufficiency in upstream oil and gas operations can be overcome 
through investment in scientific research and development (McPherson, 2004; 
Ozigbo, 2008). 
Generally, it can be concluded that based on the perceptions of stakeholders, 
the six indicators presented for the test are considered as appropriate for adding 
value to hydrocarbon resources. Since this suggests that the indicators are 
suitable for assessing the upstream performance of the NNPC, the null 





6.3.1.2 Factors Affecting the Performance of the NNPC 
According to Tordo et al. (2011) an organisation’s ability to create or add value 
is affected by factors that emanate from the organisations and the environment 
in which they operate. Thus, hypothesis HO2 was formed to assess 
respondents’ perceptions on the effect of twelve organisational and governance 
factors on the NNPC’s ability to add value to hydrocarbon resources. Table 6.5 
presents the respondents’ views on these factors upon which the null 
hypothesis HO2, stated below, was tested. 
HO2 - Environmental factors associated with the Nigerian upstream sector have, 
on balance, not had a positive influence on adding value to hydrocarbon 
resources. 
Table 6.5 summarises the results of the descriptive statistics for twelve 
environmental factors that are associated with the performance of the NNPC. 
Of these, respondents’ perception on eight factors derived a median score of 
4.00, meaning that the respondents are of the opinion that the eight 
environmental factors, in general, have not helped the NNPC in developing its 
hydrocarbon resources. The factors are: limited political interference; 
unfavourable tax system for oil companies; stability of petroleum operations; 
commercial expertise; disclosure and transparency of production; disclosure 
and transparency of oil revenue; disclosure and transparency of production 









Table 6.5: Perception on factors that affect NNPC’s value adding mission 
Note: SA=strongly agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=strongly disagree; and %=percentage   
However, the descriptive statistics’ results for appropriate powers conferred on 
the NNPC; the provisions of petroleum arrangements in use in Nigeria and the 
favourable tax system for oil companies reveals a neutral (median=3.00) view 
from the respondents. This suggests that the respondents were indecisive 
regarding the influence of the factors on NNPC’s development of hydrocarbon 
resources. 
Furthermore, respondents’ views sought on whether membership of OPEC has 
assisted the NNPC to develop Nigeria’s hydrocarbon resources was perceived 
differently from the other factors, with an overall median value of 2.00. The 
result indicates that the respondents agreed that Nigeria’s OPEC memberships 
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Despite these, the Mann-Whitney test was applied to determine statistically 
significant differences between the stakeholder groups at the 5% level of 
significance. The results of the differences detected by applying the Mann-
Whitney tests in relation to the factors that affect the NNPC’s value addition 
are presented in Tables 6.6a and 6.6b. 
Table 6.6a: Mann-Whitney Tests for Factors Affecting Value Addition 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Limited political interference 
Groups  CBN FMPR 
CS  .046 .037 
ii) Stability of petroleum operations 
Groups  DPR NA CS 
NEITI  .028 .014 .007 
MOC  .024 
iii) OPEC Membership 
Groups  NNPC MOC CBN 
NEITI  .013 .007 .018 
FMPR   .028  
iv) Commercial expertise 
Groups DPR FMPR MOC LOC CBN RMAFC AGF PAF NA CS 
NNPC .002 .041 .002 .003 .014 .017 .005 .035 .001 .005 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
Firstly, responses regarding limited political interference revealed statistically 
significant differences between the perceptions of the CS’s respondents on the 
one hand and the perceptions of the FMPR and the CBN respondents. While 
87.5% of the CS’s respondents disagreed that limited political interference 
have assisted the NNPC in adding value to hydrocarbon resources, only 50% 
and 62.5% of the FMPR and the CBN respondents disagreed. Although the 
FMPR and the CBN respondents were in agreement on the issue by 40% and 
20% respectively, the overall result showed that the differences between the 
groups are based on the respondents’ depth of disagreement. Therefore, the 
result is in line with the overall median of 4.00 for all the groups. 
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The possible reasons for the majority’s disagreement regarding political 
interference can be deduced from evidence found during the 2012 and 2014 
legislative investigation of the NNPC. For instance, the suspended central bank 
governor’s allegations against the NNPC clearly suggest that political office 
holders have influenced the NNPC’s decisions for personal benefits (Sanusi, 
2014). This conforms to Frynas’ (1998) assertion that the management of the 
NNPC had consistently been under political pressure as the management team 
is often changed in line with political leanings. In addition, Thurber et al. 
(2010) and Gboyega et al. (2011) are of the view that the NNPC’s performance 
is strongly affected by political patronage and corruption. 
Secondly, from Table 6.6a, results of the Mann-Whitney test for stability of oil 
and gas operations showed differences along two patterns of responses. On the 
one hand, differences exist between the NEITI respondents and the DPR, the 
NA, and the CS’s respondents. Although the majority of the four groups 
disagreed that there is adequate stability in the oil and gas operations in 
Nigeria, their levels of disagreement differs. While the NEITI disagreed with 
46.2% and held a neutral view with 23.1%, the DPR, the NA and the CS had 
high disagreement rates of 75%, 83.3% and 87.5% respectively. On the other 
hand, differences exist in the pattern of responses between the MOCs and the 
CS. While none of the CS’s respondents agreed that oil and gas operations are 
stable in Nigeria, 87.5% of the respondents disagreed. This position is in 
contrast with the MOCs’ 50% disagreement and 25% agreement. Similarly, 
given that majority of the MOCs’ respondents disagreed, it can be interpreted 
that the differences between the two groups is due to their strength of 
disagreement.  
The perception of the respondents’ of the NEITI, the DPR, the MOCs, the NA 
and the CS regarding stability of operations is not surprising, considering the 
constant disruptions of upstream operations in the Nigeria’s delta region. Oil 
and gas activities have suffered due to Niger delta militants criminal activities, 
such as sabotage, hostage taking and direct attack on oil installations (Nwokeji, 
2007; Thurber et al. 2010, Gboyega et al. 2011). In addition, this has affected 
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production activities to the extent that there is a difficulty in meeting up with 
Nigeria’s OPEC production quota (Thurber et al., 2010).   
Thirdly, the result of the Mann-Whitney test applied on the impact of OPEC 
membership on the performance of the NNPC indicated statistically significant 
differences at the 5% level of significance between the NEITI and the NNPC, 
the MOCs and the CBN. Similarly, the FMPR’s response also differed from 
that of MOCs’. The cross tabulation revealed that the five groups agreed that 
Nigeria’s OPEC membership impact positively on NNPC’s performance. 
However, the group differed based on their strength of agreement. The NEITI 
and FMPR agreed highly with 84.6% and 90% respectively as against the 
MOCs’ 50% agreement.  
The possible reason for these different patterns of agreed responses on the 
OPEC membership can be attributed to divergence of objectives. The MOCs 
may have responded with average agreement because the OPEC quota restricts 
depletion, which hinders the achievement of its production strategy, and its 
main objective of maximising profit (Frynas, 1998; Pongsiri, 2004). Whereas, 
the other groups being government agencies, may have considered the 
advantages that the OPEC provides to the NNPC in the areas of oil pricing, 
marketing and even the bargaining power of the OPEC as a cartel (Griffin and 
Xiong, 1997; Gidado, 1999).  
Fourthly, the Mann-Whitney tests showed statistically significant differences at 
the 5% level of significance between the NNPC and ten other groups, namely: 
the DPR, the FMPR, the MOCs, the LOCs, the CBN, the RMAFC, the AGF, 
the PAF, the NA and the CS. The differences in response are in respect of the 
NNPC’s commercial expertise and its impact on the NNPC’s value adding 
objective. An interpretation of the results between the NNPC and the ten 
groups indicated a mixed response from the NNPC respondents with 41.7% 
agreement, 33.3% disagreement and 25.0% neutral views. This differs from the 
views of the respondents of the other ten groups whose disagreement on the 
issue ranged between 70.0% and 85.7%.  
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A possible reason for the disagreed perception of the ten groups is arguably the 
tide of the market driven reform in the international oil and gas sector 
witnessed in the last two decades, which seemed not to have been efficiently 
adopted by the NNPC. Apparent evidence can be seen in the NNPC’s lack of 
autonomy in decision-making and financial management (Yisa, 2005). Other 
reasons are allegations against NNPC for not allowing the Auditor General 
audit its accounts as provided by the Nigerian constitution (Nwokeji, 2007). 
Since the government is seeking to reform the NNPC and make it 
commercially efficient through the PIB that is presently before the National 
Assembly, it can be argued that the perception of the ten respondent groups is 
an indication of NNPC’s lack of commercial expertise. 
Based on the cumulative median of 4.00, the ten stakeholder groups disagreed 
that the NNPC’s commercial expertise, if any, helps in developing hydrocarbon 
resources. On an individual group basis, the NNPC’s respondents did not take a 
clear position on this issue.  Hence, it can be concluded that the NNPC’s value 
adding objective may have been impeded due to inadequate commercial 
expertise. 
Furthermore, in relations to the factors that affect the NNPC’s performance, 
Table 6.6b presents the results of three variables whose Mann-Whitney tests 
indicate significant differences at 5% level of significance. 
Firstly, as shown in Table 6.6b, the result of the Mann-Whitney test applied to 
group responses relating to the disclosure and transparency of oil production 
indicates statistically significant differences between the responses of the 
NNPC and the responses of the NEITI, the DPR, the MOCs, the RMAFC, the 
NA and the CS. A cross tabulation of the respondents’ perception showed that 
50% of the NNPC’s respondents took a neutral stand on the issue, and another 
37.5% disagreed. This indicated a huge difference when compared with the 
76.9%, 75.0%, 75.0%, 90%, 91.7% and 87.5% rates of disagreement by the 
respondents of the NEITI, the DPR, the MOCs, the RMAFC, the NA and the 
CS respectively. The mixed opinion recorded for NNPC’s respondents can 
arguably be attributed to the unwillingness of the respondents to address the 
issue of disclosure and transparency of oil production.  
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Table 6.6b: Mann-Whitney Tests for Disclosure and Transparency 
Factors   Affecting Value Addition 
Mann-Whitney Test 
i) Disclosure and transparency of oil production 
Groups  NEITI DPR MOC RMAFC NA CS 
NNPC  .016 .047 .029 .003 .000 .002 
ii) Disclosure and transparency of oil revenue 
Groups  NEITI DPR MOC LOC CBN RMAFC AGF NA CS 
NNPC  .039 .042 .000 .003 .040 .013 .007 .000 .005 
iii) Disclosure and transparency of oil production cost 
Groups  NA CS 
NNPC  .020 .003 
LOC  .034 
Note:  NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
Being that the six groups that strongly disagreed are important oil industry 
stakeholders who are involved in the mobilisation and distribution of oil 
revenue, appropriation of upstream fund and as watchdogs of the industry, it 
could be argued that their disagreement is based on their knowledge of the 
Nigerian oil industry. For instance, in support of this argument, the RMAFC’s 
chairman stated “the operation of NNPC’s crude oil account is “shrouded in 
secrecy and therefore makes it a subject of several criticisms, suspicion and 
lack of confidence by all stakeholders” (Okubenji, 2011). Evidence of the 
NNPC’s non-transparency and non-disclosure of oil production are found in 
the KPMG audit report (2010) and the Hart group audit report (2011). In 
addition, the fact that disclosure has the potential to increase trust and improve 
state-society relations (Ocheje, 2006) may have informed the groups’ 
disagreement. 
In general, the perception of respondents on the issue of disclosure and 
transparency of oil production regarding the NNPC’s value addition is 
negative. This is evident from the overall median (4.00) score generated which 
implied respondents’ disagreement on the issue. 
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Secondly, regarding the disclosure and transparency of oil revenue, Table 6.6b 
showed that the NNPC respondents significantly differed in nine instances with 
the NEITI, the DPR, the MOCs, the LOCs, the CBN, the RMAFC, the AGF, 
the NA and the CS. The cross tabulation of responses revealed that 41.7% of 
the NNPC’s respondents disagreed on the issue of oil revenue disclosure and 
transparency, and 37.5% were neutral. On the other side, the levels of 
disagreement for the nine respondent groups ranged between 62.5% and 100%. 
This clearly showed the gap in disagreement between the NNPC and the nine 
other groups.  
In support of the opinion of the nine groups, a former Nigerian minister of 
finance said: 
“to address the agency asymmetry, the government established the NNPC, 
which has, itself, given rise to other agency problems such as endemic 
corruption and lack of transparency not only in the oil industry, but also in the 
management of public finance regarding full oil revenue disclosure” (Usman, 
2007). 
Besides this indicting statement, the response of the nine groups can also be 
justified based on various allegations made regarding the NNPC’s lack of 
physical and financial transparency in the KPMG report (2010) and the Hart 
Group report (2011). The recent allegation by the CBN about the NNPC’s non-
remittance of twenty billion dollars to the treasury is another case in sight. In 
view of this, it can be assumed that the DPR, the MOCs, the LOCs, the 
RMAFC, the NA, the NEITI and the CS are right have held a negative opinion 
given their roles as partners in the upstream sector and the relevant agencies in 
the monitoring and distribution of oil revenue. 
Therefore, in general, the findings above revealed the respondents’ 
disagreement with the notion that the NNPC’s disclosure and transparency of 
oil revenue has made positive impact on its value adding objective. 
 Thirdly, Table 6.6b presents the results of Mann-Whitney tests that signified 
differences between the NNPC and the NA and the CS. Also, differences of 
opinion exist between the LOCs and the CS’s respondents. The interpretation 
of this result showed that, though all three groups disagreed to the notion of 
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disclosure and transparency of oil production costs, their pattern of 
disagreement differed. It can be seen from the cross tabulation that the NNPC’s 
respondents disagreed with 58.3% as against the NA’s 75% and CS’s 87.5% 
disagreements respectively. In addition, the NA’s and the CS’s neutral 
responses of 16.7% and 12.5% respectively differed from the NNPC’s 
respondents’ neutral position of 33.3%. Also, regarding the differences 
between the LOC and the CS, the results indicated that 71.4% of the LOC’s 
respondents disagreed on the issue, while 28.6% took a neutral stand. This 
differed from the CS’s 87.5% disagreement and 12.5% neutrality.  
Being that the rates of disagreement for all of the groups ranged between 
61.1% and 87.5%, in general it can be argued that all of the groups do not 
agree that the level of disclosure and transparency of oil production cost has 
assisted the NNPC’s upstream value adding objectives. The differences noticed 
in the responses are as a result of the groups’ depth of disagreement and 
neutrality. Nevertheless, it was noticed that both the NNPC and the LOC had 
lower rates of disagreement (61.1% and 71.4%), which could be linked to their 
informed knowledge as direct participants in upstream activities. On the other 
hand, the other groups’ (the NA and the CS) higher disagreement rates of 75% 
and 87.5% can be attributed to the NNPC’s reputation as a corrupt organisation 
which operates a non-competitive system (Akinrele, 2003; Izeze, 2012).  
From the findings presented in Tables 6.6a and 6.6b, the conclusion is that the 
majority of respondents disagreed that six of the factors presented have had a 
positive impact on the NNPC’s value adding drive. Nevertheless, the 
respondents have a common agreement that Nigeria’s OPEC membership has a 
positive impact on the NNPC’s value adding performance. However, on a 
general note, since the respondents disagreed on six of the seven factors 
presented, the null hypothesis HO2 is accepted. 
6.3.2 The NNPC’s Efficient Management of Upstream Oil and Gas 
Operations 
This section is in relation to Section Two of the questionnaire administered. It 
sought the views of the respondents’ on the NNPC’s efficiency in the 
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management of the Nigerian upstream oil and gas sector. The rationale for 
these questions is based on the premise that better organisational performance 
requires appropriate strategies that aligns abled administrative teams with good 
management control systems (Tsamenyi et al., 2011). Furthermore, considering 
the relevant role of the NNPC to Nigeria’s socio-economic development, it can 
rightly be assumed that the NNPC’s efficiency will contribute significantly to 
the country’s aggregate value addition. Along with this are the benefits of 
developing capabilities, enhancing accountability and achieving VfM (Jones, 
1991; Richard et al., 2009). Thus, in this section the efficiency of the NNPC’s 
upstream oil and gas operations is tested using a null hypothesis HO3, as stated 
below: 
HO3 – NNPC’s management of upstream oil and gas activities has not been 
efficient. 
Table 6.7 presents the descriptive analyses of the respondents’ perceptions on 













Table 6.7: Efficiency of NNPC’s Management of the Upstream Sector 
Note: SA=strongly agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Disagree; and %=percentage 
6.3.2.1 NNPC’s Administrative Procedures for Upstream Oil and Gas 
Operations 
As presented in Table 6.7, the descriptive statistics showed the overall pattern 
of the respondents’ perception on the NNPC’s efficiency on three different but 
related issues, namely: a robust administrative system; the appropriateness of 
the NNPC’s decisions for upstream operations, and the appropriate number of 















































































































































































































































In response to the NNPC’s robust administrative system, only 27 respondents 
representing 21.4% overall agreed; while 84 respondents (66.7%) disagreed. 
Neutral perceptions on the issue stood at 11.9%. This pattern of responses 
justified the result of the median test (4.00); thereby suggesting that on average 
the respondents disagreed that the NNPC operates on an efficient 
administrative system in the upstream sector. However, as Table 6.8 presents, 
the results of the Mann-Whitney test applied at a 5% level of significance 
indicated statistically significant differences in eight group cases. 
The first set of differences from the cross tabulation showed the NNPC’s 50% 
agreement and 45.8% disagreement to the robustness of its administrative 
system. This result is in contrast with the strong disagreement of the MOCs, 
the LOCs, the AGF, and the CS’s 91.7%, 85.7%, 100% and 100% respectively. 
Possible reasons for the four groups’ disagreed perceptions can be related to 
their vast knowledge of the Nigerian upstream operations and the NNPC’s 
administrative structure. These disagreed perceptions are aligned with evidence 
from literature on the NNPC’s lack of administrative synergy and bureaucratic 
bottleneck, which delays the processing and transmitting of the necessary input 
required for achieving the organisation’s objectives (Ibrahim, 2009). 
Furthermore, it is asserted that since its establishment, the NNPC have failed to 
put in place an administrative structure that is free from government 
manipulation (Izeze, 2012). This can also be linked to the NNPC’s low level of 
managerial accountability that retards responsiveness and the efficient usage of 
resources (Mulgan, 2000). 
There were also statistically significant differences revealed between the PAF’s 
50% disagreement and the 91.7%, 100% and 100% strong disagreement of the 
MOCs, the AGF and the CS respectively. Similarly, the wide gap between the 
NEITI’s 61.5% disagreement and the AGF’s 100% disagreement was signified 
in the Mann-Whitney test. However, in all of these cases, the majority of the 
respondents disagreed, but differed based on their depth of disagreement. This 
concurs with the overall respondents’ perception mean and median scores of 
3.60 and 4.00 respectively. 
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Therefore, based on these findings, conclusively it can be assumed that the 
groups’ respondents had a negative perception on the robustness of the 
NNPC’s administrative system. 
Table 6.8: Perception on Administrative System 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Robust administrative system 
Groups  MOC LOC AGF CS 
NNPC  .006 .040 .012 .034 
PAF  .016  .012 .021 
NEITI  .049  
ii) Appropriate decisions for NNPC’s upstream operations 
Groups  NEITI DPR MOC LOC CBN AGF PAF NA CS 
NNPC  .024 .003 .001 .002 .004 .001 .010 .008 .012 
FMPR  .018  
iii) Qualified staff for monitoring upstream operations 
Groups  FMPR RMAFC AGF 
NNPC  .041 .040 .031 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; CBN= Central 
Bank of Nigeria; RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; AGF=Office of 
Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National Assembly; and 
CS=Civil Societies. 
Regarding the appropriateness of the NNPC’s decisions taken for upstream 
operations, the majority of respondents disagreed on the notion. Of the 126 
respondents tested, 23 representing 18.3% agreed; 77 representing 61.1% 
disagreed and 26 representing 20.6% were neutral. The pattern of responses 
suggests the possibility of significant differences among the respondent groups. 
Table 6.8 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney test applied on the variable. 
The responses of the NNPC have statistically significant differences at the 5% 
level of significance to the responses of nine other groups, namely: the NEITI, 
the DPR, the MOCs, the LOCs, the CBN, the AGF, the PAF, the NA and the 
CS. Also, significant differences were noticed between the FMPR and the 
AGF. 
Firstly, the cross tabulation showed that 12 NNPC respondents representing 
50% agreed that appropriate decisions are taken for upstream operations, while 
25.0% disagreed. Interestingly none of their counterparts in the DPR agreed. 
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Instead, 75% of the DPR’s respondents disagreed on the issue. As the official 
regulators of the Nigerian oil and gas industry, the disagreement articulated by 
the DPR can be assumed to be based on their knowledge of the industry. 
Furthermore, the mixed opinions of the NNPC’s respondents arguably suggest 
that they were not willing to take a position on the appropriateness of the 
NNPC’s upstream decisions. 
Secondly, the pairing of the NNPC and the MOCs indicated that 83.3% of the 
MOCs’ respondents’ disagreed that the NNPC makes appropriate decisions for 
the upstream operations, which clearly differs from the NNPC’s 25.0%. 
Further, only 16.7% of the MOCs’ respondents agreed to the view, as against 
50% agreement by the NNPC’s. Arguably, the MOCs are the most important 
players in the oil and gas industry because they produce most of Nigeria’s 
crude oil in partnership with the NNPC. The MOCs’ perception carries much 
weight because they have an international knowledge of oil industry 
management. As such, they are aware that quick and quality decisions are 
required for the challenges of a dynamic oil and gas sector (Lahn et al., 2007). 
Thus, this study can conclude that, in general, appropriate decisions were not 
taken for upstream operations. 
Thirdly, similar to the MOCs’ respondents, the LOCs’ disagreed that decisions 
made by the NNPC for its upstream operations are appropriate. No agreed 
response was recorded from the LOC’s respondents while 85.7% disagreed on 
the issue. This is quite different from the NNPC’s pattern of responses. On the 
basis of their experience in the upstream sector, it can be argued that the 
opinion of the LOC’s respondents is based on their interaction with the NNPC 
and their knowledge of upstream operations. 
Fourthly, there is a significant difference between the NNPC’s and CBN’s 
pattern of responses. A cross tabulation showed that 75% of the CBN’s 
respondents disagreed, and 25% were neutral. These contrast the position of 
the NNPC on the issue. The CBN’s opinion can be justified being that one of 
their roles is to monitor every sector of the Nigerian economy. It is as a result 
of this that the CBN recently advised the government to investigate some 
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contractual decisions taken by the NNPC (Sanusi, 2014). The CBN’s view also 
concurs with Ariweriokuma (2009:65) who stated that: 
 “The NNPC executed many projects on a year to year basis. However, the 
diagnostic process confirmed that the executions were not guided by a corporate 
wide project management governance system”. 
Fifthly, similar to the other groups, the AGF also disagreed that the NNPC 
takes appropriate decisions for the upstream sector. The interesting outcome of 
this result is that 100% of the AGF’s respondents disagreed on the issue which 
differed with the NNPC’s responses. The AGF’s respondents may have taken 
the opinion based on their auditing role, their exposure to reports on the NNPC 
and several investigative hearings on the NNPC. Also, it could have been based 
on the proposed Petroleum Industry bill (PIB) which aims to streamline the 
NNPC’s decision-making process (Gboyega et al., 2011). 
Sixthly, the PAF’s perceptions showed 62.5% of respondents’ disagreement 
and 37.5% neutrality. Justification for this pattern of response may arguably be 
due to the PAF’s exposure to the NNPC activities as external auditors. Based 
on this relationship, it is assumed that the PAF have a fair view about the 
NNPC’s operations. Another possible influence for the PAF’s perception can 
be attributed to the recent KPMG audit report (2010) that indicted the NNPC 
on corrupt practices. 
Seventh, as found in the previous cases, the NA disagreed that the right 
decisions for the upstream sector were taken by the NNPC. The pattern of 
responses suggests that 58.4% of the NA respondents disagreed, 33.3% were 
neutral and 8.3% agreed on the issue. The result differed from the NNPC’s 
50.0% agreement and 25.0% disagreement. This perception can be linked to 
several evidences gathered by the NA through legislative investigations. 
Importantly, the NA’s opinion can be assumed to be based on the relevant 
information given its expected role in the passage of the PIB, which amongst 
other issues dwelled on NNPC’s decision-making processes.  
Eight, the existing significant differences between the NNPC’s and CS’s 
respondents are due to the CS’s 87.5% disagreement on the appropriateness of 
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NNPC’s upstream decisions as against NNPC’s 25% disagreement. Likewise, 
NNPC’s 50% agreement differed from CS’s 12.5% agreement. 
Arguably, the CS’s view can be attributed to their aim of securing long-term 
welfare for the citizens of Nigeria. As such, for the CS, this is an interesting 
issue given that their aim cannot be actualised if appropriate decisions are not 
made to transform oil wealth into other areas of the economy for the benefit of 
the citizens. For instance, despite the NNPC’s ambition of expanding the 
operations of its subsidiary, the NPDC, its decision to engage an inexperienced 
third party (Atlantic Energy) in a strategic alliance agreement to operate the 
divested Shell blocks on behalf of the NPDC is viewed by many stakeholders 
not to be in the interests of Nigeria (ThisDay, 2013). This decision may have 
been based on self-interested, short-term strategies that are embedded in rent 
seeking and patronage (Hosman, 2009; Thurber, et al., 2010). 
Also, significant differences were noticed in the comparisons between the 
FMPR and the AGF. The cross tabulation analysis of the groups’ responses 
showed the FMPR’s mixed opinion on the issue with a 30% agreement; a 40% 
disagreement and a 30% neutral position. This is different from the perception 
of the AGF’s respondents who disagreed 100% on the issue. The FMPR’s view 
can be concluded as that of an organisation that is unwilling to address the 
issue. Given the conflicting role of the Minister of the petroleum resources as 
the Chair of the NNPC board, this may have influenced the lack of clear 
direction in the FMPR’s responses. On the other hand, the AGF’s opinion can 
be justified given that it is the establishment responsible for auditing 
government agencies’ accounts. Therefore, it is not unexpected that they have 
adequate knowledge on the issue. 
On whether the NNPC has the appropriate qualified staff to monitor its 
upstream operations, the descriptive statistics revealed that overall, 46 
respondents (36.5%) agreed; 18 respondents (14.3%) were neutral and 62 
respondents (49.2) disagreed. The result is backed with a mean score of 3.00. 
Further Mann-Whitney tests conducted at 5% level of significance indicated 
differences between the NNPC’s responses and those of the FMPR, the 
RMAFC and the AGF. While 58.3% of the NNPC’s respondents agreed they 
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have the capability to monitor upstream operations, in contrast 60%, 60% and 
66.6% of the FMPR, the RMAFC and AGF’s respondents disagreed. 
It is interesting that majority of the NNPC’s respondents are in agreement 
despite stating inadequate managerial capacity as one of the rationales for 
carrying out its transformation programme, Project PACE (NNPC, 2012a). 
Furthermore, evidences stated in Section 3.6.1 support the disagreed views of 
the FMPR, the RMAFC and the AGF. For example, Thurber et al. (2010) 
stated that, although the NNPC have some qualified employees with expertise 
in oil and gas operations, generally the organisation is deficient in human 
capacity. Also, the inadequate human capacity was linked to the NPDC’s 
inefficiency in work programme and budget review exercises (Penda, 2009), as 
well as in monitoring MOCs operating the JVs and the PSCs (Madubuike, 
1999; Ugwu, 2006). Therefore, the opinion of the three groups is considered 
most appropriate. 
In summary, the majority of the respondents disagreed on the three variables 
tested, namely: a robust administrative system; appropriate decisions for 
upstream operations and qualified staff for monitoring NNPC’s upstream 
operations. Thus, it can be concluded that on average, the NNPC’s 
administrative vehicles for carrying out its upstream operations are inefficient. 
Hence, in relation to the statements tested, the research hypothesis HO3 is 
accepted. 
6.3.2.2 NNPC’s Efficiency in Managing Fund for Upstream Operations 
This section sought the views of respondents on how well the NNPC manages 
funds for upstream operation. The views of the respondents were sought 
because adequate and consistent funding and fund management is vital for an 
organisation’s efficiency, as it is required to hire competent employees and 
carry out operational functions (Wang and Berman, 2001). Also, it is 
emphasised that the management of appropriated fund and the coordination of 
the activities involved are important for organisational performance (Dekker, 
2004). Therefore, in this respect, views were sought in relation to the NNPC’s 
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full utilisation of available funds; utilisation of funds according to budget and 
the availability of a good system for distributing funds. 
As shown in Table 6.7, the descriptive analysis on the NNPC’s full utilisation 
of available fund revealed that 57.9% of the overall respondents disagreed, 
19.9% agreed and 22.2% were neutral. The results indicate that the majority of 
the respondents disagreed on the issue as supported by the overall median of 
4.00. Furthermore, in the Mann-Whitney test conducted at a 5% level of 
significance, a statistically significant difference was revealed between the 
NNPC and the NEITI’s responses, as Table 6.9 presents.  
From the cross tabulation analysis, it was further revealed that the NNPC had a 
mixed response of 41.7% agreement, 20.8% neutrality and 37.5% 
disagreement. On the other hand, the NEITI only had 15.4% agreed responses 
and disagreed strongly with 76.9%. The NNPC’s mixed response may be 
linked to the unwillingness of the respondents to take a defined position. Even 
though the majority of the NNPC’s respondents agreed with a low percentage, 
it differs from the views drawn from the literature in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. 
Table 6.9: Mann-Whitney Tests for NNPC’s Upstream Fund Management 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Full utilisation of available fund 
Groups  NNPC DPR FMPR LOC RMAFC PAF NA 
NEITI  .001 .004 .030 .017 .017 .001 .009 
CBN  .021  
ii) Utilisation of fund according to budget 
Groups  NEITI LOC CBN AGF NA CS 
NNPC  .003 .015 .004 .010 .018 .030 
PAF  .048  
iii) Good system for distributing fund 
Groups  NEITI MOC LOC AGF CS 
NNPC  .000 .012 .009 .011 .002 
RMAFC  .015  .028 
PAF  .020  .040 
NA  .030  .038 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; CBN=Central 
Bank of Nigeria; RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; AGF=Office of 




For example, Thurber et al. (2010) and Penda (2009) related that poor 
utilisation of finance hinders the NNPC’s performance; increases its costs of 
operations and erodes its goodwill. Although the NEITI’s audit reports 
concentrate on revenue, its strong disagreement on the NNPC’s optimum 
utilisation of available upstream funds can be assumed to be based on 
knowledge since it is one of the oil industry’s watchdogs. This result is 
supported by an overall median score of 4.00, which is in line with the opinion 
of the major oil industry players which includes the DPR, the MOCs, the 
LOCs, the PAF, and the AGF who disagreed. Therefore, the NEITI’s 
disagreement on the NNPC’s full utilisation of finances for the upstream sector 
is considered most appropriate. 
Regarding the utilisation of funds according to budget, the descriptive statistics 
revealed that 89 respondents representing 70.6% of the total, disagreed that 
funds meant for upstream operations were utilised as budgeted. However, 23 
(18.3%) respondents agreed on the issue; while 14 (11.1%) respondents were 
indecisive. Interpreting further, the mean and median tests indicated scores of 
3.69 and 4.00 respectively, which on average implied the respondents’ 
disagreement. To ascertain the statistically significant differences in group 
responses, the Mann-Whitney test employed at a 5% level of significance 
detected differences in seven instances.  
Table 6.9 presents the results of the differences between the NNPC and the 
NEITI, the LOC, the CBN, the AGF, the NA and the CS. There were also 
differences in the patterns of responses between the PAF and the CBN. The 
cross tabulation analysis revealed that the NNPC’s responses were almost 
evenly distributed between agreement (37.5%) and disagreement (45.8%). This 
is in contrast with the strong disagreement expressed by the respondents of the 
LOC (100%), the CBN (87.5%), the AGF (100%), the NA (75%) and the CS 
(87.5%). The mixed perceptions expressed by the NNPC may arguably be 
attributed to an unwillingness to take a position on the issue. Whereas, the 
strong disagreement of the six other groups on how well the NNPC expend 
funds according to plan can be argued to be based on their knowledge of the oil 
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industry. In addition, their perception seems most appropriate considering that 
almost half of the NNPC’s respondents also disagreed on the issue. 
The significant differences noticed between the PAF’s and the CBN’s 
respondents are due to their depth of disagreement. While 87.5% of the CBN’s 
respondents disagreed on the issue, only half (50%) of the PAF’s respondents 
disagreed. Since none of the CBN’s respondents agreed, their view about the 
planned utilisation of funds is very strong and could be relied upon. Also, the 
CBN have the capacity to reasonably measure how the upstream funds were 
utilised being that they are the custodian of government funds. Generally, the 
findings indicate that majority of the respondents disagree that the NNPC 
efficiently utilises its finances as planned. This view is well-backed by the 
median and mean scores earlier indicated. 
The descriptive analysis of the respondents’ perceptions, regarding the NNPC’s 
efficiency regarding the distribution of funds, revealed that only 20.7% agreed; 
25.4% of respondents took a neutral stand; while 53.9% disagreed. On average, 
the median score is 4.00 even though the mean score is 3.37. However, the 
results of the Mann-Whitney test employed to determine statistically 
significant differences between groups revealed eleven paired cases at the 5% 
level of significance. 
As shown in Table 6.9, there were differences between the respondents of the 
NNPC and the NEITI, the MOCs, the LOCs, the AGF and the CS. Half (50%) 
of the NNPC’s respondents agreed with the suggestion that they operate a good 
system for distributing upstream funds, and the remaining 50% is equally 
shared between the respondents that agreed and those that were neutral. In 
contrast, the NEITI, the MOCs, the LOCs, the AGF and the CS mostly 
disagreed with 84.6%, 58.3%, 85.7%, 83.3% and 87.5% respectively. 
The MOCs and the LOCs have direct engagement with the NNPC in upstream 
contracting and funding processes; therefore, their position on the issue can be 
considered to be appropriate. As well, the roles that the NEITI, the AGF and 
the CS play in the oil and gas industry is justifiable to conclude that their 
disagreed opinion is based on knowledge, given the reoccurring problems of 
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cash call payment for upstream activities (Thurber et al., 2010). The difficult 
bureaucratic processes of appropriating funds by the National Assembly, in 
addition to the challenges of accessing the funds through the various relevant 
agencies, causes delays in upstream project execution (Tanimu, 2008; 
Ezenwosu, 2009; Penda, 2009). Table 3.7 gives a clear picture of the NNPC’s 
distribution of funds for upstream projects over a period of five years. 
Statistically significant differences were also detected between the NEITI and 
the CS on the one hand, and the RMAFC, the PAF and the NA on the other 
hand. While the NEITI had no agreed response and the CS had no neutral 
response, the three other groups held neutral responses of 40%, 50% and 
41.7% respectively. Therefore, on average it can be analysed that the groups 
were indecisive on how well operate a good system of distributing upstream 
funds. However, in a similar pattern, 40%, 37.5% and 41.7% of the RMAFC, 
the PAF and the NA’s respondents disagreed on the suggestion. This shows 
that despite the high rate of neutrality among the three groups, they expressed a 
much higher level of disagreement on the issue than agreement. Therefore, 
arguably the disagreed perception of the NEITI and the CS is most appropriate 
considering that mixed response expressed by the other groups.  
In general, it can be concluded that on the three statements presented in relation 
to the NNPC’s efficiency in the management of upstream funds, the majority 
of respondents disagreed. This is in line with the overall median scores of 4.00 
generated for each of the variables. Therefore, the null hypothesis HO3, stated 
above, is accepted. 
6.3.2.3 Efficient Control Mechanism for Upstream Operations 
This is the third statement in relation to testing the hypothesis HO3 earlier 
stated. The views of the respondents were sought on whether the control tools 
(see Table 6.7) were efficiently used by the NNPC in its upstream oil and gas 
operations. Since the NNPC’s activities in the upstream sector are carried out 
mainly through joint ventures with the MOCs, it is apparent that the existing 
asymmetric information in the relationship demands monitoring and control by 
the NNPC (Pongsiri, 2004). 
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Therefore, for the NNPC to achieve its objectives, it needs to reduce 
asymmetry and fully monitor the performance of the MOCs through an 
efficient control system. In view of this, six control tools were tested, namely: 
budgetary system; authorisation for expenditure (AFE); compliance audit; joint 
venture auditing; procurement procedures and carry agreement auditing. 
Firstly, Table 6.7 presents the descriptive statistics on responses relating to the 
NNPC’s efficient utilisation of the budgetary system as a control tool. The 
result revealed that 46 respondents, representing 36.5% of the overall, agreed 
to the notion, 29 respondents representing 23% were neutral and 51 
respondents representing 40.5% disagreed. This mixed distribution of groups’ 
responses generated the mean and median scores of 3.07 and 3.00 respectively; 
thereby showing that on average the respondents were neutral on the issue. 
However, as shown in Table 6.10a, further investigation using the Mann-
Whitney test at a 5% level of significance was applied. The result revealed 
significant differences between the NEITI and two other groups namely: the 
NNPC and the PAF. 
Table 6.10a: Mann-Whitney tests for control tools for upstream operations: 
Budget system and AFE 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Budgetary system 
Groups  NNPC PAF 
NEITI  .006 .016 
ii) Authorisation for Expenditure (AFE) 
Groups  NEITI FMPR LOC CBN RMAFC AGF NA CS 
PAF  .034 .004 .018 .005 .004 .003 .005 .000 
DPR  .036  .003 
NNPC  .042  .005 
NEITI  .019 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; 
FMPR=Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources; LOC=Local Oil Companies; RMAFC=Revenue 
Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; AGF=Office of Auditor 
General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National Assembly and CS=Civil 
Societies 
While 76.9% of the NEITI’s respondents disagreed that the NNPC’s budgeting 
system is used efficiently for upstream operations, in contrast the NNPC’s and 
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the PAF’s respondents agreed to the notion with 54.2% and 50% respectively. 
The respondents of the NNPC and the PAF may have answered in agreement 
because the corporation lacks an effective performance evaluation framework. 
For instance, Tanimu (2008) reported that the corporate planning division of 
the NNPC’s processes and implements the corporation’s budget without 
looking at the performance of the budget. 
On the other hand, the strong disagreement expressed by the NEITI 
collaborates with the findings in the literature. The lack of proper budget 
execution causes delays, realignment, manipulations, misallocation of inputs 
and non-accountability, which in effect makes the monitoring compliance of 
partners difficult (Abdullahi, 2006; Tanimu, 2008). In addition,  the Auditor-
General’s report observed that funds meant for joint venture cash call were 
diverted to other projects without the approval of the National Assembly (AGF, 
2010). 
Based on this evidence, and the fact that the NNPC and the PAF had just half 
of the agreed responses, it can be assumed that the budgetary system is flawed 
and inefficient. Therefore, in view of this the null hypothesis HO3 is accepted. 
Secondly, the analysis regarding the efficient use of authorisation for 
expenditure (AFE) revealed that 53.2% of the overall respondents agreed that 
authorisation for expenditure was efficiently used as a control tool for upstream 
operations. Further, the descriptive statistics indicated 31.0% neutral responses 
and 15.9% disagreement. The median test demonstrated a score of 2.00, which 
overall suggests the respondents’ agreement on the issue. Despite this, at a 5% 
level of significance, the Mann-Whitney tests conducted showed significant 
differences in thirteen instances. 
As shown in Table 6.10a, the PAF’s respondents differed in opinion with those 
of the NEITI, the FMPR, the LOC, the CBN, the RMAFC, the AGF, the NA 
and the CS. From the cross tabulation, it was made known that 100% of the 
PAF’s respondents agreed that the AFE was well-used as a control tool. Those 
of the respondents from the NEITI, the FMPR, the LOC, the RMAFC and the 
NA also agreed with 69.2%, 40%, 57.1%, 40% and 50% respectively. This 
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shows that the differences detected are due to the depth of agreement. 
However, differences also exist on the AFE issue between the PAF and the 
CBN, the AGF and the CS as a result of their 50%, 83.3% and 87.5% neutral 
opinions. Being that the AFE is an internal control tool; the neutral opinion of 
the three groups can be based on their lack of adequate knowledge on how the 
tool was used. Furthermore, if the role of the PAF is considered as external 
auditors to the NNPC, their opinion can be accepted as a fair view of the 
situation. 
Regarding other trends of responses, the DPR had 75% agreement on the 
efficient use of the AFE for upstream operations while the AGF and the CS had 
neutral responses of 83.3% and 87.5% respectively. In this case, the opinion of 
the DPR is arguably regarded as appropriate because, as the regulator of the oil 
and gas sector, the DPR have privilege information on the operation of the 
sector. Also, the NNPC’s 62.5% agreement on efficient use of the AFE 
differed with the CS’s 0% agreement and 87.5% neutral position. As 
mentioned above, the CS position might be due to lack of knowledge on the 
issue. 
There is evidence that sometimes the MOCs do expend funds without the AFE 
and due process (Ezenwosu, 2009; Penda, 2009).  In general, however, the 
opinions of the NNPC, the NEITI, the DPR and the PAF were that the NNPC’s 
efficient application of the AFE for upstream sector operations can be 
considered most appropriate. This is based on the fact that the groups are major 
players in the oil industry with adequate experience and access to the NNPC’s 
internal operations. Therefore, it can be taken that the groups present a fair 
view on the AFE that is knowledge based. For instance, the NEITI may have 
responded based on knowledge acquired from the process and physical audit it 
carried out on the NNPC, while the PAF may have been informed through their 
periodic auditing exercises. Therefore, it can generally be considered that the 
AFE is well-utilised, and as such, the null hypothesis HO3 is rejected in respect 
of the statement. 
Thirdly, Table 6.7 presents the descriptive statistics for the effective use of 
compliance audit as control tool Nigerian upstream activities. The result 
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revealed that 46.1% of the overall respondents agreed; 26.2% were neutral and 
27.8% disagreed. Although the description showed that almost half of the 
respondents agreed on the issue, the median score of 3.00 suggest that on 
average the respondents were indecisive on the issue.  
At the 5% level, the test for significant differences between the groups is 
demonstrated in Table 6.10b. The differences discovered are between the 
NNPC’s responses and those of the AGF, the NA and the CS. From the cross 
tabulation, 66.7% of the NNPC’s respondents agreed that compliance audit 
have been positively put to use in the upstream sector, while the respondents of 
the AGF, the NA and the CS disagreed with 50%, 41.7% and 37.5% 
respectively. Also, these three groups had neutral rates that ranged between 
33.3% and 50%. The perception of the disagreeing groups may be considered 
most appropriate because it concurs with the observations in the Auditor-
General’s annual report (AGF, 2010). Thus, the null hypothesis HO3 is 
accepted in relation to the statement tested. 
Fourthly, Table 6.7 also presents the descriptive results of joint venture 
auditing as a control tool for upstream activities. The results revealed that 
47.6% of respondents agreed on the issue; 38.1% were neutral and 14.3% 
disagreed. This varied opinion is further demonstrated in the median score of 
3.00; thereby showing that on average, the respondents held a neutral opinion 
on the issue. However, the Mann-Whitney test was applied at a 5% level of 
significance to determine differences between respondents groups, and eight 








Table 6.10b: Mann-Whitney Tests for Upstream Control Tools 
Compliance and JV Auditing 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Compliance audit 
Groups  AGF NA CS 
NNPC  .019 .014 .010 
ii) Joint Venture auditing 
Groups  FMPR CBN RMAFC AGF NA CS 
MOC  .007 .023 .036 .020 .006 .003 
LOC  .022 
NNPC  .028 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; FMPR=Federal Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; RMAFC=Revenue 
Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; AGF=Office of Auditor 
General for the Federation; NA=National Assembly and CS=Civil Societies 
As presented in Table 6.10b, significant differences exist between the MOCs’ 
respondents and those of the FMPR, the CBN, the RMAFC, the AGF, the NA 
and the CS. The MOCs agreed (83.3%) that the NNPC efficiently employed 
joint venture auditing to control upstream oil and gas operations. With the 
exception of the RMAFC, all of the other groups had more of neutral responses 
which may be interpreted as a demonstration of their indecisiveness on the 
issue of joint venture auditing. The RMAFC’s 40% slight majority of agreed 
responses differ with the MOCs’ 83.3%, based on their strength of agreement. 
The RMAFC’s low level of agreement on the issue may be attributed to their 
conclusion that joint venture partnership is not transparent and inefficient 
(Hosman, 2009, Thurber et al., 2010). In addition, the NEITI report 2009-2011 
observed that non cash call expenditures, amounting to $1.73 billion were paid 
from the JV’s account. Assuming that the JV auditing is efficient, there would 
have been a query to this effect (Hart Group, 2011). 
Similarly, significant differences exist between the CS and the respondents of 
the NNPC and the LOC. While the CS had a neutral response of 75%, the 
NNPC and the LOC agreed that the JV auditing is used efficiently with 62.5% 
and 71.4% respectively. Just as in the cases above, the NNPC and the LOC are 
mainly involved in the joint venture process, and their opinion may have been 
expressed based on knowledge and experience. 
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Nevertheless, despite the fact that joint venture auditing is an internal control 
mechanism and the majority of the respondents had mixed perception, their 
perception can be interpreted as non-acceptance to the statement asked. This is 
so as the picture given above is surprising and contrary to the findings in the 
literature. For instance, the Auditor-General of the Federation in his annual 
report on the accounts of the federal government, observed that the NNPC’s 
internal control system is weak given that “the statutory auditors of the JV 
operators only submitted the audited accounts of the operators to the 
NNPC/NAPIMS without the accompanied management report” which is to 
show in detail the weaknesses observed by the auditors (AGF, 2010). The 
Auditor-General stated further that the joint venture audit assignment is 
incomplete without the management report.   
Therefore, in general, despite the average neutral perception held by 
respondents with the median score of 3.00, the findings above suggests that 
joint venture auditing is not being efficiently utilised as a control tool in the 
Nigerian upstream oil and gas sector. Therefore, null hypothesis HO3 is 
accepted. 
Fifthly, questions were asked regarding the NNPC’s efficient use of 
procurement procedures in the Nigerian upstream sector. As shown in Table 
6.7, the statement was agreed upon by 26.2% of the overall respondents; 24.6% 
were neutral and 49.2% of the respondents disagreed. Despite this, median 
score of 3.00 indicated that on average the respondents took a neutral stand, 
even though the mean score of 3.36 suggest the strength of opinion was 
moving towards disagreement. Based on the varied views, further Mann-
Whitney tests carried out at a 5% level of significance revealed differences in 






Table 6.10c: Mann-Whitney Tests for Upstream Control Tools- 
Procurement and CA auditing 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Procurement procedures 
Groups  NEITI LOC CBN AGF NA 
NNPC  .008 .011 .038 .005 .014 
ii) Carry agreement auditing 
Groups  NNPC MOC PAF 
CS  .005 .009 .024 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; 
LOC=Local Oil Companies; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; AGF=Office of Auditor General for the 
Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National Assembly and CS=Civil Societies 
As demonstrated in Table 6.10c, the NNPC’s pattern of responses differed with 
those of the NEITI, the LOCs, the CBN, the AGF and the NA. While 58.3% of 
the NNPC’s respondents agreed that the NNPC efficiently utilises the 
procurement procedures for upstream operations, the NEITI, the LOCs, the 
CBN, the AGF and the NA disagreed with 69.2%, 71.4%, 50%, 83.3% and 
58.3% respectively. The NNPC’s respondents may have agreed - given the 
effort of the organisation in ensuring transparency and competition in 
procurement processes. For example, the organisation has been able to create 
an electronic portal and database called the NIPEX which is aimed at 
streamlining the procurement processes of the upstream oil and gas sector 
(Okoye, 2010). 
Nevertheless, it can reasonably be argued that the NEITI, the LOC, the CBN, 
the AGF and the NA are very much aware of the procurement procedures as 
they are either participants or observers of the procurement processes. 
Therefore, despite the improvement of the procurement system through the 
introduction of the NIPEX, the contending groups may have disagreed given 
the frequent allegations of inflation of contracts costs, over-invoicing and 
awards of contracts to incompetent companies in the Nigerian oil industry. As 
a result of this, Gillies (2009) stated that significant progress has not been made 
as more transparency is needed for competing companies to self-monitor the 
process and report unfair dealings (Gillies 2009). Similarly, another major 
problem observed is the failure to effectively vet bidders for upstream 
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operations through pre-qualifications, resulting in technically and financially 
incompetent companies acquiring rights for operation (Thurber et al., 2010). 
This managerial behaviour reduces the chances of ensuring VfM. 
Based on the forgoing, the disagreeing perceptions of the NEITI, the LOCs, the 
CBN, the AGF and the NA’s respondents may be considered as the appropriate 
perception. Thus, the null hypothesis HO3 is accepted for the statement tested. 
Sixthly, responses sought on the NNPC’s efficient employment of carry 
agreement auditing as a control tool for upstream oil and gas operations, 
related that 27% of the respondents agreed there was efficient utilisation of the 
tool. In addition, there were 28.6% disagreed responses while the majority of 
respondent (44.4%) were neutral. This is supported by the mean score of 3.05 
and the median score of 3.00 which signified the neutral position of the overall 
respondents. However, the test for individual groups indicated a 5% significant 
difference in opinion between the CS and the NNPC, the MOCs and the PAF.  
As demonstrated in Table 6.10c, in the cross tabulation analysis the majority of 
the CS’s respondents responded with 62.5% disagreement to the NNPC’s 
efficient utilisation of carry agreement auditing in the upstream operations. 
This result is in contrast to the MOCs’ and the PAF’s disagreement at 50% and 
62.5% respectively. In a different way, the CS’s agreement also differs from 
the NNPC’s: 37.5% agreed and 50% neutral responses. 
The NNPC, the MOCs and the PAF are the groups that are directly involved in 
the carry agreement auditing process. As a matter of fact, the audit is carried 
out by the PAF to ascertain how funds are alternatively sourced and utilised by 
the MOCs on behalf of JV partners, one of which is the NNPC. Therefore, the 
three groups are very knowledgeable about the function of carry agreement 
auditing as an internal control mechanism. Assuming the opinions of the three 
were the same, it might have been argued as the most appropriate, but, the 




On the other hand, the CS is involved in the oil industry as a watchdog and 
whose concern it is to ensure accountability and transparency. In this vein, 
various reports have alleged that the key institutions involved in the 
management of Nigerian oil and gas resources, and mainly the NNPC are 
deficient in accounting systems and control which has created an enabling 
environment to fraudulent practices (KPMG, 2010; NEITI Report, 2011; 
Ribadu Report, 2012). As a result of these reports, two PAFs, Akintola 
Williams Deloitte and Olusola Adekanola and Co., were indicted and 
suspended for providing a wrong view of the NNPC’s activities in the 
downstream sector. This may be a good reason for NNPC’s neutral views upon 
which it can be concluded that the CS’s opinion is more consistent with the 
situation on ground. Therefore, the view of the CS is considered. 
In conclusion, the findings above showed that of the six cases tested, five cases 
presented negative perceptions regarding NNPC’s efficient utilisation of 
upstream control tools. Hence the null hypothesis HO3 is accepted. 
Overall, the findings revealed a negative perception on the NNPC’s efficiency 
in administrative system and fund management and utilisation of control tools. 
Being that all the three sub-sections tested were perceived to have negative 
impact on NNPC’s efficiency, thus, the null hypothesis HO3 is accepted. 
6.3.3 The NNPC’s Effectiveness in Upstream Oil and Gas Management 
It is assumed that the best strategy to control natural resources is through state 
ownership, because it increases self-sufficiency, reduces information 
asymmetry and dependence on the MOCs (Aharoni, 1986). As such, in this 
section, six statements from Section Three of the questionnaire were used to 
test the null hypothesis HO4, which is concerned with the effectiveness of the 
NNPC in upstream oil and gas management.  
Based on the premise that effectiveness is concerned with meeting targets and 
objectives, this section focused on the processes and procedures that the NNPC 
utilises in achieving its objectives. Specifically, the section probed the use of 
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policies, rules, regulations and their compliance. Also included are the 
effective control on costs and communication.  
HO4 - NNPC’s management of upstream oil and gas activities has not been 
effective. 
The descriptive statistics of the six statements involved are divided into two 
presentations as shown in Tables 6.11a and 6.11b. The description in Table 
6.11a demonstrates the opinion of respondents on NNPC’s effectiveness in oil 
exploration and production, as well as the costing and sharing of the oil 
















Table 6.11a: NNPC’s Effectiveness in Exploration and Production 
Management 
Note: SA=strongly agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Disagree; and %=percentage 
6.3.3.1 The NNPC’s Effectiveness in the Management of Exploration and    
Production Activities 
This section tests the first statement of hypothesis HO4. The views of 
respondents were sought regarding the NNPC’s effectiveness in meeting its 
targets in the following areas: i) growth in crude oil reserves, ii) monthly crude 
oil production targets, and iii) the operational cash flow targets. Respondents’ 
views were sought in this respect because of the importance of importance of 
 
Statements 
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reserves, production and cash flow as source of internal funding to oil 
companies; especially the NOCs (Fazzari et al., 1988; Griffin, 1988; Tordo et 
al. 2011).  
Firstly, as shown in Table 6.11a, in relation to the NNPC’s targeted growth of 
crude oil reserves, 69 respondents representing 54.7% of total responses 
disagreed that the target has been met. There were 31 (23.8%) respondents who 
agreed on the issue while 27 (21.4%) respondents were neutral. The median 
score of 4.00 recorded for the responses demonstrates that on average, the 
respondents disagreed that the NNPC has effectively met oil reserve growth 
target. 
To further investigate the differences between the groups, the Mann-Whitney 
test applied at a 5% level of significance revealed significant differences in two 
instances (See Table 6.12). The differences detected were between the CS’s 
respondents and two other groups, namely: the NNPC and the MOCs. While 
75% of the CS’s respondents disagreed that the NNPC has been effective in 
meeting its oil reserves target, only 41.7% each of both the NNPC and the 
MOCs’ respondents disagreed. Despite the fact that all three groups had 
majority responses of disagreement, on the one hand it can be explained that 
the difference between them is the depth of disagreement. On the other hand, 
while no CS respondent agreed, the respondents of the NNPC and the MOCs 
agreed with 29.2% and 33.3% respectively. 
Nevertheless, the disagreed response of the three groups concurs with the 
literature. Although growth in reserves has been experienced over the last 
decade, the NNPC’s aspiration to attain a reserve base of 40 billion barrels by 
2010 was not achieved. This failure was attributed to the improper coordination 
of relevant operating factors and the NNPC’s bad governance style in the oil 
and gas sector (Gboyega et al. 2011). Thus, the disagreed perception is apt for 





Table 6.12: Mann-Whitney Tests for Meeting Upstream Targets 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Attaining oil reserves target 
Groups  NNPC MOC 
CS  .024 .041 
ii) Attaining oil production targets 
Groups  NNPC NEITI DPR MOC LOC RMAFC PAF NA 
   CS  .001 .003 .028 .003 .034 .013 .017 .020 
NNPC  .018  .040  .039 
iii) Attaining cash flow targets 
Groups  MOC LOC NA 
NNPC  .001 .016 .031 
NA  .016  
CS  .025  
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; 
LOC=Local Oil Companies; RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; 
PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
Secondly, the perceptions of respondents were sought on how well the NNPC 
has performed in meeting monthly oil production targets. Overall, the 
descriptive analysis presented in Table 6.11a showed that 27.8% of the 
respondents agreed that the NNPC has done well in meeting oil production 
targets, while in contrast 45.2% disagreed. The neutral position was maintained 
by 27% of the respondents, and with mean and median scores of 3.20 and 3.00 
respectively. Nevertheless, further investigation carried out for significant 
differences at the 5% significance level indicated the existence of differences 
in eleven paired group cases. 
As shown in Table 6.12, differences exist based on strength of disagreement 
between the respondents of the CS (87.5%) and the respondents of the NEITI, 
the DPR, the RMAFC and the NA who disagreed with 61.6%, 50%, 40% and 
50% respectively. Also, differences were detected between the CS’s disagreed 
position and the 41.7%, 57.1% and 37.5% responses of the MOCs, the LOCs 
and the PAF respectively. This pattern of responses can be interpreted as the 
respondents’ unwillingness to share their views, as in the cases of the MOCs 




Subsequently, differences emerged between the NNPC’s 54.2% agreement and 
the 61.6%, 42.9%, 50% and 87.5% disagreeing responses of the NEITI, the 
LOCs, the NA and the CS respectively. As stated in Section 3.3, the NNPC’s 
aspiration to produce 4.5 million barrels of crude oil per day by 2010 was not 
achieved (Gboyega et al., 2011). The failure to meet this target has been linked 
to various factors that include bad governance; a lack of stability due to the 
Niger Delta militancy, funding, OPEC quota and the related depletion policy 
(Iledare and Suberu, 2010). Therefore, it can be argued that the NNPC is faced 
with numerous internal and external challenges, upon which the disagreeing 
groups based their verdict. As such, it is apparent that the disagreed opinion is 
most appropriate for this statement. 
Thirdly, in terms of the NNPC meeting its cash flow targets, Table 6.11a 
showed that 21.4% of the respondents agreed; 41.3% were neutral and 37.3% 
disagreed. The mean and median tests demonstrated the overall neutral view of 
respondents with scores of 3.17 and 3.00 respectively. An investigation for a 
pattern of group responses indicated statistically significant differences at the 
5% level of significance in five group pairings. 
As presented in Table 6.12, the MOCs’ responses differed from those of the 
NA and the CS based on their levels of neutrality. While the MOCs had a 25% 
neutral view and no agreed response, the NA and the CS held 75% and 62.5% 
neutral opinions. On this basis it can be argued that the NA deliberately refused 
to respond to the statement, because it is aware that the revenues generated by 
the NNPC are remitted to the Federation account as provided by the 
constitution of Nigeria. The NNPC does not have the autonomy to retain its 
income, and its subsequent operations and projects are funded through 
appropriation by the NA (Jibrin, 2006; Ezenwosu, 2009). Accordingly, this 
funding process has placed the NNPC in a state of continuous insolvency 
which has greatly affected its effectiveness (Thurber et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, the CS’s high neutral opinion may have been held due to inadequate 
knowledge on the issue.   
In two other paired cases, the NNPC barely agreed that it effectively meets its 
operational cash flow targets with 50% of responses; while in contrast, two of 
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its operational partners, the MOCs and the LOCs disagreed with 75% and 
57.1% respectively. Furthermore, none of the respondents of the MOCs and the 
LOCs agreed on the issue. This suggests that these groups who are versed in oil 
and gas operations and, who are aware of the significance of adequate cash 
flow to organisational efficiency and effectiveness, gave their opinions based 
on knowledge and experience in working with the NNPC. In fact, it can be 
argued that the MOCs, due to its JV and PSC operations will be the first to 
notice and be affected if the NNPC does not meet up with cash flow targets. 
Therefore, regarding the effectiveness of the NNPC in meeting its cash flow 
targets, the disagreed opinion of the MOCs and the LOCs can be considered as 
the most appropriate. 
Generally, from the findings on the three variables presented, it is established 
that the stakeholder groups were not convinced that the NNPC has been 
effective. Thus the null hypothesis HO4 is accepted in relation to the statements 
tested. 
6.3.3.2 The NNPC’s Effective Control over Oil production and Sharing 
Three variables were presented under the second statement drafted to test 
hypothesis HO4. The statement sought the opinion of respondents regarding the 
NNPC’s effective control over crude oil production, sharing and lifting (see 
Table 6.11a). The rationale for seeking the groups’ opinion in this regard is to 
examine if transparency and accountability applies in the processes, as they are 
important in determining government take which subsequently is used to 
achieve socio-economic objectives. Furthermore, the MOCs who are the 
operators of oil concessions in Nigeria can hinder the course of achieving these 
objectives through gold plating, if their operations are inefficiently monitored 
and controlled (Akinwumi, 2009). Therefore, being custodian of government 
investments in the oil and gas sector, the NNPC is expected to have the 
capacity to effectively monitor and control the three variables presented. 
Firstly, Table 6.11a presents the descriptive analysis of the opinion sought on 
the NNPC’s effective monitoring and control over crude oil production. The 
result revealed that 50.7% of respondents disagreed on the notion; 31% agreed 
196 
 
and 18.3% remained neutral. The result is supported with the median score of 
4.00. The Mann-Whitney test employed to determine differing group responses 
indicated statistically significant differences at the 5% significance level in five 
paired cases. The differences are between the respondents of the NNPC and the 
LOC, the CBN, the AGF, the NA and the CS (see Table 6.13). 
Table 6.13: Mann-Whitney Tests Effective Monitoring and Control of 
Upstream Operations 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Capacity to monitor and control oil production 
Groups  LOC CBN AGF NA CS 
NNPC  .002 .002 .025 .026 .006 
ii) Capacity to monitor and control oil sharing 
Groups  NEITI CBN AGF CS 
NNPC  .035 .036  .020 
MOC  .018 .011 .038 .009 
iii) Capacity to monitor and control  oil lifting 
Groups  NEITI DPR MOC CBN AGF NA CS 
NNPC  .001 .029 .020 .036 .003 .030 .003 
PAF  .030  .024  .027 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; 
LOC=Local Oil Companies; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission; AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting 
Firms; NA=National Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
The analysis of the differences indicated that 58.4% of the NNPC’s 
respondents agreed that the NNPC had the capacity to effectively monitor and 
control oil production; while in contrast, the LOC, the CBN, the AGF, the NA 
and the CS disagreed with 85.7%, 75%, 66.6%, 58.3% and 75% respectively. 
This indicated the groups’ strong view on the NNPC’s ineffectiveness in 
monitoring and controlling crude oil production. The opinion of the three 
groups may have been influenced by allegations of the NNPC’s ineffectiveness 
reported in the cycle of the NEITI reports and the KPMG reports of 2010. 
Specifically, the NEITI reports have consistently reported that the actual 
amount of oil produced in Nigeria is not known because the NNPC and the 
DPR lack the capacity in staff, skills and apparatus to accurately monitor and 
measure production (Hart Group, 2011). This explains the reason for the 
conflicting records on Nigeria’s oil production. Therefore, the opinion of the 
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disagreeing groups can be argued to be appropriate as it reflects the situation 
on ground. 
Secondly, from Table 6.11a, the descriptive analysis regarding the NNPC’s 
effective monitoring and control over oil sharing revealed a mean score of 3.13 
and a median score of 3.00. This is therefore an indication that on the average, 
the respondents took a neutral stand on the issue. The descriptive statistics 
demonstrates that 40 respondents, representing 31.8% of the total agreed to the 
NNPC’s effectiveness on oil sharing, 32 (25.4%) respondents were neutral and 
54 (42.9%) respondents disagreed on the notion. The Mann-Whitney test 
employed at a 5% level of significance, determined the differences in the 
pattern of responses in twelve instances. 
As shown in Table 6.13, there were two sets of differing patterns. The first set 
was between the NNPC’s respondents and the NEITI, the CBN and the CS. 
While 54.1% of the NNPC’s respondents agreed on the NNPC’s capability to 
effectively monitor and control oil sharing, the NEITI, the CBN and the CS 
disagreed with 69.2%, 50% and 75% respectively. The disagreed perception of 
these groups on the issue can be attributed to the knowledge acquired in the 
course of their involvement in the oil and gas industry. Also, their perception 
may have been conceived from the NEITI reports which informed on the 
deficient state of the NNPC in the physical accounting of produced crude oil 
(Hart Group, 2011). In effect, the finding indicates that there is a lack of proper 
accountability in the production process, which can also be extended to sharing 
of oil. Thus, because the disagreed opinion concurs with the line of argument 
in the literature, it is considered as appropriate. 
Similarly, the second set of differences was detected between the MOCs and 
the NEITI, the CBN, the AGF and the CS. While 41.7% of the MOCs’ 
respondents agreed on the issue of effective oil sharing and 50% remained 
neutral, the majority of the NEITI, the CBN, the AGF and the CS responded in 
disagreement with 85.7%, 50%, 66.6% and 75% respectively. The fact that half 
of the MOCs’ respondents were neutral may arguably be attributed to their 
unwillingness to share their knowledge on the issue, as they are the major 
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sharing partners. Therefore, as earlier stated, the view of the disagreeing groups 
is considered as appropriate.   
Thirdly, regarding the effectiveness of the NNPC in monitoring and controlling 
the process of oil lifting, Table 6.11a presents that 30.2% of overall 
respondents agreed, and 24.6% were neutral while 45.2% disagreed. Further 
analysis revealed a mean score of 3.17 and a median score of 3.00 which 
demonstrated respondents’ neutrality on the issue. The test for significant 
differences at the 5% level of significance detected differences in ten paired 
cases. 
The first set of differences, revealed from the cross tabulation analysis, is 
between the NNPC’s respondents and those of the NEITI, the DPR, the MOCs, 
the CBN, the AGF, the NA and the CS. The respondents of the NNPC, one of 
the major oil lifters, agreed with 62.5% on the issue of its effective monitoring 
and control of oil lifting. In contrast, the respondents of the NEITI, the DPR, 
the CBN, the AGF and the CS majorly disagreed on the notion with 76.9%, 
62.5%, 50%, 83.3% and 87.5% respectively.  
The groups consist of the DPR who is the official regulator of the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry, and a major actor in crude oil lifting. Also sharing the 
disagreeing opinion are the NEITI and the AGF, who probably based their 
views on the findings of the NEITI and the KPMG reports, in which it was 
observed that the oil lifting procedures lack transparency and accountability. 
Specifically, the NEITI report alleged that the amount oil produced and lifted 
in Nigeria is not reliably known, as the metering equipment used by the NNPC 
are obsolete (Nwokeji, 2007). It further confirmed the disparity between 414.4 
million barrels of oil lifted by MOC’s and the 322.1 million barrels declared by 
the NNPC (Hart Group, 2008). 
On the one hand, the second set of differences on the issue of the NNPC’s oil 
lifting effectiveness is between the MOCs’ 58.3% neutrality and the 76.9% and 
the 87.5% disagreeing opinion of the NEITI and the CS respectively. On the 
other hand, the MOCs’ above average neutrality differed to the PAF’s 37.5% 
neutrality. While the difference that emerged between the MOCs and the PAF 
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is based on their depth of neutrality, the difference between the MOCs and the 
NEITI and the CS can be attributed to the MOCs’ unwillingness to respond. 
This conclusion is arrived at after considering the role of the MOCs as a major 
oil lifter, and upon whom the NNPC’s monitoring role is sought. Therefore, in 
contrast to the NNPC’s view, the disagreed opinion of the other groups is 
justified and considered appropriate. 
In general, the findings regarding the NNPC’s effectiveness in controlling 
crude oil production, sharing and lifting, showed that overall, the respondents 
have negative perception. Therefore, in relation to the three variables tested the 
null hypothesis HO4 is accepted. 
6.3.3.3 The NNPC’s Effective Cost Control Procedures for Upstream 
Operations 
In this section, the opinions of respondents were sought regarding the NNPC’s 
effectiveness in costs related to different aspects of upstream operations. Being 
that in Nigeria, the NNPC shares the costs of exploration and production of 
crude oil with other oil companies in joint ventures that they do not operate, it 
is important to be effective in control of expenditures. Therefore, the 
hypothesis HO4 was tested using five costs variables. 
Firstly, as presented in Table 6.11a, the overall responses for the NNPC’s cost 
control over direct operating cost in upstream joint venture operations revealed 
respondents mixed opinion. Of the overall 126 respondents, 42 respondents 
representing 33.3% of responses agreed that the NNPC had control over direct 
operating cost, 43 respondents representing 34.2% disagreed and 41 (32.5%) of 
respondents were neutral. This pattern of responses is further justified with a 
mean score of 3.04 and median score of 3.00, which averagely demonstrated 
the neutral position of respondents. However, as shown in Table 6.14, the 
results of the Mann-Whitney test run at 5% level of significance revealed 
differences in twelve paired group responses. 
The MOCs’ and the LOCs’ opinions differed with the opinions of the NEITI, 
the RMAFC, the NA and the CS. From the cross tabulation, the MOCs and the 
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LOCs agreed that the NNPC has control over the direct operating cost of its 
upstream operation with 75% and 57.1% respectively. In contrast, the NEITI, 
the RMAFC, the NA and the CS disagreed with 61.5%, 40%, 41.7% and 
62.5% respectively. Drawing from the literature, the possible reason for these 
groups’ disagreement can be attributed to several allegations relating to either 
the MOCs’ inflation of expenses or the NNPC’s inability to assess properly the 
costs of operations (Edu, 2000; Frynas, 2000; Hart Group, 2011). This 
ineffectiveness undermines the expansion of Nigeria’s reserve base and in 
effect its objective of adding value (Abutudu and Garuba, 2011). 
Subsequently, the NNPC differed with 37.5% each for agreement and 
neutrality as against the disagreed opinions of the NEITI, the NA and the CS. 
Since it is the NNPC’s responsibility to safeguard government’s oil and gas 
investment, it is therefore supposed to be apt in monitoring the operating cost 
of upstream petroleum activities. However, the NNPC returned a mixed 
response which either suggests their unwillingness to answer the question, or 
confirm that their staff are not adequately trained and versed in project costing 
(Abutudu and Garuba, 2011). Further, the differences detected between 
NNPC’s 37% neutral opinion and the DPR’s 50% can be attributed to the depth 
of their unwillingness to respond to the issue. 
Secondly, the description in Table 6.11a revealed that 33.4% of the overall 
respondents agreed that the NNPC’s control on cost recovery in production 
sharing contracts is effective, 27.8% disagreed and 38.9% of the respondents 
remained neutral. However, on average the median score of 3.00 demonstrated 
that the respondents were neutral on the issue. Due to the mixed response, the 
Mann-Whitney test employed at a 5% level of significance determined 
differences between eight paired groups’ cases. 
From the cross tabulation, Table 6.14 showed the existence of differing 
opinions between the NEITI and the NNPC, the MOCs and the LOCs. The 
NEITI generally disagreed with 61.5% that the NNPC is capable of controlling 
and monitoring the process of cost recovery. In contrast, the NNPC, the MOCs 
and the LOCs agreed (45.8%, 66.6% and 57.1% respectively) with what was 
being suggested. Since cost recovery is an avenue for the operators to recoup 
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sunk cost from produced crude oil (Akinwumi, 2009), it is not surprising that 
the NEITI disagreed on the NNPC’s capabilities in this respect. The NEITI has 
consistently observed in their audit that the operators may be lifting more crude 
oil than is due to them because of the lack of accountability in the process and 
incapability on the side of the NNPC (Abutudu and Garuba, 2011). 
Furthermore, a peculiar problem related to the cost recovery in Nigeria has 
been the NNPC’s inability to adequately monitor the expenditure of the MOCs 
(Akinwumi, 2009). 
Also, the cross tabulation revealed that in contrast to the NNPC, the MOCs and 
the LOCs agreed opinion on cost recovery, the AGF respondents took a neutral 
position with 66.7%. Other differences that emerged from the test involves the 
NEITI’s general disagreement and the PAF’s 50% neutral position, as well as 
the variance between the MOCs’ agreement and the CS’s mixed response of 
37.5% each for neutral and agreed opinions. It can be argued that, though the 
AGF and the PAF participated in the oil industry audit, their form of audit 
maybe financially inclined. Their lack of broad view about auditing, and the 
NNPC’s operation may have influenced their neutral opinions. Another 
possible reason may well be the secretive nature of oil and gas operations in 
Nigeria (Nwokeji, 2007), which is likely to have influenced the neutral 
submission of the CS. 
Likewise, it can be argued that the MOCs and the LOCs may have agreed on 
the notion because answering otherwise may easily lead to the conclusion that 
they have been taking advantage of the NNPC and Nigeria. The NNPC, on the 
other hand, may have answered in agreement to justify its role of safeguarding 
government’s interest. However, since the NEITI is mandated to watch closely 
from aside, and does not derive any personal gain, it can be concluded that its 
opinion is the most appropriate. 
Thirdly, the descriptive frequencies on responses sought on the effectiveness of 
the NNPC over monitoring cost revealed that overall, of the 126 responses, 26 
(20.7%) agreed, 54 (42.9%) were neutral and 46 (36.5%) disagreed. On 
average, the mean score of 3.17 demonstrates that the respondents were neutral 
on the issue. Notwithstanding, a Mann-Whitney test was conducted at a 5% 
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level of significance to ascertain if there were difference in groups responses. 
The results are presented in Table 6.14. 
Table 6.14: Mann-Whitney Tests for Effective Cost Control over 
Upstream Operations 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) NNPC’s control over direct operating cost  
Groups  NNPC DPR MOC LOC 
NEITI  .018 .048 .003 .011 
RMAFC    .024 .048 
NA  .037  .006 .015 
CS  .044  .009 .015 
ii) NNPC’s control over cost recovery 
Groups  NNPC MOC LOC PAF 
NEITI  .005 .004 .011 .038 
AGF  .043 .033 .018  
CS  .046  
iii) NNPC’s control over monitoring cost 
Groups  NNPC DPR MOC LOC PAF 
NEITI  .000 .001 .001 .010 .004 
AGF  .021 .029 .034   
CS  .005 .009 .011  .031 
iv) NNPC’s control over development cost 
Groups  NEITI LOC CBN CS 
NNPC  .005 .027 .013  
DPR  .016 .015 .008  
PAF  .007 .014 .009 .032 
v) NNPC’s control over overhead cost 
Groups  NNPC LOC PAF  
NEITI  .010 .049 .049 
CS  .009  .029 
Note:  NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; 
LOC=Local Oil Companies; RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
From Table 6.14, the NNPC, the DPR, the MOCs and the LOCs had differing 
opinions with the common view of the NEITI, the AGF and the CS. Firstly, a 
cross tabulation of the differences revealed that 48.8% and 41.7% of the NNPC 
and the MOCs’ respondents respectively, agreed on the NNPC’s effective 
control of monitoring cost, while 33.3% and 41.7% respectively were neutral. 
This is quite contrary to the 0% agreed response for the NEITI, the AGF and 
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the CS, and their equally contrasting disagreed responses of 76.9%, 50% and 
62.5% respectively. 
According to the cross tabulation, the first set of differences can be classified to 
be between the NNPC and the MOCs on the one side, and the NEITI, the AGF 
and the CS on the other side. While the first group barely agreed on the issue, 
the second group generally disagreed. It is interesting to observe that despite 
the direct involvement of both the NNPC and the MOCs on upstream costing, 
their responses on the issue were not definite. This can lead to the conclusion 
of their unwillingness to respond to the question. 
On the other hand, the NEITI, the AGF and the CS generally disagreed on the 
NNPC’s capability in controlling monitoring cost. The monitoring cost is 
expected to mitigate the agency problems in the NNPC’s relationships. It may 
well be that the groups disagreed because of limited accountability and 
transparency that is characterised with Nigerian oil and gas contractual 
arrangements (Nwokeji, 2007). This may have raised questions about the 
effectiveness of the NNPC’s monitoring cost as it seems the problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection still exist. The NEITI, the AGF and the CS are 
groups that are traditionally concerned about open transactions and disclosure 
of information; therefore, their opinion might not be unconnected to the 
knowledge they may have and the appropriateness of the issue. 
Another set of variances exist due to the DPR, the LOC and the PAF’s 87.5%, 
87.5% and 62.5% general neutral positions, which differs significantly with the 
disagreement of the NEITI, the AGF and the CS. Similar to the argument 
above, the DPR, the LOC, and the PAF respondents simply refused to answer 
the question. This conclusion is arrived at having considered the roles of the 
DPR, the LOC, and the PAF as the regulator of the Nigerian oil and gas sector, 
operators and auditors respectively. Therefore, this set of differences confirms 
the appropriateness of the disagreeing view. 
Fourthly, opinions were sought to ascertain how well the NNPC controls 
petroleum development costs. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 
6.11a revealed that 25.4% of the respondents agreed; 37.3% were neutral and 
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37.3% disagreed. On average, the description is justified with median and 
mean scores of 3.00 and 3.16 respectively. Further investigation for statistically 
significant differences on the 5% level revealed significant differences in 
various instances, and the result is as presented in Table 6.14. 
In the first instance, the NEITI, the LOC, and the CBN differed in opinion with 
the NNPC and the DPR in six paired cases. The differences were as a result of 
the NEITI, the LOC and the CBN’s 61.5%, 57.1% and 62.5% respective 
disagreement on the issue. In contrast, the NNPC and the DPR generally held a 
neutral opinion with 41.7% and 87.5% respectively. Incurring development 
cost is requisite for oil production, and in Nigeria the management of this and 
other costs is the responsibility of the NNPC, and as regulator, that of the DPR. 
That both groups did not respond in definite terms and this suggests that they 
are hoarding information. 
The perception of the NNPC and the DPR contradict the NNPC’s GMD who 
alleged that Shell expended $1.2 million in excess of development budget 
without regulatory approval (Ezenwosu, 2009). Other evidence of budget 
overruns in the literature strongly indicates that development costs are not 
effectively controlled by the NNPC, possibly because of delays in funding and 
executing projects, and poor monitoring (Kallamu, 2001; Abdullahi, 2006).  
Similarly, the NEITI, the LOC, the CBN and the CS’s disagreed opinions 
contrast the PAF’s 62.5% agreed response. Interestingly, the PAF agreed on 
the notion even when the NNPC and the DPR were unsure. Despite the 
possibility that the PAF’s opinion is based on knowledge, the disagreed 
opinion is still considered as most appropriate because the LOC is a direct 
participant in oil and gas development, and the opinion concurred with the 
evidence drawn from subsection 3.6.2. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that despite the several variances in perceptions, 
the findings above suggests that majority of the respondents do not agree that 




Fifthly, as shown in Table 6.11a, the descriptive analysis of opinions sought on 
the NNPC’s control over overhead costs of upstream petroleum operations 
revealed 27.8% agreed responses, 31.7% neutral responses and 40.5% 
disagreeing responses. This pattern of responses is justified with median and 
mean scores of 3.00 and 3.17 respectively. The Mann-Whitney test was 
conducted at the 5% level of significance to ascertain the differences between 
the groups. Significant differences were noticed in five instances. 
From Table 6.14, it can be seen that the responses of the NEITI and the CS 
differed with those of the NNPC, the LOC and the PAF. In the first set of 
variance, the cross tabulation showed that the NEITI (61.5%) and the CS 
(75%) disagreed to the suggestion that the NNPC have control over upstream 
overhead expenses; while the NNPC and the LOC took a neutral position with 
50% and 57% respectively. These two groups are major players that duly 
participate in the management of upstream overhead cost. Therefore, their 
neutral position may well be considered as unwillingness to respond on the 
issue suggested. 
With regards to the differences revealed in relation to the PAF’s 50% 
agreement and the NEITI and the CS’s disagreement, it may be argued that the 
PAF responded based on knowledge being auditors of the oil prospecting 
companies. However, the views of the NEITI and the CS may as well be based 
on knowledge that is derived from the various reports on the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry, and probably the reoccurring debates on the Petroleum Industry 
Bill (PIB). For instance, Frynas (1998) reported that Shell have the financial 
incentive to inflate costs and set prices and administrative charges between 
affiliate companies in order to justify its expenses.   
Generally, the neutral position taken by the NNPC and the LOCs can be 
considered a statement of ineffectiveness, because they are major oil industry 
players who should be the first to have an opinion on the issue. However, in 
several instances the literature has shown how procedures for incurring 
expenditure have been abused. For example, it is alleged that the MOCs do 
incur unbudgeted expenses with suggest laxity or the incapability of the NNPC 
in upstream cost management (Okonkwo, 2005; Abdullahi, 2006). 
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Overall, on the five statements regarding the NNPC’s effectiveness in 
controlling cost, the findings above indicated that most respondents disagreed. 
Since the interpretation of the finding is that the NNPC has been ineffective 
monitoring and controlling the various upstream related costs, the null 
hypothesis HO4 is accepted. 
Another set of three statements were presented to the respondents to form a 
view on the NNPC’s effectiveness in some upstream oil and gas activities and 
processes. The statements therein are related to the Nigerian content policy, 
compliance to provisions relevant to upstream oil and gas contracts and laws, 
and the effectiveness of communication. These activities which are of national 















Table 6.11b: Nigerian Content Policy and the NNPC’s Effectiveness in     
Monitoring Compliance 
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6.3.3.4 The NNPC’s Achievement on the Nigerian Content Objectives 
The NNPC, like most other NOCs of the developing countries is created to 
address both economic and social issues (Stevens 2008a). Specifically, it serves 
as a local content vehicle whose aim is to domicile capital, skilled manpower, 
technology and enhance economic linkages to other sectors of the economy in 
terms of wealth creation and employment generation (Thurber et al. 2010). 
This is expected to reduce dependency, capital flight and attain self-sufficiency 
(Gboyega, 2011), which in effect will help domestic industrial development 
and value generation (Balouga, 2012). 
It is in this vein that this section sought the views of respondents regarding the 
effectiveness of the NNPC in achieving the Nigerian content objectives 
through four statements: i) development of local skills; ii) use of local 
manpower; iii) transfer of technology to local companies; iv) increase in 
participation of local companies in the upstream sector. 
Firstly, the presentation in Table 6.11b showed records of 126 responses 
regarding the NNPC’s effectiveness in aiding the development of local skills 
for the Nigerian upstream oil and gas sector. The descriptive statistics revealed 
that 44.4% of the respondents agreed on the issue; 18.3% were neutral and 
37.3% disagreed. This statistic is further justified with a median score of 3.00, 
which on average indicates the respondents’ neutral position on the issue. 
However, the result of the Mann-Whitney test conducted at a 5% level of 








Table 6.15: Mann-Whitney tests for meeting local content targets 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Development of local skills 
Groups  NEITI FMPR NA CS 
NNPC  .028 .007 .018 .008 
MOC  .038 .012 .022 .011 
ii) Use of local manpower 
Groups  NNPC MOC FMPR CBN PAF NA 
NEITI  .003 .041     
FMPR  .047      
LOC  .001 .013   .027  
AGF  .005 .029     
CS  .000 .002 .043 .018 .006 .008 
iii) Transfer of technological expertise 
Groups  DPR LOC NA CS 
NNPC  .004 .006 .009 .026 
iv) Increase in participation of local companies 
Groups NEITI DPR FMPR CBN RMAFC AGF PAF NA CS 
NNPC   .016  .046 .001  .001 .001 
AGF .016 .042  .023   .032   
CS .045   .048      
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
In one set of differences, the NNPC and the MOCs generally agreed that the 
NNPC has been effective in aiding the development of local skills with 70.8% 
and 75% respectively. This view is in variance with the FMPR, the NA and the 
CS’s 50%, 58.3% and 75% disagreement. Another set of differences presented 
in the Table 6.16 is between the NEITI’s 38.5% neutral position and the NNPC 
and the MOCs’ major agreement. 
The NEITI’s neutral position may possibly be due to lack of adequate 
knowledge of the issue because its transparency mission is mainly focused on 
oil revenue. However, the agreeing response of the NNPC and the MOC can be 
related to the NNPC’s enormous effort in the creation of the Nigerian Content 
Division (NCD); its contribution towards the statutory establishment of the 
Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB) and the 
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enactment of the Nigerian Content Act of 2010 (Nwokeji, 2007; Thurber et al., 
2010).  
Additionally, the NNPC developed local content strategies that provided the 
platform for training it personnel in engineering, welding and fabrications in 
collaboration with the MOCs. As well, the NNPC have contributed in 
producing skilled engineers, geologist, geophysicists and oil industry managers 
through its cooperation with the Petroleum Technology Development Fund 
(Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011; Balouga, 2012). Based on this, it can be argued 
that the NNPC has really aided local content development to the current 
estimated achievement of about 40% (Atsegbua, 2012, Ovadia, 2013a).  
Even the FMPR, the NA and the CS acknowledged the effort of the NNPC in 
local skill development with minority agreement of 20% and 33.3%; however, 
the groups majorly disagreed because the NNPC was not able to meet the 70% 
domiciliation target by 2010 (Nwaokoro, 2011b; Ovadia, 2013b). It is in line 
with this reasoning that a former Minister of petroleum resources, Odein 
Ajumogobia states: 
“In the last 20 years alone, the industry has generated total revenues of some 
$300 billion while industry spending has grown to some $12 billion annually in 
the last 5 years. Despite this activity level, the country has little to show in 
terms of local capacity and capability for indigenous participation” (Nwaokoro, 
2011a). 
In addition, it is reported that the MOCs were not complying with their 
contractual obligations regarding local skill development because they are 
aware that the NNPC lack the human and technological capability to monitor 
and enforce compliance (Ovadia, 2013; Ibrahim, 2008). In fact, a conflict of 
interest that surfaces in the NNPC/MOCs’ relationship can also be argued to 
impede the NNPC’s monitoring functions. 
Therefore, despite the NNPC’s acknowledged contribution to the development 
of local skills, Nigeria is still far from achieving the 70% target. Since the 
measurement of effectiveness is based on the achieving objectives, the 




Secondly, respondents’ views were sought on how well the NNPC ensures the 
use of local manpower in the upstream petroleum sector. The descriptive 
analysis indicated an overall agreement score of 43.7% and disagreement score 
of 39.7%. With a median score of 3.00, the respondents averagely held a 
neutral view. Despite the descriptive results, the Mann-Whitney test indicated 
several differences in the groups’ pattern of responses (see Table 6.15). 
From Table 6.15, differences were identified in group responses on the 
NNPC’s effective use of local manpower between the NNPC and the 
respondents of the NEITI, the FMPR, the LOC, the AGF and the CS. While the 
NNPC generally agreed with 70.5%, in contrast the NEITI, the FMPR, the 
LOC, the AGF and the CS disagreed with 46.2%, 40%, 85.7%, 66.6% and 
87.5% respectively. Similarly, differences also exist between the MOCs’ 
66.7% general agreement and the NEITI, the LOC, the AGF and CS’s 
disagreement. 
The NNPC and the MOCs expressed their agreement because they are the main 
groups concerned with the utilisation of local manpower in the oil industry. 
The Petroleum Act provides that the MOCs can only use expatriates where 
there are no qualified Nigerians. Therefore, the agreed response of the MOCs is 
defensive, because despite the increase in skilled manpower in oil and gas 
industry, the manpower has been highly underutilised (Ihua, 2010). On the 
other hand, the NNPC is one of the three main organisations that are to monitor 
and ensure compliance by the MOCs. However, the agreed view of the NNPC 
may be doubted, because it is in contrast with the evidence from the literature. 
In light of this, The Nation (2013:19) stated: 
“What is more confounding is that NNPC and its subsidiaries ought to be the 
driving force behind the country’s economic development. But they are all, 
sadly, pursuing neo-colonial employment policy that negates the contents of 
NNPC’s enabling Act. The NNPC, over time, has become renowned for being a 
cesspit of corruption necessitating its being treated with disdain by many 
Nigerians.”  
Another angle to this issue is the conflicting role that the NNPC plays as 
manager of oil and gas resources as well as serving as regulator (Thurber et al., 
2010). Since the NNPC is the MOCs’ partner in all JVs operated in Nigeria, the 
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close relationship may have led to a laxity in ensuring compliance. This raises 
the questions of transparency and accountability. Therefore, as a result of this it 
can be argued that the disagreed view of the NEITI, the FMPR, the LOC, the 
AGF and the CS, who are important oil industry participants, is based on 
knowledge and experience. 
The Mann-Whitney test also indicated variances between the responses of the 
CS and those of the FMPR, the CBN and the PAF. The CS highly disagreed 
(87.5%) that the NNPC manages the process of utilising local manpower 
effectively, while the FMPR disagreed with only 40%. As such, the variance is 
due to their depth of disagreement. The variance between CS’s disagreement 
and the CBN and PAF’s average agreement of 50% and 41.7% respectively 
can be attributed to the groups’ lack of certainty on the issue. This is because 
they also disagreed averagely with 37.5% and 33.3% respectively. However, 
since the view of the CS concurs with the argument earlier discussed, it is 
considered most appropriate. 
Thirdly, opinions about the NNPC’s effectiveness in ensuring transfer of 
technology were sought as presented in Table 6.11b. The descriptive analysis 
indicated that the overall number of agreed responses was 26 (20.7%), the 
disagreed responses were 70 (55.5%) and the neutral responses were 30 
(23.8%). The median score of 4.00 signifies that on average terms, the 
respondents disagreed that the NNPC has done well in ensuring the transfer of 
technology. Further investigation carried out uncovered differences among 
groups’ responses in four paired cases (see Table 6.15). 
The result of the Mann-Whitney investigation tested at the 5% level of 
significance is presented in Table 6.15. The result revealed significant 
differences between the NNPC and the DPR, the LOC, the NA and the CS. The 
cross tabulation on effective transfer of technology showed that 41.7% of the 
NNPC’s respondents agreed; 33.3% were neutral and 25% disagreed. 
However, in contrast, the DPR, the LOC, the NA and the CS highly disagreed 




In its pursuit to achieve technological transfer and build local capacity for 
operations in the oil and gas sector, the NNPC adopted some technological 
learning practices. For instance, the NNPC encourages the secondment of its 
personnel to the MOCs; partnering with the MOCs in the areas of engineering 
and fabrications, and encourages the transfer of operatorship to the NPDC 
(Ovadia, 2013a). Despite this effort, it is surprising that the NNPC narrowly 
agreed on its effectiveness in technological transfer.  
On the other hand, the DPR, the LOCs, the NA and the CS may have clearly 
disagreed because they view the enormous effort of the NNPC as aberrations of 
the real transfer of technology. Although the MOCs train low and medium 
level technicians, engineers and even administrators, is argued that they limit 
their career development to a certain extent. Through this and other possible 
ways, the MOCs protect the market for their technologies and services, and 
maintain effective control of petroleum operation (Alegimenlen, 1991). 
Furthermore, they use the strategy to resist the transfer of technology and avoid 
displacement in the upstream sector (Chima et al., 2002).  
Therefore, as major oil industry participants, the disagreeing opinion of the 
groups, particularly the DPR and the LOC who are officially the regulator of 
the oil industry and local oil explorers respectively cannot easily be 
disregarded. Even the NA and the CS may have opined based on knowledge 
acquired through their oversight functions. In light of this, it is concluded that 
respondents generally perceive the NNPC as ineffective in the pursuit of 
transfer of technology. In other words, VfM has not been ensured in this aspect 
of the NNPC’s operation. Hence, the disagreeing opinion is considered most 
appropriate and the null hypothesis H4 is accepted. 
Fourthly, respondents’ views were sought regarding the performance of the 
NNPC in aiding increased participation of local companies in the Nigerian 
upstream sector. The descriptive analysis shown in Table 6.11b revealed that 
50.8% of the respondents agreed; 16.7% of respondents were neutral and 
32.5% disagreed. This is justified by the median scores of 2.00 respectively. 
Furthermore, Table 6.15 presents the results of Mann-Whitney test conducted 
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at the 5% level of significance; the results revealed significant differences 
between two set of groups. 
From the cross tabulation analysis, it is shown that the first set of groups’ that 
compromise the NNPC, the NEITI, the DPR, the CBN, and the PAF disagreed 
with 75%, 46.2%, 75%, 62.5% and 50% respectively. In contrast, the second 
set of groups comprising the RMAFC, the AGF, the NA and the CS disagreed 
with 40%, 83.3%, 58/3% and 62.5% respectively. 
The first set of groups may have answered in agreement considering the 
enormous effort made by government and the NNPC in the recent past. For 
example, as stated in section 3.3.1, the repositioning of the NPDC has 
significantly increased local companies production capability. This is 
demonstrated in the NNPC’s acquisition of all the equity interest Shell divested 
in their JV blocks, which added 600 million barrels of reserves to the NPDC’s 
portfolio. In a similar manner, other Nigerian companies have taken over in oil 
blocks divested by the MOCs (Eboh and Nwokpoku, 2013). 
Likewise, the NETCO and the IDSL, two of the NNPC’s service subsidiaries 
have increased their level of involvement in the areas of petroleum 
engineering, seismic data gathering, data processing and management. Balouga 
(2012) reported increased participation in fabrication and other deep-water 
offshore activities, which is evident in the successful construction of the Bonga 
Buoy by Nigerdock. The marginal field reform also provided an avenue for 
increased participation of local oil and gas explorers, and service companies. 
These developments have provided linkages to the banking and insurance 
sectors of the economy, and in effect contributed to job creation and capacity 
building (Ovadia, 2013a). 
However, despite these strides, the second set of groups may well possibly 
have disagreed on the basis that the current capability of local companies is far 
less than expected. It is evident that after five decades of oil and gas activities, 
the contribution of Nigerian local companies in crude oil production is less 
than 10% (NNPC, 2013). Likewise, the local companies’ contribution to the 
economy is still insignificant given that their annual earnings “constitute less 
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than 5% of the upstream sector’s annual aggregate contracting budget” 
(Balouga, 2012). Furthermore, it is alleged that some of local companies are 
used as avenue for patronage (Chima et al., 2002), which undermines 
accountability and hinders VfM. 
It is evident that the NNPC contributed enormously towards the enactment of 
the Nigerian Content Act, which in effect served as a basic incentive for 
increased local participation. However, the level of contribution of the local 
companies is still considered minimal and below expectation. Therefore, the 
disagreeing opinion of the second set of groups is considered.  
Overall, based on the findings above, it is concluded that the respondents had a 
negative perception on the performance of the NNPC regarding the four 
Nigerian content statements tested. Thus, the null hypothesis HO4 is accepted. 
6.3.3.5 The NNPC’s Effectiveness in Monitoring Compliance with the 
Provisions of Upstream Oil and Gas Operations 
Most oil rich countries use their NOCs strategically to ensure control of their 
upstream oil and gas sectors, and optimise value (Balouga, 2012). However, 
since the NOCs, such as NNPC, lack the technological and financial capability 
to undertake exploration and production, they passively participate in JV 
operations that are operated by the MOCs. As a result, a principal-agent 
relationship is established and with the expectation for accountability. 
Therefore, to mitigate the agency problem, it is important for the NOCs to have 
the adequate human capability that can monitor JV activities and enforce 
compliance to relevant provisions, rules and regulations. 
In view of this, nine statements were designed to seek respondents’ perceptions 
on the NNPC’s effectiveness in monitoring and ensuring compliance. The 
descriptive statistics for the statements are presented in Table 6.11b and are 
accordingly used to test hypothesis HO4. 
With regards to the first statement presented in Table 6.11b, views were sought 
on how effective the NNPC is in monitoring and ensuring compliance to the 
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provisions of JVs in the upstream sector. Overall, the descriptive analysis 
revealed that 50 (39.7%) respondents agreed that the NNPC effectively 
monitors and ensures compliance; 32 (25.4%) respondents were neutral and 44 
(34.9%) respondents disagreed. On average, the respondents were neutral and 
the result is justified with mean and median scores of 2.92 and 3.00. From 
Table 6.16a, the results of the Mann-Whitney test applied at the 5% level of 
significance revealed significant differences in fifteen paired cases. 
Table 6.16a: Mann-Whitney tests for ensuring compliance with the 
provisions of contractual agreements 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Compliance with JV provisions 
Groups  NEITI DPR LOC CBN RMAFC AGF NA  CS 
NNPC  .002 .011 .001 .018 .009 .004 .004 .003 
MOC  .034  .006   .025  .031 
FMPR    .022      
CBN    .019      
PAF    .036      
ii) Compliance with PSC provisions 
Groups  FMPR LOC CBN RMAFC AGF NA CS 
NNPC  .023 .001 .021 .042 .002 .002 .001 
MOC  .025 .000 .011 .028 .002 .002 .001 
CBN   .009   .020  .030 
RMAFC   .027   .041   
PAF   .035   .048   
iii) Compliance with CA provisions 
Groups  NEITI DPR FMPR AGF 
NNPC  .043 .047 .032 .010 
MOC     .040 
PAF     .023 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies 
Firstly, in Table 6.16a, differences of opinion are shown between the NNPC, 
who agreed that they ensure compliance to the provisions of JV agreements, 
and two other set of groups who held neutral and disagreed opinion 
respectively. In one instance, the NNPC agreed with 79.1% while the DPR, the 
CBN and the CS were neutral with 50%, 62.5% and 50% respectively. In 
another instance, the NNPC’s agreed response is in variance with those of the 
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NEITI, the LOC, the RMAFC, the AGF and the NA who disagreed with 
53.9%, 71.4%, 60%, 66.6% and 50% respectively. Similar differences were 
also detected between the MOC’s 66.6% agreed perception and the disagreed 
perceptions of the NEITI, the LOC, the AGF and the CS. 
The neutral response of the DPR, the CBN and the CS may well be argued as a 
confirmation of the alleged secretive nature of the JV agreements in Nigeria. 
While it may be assumed that the CBN and the CS responded due to 
inadequate knowledge, it will be difficult to assume the same in the case of the 
DPR, whose responsibility is to regulate the oil and gas industry. Indeed, this 
suggests that accountability is lacking in the JV operations, and the DPR 
decided to remain neutral because it shares the responsibility of ensuring 
compliance with the NNPC. 
On the other hand, the NEITI, the LOC, the RMAFC, the AGF and the NA 
may have disagreed based on knowledge, as audit reports have shown that the 
NNPC has been deficient in ensuring compliance in several instances. For 
example, the KPMG (2010) reported that the NNPC could not ensure the 
MOCs’ compliance because it has a poor data management culture; sub-
optimal technology and deficient human capability. Similarly, Ovadia (2013b) 
stated that many provisions of the various contractual agreements are 
completely ignored by the MOCs, and could not be enforced by the NNPC 
because of the conflicting role of the NNPC as a JV partner. This situation 
leads to inefficient behaviours and managerial rent-seeking which creates a 
principle-agent problem between government and the NNPC. It is attested by a 
former Minister of Finance, Anthony Ani, who said that the JV partners collide 
with the NNPC’s officials at the expense of government revenue (Frynas, 
2000). In this light, the disagreed perception is considered appropriate. 
Also, significant differences were detected between the LOC’s agreement and 
the 40% and 62.5% neutral perception of the FMPR and the CBN’s 
respectively. The explanation for this may well be because of the CBN’s lack 
of adequate information, as the JV in Nigeria can be termed a private affair 
because of the NNPC’s reputation as a secret empire (Thurber et al., 2010). 
Also of interest is the FMPR’s pattern of mixed responses with 40% each for 
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agreement and neutrality. The FMPR is officially the policy maker for the oil 
and gas industry, and ultimately responsible for monitoring all of the 
government’s interest in the oil industry. It can therefore be argued and 
concluded that the FMPR was being secretive or unwilling to take a clear 
position on how well the NNPC ensures JV compliance. As such, the LOC’s 
disagreed perception is considered most appropriate.  
On a general note, it can be concluded that despite the secrecy of the 
contracting terms, the perceptions of the NEITI, the LOC, the RMAFC, the NA 
and the CS is knowledge based, given their important roles in the oil and gas 
industry. Other important stakeholders like the DPR and the FMPR that shied 
away from taking a position only helped to confirm the disagreed perception. 
This leads to the conclusion that the NNPC has been ineffective in monitoring 
and ensuring compliance to JV provisions. Therefore, hypothesis HO4 is 
accepted. 
Secondly, regarding the effectiveness of the NNPC in monitoring compliance 
to the provisions of the PSC, 43.6% of the overall 126 respondents agreed; 
25.4% were neutral and 31.0% disagreed (see Table 6.11b). On average, the 
mean and median scores of 2.83 and 3.00 respectively, indicated the 
respondents’ neutral opinion. The investigation for statistically significant 
differences at the 5% level of significance revealed a number of differences. 
The results are presented in Table 6.16a. 
Similar to the case of JV compliance, the NNPC, the MOCs and the PAF 
agreed that the NNPC ensures compliance to the PSC provisions with 83.3%, 
83.3% and 50% respectively. On the one hand, these statistics vary from the 
neutral views of the FMPR (40%); the CBN (62.5%) and CS (50%) 
respectively. The neutral position taken by the FMPR can be attributed to the 
Ministry’s unwillingness to share information because, as the oil industry’s 
policymaker, it is ironic that it lacks knowledge on the PSC’s operations. 
On the other hand, the LOCs, the AGF, the NA and the CS disagreed with 
71.4%, 83.3%, 41.7% and 62.5% respectively. Similar to the conclusion on the 
provisions of JV agreements, the disagreed perception may have been 
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influenced by the NNPC’s human and technical incapability (KPMG, 2010). 
Furthermore, the conflict of interest associated with the NNPC’s role of 
enforcing compliance is a possible reason for the disagreed perception. As 
well, it can be argued that the difficulty of ensuring accountability and 
compliance under the PSC is enormous, given that the NNPC is not responsible 
for the management of operations (Umar, 2005). In this case, the disagreed 
perception can arguably be considered as appropriate. 
Another aspect of differences detected is between the LOC and the AGF’s high 
disagreement that the NNPC is effective in monitoring and ensuring 
compliance to the PSC’s provisions, and the neutral perception of the CBN and 
the RMAFC. As earlier argued, the CBN and the RMAFC may have held the 
neutral position due to lack of adequate information on the NNPC’s 
performance in ensuring compliance. This is particularly plausible in the case 
of the RMAFC, since its main area of interest is revenue mobilisation and 
distribution. 
 Also, the LOC and the AGF’s perception differed with the opinion of the PAF, 
who averagely agreed with 50%. Since the PAF partakes in the PSC’s audits, 
it’s agreeing perception on the NNPC’s performance may be based on 
knowledge. Correspondingly, the AGF’s disagreement can be plausible since it 
is constitutionally empowered to carry out audits on all government agencies. 
Likewise, the perception of the LOC should carry weight because of their 
direct involvement in the PSC’s operations. Additionally, Ameh (2007) 
reported that the NNPC’s ineffective monitoring and compliance enforcement 
provides an avenue for the MOCs to gold plate cost under the PSC’s 
arrangement. Further evidence in this respect, as related by Frynas (1998), is 
given in the statement of a former GMD of NNPC: 
“Proper cost monitoring of their operations has eluded us and one could 
conclude that what actually keeps these companies in operation is not the 
theoretical margin but the returns which they build into their costs”. 
This self-admission from a high NNPC official is plausible enough to doubt the 
perceptions of the NNPC, the MOC and the PAF. Therefore, in concurrence 
with the disagreed perception of the LOC, the AGF, the NA and the CS, 
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arguably, it can be concluded that the NNPC has been ineffective in ensuring 
compliance to the provision of PSC.  Consequently, the null hypothesis HO4 is 
accepted. 
Thirdly, Table 6.11b presents the perceptions of respondents sought regarding 
how well the NNPC monitors compliance with the provisions of carry 
arrangements (CA). The descriptive analysis of the respondents’ perceptions 
revealed is 30.9% for agreement; 35.7% for neutrality, and 33.4% for 
disagreement. The mean and median scores of 2.99 and 3.00 averagely justify 
the respondents’ neutral position. The Mann-Whitney test was employed at a 
5% level of significance to determine differences between respondents groups, 
and the results are as presented in Table 6.16a. 
The first pattern of significant differences, shown in Table 6.16a, was as a 
result of the NNPC’s 62.5% agreement and the neutral position taken by the 
DPR and the FMPR with 62.5% and 40% respectively. Since these two groups 
represent the policy making and regulatory arms of the oil and gas industry, 
their neutral perception can be interpreted as hoarding of information. 
A second pattern of differences were revealed between the NNPC’s agreed 
perception and that of the NEITI and the AGF who disagreed with 53.8% and 
83.4% respectively. Similarly, differences were also noticed between the 
agreeing response of the PAF (50%) on the one hand, and the disagreeing 
responses of the AGF (83.4%). Both the NNPC and the PAF may have 
responded in agreement to CA compliance, based on knowledge. According to 
the NAPIMS (2013a), a modified carry agreement (MCA) was introduced by 
the NNPC to enhance transparency and accountability in the payment and 
compensation processes of the alternative funding. 
The possible reasons for the NEITI and the AGF’s disagreement may be linked 
to the 2010 annual reports of the Auditor-General of the federation where it 
was alleged that loans were collected by the operator on behalf of the JVs 
without regulatory approval and at an exorbitant interest rate (AGF, 2010). 
This agrees with the National Assembly’s investigation which found that the 
carry agreements have been used fraudulently to the disadvantage of Nigeria. It 
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was specifically reported that $3.67 billion over-bloated CA claims were made 
by the MOCs (Okubenji, 2011; Abdulrauf, 2012). In this vein, it can be 
concluded that VfM was not ensured, accountability is lacking and the NNPC 
is ineffective in monitoring and ensuring compliance. As such, the disagreed 
opinion is considered most credible.   
Another pattern of differences was noticed between the MOCs who held 
neutral opinions with 41.7%, and the high agreed perception of the AGF 
(83.3%). The neutral position taken by the MOCs is most probably intentional, 
because it cannot claim lack of information since it is responsible for sourcing 
funds on behalf of the JV under the carry agreement. 
Generally, the findings regarding monitoring compliance of CA were mostly of 
negative perceptions. This concurs with the findings from the KPMG audit 
report (2010); AGF annual report (2010); Hart Group audit report (2011) and 
the investigation of the National Assembly. Therefore, it is taken that the 
respondents perceived the NNPC as ineffective in monitoring and ensuring CA 
compliance. Hence, the null hypothesis HO4 is accepted. 
Fourthly, views were sought on the NNPC’s performance in ensuring 
compliance with petroleum laws and regulations. The descriptive statistics as 
shown in Table 6.11b revealed that 32.6% of the 126 respondents agreed; 
42.8% disagreed and 24.6% were neutral. The respondents were averagely 
neutral as justified by the median score of 3.00. However, at the 5% level of 
significance, statistically significant differences in the groups’ pattern of 
responses were revealed in twenty-five instances (see Table 6.16b). 
From Table 6.16b, differences were noticed between the respondents of the CS 
who disagreed with 87.5% and the responses of the NEITI, the DPR, the 
RMAFC and the NA who also held disagreeing opinions with 69.2%, 62.5%, 
50%, and 50.0% respectively. As shown from the cross tabulation test, the 
differences were due to their depth of disagreement as all the groups generally 




Table 6.16b: Mann-Whitney Tests for Ensuring Compliance with  
Oil and Gas Laws and Best Practices 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Compliance with petroleum laws and regulations 
Groups NEITI DPR FMPR LOC CBN RMAFC AGF NA CS 
NNPC .000 .005 .000 .003 .001 .024 .008 .001 .000 
MOC .012  .016  .015   .045 .004 
PAF .005 .045 .009 .027 .008   .022 .005 
CS .032 .047    .049  .048  
ii) Compliance with industry best practice 
Groups NEITI DPR FMPR MOC LOC CBN PAF AGF NA CS 
NNPC .000 .019 .015 .016 .019 .010  .017 .026 .002 
RMAFC .002     .039    .012 
PAF .006         .021 
iii) Compliance with environmental laws and regulations 
Groups  DPR MOC LOC CBN AGF PAF CS 
NNPC  .006 .012 .024 .004 .007 .022 .005 
NEITI  .036    .018  .016 
RMAFC  .013 .032 .038 .008 .010 .036 .010 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies 
Again, a variant set of responses were revealed on the how well the NNPC 
ensures compliance with petroleum laws and regulations. One set of groups 
comprising of the NNPC, the MOCs and the PAF generally agreed 66.6%, 
50% and 50%, while in contrast, the other set of groups, namely: the NEITI, 
the FMPR, the CBN, the NA and the CS disagreed with 69.2%, 60%, 75%, 
50% and 87.5% respectively. Likewise, on the one side, the NNPC and the 
PAF’s agreement differed from the disagreement of the DPR and the LOCs; 
whilst on the other side, the NNPC differed with the disagreed perceptions of 
the RMAFC and the AGF. 
On the issue of compliance with laws and regulations, the common agreed 
opinion of the NNPC and the MOCs can be understood, as both groups may be 
classified as one entity, given their relationship in the JV partnerships. 
Although a NOC is expected to put national interest first before other interests, 
it may possibly connive to subvert laws and regulations in order to maintain its 
influence in the polity (Stevens, 2008), rather than enforce compliance. In 
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concurrence with this argument, Nwokeji (2007) acknowledged that the laws 
and regulations governing the oil and gas industry in Nigeria are obsolete and 
often disregarded. This explains the demand for changes in the existing 
legislation through the PIB. 
Therefore, it is arguable that the perception of the disagreeing groups is based 
on knowledge and experience derived from the oil and gas industry, 
considering their roles as regulator, policymaker, exploration contractors and 
lawmakers. On this basis, it may well be taken that the disagreed perception is 
most appropriate, and the null hypothesis HO4 is accepted in relation to the 
statement tested. 
Fifthly, regarding compliance with industry best practice, the descriptive 
analysis presented in Table 6.11b revealed that 15.9% of the respondents had 
an agreed perception; 57.9% had disagreed perception and 26.2% held a 
neutral perception. On average, the median score of 4.00 justified respondents’ 
disagreement on the NNPC’s effectiveness in ensuring industry best practice. 
The Mann-Whitney test applied at the 5% level of significance uncovered 
significant differences in a number of cases. 
From Table 6.16b, the results on the NNPC’s competence in ensuring 
compliance to the oil industry best practices revealed significant differences 
between the NNPC’s neutrality (41.7%), and the strong disagreement of the 
NEITI, the DPR, the FMPR, the MOCs, the LOCs, the CBN, the AGF, the NA 
and the CS. The groups disagreed on the issue with rates that ranged between 
66.6% and 92.3%. The neutral position, taken by the NNPC, can be interpreted 
as its unwillingness to share information rather than a lack of knowledge on 
industry best practices. The neutral position may also be taken as a silent 
acceptance that the NNPC falls behind in the area of best practices. These 
explain the NNPC’s endeavour to ensure best practices and good governance 
through its transformation programmes. Evidence of this is the proposed cost 
reduction initiative that will ensure that costs of projects in Nigeria are in line 
with the international best practice (NNPC, 2010). 
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In view of the above, it is evident that the NNPC is deficient in ensuring best 
practice. Also, the nine groups may have strongly disagreed due to the flawed 
bureaucratic tendering, procurement and funding processes in the Nigeria 
upstream sector (Nwokeji, 2007). Therefore, arguably the groups disagreed 
based on knowledge and experience. This suggests that best practice in the 
upstream sector is lacking and can only be encouraged and enforced where 
there is standard system and procedures for operations.  
Also, differences were noticed as a result of the indecisive stand of the 
RMAFC and the PAF, who each agreed and disagreed with 30% and 37.5% 
respectively. This is in contrast with the strong disagreement of the NEITI, the 
CBN and the CS. The possible reason for the mixed response of the RMAFC 
and the PAF may be due to lack of adequate information. 
Generally, the respondents were of the perception that best practice is not 
enforced in the upstream sector. As such, there is a need for the development of 
industry best practise to help execute upstream project efficiently and 
effectively. Based on the aforementioned, the study accepts the null hypothesis 
HO4. 
Sixth, from Table 6.11b respondents’ perceptions were sought regarding the 
monitoring compliance of environmental laws and regulations in the upstream 
petroleum sector. Overall, the descriptive analysis revealed the respondents’ 
weak agreement (15.1%) and strong disagreement (63.5%). With a median 
score of 4.00, the disagreement of the respondents was further demonstrated. 
Despite this, a number of statistically significant differences at the 5% level 
were detected when a Mann-Whitney test was conducted. As presented in 
Table 6.16b and interpreted through cross tabulation, the NNPC had a mixed 
response with 33.3%, 33.4% and 33.3% for agreement, neutral and 
disagreement respectively. The result contrasts the strong disagreement from 
the respondents of the DPR (75%), the MOCs (75%), the LOCs (85.7%), the 
CBN (87.5%), the AGF (100%), the PAF (87.5%) and the CS (87.5%). 
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The differences noticed between the responses of the RMAFC and those of the 
DPR, the MOCs, the LOCs, the CBN, the AGF, the PAF and the CS are on the 
basis of their strength of disagreement. The cross tabulation showed the 
RMAFC’s 40% weak disagreed opinion as against the other groups strong 
disagreement that ranged from 75% to 100%. Similarly, this pattern applies to 
the differences detected between the NEITI’s 61.5% disagreement and the 
higher degrees of disagreed perception given by the DPR, the AGF and the CS. 
Possibly, the NNPC’s respondents were not willing to share their views 
because of their conflicting roles in the upstream oil and gas sector. For 
example, out of the 6.6 billion cubic feet’s daily output of gas, 37.9% is flared, 
and due to the NNPC’s 60% participating interest in the JVs there are equally 
liable for environmental degradation. As a result, the enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations became difficult from the part of the 
NNPC (Oyefusi, 2007). 
On the other hand, the DPR, the regulator with whom the NNPC shares the 
monitoring role may have disagreed based on knowledge or as a result of the 
rivalry between them in monitoring compliance.  This view is supported by 
Nwokeji (2007) when he asserted that other agencies of government sharing 
the responsibility of enforcement are overpowered by the might of the NNPC, 
and as such the laws are under-enforced.   
However, surprisingly the MOCs who have always been accused of activities 
that have caused the negative environmental impacts that result in conflict with 
host communities (Kadafa, 2012), also admitted to the NNPC’s lack of ability 
to enforce compliance. This is in line with the findings of literature, as Ite 
(2004) reported that the NNPC is weak in enforcing environmental laws and 
regulations in the upstream sector possibly because of its status as a major 
partner in the oil and gas JVs. As well, Frynas (1998) asserted that the 
environmental standards in Nigeria have deliberately been weakened for the 
sake of economic development, and as a result investment in old pipelines and 
infrastructures are not usually replaced. In effect, there is oil pollution and local 
unrest which hinders the achievement of VfM. Therefore, it may be argued that 
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the perception of the groups is based on informed knowledge and it is most 
appropriate for consideration. 
Generally, it can be argued that the respondents disagreed on NNPC’s 
monitoring compliance of environmental laws and regulations based on the 
findings above. On the basis of this general perception, the hypothesis HO4 is 
accepted. 
Seventh, Table 6.11b presents the descriptive results of respondents’ 
perceptions sought on compliance with joint operating decisions of the joint 
operating committees. Of the 126 respondents, 42 (33.3%) agreed; 51 (40.5%) 
were neutral and 33 (26.2%) disagreed. The mean and median scores of 2.94 
and 3.00 respectively, showed that on average the respondents were neutral. 
Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney test was conducted to determine statistically 
significant differences at a 5% level of significance. As presented in Table 
6.16c, the results revealed differences between respondents’ groups in a 
number of cases. 
Table 6.16c: Mann-Whitney Tests for Ensuring Compliance with 
Provisions of Joint Operating Decisions, Health and Safety and Local 
Content Act 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i)   Compliance with joint operating decisions 
Groups  NEITI DPR LOC CBN AGF CS 
NNPC  .001 .010 .003 .003 .005 .004 
MOC  .009  .015 .025 .028 .037 
PAF  .045      
NA  .046      
ii) Compliance with Health and Safety procedures 
Groups NEITI DPR FMPR MOC LOC CBN RMFC PAF AGF NA CS 
NNPC .005 .007   .022 .021   .016 .023 .000 
CS .048 .004 .007 .009   .048 .010  .026  
iii) Compliance with local content Act 
Groups NEITI DPR FMPR MOC LOC CBN RMAFC AGF NA CS 
NNPC .001 .001 .006 .015 .007 .007 .048 .004 .013 .001 
MOC          .034 
RMAFC          .039 
PAF          .040 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies 
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One set of significant differences noticed from the cross tabulation involves the 
NNPC (66.6%) and MOCs’ (50%) agreement on the NNPC’s capability to 
monitor the compliance of joint decisions, and the neutral positions held by the 
DPR (62.5%), the LOC (57.1%), the CBN (75%), the AGF (66.7%) and the CS 
(87.5%). Possible reasons for the differences may well be attributed to the fact 
that joint operating decisions are taken by the joint operating committee, and 
the five groups that had neutral perception will not be exposed to such 
decisions. Therefore, being that the NNPC and the MOCs’ members constitute 
the joint operating committee, it can be argued that their view is most 
appropriate. 
However, the Mann-Whitney test also showed a significant variance between 
the disagreed responses of the NEITI (69.2%) and two other patterns of 
responses. Firstly, it differed with the agreed responses of the NNPC, the 
MOCs and the NA. Secondly, the NEITI disagreement is different from the 
neutral positions of the PAF at 62.5%. The PAF may have been unaware of 
how the joint operating decisions are implemented. However, the disagreed 
perception of the NEITI may be based on the findings of its process audit. 
Specifically, the NEITI tactfully questioned the ability or the inclination of the 
NNPC/NAPIMS to take part as an equal partner in the decision-making of JV 
companies, and as well ensure compliance, by stating that:  
“…it is unclear whether as a co-venturer it undertakes truly independent 
technical assessments or economic evaluations of potential opportunities, or 
relies mainly on the JV/PSC Operators to provide the information that it 
reviews.” (Hart Group, 2006 p2) 
Based on this, it may be argued that the perception of the NEITI on the 
effectiveness of the NNPC to ensure compliance to joint operating decisions is 
more credible, and therefore most appropriate. Thus, the null hypothesis HO4 is 
accepted for the statement tested. 
Eighth, Table 6.11b revealed the descriptive statistics of respondents’ 
perceptions on the NNPC’s effectiveness in monitoring compliance to Health 
and Safety procedures in the upstream petroleum sector. Of the 126 
respondents asked, 35 (27.8%) of the respondents agreed on NNPC’s 
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effectiveness; 24 (19%) were neutral and 67 (53.2%) disagreed. Overall, the 
respondents disagreed on the issue as justified by a median score of 4.00. 
However, the Mann-Whitney test was employed to ascertain the significant 
differences between the groups’ perceptions, at the 5% level of significance. 
The results are shown in Table 6.16c. 
As presented in Table 6.16c, significant differences were noticed between the 
responses of the CS and the responses of the NEITI, the DPR, the MOCs, the 
RMAFC and the NA. The cross tabulation showed that the difference is as a 
result of the strength of disagreement. While the CS disagreed with 87.5%, the 
NEITI, the DPR, the MOCs, the RMAFC and the NA disagreed with 69.2%, 
75%, 50%, 60% and 50% respectively. The groups’ response reflects on their 
levels of exposure to the issue suggested. This explains the MOCs’ weak 
disagreement, since it is a direct participant in the upstream petroleum sector, 
and likely has better understanding of the NNPC’s effort in ensuring 
compliance. 
The perceptions of the FMPR and the PAF were equally split between 
agreement and disagreement. While the FMPR held 40% each for agreement 
and disagreement, the PAF responded similarly with 37.5%. These mixed 
responses differed from the outright disagreement of the CS, and may have 
been due to the FMPR’s unwillingness to give information. Similarly, the PAF 
may have mixed their response due to inadequate information, given that the 
issue of Health and Safety is not within the comfort zone of professional 
accountants’ firms. 
Another pattern of differences is detected where 50% of the NNPC’s 
respondents agreed that there is effective monitoring compliance of Health and 
Safety procedures, and in contrast, the NEITI, the DPR, the LOC, the CBN, the 
AGF, the NA and the CS strongly disagreed with 69.2%, 75%, 71.4%, 75%, 
83.4%, 50%, and 87.5% respectively. The NNPC claimed to have improved its 
performance through periodic Health, Safety and Environment audits. As a 
result, it was rewarded with the African Most Outstanding Health, Safety and 
Environment Company of the Year, 2012 (NNPC, 2012b). 
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However, the perception of the disagreeing groups may be based on 
knowledge. Again, the conflicting role of the NNPC in the oil and gas 
partnerships hinders compliance by the MOCs. The Minister of Petroleum 
Resources at a conference in Abuja stated that there is no robust control 
mechanism for ensuring compliance to Health and Safety in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry, as such; the rules and procedures are often ignored by the 
MOCs (NNPC, 2012b). The disagreed response of the MOCs also supports this 
opinion. Although the DPR shoulders more of the responsibility of ensuring 
compliance, it may have disagreed as well considering the role of the NNPCs 
in the oil and gas partnerships. 
The general perception on the issue of Health and Safety compliance is that of 
disagreement. Even groups like the MOCs and the LOCs who are usually 
accused of violating the Health and Safety procedures, and upon whom the 
NNPC is to ensure compliance have disagreed on the capability of the NNPC. 
As such, the hypothesis HO4 is accepted. 
Ninth, the perceptions of respondents were sought on the NNPC’s compliance 
monitoring of the local content act. The descriptive statistic drawn from Table 
6.11b revealed that of the 126 respondents, 42 respondents representing 33.4% 
agreed there was effective compliance monitoring; 62 respondents representing 
49.2% disagreed. The result is justified with mean and median scores of 3.97 
and 3.00 respectively. However, the Mann-Whitney test conducted at a 5% 
level of significant differences found differences between groups in thirteen 
instances. 
From Table 6.16b, significant differences of opinion on the NNPC’s 
effectiveness in monitoring compliance to the local content Act are shown to 
exist between the NNPC and ten other groups. The cross tabulation revealed 
that 75% of the NNPC agreed to the suggestion while 84.6%, 75%, 40%, 
41.7%, 57.1%, 62.5%, 40%, 83.4%, 41.7% and 75% of the NEITI, the DPR, 
the FMPR, the MOCs, the LOCs, the CBN, the RMAFC, the AGF, the NA and 
the CS disagreed respectively. 
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The NNPC may have strongly agreed to the suggestion because it specifically 
established the Nigerian Content Division (NCD) to implement the Nigerian 
content policy. The division was focused on working with the MOCs to 
“develop strategies, drive implementation and ensure compliance with 
directives by the oil companies” (NNPC, 2009). In addition, the NNPC 
introduced the NIPEX Joint Qualification System to gather data of available 
goods and services and help facilitate contracting processes (Gboyega et al., 
2011). 
Nevertheless, the ten groups that disagreed may have done so based on 
knowledge and the experience gained in the petroleum industry. Their 
perceptions are in line with the findings of the literature, where for instance, 
Atsegbua (2012) reported the NNPC’s admittance to low level of Nigerian 
contents, considering that 80% of work value is carried out abroad. In addition, 
he asserted the inadequacy of the correlation between the NNPC’s directives 
on local content with the Nigerian capacity. Nwaokoro (2011a) concludes that 
the NNPC has adequate provisions that could help it control the Nigerian 
content regime, but could not because of its inadequacy in capacity and 
unwillingness to enforce regulations. 
The NEITI may have been informed on the issue suggested due to the debates 
that preceded the passage of the Nigerian content Act and reports available to 
them after the passage of the Act. Also, the DPR disagreement is argued to be 
based on knowledge derive from the dual stewardship it shares with the NNPC 
in monitoring and ensuring compliance. The DPR was probably influenced by 
the difficulty to enforce compliance where the NNPC has business interests. 
The MOCs who operate the ventures and are expected to comply with the 
content directives may have disagreed knowing that the human and technical 
capacity required to achieve the provisions of the content Act are not 
adequately available. In addition, the CBN and the NA’s disagreement may 
have been based on the self-admittance of the NNPC on low content 
achievement. In addition, the CS may have disagreed because they always 
partly attribute the cause of poverty in Nigeria to the inadequate 
implementation of local content provisions (Nwaokoro, 2011a).  
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The FMPR’s 30% perception each in agreement and disagreement showed a 
mixed perception which may be interpreted that some sections of the policy 
making body do not have adequate information on the issue of discourse. 
Overall, the majority of the opinions were not satisfied with the NNPC’s 
performance in the area of local content enforcement. In light of this, the null 
hypothesis HO4   is accepted. 
On a general note, the respondents disagreed on all nine statements tested. This 
clearly showed the NNPC’s compliance function has, over time, not been 
effectively managed. Thus, the null hypothesis HO4 is accepted. 
6.3.3.6 The NNPC’s Effectiveness in Communication 
Communication is an essential ingredient for the effective management of 
organisations and implementation of policies, as ineffective communication 
hinders coordination and widens the gap of achieving objectives (Makinde, 
2005). In organisational and inter-organisational settings, formal and informal 
communication channels are utilised to establish flow of information and create 
a cohesive community upon which organisational objectives are achieved 
(Daft, 2003; Elving, 2005).  
Being that the performance of organisations are measured by their objectives’ 
functions (Tordo et al., 2011), this section sought the perceptions of the 
respondent groups, in general, regarding the NNPC’s effective use of 
communication through the following statements: i) the NNPC’s effective 
communication with relevant stakeholders on all material issues relating the 
upstream petroleum operations; ii) the NNPC’s effective utilisation of 
feedback. These two statements were used to test hypothesis HO4 of the study. 
As shown in Table 6.11b, the perceptions of the respondents were sought in 
relation to the NNPC’s effective communication with relevant upstream 
petroleum industry’s stakeholders. Of the 126 respondents asked, 39 
representing 31% agreed there is effective communication between the NNPC 
and other stakeholders; while 67 representing 53.1% disagreed. On average, a 
median score of 4.00 justified the respondents’ disagreement. Further 
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investigation for statistically significant differences at the 5% level revealed 
differences between groups’ in twelve instances (see Table 6.17). 
Table 6.17: Mann-Whitney Tests for Effective Communication System of 
Upstream Operations 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Effective communication system between stakeholders 
Groups NEITI DPR FMPR MOC LOC CBN RMAFC AGF PAF NA CS 
NNPC .006 .002 .001 .017 .002 .001 .002 .029 .008 .008 .000 
NA           .048 
ii) Appropriate use of feedback 
Groups  NEITI DPR FMPR MOC CBN RMAFC AGF PAF CS 
NNPC  .007 .003 .007 .011 .020 .012 .039 .009 .020 
Note:  NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; 
RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; CBN=Central Bank of Nigeria; 
AGF=Office of Auditor General for the Federation; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
The results of the Mann-Whitney test, presented in Table 6.17, revealed 
significant differences between the NNPC and eleven other groups. The cross 
tabulation shows the NNPC’s strong agreement (75%) in relation to its 
effectiveness in communicating with stakeholders; while contrastingly, the 
NEITI, the DPR, the FMPR, the MOCs, the LOCs, the CBN, the RMAFC, the 
AGF, the PAF, the NA and the CS who disagreed with 69.2%, 62.5%, 70%, 
50%, 71.4%, 75%, 70%, 66.7%, 50%, 41.7% and 75% respectively.  
The NNPC must have responded in agreement because the cultural and 
operational transformation it introduced emphasised on openness to 
information; improved professionalism; communication and systemic 
documentation (Nwokeji, 2007; NNPC, 2012a). However, the stakeholders’ 
disagreeing perceptions may possibly be based on experience given their level 
of interaction with the NNPC. For instance, the NNPC’s project PACE 
acknowledged that the top down communication system within the 
organisation causes inefficiency. Also, the NNPC’s deficiency in human 
capacity and relevant technology has hindered effective communication within 
and without the NNPC (Ugwu, 2006; Thurber et al., 2010). Consequently, the 
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budget realignment and misalignment have been identified to create 
communication gap between the NNPC and its stakeholders (Tanimu, 2008; 
Ibrahim, 2009). 
Also, there is conflict in regulatory functions of the NNPC and the DPR 
(Nwokeji, 2007), which arguably would have been solved if there was an 
effective communication system. Other possible reasons for the NNPC’s 
ineffectiveness as perceived by the stakeholders may be the alleged inadequate 
provision of information to stakeholders such as the RMAFC, the AGF, the 
CBN and the CS and inadequate transparency in the NNPC’s operations. For 
instance, Abdulrauf (2012) reported that the head of the RMAFC accused the 
NNPC of non-remittance of revenue and operating secret accounts without 
being monitored by relevant agencies as required by law. This concurs to the 
findings in literature where it was opined that the secretiveness of the NNPC is 
a measure for its importance and influence in the Nigerian political space 
(Nwokeji, 2007). Finally, in relation to the CS, it was related that the NNPC’s 
ineffective communication has led to ineffective stakeholders’ engagement. 
Therefore, it may be argued that the perception of the stakeholders is apt. 
Generally, the analysis of the various groups suggests that most respondents 
disagreed that the NNPC has an effective communication system in place that 
will help it achieve its upstream objectives. In view of this, the null hypothesis 
HO4 is accepted in relation to the statement tested. 
Regarding the NNPC’s effectiveness in its management of feedbacks from 
upstream operations, the Table 6.11b revealed that 20 respondents representing 
15.9% agreed on the notion, and 67 respondents representing 53.1% disagreed. 
The median score of 4.00 showed that on average, the respondents disagreed. 
Thereafter, the Mann-Whitney test was employed at a 5% level of significance 
to determine differences between respondents’ groups. 
Table 6.17 that presents the results of the Mann-Whitney test indicated the 
existence of differences on the management of feedbacks, between the NNPC 
and nine groups, namely: the NEITI, the DPR, the FMPR, the MOCs, the 
CBN, the RMAFC, the AGF, the PAF and the CS. The cross tabulation 
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analysis revealed both the NNPC’s agreed and neutral perceptions at 41.7% 
each. This is in contrast with the opinion of the majority of the other nine 
groups who disagreed on the suggestion.  
The NNPC’s pattern of responses may be taken as the unwillingness of 
respondents to share their view. Considering the roles of the other 
groups/stakeholders that are responsible for policy making, regulation, oil and 
gas contract operators and managers, it may well be concluded that their 
perception is based on knowledge and experience. Therefore, this can justify 
the acceptance of the null hypothesis tested. 
Overall, for the two statements tested, the respondents perceived that the 
NNPC has been ineffective in managing communication and feedbacks from 
relevant upstream stakeholders. Thus, the null hypothesis HO4 is accepted. 
6.3.4 The Economy of the NNPC’s Upstream Management 
In this section, the perceptions of respondents’ groups were sought on whether 
the NNPC ensures economy in its upstream oil and gas investment. Ensuring 
economical operation in any arrangement is concerned with how oil and gas 
rent is shared between the principal (NNPC) and the agent (MOCs), and how 
costs are incurred and treated (Radon, 2005). In the light of this, it is 
imperative to determine if the NNPC’s choice of oil and gas arrangements, and 
other related processes are economical (produce high profit and benefit). It is 
of importance to ensure that the input acquired for exploration and 
development activities are of minimised cost and optimum output. In addition, 
their quality should not be compromised while at the same time objectives are 
achieved (Daujotaite and Macerinskiene, 2008). Therefore, since it is the 
NNPC’s responsibility to protect Nigeria’s interest in the oil and gas sector, its 
decisions in this respect will affect economic efficiency. 
In view of the aforementioned, statements related to the optimisation of 
contractual arrangements, cost performance and the NNPC’s capability to 
identify, measure and improve cost performance were drafted to test the null 
hypothesis HO5 stated below: 
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HO5 – NNPC has not ensured economy in the management of the upstream 
sector. 
The descriptive statistics of the respondents’ perceptions on the performance of 
NNPC in ensuring economy in the Nigerian upstream oil and gas sector is 
presented in Table 6.18. 
Table 6.18: The Economy of NNPC’s Management of Upstream Petroleum 
Sector  





i) In general, how  has NNPC’s  costs of using the following 































































ii) In general, NNPC’s monitoring of the following 
categories of operators have the potential to adversely 
































































iii) In general, NNPC’s monitoring of the following 















































































































c)Assisting with improving the 

















6.3.4.1 Ensuring Economy in the Choice of Contractual Arrangements 
Firstly, from Table 6.18, in general, the perceptions of the respondents were 
sought with regards to the cost effectiveness of using JV contractual 
agreements in Nigerian upstream petroleum operations. The descriptive 
analysis revealed that 57.9% of the 126 respondents asked agreed that the JV is 
cost effective and optimum for the outcome achieved. 24.6% of the 
respondents disagreed and 17.5% were neutral. The median score of 2.00 
indicated that, on average, the respondents are in agreement. However, further 
investigation was carried out to determine significant differences between 
individual groups. 
Table 6.19 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney test employed at a 5% 
level of significance. It is shown that there are significant differences between 
the respondents of the CBN and the NA on the one hand, and those of the 
NNPC, the NEITI, the DPR and the MOCs. The cross tabulation analysis 
shows that 62.5% of the CBN’s and 41.7% of the NA’s respondents disagreed 
on the cost effectiveness and optimality of JV contractual arrangement. In 
contrast, the NNPC, the NEITI, the DPR and the MOCs strongly agreed to the 
suggestion with 66.6%, 77%, 75% and 83.3% respectively. 
The NNPC have been utilising the JV arrangement for over three decades and 
it is assumed to be optimal since it produces about 80% of Nigeria’s crude oil. 
Even though there is the problem of cash calling as a result of other competing 
priorities of government, the JVs have continued operations through the 
introduction of carry agreements, and still contribute the largest portion of 
government revenue. Arguably, the agreement expressed by the NNPC, the 
MOCs, the DPR and the NEITI is based on knowledge and experience derived 
from these reasons.    
The CBN and the NA may have disagreed because of the separate 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) that applies in JV arrangements. The 
MoU were introduced as a fiscal incentive to encourage the MOCs during the 
gloomy period of oil and gas production (Nwokeji, 2007). Since oil production 
is booming it can be argued that the continuous application of the MoU terms 
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increases cost and reduces government revenue. In other words, since more 
could be made without discouraging the MOCs, the argument is that the 
operations of JVs are not cost effective, and do not ensure VfM. Another issue 
is the interests that accrue on the carry agreement that is believed to be 
exorbitant (Iledare and Suberu, 2010). These are possibly some of the problems 
the PIB is advocating to correct. This explains the disagreement of the FMPR 
(50%) as against the agreed response of the NEITI (77%). 
Overall, despite the fact that renegotiation of the MOU can lead to an increase 
in government revenue, surprisingly the respondents agreed that the JV 
arrangement is cost effective and produces optimum output. Since, the NNPC 
and the MOCs are the major JV participants, the null hypothesis HO5 is 
rejected. 
Table 6.19: Mann-Whitney Tests for Optimum Outcome from Petroleum 
Arrangements 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Joint Venture (JV) agreements 
Groups  FMPR CBN NA 
NNPC   .007 .021 
NEITI  .022 .004 .008 
DPR   .022 .041 
MOC   .010 .018 
ii) Production sharing contracts (PSC) 
Groups  NNPC FMPR CBN RMAFC NA 
NEITI   .016  .038 .010 
MOC  .047 .011 .043 .025 .006 
iii) Service contracts (SC) 
Groups  NNPC DPR FMPR LOC RMAFC PAF NA CS 
NEITI  .007 .038 .004 .008 .022 .048 .020 .007 
MOC  .016  .009 .015 .042  .034 .011 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; DPR=Department of Petroleum Resources; FMPR=Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; CBN=Central 
Bank of Nigeria; RMAFC=Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; NA=National 
Assembly and CS=Civil Societies. 
Secondly, as presented in Table 6.18, the cost effectiveness of the PSC was 
sought and tested. The descriptive analysis revealed that of the 126 respondents 
asked, 67 representing 53.2% agreed that the PSC is cost effective; 31 
respondents representing 24.6% disagreed and 28 respondents representing 
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22.2% were neutral. The median score of 2.00 justified that the respondents 
averagely agreed. However, the Mann-Whitney test was employed to ascertain 
significant differences between individual groups and the results are presented 
in Table 6.19. 
The test on cost effectiveness of the PSC arrangement generated significant 
differences at the 5% level of significance, between the MOCs and five groups, 
namely: the NNPC, the FMPR, the CBN, the RMAFC and the NA. The 
differences between the MOCs’ 75% agreement and the responses of the 
NNPC and the CBN, who agreed with 54.2% and 50% respectively, are shown 
to be as a result of their depth of agreement.  
Another pattern of significant differences exist between the respondents of the 
MOCs and the NEITI, who agreed with 75% and 77% respectively, and the 
disagreeing responses of the FMPR (50%), the RMAFC (50%) and the NA 
(41.7%). The FMPR, the RMAFC and the NA being important government 
agents who make and implement laws and policies for the oil and gas industry 
may have disagreed with the cost effectiveness of the PSC based on 
knowledge. Possible reasons for their disagreement may have emanated from 
the defects of the first PSC arrangements entered into in 1993, in which cost 
recovery was not capped (Ameh, 2007). 
In contrast, the MOCs and the NEITI may have agreed on the issue knowing 
that the subsequent PSCs have been enhanced with tougher fiscal terms in 
favour of the Nigerian state. In addition, the NNPC is not burdened with 
funding the PSC, which frees up resources for government to meet its socio-
economic obligations (Umar, 2005; Ameh, 2007). With proper monitoring, it 
can be argued that the PSC can be cost effective and produce an optimum 
outcome (Johnston, 2007). Since the MOCs are directly involved in the PSCs 
and their perception coincide with those of the NNPC and the LOCs, it can be 
taken as the most appropriate. In general, based on the findings, it can be 
argued that the respondents agreed to the cost effectiveness of the PSC. Thus 
the null hypothesis HO5 is rejected. 
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Thirdly, the perceptions of the respondents were sought on the cost 
effectiveness and optimisation of the SC. The descriptive analysis as presented 
in Table 6.18 revealed that of the 126 respondents, 46% agreed; 17.5% 
disagreed and 36.5% remained neutral. On average, the median and mean 
scores of 3.00 and 2.60 showed that the respondents were neutral on the issue 
of discourse. However, investigation for statistically significant differences 
between individual groups indicated fourteen cases at the 5% level of 
significance.  
As presented in Table 6.19, the cost effectiveness of the SC generated 
differences in perceptions between the MOCs and the NEITI on the one side, 
and several other groups. In the first instance, the cross tabulation analysis 
revealed that the MOCs and the NEITI strongly agreed with 83.3% and 77% 
respectively, while the NNPC, the DPR, the RMAFC and the NA weakly 
agreed with 45.8%, 37.5%, 40% and 50% respectively. These results showed 
that the differences were based on respondents groups’ strength of agreement, 
as the majority of the respondents in all of the groups agreed. The perception of 
the MOCs can be argued to be appropriate given the only SC in Nigeria is 
operated by the MOCs. 
In another instance, the MOCs and the NEITI’s 83.3% and 77% respective 
agreement is in contrast with the 42.9% and 50% weak disagreement of the 
LOCs and the FMPR. Although the two groups are relevant players in the 
petroleum industry, none of them participates directly in a SC. Therefore, since 
the MOCs are the only operator of a SC, the study may arguably accept their 
perception as appropriate. 
The cross tabulation also revealed differences between the MOCs who strongly 
agreed with 83% and the CS’s 50% neutral perception. In a similar manner, 
differences were indicated between the NEITI’s 77% agreement and the PAF’s 
and CS’s respective 50%. Again, it can be argued based on the secrecy of 
contractual agreements in Nigeria, that the PAF and the CS do not have much 
knowledge about the workings of the SC. Therefore, based on knowledge, the 
perception of the MOCs and the NEITI may be considered most appropriate. 
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Overall, the findings suggest that the SC is cost effective. This perception is 
consistent with Johnston (2007) who reported that the cost effectiveness of a 
contractual agreement is relative to implementation. As a result, the null 
hypothesis HO5 is rejected. 
6.3.4.2 The NNPC’s Monitoring Role has Adverse Effect on Cost 
Performance of Operators 
The functions of monitoring and control in oil and gas principal-agent 
relationships are important to curb the moral hazard of the agent (MOCs). 
However, these roles may have adverse effect on the cost performance of the 
MOCs, and eventually the profitability of the operation if the MOCs are faced 
with bad incentives (Pongsiri, 2004; Rossiaud, 2007).  In view of this, three 
variables are tested.  
Firstly, as presented in Table 6.18, the perception of the respondents were 
sought to find out if the monitoring role has a negative effect on cost 
performance of private indigenous oil companies. In this respect, overall, the 
descriptive statistics revealed that 11 respondents representing 8.7% agreed; 26 
respondents representing 20.6% were neutral and, overwhelmingly, 89 
respondents representing 70.7% disagreed. The mean and median scores of 
3.79 and 4.00 justified that on average, respondents’ disagreed that the NNPC’s 
monitoring role in the upstream petroleum sector negatively affects the cost 
performance of private indigenous oil companies. A further Mann-Whitney 
test, conducted at the 5% level of significance, revealed significant differences 
between individual groups and indicated three cases of differences. 
Table 6.20: Mann-Whitney Tests on the Adverse Effect of NNPC’s 
Monitoring of Indigenous Oil Companies 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Monitoring role of NNPC adversely affect performance of 
indigenous oil companies 
Groups   NEITI LOC CS 
NNPC  .038 .049 .044 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; NEITI=Nigerian Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative; LOC=Local Oil Companies; and CS=Civil Societies. 
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Table 6.20 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney test conducted to 
determine whether the NNPC’s monitoring role negatively affects indigenous 
oil companies. Significant differences in responses were identified between the 
NNPC who disagreed with 62.5%, and the respondents of the NEITI, the LOC 
and the CS who disagreed with 84.6%, 100% and 75% respectively. It can be 
seen that the differences emerged due to the groups’ strength of disagreement. 
The result confirms that, in general, the NNPC’s monitoring role does not have 
the potential to negatively affect the cost performance of indigenous oil 
companies.    
Secondly, respondents were asked whether the NNPC’s monitoring role 
negatively affects cost performance of the MOCs. The descriptive analysis 
indicated that 16 (12.7%) respondents agreed; 19 (15.1%) respondents were 
neutral and 91 (72.2%) respondents disagreed. This strong pattern of 
disagreement is justified with mean and median scores of 3.78 and 4.00 
respectively. A further Mann-Whitney test did not indicate significant 
differences between the individual groups. 
Thirdly, with regards to the NNPC’s monitoring role and its effect on oil 
servicing companies, the descriptive statistics revealed that 5.6% of the 126 
respondents agreed; 69.8% of the respondents disagreed; while 24.6% were 
neutral. On average, the mean and median scores of 3.84 and 4.00 respectively, 
showed the respondents’ disagreement. No significant differences were 
detected after running a Mann-Whitney test for paired group differences. 
Despite the fact that the respondents generally disagreed on the issues 
presented, the literature suggests that the NNPC’s monitoring functions may 
contribute negatively to the performance of the oil companies, due to conflicts 
of interest and deficient administrative, human and operational capacities 
(Heller and Marcel, 2012). It is further argued that the bureaucratic bottle neck 
involved in budgeting, approval and funding processes increases the costs of 
projects and affects cost performance (Thurber et al., 2010). 
 In addition, concentrating regulatory functions on the NOC poses an 
accountability crisis, which may exclude other industry participants in 
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decision-making, and create an exclusive relationship between the NOC and 
the presidency. Since the oil is the mainstay of the economy, the NOC may 
become a state within a state that may not effectively protect national interest 
and ensure VfM (Heller and Marcel, 2012).   
Overall, in contrast to the findings of the literature, the three variables 
presented showed that respondents were of the perception that the monitoring 
role of the NNPC does not have the potential to negatively affect the cost 
performance of the operators. Thus, the null hypothesis HO5 is rejected. 
6.3.4.3 Positive Effect of NNPC’s Monitoring Role on Cost Performance of 
Upstream Operators 
The aim of cost performance is to optimise stakeholders’ gains across the value 
chain. The cost processes within an operational chain, otherwise referred to as 
cost structure, is important for the measurement and analysis of cost 
performance. Subsequently, this provides a basis for comparison with 
competitive benchmarks, and help to identify opportunities for improvement 
(Neely, 1999; Anderson and McAdam, 2004).  
Therefore, being that the NNPC’s upstream activities are in partnership with 
the operators that incur expenditure on its behalf, it is assumed that its effective 
monitoring of cost processes will have a positive impact on cost performance 
(Johnston, 2007; Penda, 2009). This, in effect, will ensure VfM and generate 
more revenue to the government. In light of this, three variables, namely: 
private indigenous oil companies, MOCs and service companies are presented 
to test hypothesis HO5. 
Firstly, from Table 6.18, the description of responses were shown indicating 
whether the NNPC’s monitoring role in the upstream sector has the potential to 
positively affect the cost performance of private indigenous oil companies. The 
descriptive statistics revealed that 37.3% of respondents agreed; 26.2% 
disagreed and 36.5% were neutral. The strong pattern of agreement was 
justified with mean and median scores of 2.84 and 3.00 respectively. The 
Mann-Whitney test did not indicate any significant difference. 
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Secondly, in the same manner as above, perceptions were sought on the 
positive potential of the NNPC’s monitoring role on the cost performance of 
MOCs. Of the 126 respondents asked, 48 representing 38.1% agreed that the 
NNPC’s monitoring role in the upstream sector has the potential to positively 
affect MOCs. There were 36 respondents representing 28.6% who disagreed 
and 33.3% of respondents were neutral. With mean and median scores of 2.83 
and 3.00 respectively, it is indicated that the respondents averagely agreed on 
the issue of discourse. Further investigation revealed no significant differences 
between the groups. 
Thirdly, with regards to the potential of the NNPC to positively influence the 
cost performance of the service companies through its monitoring role in the 
upstream sector, 45.2% of the respondents agreed. While 34.9% of respondents 
disagreed, 19.9% remained neutral. This strong agreement is justified with 
mean and median scores of 2.65 and 3.00 respectively. The Mann-Whitney 
test, however, indicated no differences between individual groups. 
Respondents generally remained neutral on the three variables presented to 
check the potential positive effect of the NNPC’s monitoring role on cost 
performance. Since monitoring entails necessary checks on processes to detect 
defects and correct them (Johnston, 2007; Penda, 2009), and the respondents 
had previously opined that the NNPC’s monitoring role does not have adverse 
effect, it is logical to conclude that the NNPC has the potential to positively 
affect the cost performance of the various operators. Hence, the null hypothesis 
HO5 is rejected. 
6.3.4.4 NNPC’s Capability to Improve Cost Performance 
Ensuring economy in the upstream activities requires the capability of the 
NNPC in identifying areas where costs are not efficiently applied; to measure 
cost performance and provide mechanisms for improving cost performance. 
With good fiscal incentives in place, and knowing that the NNPC has the 
capacity to control effectively their operations, the MOCs subjective beliefs 
will be that it is in their interest to take into account the NNPC’s prerogatives 
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(Rossiaud, 2007). In the light of this, three variables were tested in relation to 
null hypothesis HO5.  
Firstly, the perceptions of group respondents were sought to determine if the 
NNPC has the capability to measure the cost performance of the MOCs. Of the 
126 respondents, the descriptive statistics revealed that 35.8% agreed; 38% 
disagreed and 26.2% were neutral. The mean and median results were 3.04 and 
3.00 respectively; thereby indicating that on the average the respondents held a 
neutral opinion. The Mann-Whitney test carried out to ascertain the differences 
between groups at a 5% level of significance; revealed differences in three 
cases (see Table 6.21). 
In terms of the NNPC’s capability to measure cost performance of the MOCs, 
the Mann-Whitney test revealed differences between the perceptions of the 
NNPC’s respondents who agreed (58.4%), and the disagreeing perceptions of 
the NEITI (61.6%), the LOC (57.1%) and the RMAFC (50%). The disagreeing 
groups may have perceived that the NNPC is incapable based on the NNPC’s 
human, process and technological deficiencies (Thurber et al., 2010). For 
instance, monitoring, control and information and communication technology 
(ICT), in which the NNPC have been reported to be deficient, greatly 
contributes to productivity and cost reduction (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Table 6.21: Mann-Whitney Tests on the NNPC’s Capability in Cost 
Management 
Mann-Whitney  tests 
i) Measuring cost performance of MOCs 
Groups  NEITI LOC RMAFC 
NNPC  .023 .041 .037 
ii) Identifying problematic cost areas 
Groups  CS 
PAF  .044 
iii) Assisting with improving the cost performance of MOCs 
Groups  MOC CBN CS 
NNPC  .038 .042 .034 
FMPR  .043 .041 .048 
Note: NNPC=Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; FMPR=Federal Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources; MOC=Multinational Oil Companies; LOC=Local Oil Companies; RMAFC=Revenue 
Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission; PAF=Public Accounting Firms; NA=National Assembly 
and CS=Civil Societies 
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However, in consistence with the literature, the agreement expressed by the 
NNPC can be attributed to its stride from being a cost-centre to profitability 
(Okoye, 2010). The corporation demonstrated this through the introduction of 
NIPEX, an electronic bidding platform created to measure the cost of materials 
and ensure that optimum economic value is derived from upstream operations 
(Gboyega et al., 2011). In addition, the corporation introduced the usage of 
System Application Products (SAP), an ICT device designed to help it to 
integrate, standardise and streamline its systems and processes in line with 
industry best practices (NNPC, 2011). 
While the arguments above demonstrated the effort of the NNPC in cost 
management, it can be argued that its deficient human and technical 
capabilities do not provide the incentive for cost ineffectiveness. This supports 
Andrew and Boyne’s (2009) argument that achieving economy within the VfM 
framework requires the combination of all relevant factors of production. 
Hence, the disagreement expressed by the NEITI, the LOCs and the RMAFC is 
considered most appropriate and the null hypothesis HO5 is accepted. 
Secondly, the responses regarding the capability of the NNPC to identify 
problematic cost areas in the upstream sector indicated that 32.6% of 
respondents were in agreement, while 41.3% of the respondents disagreed. The 
neutrality score stood at 26.2%. Overall, the mean and median scores of 3.09 
and 3.00 respectively indicated the respondents’ disagreement. The 
investigation for statistically significant difference at the 5% level of 
significance revealed a difference between two groups. 
The difference revealed in Table 6.21 is between the PAF and the CS. While 
the PAF agreed with 50% that the NNPC has the capability to identify 
problematic cost areas in the Nigerian upstream sector, the CS disagreed with 
62.5%. The CS may have based its perceptions on the NEITI and the KPMG 
reports that showed lapses in the NNPC’s monitoring and control functions. 
These lapses may not be solely due to the managerial incapability of the 
NNPC’s employees, but also because of corrupt tendencies (Gillies, 2009). 
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However, the PAF may have agreed, given that the NNPC recently outlined a 
seven point plan of action that will help detect high cost areas and reduce them. 
It is an industry-wide standardisation of processes and evaluation mechanisms 
for the estimation of drilling and drilling services’ costs, using a common 
template across the MOCs (Alike, 2013). Other previous efforts demonstrated 
by the NNPC include it’s strive on profitability through the NIPEX, the TQM 
and the Project PACE (Makeri, 2009; Okoye, 2010).  
In addition to these favourable points raised on the NNPC’s capability, the 
PAF’s perception can also be considered on the basis of its audit work on both 
the NNPC and the MOCs. When compared with the CS who perceived from 
afar, the perception of the PAF can be argued to be knowledge-based given its 
role as the auditor to both the NNPC and the MOCs. 
However, as earlier argued, the various initiatives mentioned have the potential 
of helping the NNPC to identify problematic cost areas, but also requires a 
sound administrative and financial system, backed by the appropriate human 
and technical resources to be successful. On this basis, the disagreement 
expressed can arguably be considered as the most appropriate perception. Thus, 
the null hypothesis HO5 is accepted in relation to the statement tested. 
Thirdly, the perception of respondents sought on the capability of the NNPC to 
assist in improving the cost performance of the MOCs indicated that 49.2% of 
respondents disagreed. It was also revealed that 23% agreed on the notion, 
while 27.8% held a neutral opinion. On average, the respondents were neutral 
with a median score of 3.00. Further investigation for significant differences 
between groups revealed differences in several cases.  
As shown in Table 6.21, significant differences at the 5% level of significance 
were revealed in six cases. The NNPC and the FMPR, on the one side agreed 
that the NNPC has the capability to assist with improving the cost performance 
of the MOCs with 41.6% and 50% respectively. In contrast, the MOCs, the 




Again, the disagreed opinions of the MOCs, the CBN and the CS can be 
attributed to the NNPC’s human, process and technological deficiencies, which 
the transformation programmes, are tackling. Possibly, it is in this vein that the 
NNPC and the FMPR agreed. Their perception may have been based on efforts 
being made towards ensuring VfM in the petroleum industry, such as the 
NIPEX joint qualification system. As reported in the literature, the system has, 
since inception, acted as a working catalyst for upstream activities through 
which cost saving increased and cost processing cycle time reduced 
(Kupolokun, 2006; Gboyega et al., 2011). Also, in line with the global 
benchmark trend, the NNPC introduced new measures that will focus on life 
cycle costs and unit technical costs. The aim of this is to “develop synergy 
among operators by pooling common services and resources to avoid 
duplication of costs often associated with stand-alone projects – rig share 
programmes, vessels and pipelines” (Alike, 2013). 
Therefore, in conclusion, the NNPC in recent years have been demonstrating 
its capability by rolling out new initiatives that will assist in improving the 
MOCs’ cost performance, ensure VfM and enhance accountability. Based on 
this, the agreed perception of the NNPC and the FMPR is considered as the 
most appropriate. Hence, the null hypothesis HO5 is rejected in relation to the 
statement tested. 
Summarily, the respondents’ perception showed that the NNPC is incapable in 
measuring cost performance and identifying problematic cost areas. However, 
the respondents perceived that the NNPC have the potential capability to assist 
the MOCs to improve cost performance. On this basis, the null hypothesis HO5 
is accepted. 
On a general note, of the four main set of statements tested in Section Four of 
the questionnaire, hypothesis HO5 was rejected in three instances and accepted 






In this chapter, the analyses of the data collected for the study was presented. 
This was done with the aim of ascertaining whether, in the opinion of the 
stakeholders, the operations of the NNPC in the upstream sector of the 
Nigerian oil and gas sector is being managed in an efficient, effective and 
economical manner, and VfM is achieved. In general, the result of the analysis 
suggests that the stakeholders perceived that the NNPC’s management of 
upstream operations were inefficient, ineffective and uneconomical; VfM was 
not achieved. Specifically, the organisational decision-making structure of the 
NNPC is defective; financial management system is not suitable for 
commercial purpose, monitoring and compliance procedures are inadequate, 
















ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented and interpreted the results of the questionnaire 
administered to twelve groups of stakeholders. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present and analyse the result of the interviews conducted with sixteen experts 
drawn from stakeholders’ groups earlier consulted in the questionnaire survey. 
The interviewees
90
 were carefully selected on the basis of their experience and 
level of managerial cadre they have achieved. While this section provides an 
introduction of the chapter, Section 7.2 presents and analyses the interviews; 
Section 7.3 concludes the chapter.   
7.2 Interview Survey Analysis 
As earlier indicated in Section 5.6.3.2.2, the purpose of employing the 
interview research tool for this study is to further ascertain the issues that 
emerged from the findings of the questionnaire. Consequently, the five, key, 
broad areas designed in the questionnaire were used to interview the evidently 
abled experts. The five broad areas and questions are summarised as follows: 
1. Standardised indicators of value addition and their applicability to the 
upstream operations of the NNPC. 
2. Environmental factors that affect the value adding objectives of the NNPC. 
3. Operational efficiency of the NNPC in the upstream sector. 
4. The effectiveness of NNPC in the upstream sector. 
5. The NNPC ensuring economy in the upstream sector (see interview 
questions in appendix E). 
 
 
                                       
90
 The interviewees were coded from S1 to S12.  Those groups with more than one interviewee 
further differentiated with alphabetical letters. 
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7.2.1 Responses relating to Value Addition to Hydrocarbon Resources in 
the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry 
As generally evident from the literature, the NOCs unlike the MOCs have the 
dual responsibilities of maximising profit and ensuring sustainable 
development in the spirit of the national mission (Lahn et al., 2007). Although 
the significant indicators for achieving these two components of the NOC’s 
value adding responsibilities are often not clearly defined, six indicators were 
identified in the literature, namely: i) discovery of oil and gas; ii) high 
production of oil and gas; iii) high oil and gas revenue; iv) development and 
application of research; v) local capacity building; vi) increase the participation 
of local companies. These indicators are perceived to be of a global standard 
(Wainberg and Foss, 2007; Robinson, 2009).  
Being that the assessment of the NOCs can appropriately be done based on 
their objectives (Al-Naimi, 2004; Tordo et al., 2011), the value indicators were 
presented to Nigerian stakeholder groups in the questionnaires administered. 
Subsequently, further enquiries were made on the appropriateness of the value 
adding indicators through interviews. The opinions of the interviewees are 
consistent with the findings of the questionnaire except in one of the variables, 
the development and application of scientific research. The assertions of the 
interviewees are related as follows: 
i) Discovery of new oil reserves: in several instances the interviewees 
identified the discovery and addition of oil reserves as a form of adding value 
to hydrocarbon resources. Below are some of the pronouncements of the 
interviewees. 
One interviewee from the MOCs (S5A) said:  
“Value is added in term of revenue generation and the discovery of new 
frontiers, where there have been a lot of enhanced recovery”.  
In concurrence, interviewee (S1A) was quoted to have said:  




Further affirmation of the discovery of oil reserves as an indicator for adding 
value to oil and gas resources was given by interviewee (S3B) who said: 
 “For me I will say value addition is in two folds. Firstly, how to enhance the 
recovery of the hydrocarbon in the earth, and secondly, how to improve the 
products you get from the hydrocarbon”.  
An assertion that further buttresses the place of oil and gas discovery as a form 
of value addition was interestingly delivered by interviewee (S11) who said:  
“It is imperative to continue to add value through new discoveries. Currently a 
new bill titled “A Bill for act to establish the National Frontiers Basins 
Exploration Agency” is being debated in the National Assembly, with the aim 
of seeking value from the inland sedimentary basins in the northern part of 
Nigeria”.  
Similarly interviewees (S9) and (S12) concurred that the discoveries of oil and 
gas fields indicate adding value to hydrocarbon resources. 
ii) High production of oil and gas: the interviewees also indicated that 
successful production of oil and gas express that value is added to hydrocarbon 
resources. Some of the assertions of the interviewees in this respect are stated 
below. 
An interviewee (S1B) asserted that:  
“Nigeria depends on hydrocarbon 90%. It is only when upstream activities are 
undertaken and production is optimised that we can say value is added”.  
Another interviewee (S2A) concurred to this view through this assertion:  
“The expectation of Nigerians hinge on the level oil production, because as the 
mainstay of the country high production of oil translate to value addition”.  
Interviewee (S11) argued the case of adding value through high production in 
an interesting way, that:  
“As you can see the level of production influences the kind of the budget the 
president presents to the National Assembly for appropriation. In the recent 
past, production level reduced due to the militancy in the Delta production, and 
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this was costly for the economy. Therefore, as it is I will say high level of oil 
and gas production is very important for the survival of Nigeria”.  
The view that high production represents value addition to hydrocarbon 
resources is also shared by interviewees (S7), (S6) and (S4). 
iii) Higher revenue from oil and gas resources: although some of the opinions 
earlier stated point to the fact that revenue generated from oil and gas is 
considered as value addition, specific assertions are stated below. 
One interviewee (S7) shared his views on the relevance of oil and gas revenue 
by saying:  
“It is only when we increase our reserves that we cash in on the hydrocarbon. 
So the revenue we expect as a country is what we use to sustain our 
development”.   
Correspondingly, interviewee (S8) said: 
“When we look at the hydrocarbon itself, it does not have any value except it is 
explored and developed and produced. The value that is created manifest in the 
oil and gas revenue we get”.  
As well, interviewee (S2B) reiterated this view by saying that: 
“Value comes in the form of the oil and gas revenue that constitute the bulk of 
fund that is shared to the federal, states and local governments from the 
federation account”.  
In conclusion, in the course of the interviews many interviewees have 
indirectly emphasised the importance of oil and gas revenue to Nigeria. 
iv) The increase in local capacity to explore, develop and produce oil and gas: 
being that oil and gas activities in Nigeria are dominated by the MOCs, the 
development of local capacity was also indicated as value addition. The 
assertions of the interviewees are related as follows. 
Interviewee (S1A) was of the view that:  
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“Value will seem to have been added, if we attain self-sufficiency in upstream 
activities. We are already doing that through the NPDC and other local 
companies such as Oando and SAPETRO”.  
The same view was related by (S11) who said:  
“Nigeria is deriving value from the fields ceded to local companies as a result of 
the Marginal Fields Act”.  
A good number of stakeholders perceived the increase of local capacity in the 
oil and gas upstream sector as value adding. Amongst them are (S1C), (S4), 
(S7) and (S12). 
v) Creation of stronger economic linkages within the oil and gas value chain: 
creation of value within the oil industry and even the multiplier effect of oil 
and gas activities to other sectors of the economy, according to the literature, 
addresses some aspect of a NOCs national mission (Lahn et al, 2007). In this 
regards, some of the assertion of interviewees are stated.  
In the first instance, interviewee (S6) said:  
“Nigeria could have added value to the hydrocarbon resources by setting up 
functional and effective refineries that are working optimally; we would not 
have cause to export crude and import petroleum products. In that case, the 1.7 
billion dollars that the subsidy is claiming will not even arise. So if we look at it 
effectively we are not adding value optimally to hydrocarbon resources in 
Nigeria”.  
Although the interviewee suggested that there is need for improvement in this 
aspect, it is confirmed that economic integrations are considered as adding 
value. This is further affirmed by interviewee (S1B) who said:  
“We are adding value enormously through the activities of IDSL and NETCO in 
the upstream sector. In fact some other local companies in the service sector are 
now benefiting hugely. Lest I forget, there are plans to add value through the 
power sector”.  
Interviewees (S4) and (S10) are also in agreement on the perception that 
linking economic activities within and without the oil and gas value chain 
denotes value addition. 
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vi) The development and application of results of scientific research: regarding 
this, the argument is that the output of the investment in research and 
development will create an intangible asset; the organisation’s knowledge base 
from which oil and gas exploration, development and production will be 
enhanced; from which future profit will be made (Hall, 2002).  
However, this important value driver that is most necessary for reducing 
dependency and enhancing self-sufficiency, in contrast to the findings of the 
questionnaire, was not out rightly recognised by the interviewees. The closest 
to acknowledging this value indicator was the expression of interviewee (S1A) 
who said:  
“Some of our strategies to achieve the mission statement are that we want to 
improve technology”.  
This arguably explains the overbearing dependence syndrome of the NNPC in 
the upstream sector. Although the variable is accepted as a value adding 
indicator in the questionnaires, the lack of regards in the interviews suggests 
that the NNPC is not capable to add value in this respect. 
Table 7.1: Summarised Interview Findings in Relations to Value Adding 
Indicators 
Question: Can you please give your opinion on the outcomes that signify that value is 




i) Discovery and replacement of new reserves 
S1B,S2A,S4,S6, 
S7,S11 
2) Higher than budgeted production 
S1A,S1B,S1C,S2B, 
S7,S8,S10,S11,S12 
3) High than budgeted revenue 
S1A,S1C,S4,S7, 
S11, S12 
4) Increase in local capacity to explore, develop and produce oil 
and gas 
S1B,S1C,S4,S8,S8 5) Economic linkages 
None 6) Development and application of scientific research 




7.2.2 Responses on the Impact of Environmental Factors on the 
Performance of the NNPC in Adding Value to Hydrocarbon 
Resources  
The performance of an organisation depends on its interaction with the 
dynamic environment in which it operates (Tordo et al., 2011). A good match 
of organisational action and the environment produces a successful outcome, 
while the contrary is experienced in the event of a mismatch (Sheppard and 
Chowdhury, 2005). The environments are categorised into internal and external 
environments; whereby, the former relates to the role of the internal 
management of the organisation and the latter deals with the conditions within 
which the organisation is immersed.  
These conditions that influence the actions of the organisation include the 
technological, legal, economic, political, social, ecological and cultural factors 
(Rainey, 2003; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). As such, a mixture of 
environmental factors, peculiar to the oil and gas industry, were identified and 
presented to the respondents in the questionnaire, and the findings were 
overwhelmingly in the negative. This prompted the further enquiry through the 
interview and the findings turned out to be consistent with those of the 
questionnaire. The following are the assertions of the interviewees. 
i) Political interference: the political factor has been long identified as a major 
cause for patronage, rent seeking and low performance in public organisations 
(see Thurber et al., 2010; Tordo et al., 2011). The perception of the 
interviewees, below, validates the findings of the questionnaire. 
While emphasising the negative impact political meddlesomeness has on 
NNPC’s performance, interviewee (S9) said: 
“Well, there is a lot of government interference in every government company. 
However, it is actually intense in the NNPC”.   
Further confirmation of the adverse government interference was related by 
interviewee (S12) who narrated that:  
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“Globally, governments influence oil production, especially through taxation. 
However in countries that depend highly on crude oil like Nigeria, the situation 
is bad. This is because individuals and corporate organisations within 
government are using political interference for personal gains and benefits. In 
other words, there are side-tracking it for their own personal profit and not for 
the benefit of government and the people”.  
In subsequence, one interviewee (S2A) related that:  
“In Nigeria, government interference has impacted negatively against the 
people, environment and even the oil industry. That explains the lack of 
accountability and bad performance on the side of the NNPC”.  
As well, interviewee (S1A) expressed that:  
“Where we have issues most of the time is when you are depending on who is in 
power and all that. You can have an idea which if taken forward will not pass 
through because of personal interest. The PIB is an example”. 
 Finally, interviewee (S1B) dramatically concluded by saying:  
“I wonder why people expect high performance from NNPC. With the frequent 
politically motivated change of leadership and management we experience in 
NNPC, there is no way we can achieve much”.  
ii) Fiscal regime: the literature suggested that a properly designed fiscal regime 
is one that finds optimum balance in the interest of both government/NOC and 
the MOCs. In other words, it is a regime that has sufficient progressivity and 
guarantees favourable revenue to partners against any deterrent effect on 
investment (Davis et al., 2003). It is in this regard that the views of the 
interviewees are stated.   
Despite the quest for the introduction of a new oil and gas fiscal policy in 
Nigeria through the PIB, similar to the findings of the questionnaire, the 
interviewees are of the opinion that the present fiscal regimes are favourable to 
both the government and the MOCs. In assertion, Interviewee (S1C) said: 
“Nigeria has a robust fiscal arrangement for exploration and production. We 
have a lot of concessions given; there are tax reliefs and fiscal incentives for 
offshore and inland basins”.  
This perception is further affirmed by interviewee (S10) who related that:  
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“The Nigerian petroleum fiscal terms are good, and that explains the presence 
of the MOCs despite the high risk involved in the Nigerian oil and gas 
operations”.  
Even though interviewee (S12) acknowledged that the fiscal regimes are 
balanced, he expressed some concern about the utilisation of the generated 
revenue. He expressed that: 
“The fiscal regimes are favourable to both NNPC and oil companies. It’s a win-
win situation but the government is not using its own part very well. They are 
getting good revenue”. 
Other interviewees that agreed that the fiscal regimes positively influence 
NNPC performance include (S1A), (S4), (S7) and (S8).  
iii) Stability of petroleum operations: an instable and risky operational 
environment is well-acknowledged to breed uncertainty which hinders 
economic development (Frynas, 1998). In response to this, the findings of the 
questionnaire suggested NNPC’s recent poor performance should partly be 
attributed to Niger Delta militant crisis. Nine interviewees related this view and 
some of the assertions are thus stated below.  
An interviewee (S5B) who had first-hand experience of the instable 
environment said:   
“The security situation in the Niger Delta is a major hindrance to performance. 
It leads to a high cost of production. For instance, I worked on a project which 
currently I will say is the most expensive pipeline project in the world, 1.3 
billion for a 98 kilometres trunk line. If you look at it, the big chunk of the 1.3 
billion is factored to security”. 
Likewise in support, another interviewee (S1C) related that:  
“In terms of the contract because when you have an environment that is not 
peaceful there will always be premium. There will be premium on the expatriate 
that want to come and premium on the contract. So there will be increase in 
cost. In this situation contractors may take advantage and inflate prices. All 
those come to play so it affects our performance”. 
The responses drawn from the interviews are consistent with the findings of the 
questionnaire and the conventional analysis of organisational studies. This is 
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despite the fact that Frynas (1998) argued that the crisis in the Niger Delta has 
had much impact on the operations of Shell. 
iv) The commercial expertise: it is generally assumed in the literature that a 
lack of professionalism and commercial oversight undermines the NOC’s 
performance. While on the other hand, commercialisation is associated with 
good governance, transparency, accountability and oil industry best practice 
(McPherson, 2004; Wainberg and Foss, 2007). In this regard, responses from 
the questionnaire showed a general agreement that the NNPC lacks commercial 
expertise to add value to the hydrocarbon resources. The perceptions of the 
interviewees are as follows: 
While buttressing the point that commercialisation will drive NNPC to perform 
positively in adding value to oil and gas resources, interviewee (S1B) related 
that: 
“Commercialisation will help us as a corporation. We need to be unbundled 
from government totally. If we look at other national oil companies such as 
PETRONAS, there is separation between government and the oil company. It is 
delineated”. 
Correspondingly, commercialisation is suggested to entail the independence of 
operations. This is the view portrayed by interviewee (S1A) who said: 
 “We want to be commercialised without unnecessary government interference, 
where we can hire and fire, and we can use the carrot and stick, then I think we 
will get there. Then the government can hold us accountable in terms of 
dividends, taxes and revenue”. 
From another perspective which showed that the NNPC has not been run with 
much commercial consideration, interviewee (S2A) related that:  
“This is not about the government appointing politicians to the board of the 
NNPC. We need to have people that know the business and can add value to the 
business. Even of recent, we saw decisions that were taken without looking at 
the commercial implications”. 
Finally, unlike some other NOCs like Petrobras and Statoil who are reputed for 
professionalism, interviewee (S12) suggested that NNPC’s value adding 
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performance is greatly undermined for lack of commercial professionalism, by 
relating that:   
“Regarding the issue of adding value to hydrocarbon resources, in my candid 
view I don’t think the NNPC is really adding value because there is issue of 
doing business and declaring profit or loss. This is what I don’t see the NNPC 
doing. In fact, what I am saying is that the NNPC business is not real business”. 
These responses confirmed the findings of the questionnaire. However, it 
seems the government is making effort to address this issue by incorporating 
the JV arrangements through the PIB. 
v) Transparency and disclosure: As shown in Section 4.2, transparency is a 
vital tool for enhancing and ensuring accountability (Boyne, 2002). It is central 
to improving the governance of NOCs, which in effect is instrumental to 
mitigating the agency problem; increases performance and provides a platform 
for effective communication with stakeholders (Indreswari, 2006; Iyoha and 
Oyerinde, 2009). The findings of the questionnaire regarding transparency in 
revenue, oil production and cost suggested that the NNPC is negatively 
affected. These findings are reiterated in the interviews conducted by all the 
interviewees engaged. 
For instance, interviewee (S8) who represents an important government agency 
stated that: 
“One of NNPC’s major problems is its lack of transparency and accountability. 
Its secretive nature has led the people to perceive it as corrupt and inefficient. 
You can hardly pin down an accurate figure for its volume of production, 
revenue and expenditure”. 
In addition, further responses suggested that even within government circles, 
the NNPC is poorly perceived in terms of transparency and accountability. This 
undermines its essence to reduce the information gap between government and 
the MOCs. Representing another government agency, interviewee (S7) opined 
that: 
“The NNPC’s problems go down to accountability, responsibility and optimal 
use of either cost or benefit”. 
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This perception is further confirmed by a representative of the civil society, 
interviewee (S12), who opined that in the NNPC:  
“Transparency is not there, but there is hope that with the passage of the 
Freedom of Information bill things will improve. Probably NNPC will be more 
transparent. DPR and other agencies in the petroleum sector will be able to be 
more accountable and everybody will see the books better. But currently 
nobody can explain the actual revenue made and how they are disbursed”. 
vi) The existing oil and gas laws: this represents the legal framework upon 
which oil and gas activities are governed with the aim to add value optimally 
(Omoregbe, 2001). Furthermore, as related in Section 4.7, these laws and rules 
are vital to ensuring VfM, given that they are the crux of the operational 
system that provides for rewards, compliance and sanctions (Dubnick and 
Justice, 2002). Responses from the questionnaire suggested that the existing oil 
and gas laws are obsolete and ineffective. However, contrary to this finding, 
the interviewees have perceived that the existing oil and gas laws have had 
positive influence of the NNPC’s performance. 
The first response in favour of the existing laws is expressed by interviewee 
(S7) who said: 
“The legal framework upon which the NNPC operates is alright, but the 
operation, structure and processes of implementing the framework are faulty. 
This leads to misplacement of resources in terms of human and capital 
resources”. 
Correspondingly, interviewee (S5A) responded in support by saying: 
“Even though the PIB is to replace the Petroleum Act if passed by the National 
Assembly, it is my sincere view that the existing Act has all it takes to 
judiciously help the NNPC to operate. After all it has been in use for over four 
decades”. 
Finally, interviewee (S6) concurred by saying that: 
“The Nigerian petroleum laws are appropriate for oil and gas operations. 
However, the NNPC and the DPR need to enforce some of the provisions of the 
laws so as to encourage local participation”. 
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Interviewees (S9) and (S12) also shared the same perception that the oil and 
gas laws that govern upstream operations in Nigeria have been effective in 
adding value. In conclusion, the views of the interviewees differed with the 
findings of the questionnaire. 
Table 7.2: Summarised Interview Findings on the Environmental Factor 
that Affect the NNPC 
Question: Based on the findings of the analysis of my questionnaire, the experts 
seemed to hold the opinion that there are factors that have had positive and negative 
effect on NNPC’s development of hydrocarbon resources. Do you share this view? If 
so, can you please comment on the factors? 





i) Fiscal regimes 
 Tax relief 
 Fiscal incentives (MoU) 
 Balanced tax system 
S5A,S6,S7,S9,S12 
ii) Petroleum laws and regulations 
 Appropriateness 






i) Political interference 
 Patronage 
 Rent seeking 
 Politically influenced appointment of 
managers 












iii) Lack of commercialisation 
 Lack of administrative autonomy 
 Lack of financial autonomy 
 Lack of professionalism 
 
All interviewees 
iv) Lack of transparency and accountability 
 Secrecy 









7.2.3 Responses on the Efficiency of the NNPC in Upstream Management  
In the quest to ascertain the NNPC’s performance within the perspective of 
VfM, the efficiency of the NNPC was sought in the questionnaire. Efficiency, 
in this respect, denotes the outcome of the appropriate use of administrative 
principles in directing and controlling the internal mechanisms of an 
organisation (Murshid, 1988). These mechanisms include the structure, the 
administrative system, the financing network and the control apparatus. 
The general findings of the questionnaire showed that the NNPC has not been 
efficient in managing its upstream activities. Thus, in order to examine further 
and seek validation of the findings, interviews were conducted. The assertions 
derived are categorised and stated below. 
i) The administrative procedures: as stated in Section 3.6.1, this is concerned 
with the organisational structure, the administration system and other essential 
inputs that are requisite for achieving efficiency (Richard et al., 2009). Below 
are some of the assertions of the interviewees. 
a) The corporate resources are mobilised, allocated and utilised through the 
organisational structure (Obiwuru et al., 2011). With respect to NNPC, 
interviewee (S5B) related that:  
“The NNPC’s administrative structure for actualising the upstream objectives 
and strategies is flawed, because it is not well-defined”. 
To further emphasise this point, interviewee (S3) who represents the regulator 
remarked that: 
“For goodness sake, how do you expect a company that is involved in oil and 
gas exploration, upstream, downstream, marketing, transportation and 
everything under the leadership of one person to work? It is practically 
impossible.  Therefore the issue of structure and processes will have to be 
revisited”. 
While arguing that the frequent change of the NNPC’s leadership is the reason 
for its administrative failure, interviewee (S8) said: 
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“I will say on paper, that the NNPC has a good structure, but the issue is 
consistency. Another man comes on board and for some reason they start a new 
policy; they start a new roadmap while another man comes on board and change 
it; that affects progress. Building on the progress made by others, based on a 
roadmap will bring operations to be more effective and economic”. 
In relation to the assertion above, interviewee (S12) said: 
“The NNPC is supposed to be a prestigious company doing its business and at 
the same time providing service to the nation just like Petrobras in Brazil, 
Statoil in Norway and Petronas in Malaysia. It has to be an independent 
organisation that can attract expertise worldwide to make money for the 
country. It has to be split and restructured to follow laid down processes”. 
Finally, the structural problem is perceived to be beyond the NNPC, but rather 
the whole oil and gas industry. In relation to this, interviewee (S11) related 
that: 
“The structure in place for the industry is wrong”. 
In consistence with the findings of the questionnaire, the interviewee held the 
view that the structure upon which NNPC operates is defective. Thus, 
conveying economic information within such a structure undermines 
accountability and the achievement of VfM and efficiency. 
b) Regarding NNPC’s efficiency in upstream decision-making, the views of the 
interviewees remained consistent with the finding of the questionnaire. The 
positions drawn from the interviews are as stated below. 
The interviewee (S3) reported that: 
“By the arrangement of the NNPC, the Minister of Petroleum Resources is the 
Chairman of the corporation, and there are some board members appointed by 
government. Probably it is only the GMD who represents the entire corporation 
as a professional in the board, and the board is to decide the fate of the 
corporation. So, this is the largest and most important corporation owned by 
government being managed by politicians that may not have required 
knowledge of the industry. Ironically, every critical decision for the corporation 
will be made by the board, therefore there is a problem”.  
From another perspective, the NNPC’s decision-making process was doubted, 
as interviewee (S1C) narrated that:  
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“One area we have government interference is when the board decides on 
contracts. For example in the NNPC, contracts are given to the lowest bidder 
and the lowest bidder may not necessarily be the best. There are politicians; 
whenever there is a big contract the minister is interested”. 
Similar perceptions are held by interviewees (S7), (S9) and (S12). This 
suggests that the finding of the questionnaire is reaffirmed by the interviewees. 
c) Appropriate human capacity: having the adequate quality and quantity of 
human resources is also an important requisite for corporate governance. In this 
respect, the finds of the questionnaire indicated that the NNPC has not 
appropriately utilised it human resources, or even lacks the adequate capacity. 
The interviews conducted revealed the following assertions: 
Interviewee (S3) briefly said that: 
“The NNPC have qualified staff but they are not being used wisely. They are 
not well-placed”. 
In relation, interviewee (S5A) related that: 
 “I know the NNPC have good hands, but they are not used rightly. Site visits 
are rarely held as scheduled due to non-availability of their personnel. This is a 
major factor that contributes to slowing down progress”.  
The assertion of interviewee (S10) reiterated the point that NNPC have 
qualified staff but use them inappropriately by saying: 
“I will say the capacity is there but the deployment of capacity is a challenge”.  
Emphasising the lack of adequate utilisation of human capacity as one of the 
NNPC’s deficiencies and describing the way it affects the NNPC’s 
performance, interviewee (S9) asserted that: 
 “Another problem is that the NNPC reshuffle their staff frequently. For 
instance, personnel that have worked in the downstream sector all his career 
may find himself in the upstream sector at the decision making level. How then 
do we expect the right decisions to be taken”? 
The issue is also asserted in a different perspective by interviewee (S1C): 
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“Again, the issue of training, they are so many misplacement of priorities. There 
is no deliberate and conscious effort by NNPC to train certain group of 
personnel to manage those areas that are critical to their business”. 
Overall, the assertions of the interviews conducted agree with the findings of 
the questionnaires; as such, the result is validated that the NNPC’s 
administrative procedures are deficient and causes inefficiency. 
ii) Financial management: the processes of sourcing, managing and expending 
fund are also critical to organisational efficiency. Findings of the questionnaire 
suggested that the NNPC is also deficient in this aspect. Further probe through 
the interviews conducted revealed the assertions below. 
Regarding the sourcing of finances for upstream projects, a respondent from an 
operating company, coded as interviewee (S5B) declared that: 
“The fact that the NNPC will have to source funds for reinvestment from the 
government is a major challenge to oil and gas operations in Nigeria. The fund 
does not come in time and this affects our lead time performance. We know that 
in big corporations, bureaucracy cannot be eliminated but they will have to be 
improved. When it comes to projects they will have to cut some of the processes 
to enable efficient and effective management of the projects”. 
Interviewee (S5A) also asserted in a similar manner by giving this example: 
“For instance, there is the Afam project which Shell funded in Nigeria without 
the agreed contribution of the Nigerian government. The government share was 
released by President Yar’adua long after the project had been completed. If 
Shell had waited for the government’s share, the project would not have taken 
off”. 
Similarly a representative of the regulator, interviewee (S3) affirmed this 
position by saying: 
 “The NNPC is a company like Shell, Chevron and others. To make it efficient 
and effective they have to make it and its units autonomous, so as to enable 
them make profit and retain some of the earnings for reinvestment without 
having to go to the government. The oil companies go through a long 
bureaucratic process to secure funds for further investments. In most cases they 
rarely get what is need for reinvestment”. 
Interviewee (S1A) also emphasised the point that: 
“I feel as a company we can do far better than we do presently, but because of 
unnecessary bureaucracy we are still where we are. Take for instance, an MD of 
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a NNPC subsidiary cannot approve an expenditure of five thousand pounds; 
then how are you going to be efficient? Then imagine a situation where a line 
manager cannot approve a thousand dollars”. 
A picture of the NNPC’s system for distributing funds for upstream operation 
was captured by interviewee (S5A) who said: 
“Most times the bureaucratic process is too much that by the time the primary 
action is to be taken, it doesn’t serve the purpose again. For instance, about 
three years ago when I was working on a major project in Nigeria, one of the oil 
servicing companies executing the project came up with some quotations of 
some foreign materials which we needed and the prices really were high. We 
have our procurement team in house which looked at it and reported that the 
prices were high. Eventually the contractor reduced it reasonably and we 
forwarded it to the NAPIMS’ board for approval. There was so much 
bureaucracy, after several meetings and reviews it took four months to get the 
approval and at that time the contractor could not abide by the quoted prices 
because time has overtaken the validity of the quotation. Therefore, the 
approval for funding does not meet the need and this seriously affected the 
project schedule”. 
In this respect, similar views were held by interviewees (S1C), (S2) and (10). 
Therefore, overall, the assertions of the interviewees are consistent with the 
findings of the questionnaire where it was perceived that NNPC’s procedures 
for sourcing, utilising and expending funds are flawed, and contributes to 
inefficiency. 
iii) Efficient use of control tools: a good control mechanism is vital for an 
efficient operation, in that it helps in ensuring that actors within and outside the 
organisation undertake functions in the best interest of the organisation. The 
findings of the questionnaire portray a negative perception on the NNPC’s 
efficient use of control tools. The follow up interviews conducted have the 
following declarations.   
With regards to budgetary system, interviewee (5A) asserted that: 
 “The NNPC’s budgetary procedures need to be reformed. Can you imagine that 
a budget plan given in January might not be approved till in June? Often the 
operator takes the risk to bear the cost as long as there is an understanding on 
paper. Most times the excuse the NNPC gives is that the budget is tied to the 
National budget which will have to be appropriated by the National Assembly 
before the presidency approves. So the whole thing is like a chain reaction”.  
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Another interviewee (S12) specifically emphasised on NNPC’s procurement 
procedures by stating that: 
“I don’t think the tendering and contracting processes are efficiently used 
because of the large scale of fraudulent transactions that we have uncovered 
over time. For instance, some companies that lift our crude oil were discovered 
not to be on the tender list. That is just one case; there are several cases that can 
be mentioned”. 
This view is supported by interviewee (S2): 
“During our auditing exercise, it was discovered the procurement procedures 
lacked transparency. This is one area where politicians have much interest, so 
high corruption prevails”. 
While acknowledging the availability of controls tools in NNPC, interviewee 
(S1B) asserted on the utilisation of the tools as stated: 
“We have control tools in place such as AFE’s, budget and auditing. The 
challenge is that, you can alike the budgetary procedures to the computer, its 
garbage in garbage out.  We are not the operator but we try within our capacity. 
For example, we collect medium and long-term strategic plans. On a yearly 
basis, we build up a profile for exploration, development, production and new 
business upon which the budget is based. That is a way of controlling what we 
are doing in the industry”. 
Although, interviewee (S1B) did not declare out-right that the control tools are 
used efficiently, the statement infers so. However, a clearer perception is 
asserted by interviewee (S10). 
“For the JV and compliance audits, there are provisions for them in the joint 
operating agreements. We do periodic audits. However, what the auditors see is 
what the International Oil Companies want them to see. They qualify based on 
the documents the International Oil Companies give to them. For example, if 
you come to my house you will be limited to what I want you to see”. 
Similar to the findings of the questionnaire, the assertions of the interviewees 
suggested that, in general, the control tools are not efficiently used - possibly 
due to inadequate human resource. 
Overall, the perception of drawn of the interviews conducted concurred with 
the findings of the questionnaire, where it was generally perceived that NNPC 
has not been efficient in managing its upstream oil and gas operations. 
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Table 7.3: Summarised Findings of Interview on the Efficiency of NNPC 
in the Upstream Sector 
Question: From the analysis of the questionnaire earlier administered, it appears 
that the respondents believe that the NNPC has not managed its upstream operations 
efficiently. Do you share this view? If so, please can you mention the reasons for its 
managerial inefficiency? 









 Unclear objectives 
 Defective organisational structure 
 Defective administrative system 
 Excessive bureaucracy 
 Lack of independence in decision making 
 Human and technical incapacity 
 Inappropriate use of available manpower 
 Lack of adequate training and development 




ii) Financial Management 
 Lack of financial autonomy 
-Funds depend on government budget 
-Controlled approval limits 
-Cannot retain profit 
 Unnecessary bureaucracy in processing fund  
 
S1B, S2, S5A,S10,S12 
iii) Efficient use of control tools 
 Defective budgetary procedures 
 Deficient human and technical capacity used for 
doing audit work 
Source: Author 
7.2.4 The Responses on the Effectiveness of the NNPC in the Upstream 
Sector 
As stated in Section 3.6.2, effectiveness is another component of the VfM 
which is concerned with achieving organisational targets and objectives (Aktas 
et al., 2011). In this light, the questionnaire focused on the NNPC’s operational 
targets and national mission targets. In general, the findings of the 
questionnaire suggested that the NNPC was not effective in its upstream 
operations. Investigations were further conducted through interviews and the 
assertions drawn are as related below. 
Some assertions were made on NNPC’s operational targets. On the issue of 
meeting its reserves and production targets, interviewee (S1A) said: 
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“Actually, our target was to achieve a reserve base of 40 billion barrels and 
produce 4.5 million barrels of crude oil per day. We have not been able to meet 
up because of several reasons, which are not mainly our fault. I’m sure you are 
aware of the problems in the Niger Delta. Another reason is the non-passage of 
the PIB. The oil companies are not doing much of exploration because of the 
uncertainty involved”. 
This assertion, which confirmed the targets set was not attained; were also 
expressed by interviewees (S1C), (S2), (S3), (S4), (S5B) and (S8). 
Regarding cash flow targets, interviewee (S5A) said: 
“You see, when you talk of cash flow targets then the whole NNPC case 
becomes a joke. Did you not hear of the debate on the NNPC’s solvency some 
years back? The truth is that the NNPC survives on government; it does not 
really earn anything for keeps. That is why its investments are funded by 
government. In fact, one can conclude that the NNPC’s business is that of a 
messenger who conveys messages between the government and the oil 
companies. It does not have money of its own”. 
In a similar manner, interviewee (S3) asserted that: 
“The NNPC business is not real business. It is not run like companies like Shell 
or even contemporaries like PETRONAS and Aramco where there is some sort 
of control over income and cash flow. This is one of those areas the PIB is 
designed to address”. 
The ineffectiveness attributed to the NNPC in this aspect can be linked to the 
design of the oil and gas industry, rather than the NNPC. However, other 
aspects of the NNPC’s operational targets were also commented on. 
Regarding the NNPC’s effectiveness in controlling oil sharing and lifting, 
interviewee (S1C) asserted differently from the perception drawn from the 
questionnaire, as such: 
“It has always been alleged that we don’t know what we produce and what is 
lifted. I can tell you that this is not true. The jetties have a metering system that 
ascertains what is taken. Yes, there will be bunkering which is an international 
thing but generally we are in control. Nigeria produces over 2.5 million barrels 
per day, but when we vandalise; when there are have shut-ins; when there are 
operational issues we don’t get that volume”. 
However, interviewees (S2), (S9) and (S12) disagreed with the assertion. For 
instance, interviewee (S2) declared that: 
“I don’t think that the NNPC really know what the oil companies’ produce 
because from our physical audits, we have has consistently pointed out this fact. 
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The volumes the NNPC give us are usually different from those of the oil 
companies. Besides, it is no secret that the NNPC do not have the technological 
capacity to monitor the oil companies”. 
With regards to the performance of the NNPC in the area of the Nigerian 
content objectives, several assertions were made. In response to the 
development of local skills, interviewee (S6) said: 
“Nigeria has so much skilled and unskilled manpower that can run the oil 
industry. The NNPC have some programmes that are aimed at developing skills. 
Some are in the form of attachments with the oil companies”. As well, a lot of 
wealthy Nigerians have started getting involved. Having said that, I am 100% in 
support of the way the local content agenda is being implemented”. 
In concurrence, interviewee (S1B) said: 
“The NNPC has done well in the development of local skilled workers. We 
ensure that there is shop placement with the oil companies, and we have worked 
closely with the PTDF to develop more hands. However, we still need to do 
better if we want to expand”. 
However, a different view was declared by interviewee (S5B) who said: 
“In terms of manpower, the NNPC often allows you to go ahead on projects 
based on your past experience without coming to check what they are supposed 
to check. This is mainly due to a shortage of qualified manpower. Sometimes 
they send the wrong personnel who are not qualified to go offshore and 
therefore the inspection does not go ahead. We need to improve the interface”.  
The views of these respondents correspond with the findings in the previous 
chapter. It confirmed that despite the NNPC’s stride towards the development 
of local skills, targets were not met. 
The perception is not different on the effectiveness of the NNPC in ensuring 
the use of local manpower, and the transfer of technological expertise. In this 
respect, Interviewee (S3) said: 
“The NNPC, the DPR and all petroleum agencies are currently driving to 
improve local content involvement in Nigeria. But there are problems. Look at 
the high number of unemployed local skilled workers available in the market. 
The MOCs are not willing to give the skilled Nigerians the chance to take over. 
To be honest, this is not good for Nigeria. The main issue here is corruption….I 
encountered several companies (I don’t want to mention their names) that bring 
in Document Control Officers, that is another name for ‘secretary’. I asked the 
company the difference between the two, and couldn’t be given a convincing 
answer. Do you mean out of 160 million Nigerians you cannot find a capable 
secretary? I mean a graduate that will take care of documents. There are so 
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many loopholes in the system. The MOCs are here for business and at the same 
time to create jobs for their people at our expense. In order to achieve their 
objectives they are ready to pollute the minds of even the unpolluted 
Nigerians.” 
Similarly, interviewee (S12) asserted that: 
 “We have an increasing number of foreigners coming to Nigeria at the expense 
of qualified skilled Nigerians. This increases the number of unemployed skilled 
Nigerians. This is not done elsewhere in the world. For example, in the UK, for 
a foreigner to be employed it will have to be proved that there is no qualified 
citizen to take the job. In Nigeria it is not so”. 
Although interviewee (S5A) also acknowledged that there is need for 
improvement in the use of local manpower, he singled out the high level of 
compliance in one of the MOCs. He asserted that: 
“For the use of local, skilled and unskilled workers, I will also give kudos to 
Shell, because about 85 to 90% of Shell personnel are Nigerians. As a result, 
Shell gets annual awards. This is not the case with ExxonMobil, Chevron and 
Total”. 
While attesting to the ineffectiveness of the NNPC, in ensuring that 
technological expertise is transferred to local companies including the NNPC 
itself, interviewee (S1C) said:  
“We have technological challenges. We do not have the kind of technology the 
MOCs have. I believe it is not because we cannot have them but, when we need 
to acquire them, we will still have to go through a long bureaucratic process. In 
fact, if it is not of priority to those at the top - despite its importance - you won’t 
get approval. If these areas are looked into, we will perform more efficiently”. 
Similarly, interviewee (S1A) who declared that: 
“For me you acquire technology based on the way you approach it. We need to 
say this is where we want to be. For example like China, you have to steal it. 
We have had money over the time that would have helped acquire technology 
through planning, but we have wasted it”.  
This assertion is equally shared by interviewee (S1B) who declared that:  
“You can’t acquire the technology without the resources.  It is for us to have a 
deliberate strategy that at some point will lead to acquiring the technology, 
which we have. But as a country we don’t follow through. Since 1958, when we 
started, it is expected that some Nigerians would have gotten to the level of 
understanding and handling petroleum business on our own. If you look at 
PTDF, the brain behind the policy is to train Nigerians abroad but the lapse of 
that policy is that the people do not come back contribute to the industry”. 
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Regarding the increased participation of local companies in the upstream 
sector, responses drawn from the interviews are mixed. For instance, 
interviewee (S5A) asserted that: 
 “For example, we in Shell, the NNPC has compelled that marginal fields be 
handed over to upcoming, small scale oil companies. Some of the fields were 
not operated for 8 to 10 years, and the government believed they can still get 
something out of the fields. It will amaze you that fields that were projected to 
have the capacity to produce 20,000 barrels per day, now, under some small 
indigenous oil companies, produce up to 40,000 barrels through some side-
tracking and enhanced recovery”.  
This opinion is also held by interviewee (S5B) who expressed: 
“Regarding participation of local oil servicing companies, there is a lot of 
improvement. Take Nestoil for example, they did a fantastic job for Shell 
recently, months ahead of schedule. The company employs over two thousand 
Nigerians and has even succeeded in buying one of Shell’s marginal fields. So 
gradually the company is turning to an operator. In addition, from its profit in 
the oil sector also the company set up a reputable construction company. This is 
all because Shell took it on board in partnership with government to increase 
local content. There are a few oil servicing companies like that, and it is very 
good for the economy. In a way we can say technology is being transferred 
gradually”.  
In contrast, interviewee (S7) responded differently by saying: 
“Can we really call what we are seeing ‘local participation’? Most of the local 
service companies are fronting for foreign companies and the products they 
supply are sourced abroad. As far as I know, the level of capital flight is still 
very high. But then, we should know that we cannot really participate without 
the requisite technology because the oil and gas industry is different from other 
industries”.   
Another respondent, who had earlier accepted that there is increased local 
participation in the oil and gas industry, pointed out some areas that need to be 
improved on. Interviewee (S5B) said: 
 “There are areas I am not pleased with in terms of the implementation of the 
content act. The NNPC now force on the operators some local companies that 
are not capable. For instance, on a recent project I worked on, a company which 
failed the technical and commercial bid, a company which was not even second 
or third on the list was enforced on the operator by the NNPC. Whereas there 
were other qualified Nigerian firms. This is extremely bad for oil project 
management. It will reduce efficiency and effectiveness of the operations. And 
at the end of the day it will not be economical”. 
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Despite the NNPC’s effort and improvement on local content, in general, the 
assertions of the interviewees are consistent with the findings in the previous 
chapter, where the NNPC’s ineffectiveness was declared. 
Issues on the effectiveness of the NNPC in monitoring the compliance of the 
upstream sector activities were sought in the interviews. Some of the assertions 
made are stated below. 
One experienced respondent, interviewee (S1A) said: 
 “Even in most of our agreements that were signed, the PSC for example, have 
the provision where Nigerians that work need to understudy the expert. It is 
even provided that at some point Nigerians will head those companies. In the JV 
agreement, there is a proportion of people we need to have on different cadre. 
Actually this is on paper, but in terms of compliance with some of these 
provisions we still have a lot to do”.  
Interviewee (S5B) related the NNPC’s effort in the following words: 
“The NNPC has some effective control tools. If we take auditing, the NNPC 
have qualified team to do the job. And that has kept us to set up to make sure 
our books are well-balanced. In fact, there were instances where audit staffs 
were sacked because NNPC found their team wanting. But the problem is that 
the team is overworked, and getting them to do the audits is difficult due to their 
tight schedule. In that regard we can say that the NNPC need to recruit more 
and improve on its manpower training and development”. 
The assertions above suggest that the NNPC is not effective since the MOCs 
have to pursue them to perform their duty. A similar comment was made 
regarding compliance to the provisions of the carry agreement. 
In responses to the issue of carry agreement, interviewee (S1C) related this: 
“At the initial stage, best decisions were not taken regarding the carry 
agreements we signed with the MOCs. We had problems with the way it was 
implemented and we could not really monitor the activities. I can tell you that 
we have improved greatly, that is why we now have the modified carry 
agreements”. 
Commenting on compliance with industry best practice, interviewee (S3) who 
represents the regulator confirmed the findings of the questionnaire by saying: 
“Regarding the application of best practice in the industry, I will answer in two 
ways, one leading to the other. On paper the standards are there but practically it 
is often not followed”. 
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Furthermore, interviewee (S5A) and (S12) related that the NNPC does not have 
the capacity to effectively monitor compliance to environmental laws and 
regulations. Although, there are other government agencies that are also 
responsible for ensuring compliance in this aspect, since the NNPC is a major 
partner, and one that bears loss when the environment is damaged, it should be 
able to monitor activities.  
In this respect, the assertion of interviewee (S5A) states the position of the 
NNPC: 
“Last year we had a spill and we were trying to get the NAPIMS people to come 
around so as to reconcile what the community and the media are saying 
regarding the spill. It was supposed to be an all-inclusive survey of the spill, 
including Rivers and Bayelsa state governments, NAPIMS and the 
environmental people, but NAPIMS couldn’t come, thereby couldn’t have had a 
clear understanding of the actual situation. Some of these spills are actually as a 
result of sabotage on pipelines in order to make claims from government and 
MOCs. The end result is that it reduces efficient and effective project 
management”.  
On a general note, the statements drawn from the interviews on the NNPC’s 
effectiveness in monitoring compliance on various upstream activities are 
consistent with its ineffective performance derived from the findings of the 
questionnaire. 
Communication is an important element of organisational effectiveness 
because it is helps to coordinate activities (Makinde, 2005). In this respect, the 
findings of the questionnaire suggested that the NNPC has an ineffective 
communication and feedback system. Further investigation through the 
interviews affirmed this position as shown in these statements. 
Interviewee (S5A) related that: 
“The NNPC need to improve on mainly interfacing with the oil 
companies, and especially in terms of bureaucratic processes. They 
should set up liaison offices within the operator’s premises to improve 
the interface. Sometimes it takes up to a month to chase after personnel 
to get approvals”. 




“Getting information from the NNPC is usually a herculean task. They are so 
secretive, and by so doing they alienate others who have dealings with them. 
The NNPC is not in any way transparent and this is an issue of concern”. 
One other respondent, interviewee (S1C) related that:  
“In the cause of doing our jobs there are procedures for how we communicate. 
But then we cannot say it is perfect, because everybody has got his own interest. 
Sometimes if something is not in one’s favour one is likely to keep mute. In 
general, I think we have good relationship with the IOCs, and we do that 
through various meetings like the sub-committee, technical committee and 
management committee meetings. Also, we communicate and pass information 
through other official and unofficial channels”. 
Interviewees (S7), (S9), (S11) and (S12) also stated the difficulty of 
communicating and assessing information from the NNPC. Therefore, the 
general conclusion is that communication between the NNPC and its other 
partners is ineffective. 
Overall, the assertions of interviewees, as in the findings of the questionnaire 
suggested that the NNPC has not been effective in meeting its operational and 













Table 7.4 Summarised Findings of Interviews Concerning NNPC’s 
Effectiveness in the Upstream Sector 
Question: The findings of my questionnaire suggest that NNPC have not done well in 
achieving its upstream goals and objectives. Do you have a similar opinion? If so, 
please can you comment on the reasons for the ineffectiveness? 








i) Oil and gas operational targets 
 Unstable environment for operations 
 Non-passage of the PIB 
 Lack of financial autonomy and solvency 
 Delay due to structural and process defect 
 Human and Technical incapacity to monitor and control 
MOC activities 











ii) National mission targets 
 Inadequate capacity to develop local skills and use the 
available manpower 
 Structural gap between the top management and middle 
managers 
 Lack of technical capacity 
 Lack of human capacity to control and monitor 






- Health and Safety 
- Best practices 
- Employment   
Source: Author 
7.2.5 Responses on NNPC’s Economic Considerations in the Management 
of its Upstream Activities 
As stated in Section 6.3.4, economy, which is the third component of VfM, is 
concerned about the economic decisions taken where cost is minimised; output 
is optimised and quality is not compromised in the case of achieving objectives 
(Daujotaite and Macerinskiene, 2008; Lee, 2008). In the light of this, the 
opinions of interviewees were sought on how well the NNPC has ensured 
economy in its upstream operations. 
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On the issue of optimum outcome to be achieved from the choice of petroleum 
contractual arrangements, these responses (below) were drawn from the 
interviews. 
While showing that the three petroleum arrangements presented in the 
questionnaire can produce optimally in Nigeria, depending how they are used, 
Interviewee (S3) asserted that: 
 “Depending on how we look at it, all of the contractual arrangements are 
beneficial. Technically, there are areas where JV is the best option to use, while 
in some areas it’s the PSC and Service Contract”. 
Supporting this view, interviewee (S1A) also said: 
“The choice of contract depends on some factors which we have to put into 
consideration. For instance, in the areas where there is the need to induce 
production up through the use of a pump in the well, the JV is likely the best 
option having checked the cost effectiveness of the technology. However, the 
PSC is more accepted in deeper waters because huge money is involved. It 
makes sense to bring in investors to invest while we share the discovered 
product for a certain period of time after which it all become ours. So because 
we have a lot of PSCs and, afterwards it all becomes solely the property of the 
country, we can use the Service Contractor to continue production. Therefore 
they are all useful and beneficial”.  
Some other respondents dwelled on the problems of the different arrangements 
and settled for the option they perceived as optimal in terms of costs and 
output.  
Interviewee (S4) asserted that: 
“All the arrangements have their pros and cons. The JV is good, but the 
challenge is the ability of government to fund its share of the venture. That is 
the cash calls. For the PSC, to our advantage the exploratory risk is on the 
MOC, however if you don’t manage it properly you could be short-changed. If 
the fund is available to us, I think with due diligence the JV is better. 
Specifically the incorporated JV will be most appropriate”. 
In concurrence, interviewee (S7) said: 
“Now looking at the major contracts we have in Nigeria, which are the JV and 
PSC. The JVs were signed a long time ago when the government does not have 
the manpower and technical ability to run oil operations. It was the right 
decision then and government still gets benefit from it. But, for the issue of 
funding, it is a very good contract. This led to PSC. So the PIB will incorporate 
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the ventures and it will help the economy. Government will make more and it 
will trickle down to other aspects of the economy”. 
Finally, interviewee (S2B) also asserted that: 
“With the current situation of cash calling in Nigeria, I will say the PSC is the 
most preferable. It minimizes the risks on government. And there is less 
interference from the NNPC in the PSC contracts. Also, because most PSCs are 
offshore where there is no community interference, they are more efficiently 
and effectively run. But then, being operated offshore the cost of running the 
PSC is far higher. However, both the PSC and JV are good depending on how 
you use them”. 
Based on these assertions, it can be concluded that the various petroleum 
arrangements in use in Nigeria produce optimally, considering the means 
available to the NNPC, and the circumstances in which they are used. This 
conclusion is consistent with the findings of the previous chapter. 
One other issue that was investigated through the interviews conducted is the 
effect of NNPC’s monitoring role on the cost performance of oil companies 
and service companies. Since the NNPC mainly operates in the upstream sector 
through other parties, it is vital for it to monitor and control cost performance.  
However, there is a need to carry out this function without undermining the 
overall objective of value creation. In this respect, assertions were drawn from 
interviewees. 
Interviewee (S5B) responded by saying that: 
“Any contract that is over 500,000 dollars must be presented to the NAPIMS. 
They will scrutinize the contract, see the value in it, assess the bidders, and 
carry out technical and commercial evaluations before the MOCs release it to 
the public to invite for bidding. But for the excessive bureaucracy, I will say the 
process is good”. 
In concurrence, interviewee (S5A) also related a similar view: 
“Monitoring cost or cost control is good management practice, and over the 
years the NNPC have adopted and used the concept vigorously. However, one 
of the issues with their approach is that of enforcing incapable companies on us 
because they are the principal partners in the venture, thereby causing delay in 
the progress of the project. Our engineers end up doing the job because the 
companies don’t even understand the basic things there are expected to do. This 
causes inefficiency, ineffectiveness and it doesn’t make economic sense. 
Logically, one wonders how such companies get through the NNPC’s screening 
in the first place”. 
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While emphasising on the effect of the NNPC’s conflicting role on monitoring 
cost performance, interviewee (S3) stated that: 
I think it is wrong for the NNPC who is also a player in the industry to measure 
cost performance; rather it should be done by the regulator. That’s why we have 
institutional structural changes in the PIB. For instance, the NNPC is a partner 
in JVs with MOCs, how are they going to regulate the MOCs? That is where we 
have a conflict of interest.” 
The assertions drawn from the interviews acknowledged that the monitoring 
role of the NNPC has the potential to positively affect the cost performance of 
the oil and service companies. However, it was also shown that the conflicting 
role of the NNPC in the upstream operations and other processes and human 
deficiencies adversely affect cost performance. This latter position negates the 
findings of the questionnaire.  
The investigation on the capability of the NNPC to identify problematic cost 
areas and measure the cost performance of the MOCs drew the various 
assertions. In one instance, interviewee (S1A) emphasised the NNPC’s 
capability of identifying and measuring cost by saying: 
“We need to think commercial and assess the implication of what we are doing. 
The reason why our group was formed is to do a valuation for any business we 
want to do. That is the objective of the Economic Decision Support Group. All 
quotations are consistently assessed in course of implementing any project”. 
In support of this view, interviewee (S6) said: 
“Since the NNPC established a joint qualification portal called NIPEX, it has 
been able to compare cost effectively. Bidders must qualify in NIPEX to bid for 
jobs, thereby eliminating the issue of pre-qualification”.  
The interviewee (S1C) also affirmed NNPC’s measures of capability while 
bringing to fore the challenges involved through this statement: 
 “We follow the international standard. The Nigerian accounting standard board 
also do provide accounting regulations. We are conscious of the cost of 
materials and equipment which we benchmark based on the global market. But 
remember, in Nigeria the cost is determined by uncertainty of our environment; 
the unrest and political interference does not give us the flexibility to perform”. 




“Take for example the NNPC’s Group Executive Director, Exploration and 
Production (GED Exploration & Production) who is supposed to be in charge of 
exploration and production activities, can adequately tell you of their portfolio 
as a company, the reserves they are involved with, their present position and 
expectations. But, at what cost and benefit are the projects being carried out? 
That is a question he can hardly answer because there is consistent change in 
people and policy in the NNPC”. 
Mixed positions were taken on the NNPC’s capability to identify problematic 
cost areas and to measure cost performance. While on the other hand, it was 
asserted that the NNPC is capable, based on the evaluation system and the 
benchmark in place; on the other hand, it is not because of the defect in the 
processes and the unstable operational environment. The latter argument is 
considered plausible as it aligns with the findings of the questionnaire. 
Furthermore, the respondents commented on the capability of the NNPC to 
assist with improving the cost performance of the MOCs. The respondents 
generally agreed that the NNPC has the capability, but there are areas that need 
to be reformed. The assertions are stated below. 
Interviewee (S1B) related that: 
 “The NNPC has done a lot to improve the cost performance. We have 
introduced SAP to improve communication and compare costs. We have also 
created a data base for project costs and equipment costs. Also available is the 
Nigerian Petroleum Exchange (NIPEX) where we pre-qualify contractors; 
where we have bidding guidelines and requirements for equipment”. 
Interviewee (S1A) also said:  
We have been able to improve on cost management in our modified carry 
agreements. As it is now, the MOC need to get to a certain level of a project 
before they can start carrying us. The project must have gotten to the front-end 
engineering design level where we can 50-50 predict the cost of the project. 
Carrying us at this level does not give room for escalation of the cost for the 
project”.  
While these two assertions portrayed the NNPC’s capability in improving cost 
performance, the next two assertions showed the loopholes in the system. In 
the first instance, interviewee (S9) related that: 
 “Regarding cost, we can say that the NNPC have a benchmark for the industry. 
However, I have a problem with the system because I don’t believe the lowest 
bidder is the best. There has to be an optimal cost. That is why the system 
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creates corruption. For instance, a bidder can cut low to get the contract and do 
the wrong thing afterwards”. 
This assertion is supported by interviewee (S3) who said:   
 “I won’t say we have total control. We have processes. We have procedures in 
place for procurement, approval and reporting. For me, to some extent that is 
good. The issue of cost control is very complex in nature. During the bidding 
process, the lowest bidder might not be the most capable for the project. The 
lowest bidder may be cheap but not the one that will give least value to the 
project”. 
Eleven of the sixteen interviewees mainly asserted that the NNPC is capable of 
improving cost performance of the MOCs, while five held a mixed position, 
thereby suggesting that some further improvement is required to ensure cost 
effectiveness. Therefore, it can arguably be concluded that the NNPC has the 
capability to improve its upstream cost performance. 
Table 7.5 Summarised Findings of Interviews in Relation to How Well 
NNPC has ensured Economy in the Upstream Sector 
Questions: On a general note, the results derive from the analysis of my 
questionnaire suggests that NNPC did not ensure economy in the management of its 
upstream operations. Do you share this opinion? If so, can you please mention the 
where and why economy has not been ensured in the upstream sector? 








i) NNPC’s monitoring role in cost performance of 
oil and service companies 
 Adverse effect due to NNPC’s conflict of interest 
 Deficient human and technical capability that will 
ensure compliance 
 Excessive bureaucracy 








ii) Management of cost performance 
 Deficient benchmarking 
 Deficient human and technical capability to 
measure cost and identify cost problematic areas 
 Deficient procurement procedures 
 Unstable operating environment 
 Patronage and corruption 
Source: Author   
7.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the findings relating to the analysis of the interviews conducted 
were presented. Sixteen interviews were conducted within the realm of the five 
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broad areas that reflect on the objectives of this study. This was done to clarify 
and validate the findings drawn from the last chapter. 
In relation to the first question, it was shown that most of the interviewees 
agreed that five of the six indicators presented in the questionnaire are 
appropriate and applicable as yardsticks for the NNPC’s value adding 
functions. That the development and application of scientific research was not 
acknowledged as a value adding indicator depicts the NNPC as a NOC that is 
largely dependent on the MOCs’ operations. However, the finding supports the 
findings in the previous chapter which showed the indicators presented meets 
global standard measures for adding value in the NOCs. In effect, it also 
confirms that the indicators are applicable in measuring the performance of the 
NNPC. 
In addition, in response to the factors that affects the value adding performance 
of the NNPC, the finding of the interviews can be categorised into two parts. 
On the one hand, the factors that help the NNPC positively to add value were 
perceived to be the fiscal regimes and the petroleum laws and regulations. On 
the other hand, the interviewees mostly dwelled on the negative consequences 
of political interference; instable operating environment; inadequate 
commercial expertise, and the NNPC’s lack of transparency and accountability. 
Except for the perception that the petroleum laws and regulations impact 
positively on the NNPC’s value addition and the failure to mention the OPEC 
as a positive factor, the findings of the interviews are consistent with the 
findings of the previous chapter. 
The opinions of the respondents on the questions that were raised based on the 
VfM components of efficiency, effectiveness and economy, were generally in 
consistence with the questionnaire’s survey findings. In the area of efficiency, 
the interviewees generally viewed the NNPC as deficient in organisational 
structure, decision-making and administrative procedures and processes. Other 
deficient areas are human, technical and financial capacities. Likewise, the 
interviewees validated the findings, in the previous chapter, by acknowledging 
the ineffectiveness of the NNPC in meeting its operational and national 
mission targets.  
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Regarding economy, the interviewees asserted that all contractual 
arrangements produce optimally, considering the circumstances in which they 
are operated. However, in disparity with the findings in the previous chapter, 
the interviewees asserted that the NNPC’s monitoring role has a negative effect 
on the cost performance of oil companies. This is argued on the basis of the 
NNPC’s process and human deficiencies, as well as its conflicting role in the 
upstream sector. With regards to the NNPC’s capability in managing cost 
performance, the interviewees acknowledged that the NNPC is trying but the 
capabilities are still deficient. However, in concurrence with the previous 
findings, the interviewees share the view that the NNPC is capable of assisting 

















SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the thesis. It is partitioned into four sections. In 
Section 8.2, a summary of the whole study is presented including the summary 
of the findings of the study. Section 8.3 discusses the contribution of the study, 
while Section 8.4 presents the limitations inherent to the study. In section 8.5, 
recommendations are provided for further research. 
8.2 Summary of the research 
This thesis has explored the governance practices of the NOCs in relation to 
their value adding performance. Specifically, the thesis empirically and 
critically investigated the practices of the NNPC with the aim of determining 
whether the corporation ensures that VfM is achieved in its upstream sector 
activities, as stated in the mission statement and desired by the stakeholders. 
Three research questions were addressed in the study: 
1. How well do the stakeholders view the efficiency of oil and gas 
resources exploitation in Nigeria? 
2. How well do the stakeholders view the effectiveness of oil and gas 
resources exploitation in Nigeria? 
3. How well do the stakeholders view the economy of oil and gas 
resources exploitation in Nigeria? 
8.2.1 Summary of the Findings on the Efficiency of NNPC’s Roles in 
Upstream Operations 
The operational efficiency of the NNPC’s operations was explored through 
administrative, financial and control processes, with the aim of ascertaining 
whether VfM is ensured. On a general note, the findings showed that the 
NNPC has been inefficient in carrying out its managerial functions in the oil 
and gas upstream sector. The findings suggested the following implications.   
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Firstly, although the NNPC had undergone various organisational structural 
changes to enhance its performance, the respondents still perceived it as 
inefficient. Arguably, this perception is based on the centralised nature of the 
NNPC’s organisational structure which slows down processes due to its 
excessive bureaucracy (see Section 3.6.1). This suggests the need for further 
reform in processing and organisational culture.  
Secondly, the decision-making process is not autonomous, and therefore lacked 
the professionalism required to achieve VfM in upstream investment (Gboyega 
et al., 2011). It is evident that poor decision-making undermines the early 
execution of projects because of its negative impact on the planning process. 
Arguably, this erodes the essence of managerial accountability and creates an 
atmosphere that is conducive for opportunistic behaviours to flourish.  
Thirdly, the perception of the NNPC’s inefficiency can be attributed to the 
inadequacy of qualified human resources (see Section 3.6.1).  As shown in 
Figure 3.4, human resources are an important input for creating value in oil and 
gas value chain. Therefore, the lack of it undermines the achievement of VfM 
in NNPC’s operations. Arguably, this inadequacy confirmed the insinuation 
that employment of personnel into the NNPC is driven mainly by nepotism and 
political patronage, rather than professional expertise (Thurber et al., 2010).  
Finally, the respondents also perceived that the NNPC has been inefficient in 
financial management and control. This can partly be attributed to the fact that 
the NNPC does not have the necessary autonomy required for efficient 
financial management. For instance, it depends on the national budget to fund 
its projects and cannot retain its earnings (Thurber et al., 2010). Another reason 
for the inefficiency is the excessive bureaucracy involved in getting approvals 
and payment for projects. This leads to delays in project execution, the 
realignment and misalignment of budgets and cost overruns. In effect, 
accountability and VfM can hardly be achieved because the control tools, such 
as budgeting and auditing, are undermined. 
Consequently, the findings in this respect suggest a reform of the NNPC’s 
administrative and financial processes to enable it operate in a manner that will 
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ensure VfM and portray the existence of managerial and communal 
accountabilities.   
8.2.2 Summary of the Findings on the Effectiveness of NNPC’s Upstream 
Operations   
The respondents’ perceptions on the effectiveness of the NNPC’s upstream 
activities were spread over six categories; comprising of both commercial and 
national mission objectives and processes. Firstly, the respondents perceived 
that the NNPC has been ineffective in meeting its crude oil reserve, production 
and cash flow targets. The findings suggest that bad governance is the cause of 
the NNPC’s ineffectiveness. However, other causes of the ineffectiveness, such 
as the unstable operating environment in the Niger Delta and the inadequate 
funding of projects cannot be linked directly to the NNPC. Nevertheless, this 
has great implications for a mono-economy like Nigeria, whose socio-
economic needs depend on oil and gas revenue.  
Secondly, the respondents perceived negatively on the effectiveness of the 
NNPC’s control over crude oil production, sharing and lifting. These findings 
underscore the NNPC’s deficiencies in physical accounting, and the lack of 
accountability between the NNPC and its partners. The findings suggested that 
the NNPC will have to enhance its human and technical capabilities, as 
deficiencies in these areas hinder effective management and control of oil and 
gas processes and operations. Collusion, patronage and corruption also 
contribute to the NNPC’s ineffectiveness in these aspects of its upstream 
operations (Thurber et al., 2010). 
Thirdly, the NNPC has been perceived to be ineffective in controlling the five 
oil and gas upstream costs tested. Generally, the respondents’ negative 
perceptions on the NNPC’s control over the upstream costs confirm the 
position of the literature; on realignment and misalignment of budget plans, as 
well as budget overruns. Ineffective control of costs can provide an avenue for 
the MOCs to inflate expenses and gold-plate costs (Akinwumi, 2009). As a 
result, VfM can hardly be ensured because the upstream investments will 
generate less revenue. 
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Fourthly, the national mission objectives of developing local skills; the use of 
local manpower; the transfer of technology and the increased participation of 
local companies were tested. Despite the enactment of the Nigerian Content 
Act of 2010, and the various strides of the NNPC in ensuring local content 
achievement, the respondents perceived that the NNPC has not done enough. 
The findings confirmed the position of the literature on all four variables. The 
main points highlighted dwelled on the NNPC’s inability to acquire technology 
and its incapability to ensure that the MOCs use available local manpower. 
Fifthly, the NNPC have also been perceived as ineffective in its function of 
monitoring and ensuring that the MOCs comply with the provisions of 
contractual agreements, and laws and regulations in all facets of upstream 
operations. The findings suggested that the relationship between the NNPC and 
its upstream partners has contractual and managerial accountability problems. 
Again, the enhancements of human and technical capabilities are necessary for 
the NNPC to meet up with this challenge. Achieving effectiveness demands the 
usage of good and appropriate inputs; therefore, the government needs to 
expedite action to reform the NNPC – possibly, first by ensuring that the PIB is 
passed into law. 
Finally, the perceived ineffectiveness of the NNPC in the area of 
communication and feedback suggests that the NNPC lacked a sound 
governance system. The implication of this is that economic decisions will be 
taken in an ineffective way (Indreswari, 2006), and in effect this will reduce 
the level of performance (see Section 4.2). In addition, ineffective 
communication is likely to slow down other administrative and financial 
processes, and this situation may encourage opportunistic behaviours that will 
hinder managerial accountability. As well, with regards to external 
stakeholders, the lack of communication and feedback reduces the incentive for 
competition and answerability. Furthermore, both contractual and communal 




8.2.3 Summary of the Findings on the Economy of NNPC’s Upstream 
Operations 
In this section, findings on the perceptions of the respondents are presented in 
respect of: i) the cost and optimality of petroleum contractual arrangements; ii) 
the potential effect of the NNPC’s monitoring role on cost performance; iii) the 
capability of the NNPC in measuring, identifying and assisting the 
improvement of cost performance. 
The respondents perceived that the three contractual arrangements used in 
Nigeria, namely: JVs, PSCs and SCs, achieve the optimum outcomes relative 
to the cost employed. This suggests that the optimality and cost effectiveness 
of the Nigerian petroleum arrangements depends largely on the availability and 
applicability of inputs (human and financial resources) rather than the contracts 
themselves. For instance, the increasing usage of the PSC arrangement is 
mainly to overcome the problem of inadequate cash calling, otherwise the JV 
evidently generates more revenue to government. However, if the risk 
shouldered by the PSC operator is considered, then arguably it can be taken 
that value is derived relative to the risk taken and investment made. This 
conclusion confirms the position of Johnston (2007). 
In terms of the potential impact of the NNPC’s monitoring on cost performance 
of operating partners
91
, the respondents generally perceived that there is no 
potential adverse effect. This finding may be appropriate in the case of 
indigenous oil companies because the NNPC have minimal business relations 
with them. However, this finding of the questionnaire is inconsistent with the 
findings of the interview and literature, especially in the case of the MOCs and 
the service companies. Evidence show that some of the NNPC’s monitoring 
processes actually increases the cost of operation because they are deemed to 
be obstructive and serve as a fulfilment of obligations without competence 
(Thurber et al., 2010; Heller and Marcel, 2012). 
                                       
91
 The operating partners in this respect are: i) private indigenous oil companies; ii) 
multinational oil companies; and iii) service companies. 
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Having opined that the NNPC’s monitoring role does not have an adverse 
effect, it is not surprising that the respondents agreed that the NNPC’s 
monitoring role has, in general, the potential to positively affect the cost 
performance of the operating partners. The implication is that the NNPC will 
have to enhance its monitoring processes; improve its human and technical 
resources and devise a more effective communication and feedback process. 
This will reduce the cost of monitoring and provide an enabling environment 
for effective monitoring; thereby ensuring that VfM and accountability are 
achieved. 
Subsequently, the respondents perceived that the NNPC lack the capability to 
measure the cost performance of the NNPC, as well as the ability to identify 
problematic cost areas, having considered the resources at hand. It was 
however perceived that the NNPC has the capability to improve the cost 
performance of the MOCs. Even though the contractual arrangements are 
perceived to achieve optimal outcomes, there is uncertainty regarding the 
extent to which VfM has been achieved. Therefore, the NNPC needs to 
improve its mechanisms for benchmarking and cost estimation. 
8.3 Contribution of the Study 
This thesis explored the performance of the NNPC’s management and 
processes in the upstream sector of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The thesis 
has made a number of contributions. 
Firstly, this thesis is unique in that it is the first empirical research to have 
utilised the concept of VfM to assess the performance of a NOC, which is the 
NNPC. This thesis is also the only one known to have provided direct evidence 
on the performance of the NNPC’s managerial processes in its upstream 
activities on the basis of documented perceptions of relevant stakeholders.  
Secondly, this thesis employed both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
carry out its assessment, putting into cognisance both commercial and national 
mission objectives. This makes it different from the few known empirical 
studies on NOCs’ performance that utilised secondary data and the quantitative 
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approach to assess NOCs’ performance with a main focus on commercial 
indicators. 
Thirdly, given the importance of the NNPC’s role in the Nigerian economy, 
this study contributes by bringing to the attention of policy makers, law makers 
and other stakeholders a basis for judging the performance of the NNPC; not 
solely from the lens of profitability but also on how well VfM has been 
achieved. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to the existing body of literature on the 
governance of the NOCs. It helps to build up the understanding of the 
relationship between NOC governance, VfM concept and stakeholder’s 
perceptions. Therefore, the study may be useful to those interested in 
undertaking research on NOCs, in that it introduced a new dimension of 
assessing NOC performance using VfM and organisational processes rather 
than financial data.   
8.4 The Limitations of the Study   
While the key findings of this thesis are believed to have adequately answered 
the questions addressed by the study, there are some limitations which should 
be acknowledged.  
Firstly, there is a general lack of literature on the performance of NOCs. Also, 
as NOCs can be reluctant to disclose information about their activities, 
difficulties were encountered in the process of gathering the theoretical and 
financial information required to satisfactorily assess the NNPC’s performance.  
Secondly, as usual with the use of questionnaire and interview methods, there 
are inherent limitations such as non-response bias; the possible insincerity of 
respondents and the possibility of interviewer’s bias which can affect the 
results. However, appropriate steps were taken in designing the questionnaire 
and conducting the interviews, along with the identification of all reliability 
and validity threats to help minimise these limitations. 
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Finally, there is also the limitation of generalising the findings of the study to 
other NOCs. However, the findings of the study may be applied to other NOCs 
from developing countries that are, by nature, similar to Nigeria, and those that 
operate in a similar context to the NNPC and its stakeholders. 
8.5 Recommendations for Further Research 
Considering that the findings of this research have adequately addressed the 
questions raised in the research, other areas relating to the performance of 
NOCs can be further investigated. In particular, emphasis can focus on the 
following areas: 
Firstly, since the focus of this research was on the upstream sector of the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry; the VfM analysis can be replicated in assessing 
the performance of the NNPC in the other streams of the oil and gas value 
chain. 
Secondly, the VfM concept can be used to investigate the performance of 
another NOC, especially one that is not quoted in the stock exchange. 
Accordingly, further development of the VfM concept can be used to 
investigate financial issues based on financial information, unlike the processes 
used in this study. 
Thirdly, the VfM concept can be further developed and standardised as the lens 
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Management at Robert Gordon University and a professor of 
petroleum accounting.  I very much hope that you can assist with a 
research project that my excellent research student, Ibraheem 
Adam, is undertaking. We are aware of your expertise in the 
research areas under investigation and your input will be invaluable 
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I am a research scholar based in Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen, United Kingdom. My research interest and speciality is 
governance practices in the petroleum sector. I am particularly 
interested in governance issues related to National Oil Companies. I 
attach a questionnaire relating to the upstream performance of the 
NNPC. 
I would be very grateful if you can complete the questionnaire so 
that we can have the benefit of your expertise. Please, be assured 
that your responses will be treated in strict confidence and that your 
identity will not be revealed at any time.  I am happy to let you 
have a summary of my findings in due course, should you request 
one. Information on completing the questionnaire can be found at 
the beginning of each section.  
I would be glad to be contacted any time about the survey or 
procedures on: +44(0) 741358301. Alternatively by email at: 
i.s.adam@rgu.ac.uk    
 











(Codification of Questionnaire Response) 
Variable  Variable Label Value 




Sec1Q1a Discovery of new reserves 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q1b Production higher than budgeted 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q1c Revenue higher than budgeted 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q1d Development and application of 
scientific research 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q1e Increase in local capacity 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q1f Stronger economic linkages 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2a Limited political interference 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2b Power conferred on NNPC for upstream 
operations 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2c Petroleum contractual arrangements 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2d Favourable tax systems to oil companies 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2e Unfavourable tax systems to oil 
companies 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2f Stability of petroleum operations 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2g OPEC Membership 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2h Commercial expertise 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2i Disclosure and transparency of 
production 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2j Disclosure and transparency of revenue 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2k Disclosure and transparency of 
production cost 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec1Q2l Petroleum laws for upstream operations 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q1a Robust administrative system 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q1b Appropriate decisions for upstream 
operations 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q1c Appropriate number of staff for 
monitoring 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q2a Full utilisation of available fund 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q2b Utilisation of fund according to budget 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q2c Good system for distributing fund 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q3a Budgetary system 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q3b Authorisation for Expenditure 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q3c Compliance audit 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q3d Joint venture auditing 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q3e Procurement procedures 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec2Q3f Carry agreement auditing 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q1a Achieve oil reserves targets 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q1b Achieve production targets 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q1c Achieve cash flow targets 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q2a Capacity to monitor and control oil 
production 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q2b Capacity to monitor and control sharing 
of oil 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 





Sec3Q3a NNPC’s control over direct operating 
cost 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q3b NNPC’s control over cost recovery 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q3c NNPC’s control over Monitoring cost 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q3d NNPC’s control over Development cost 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q3e NNPC’s control over Overhead cost 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q4a Development of local skills 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q4b Use of local manpower 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q4c Transfer of technological expertise 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q4d Increase in participation of local 
companies 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5a Compliance with JV provisions 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5b Compliance with PSC provisions 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5c Compliance with CA provisions 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5d Compliance with laws and regulations 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5e Industry best practice 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5f Compliance with environmental laws 
and regulations 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5g Compliance with joint operating 
decisions 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5h Compliance with Health and safety rules 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q5i Compliance with local content Act 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q6a Effective communication system 
between stakeholders 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec3Q6b Appropriate use of feedback 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q1a Utilisation of JV gives optimum 
outcome 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q1b Utilisation of PSC gives optimum 
outcome 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q1c Utilisation of SC gives optimum 
outcome 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q2a Monitoring affects IOC’s cost 
performance negatively 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q2b Monitoring affects MOC’s cost 
performance negatively 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q2c Monitoring affects service companies 
cost performance negatively 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q3a Monitoring affects IOC’s cost 
performance positively 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q3b Monitoring affects MOC’s cost 
performance positively 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q3c Monitoring affects service companies 
cost performance positively 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q4a Capability to measure cost performance 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q4b Capability to identify problematic cost 
areas 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 
Sec4Q4c Capability to improve cost performance 1=SA,2=A,3=N,4=D,5=SD 










Survey on certain aspects of the performance of the Nigerian National 




1. Please tick the box that represents your organisation: 
 
1 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)  
2 Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI)  
3 Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)  
4 Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources (FMPR)  
5 Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs)  
6 Local Oil Companies (LOCs)  
7 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)  
8 Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC)  
9 Office of the Auditor-General for the Federation (AGF)  
10 Public Accounting Firms  
11 National Assembly  




Performance of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) 
 
1. Please indicate your opinion on whether or not the listed outcomes 
signify “adding value” to hydrocarbon resources as per NNPC’s mission 
statement: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Discovery of new oil and gas reserves to replace 
production. 
     
b) Higher than budgeted oil and gas production levels.      
c) Higher than budgeted oil and gas revenue to 
government. 
     
d) Development and application of results of scientific 
research in upstream operations. 
     
e) Regular increase in local capacity to explore, 
develop and produce oil and gas. 
     
f) Creation of stronger economic linkages within the oil 
and gas value chain. 










2. Please tick the box that best indicates your opinion on whether the 
following factors have assisted NNPC to develop Nigeria’s hydrocarbon 
resources: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Limited political interference in decision making.      
b) Oil production, refining and regulatory power 
conferred on NNPC. 
     
c) Provisions of existing petroleum contractual 
arrangements used in Nigeria. 
     
d) Taxation and fiscal systems which are favourable to 
oil companies. 
     
e) Taxation and fiscal systems which are unfavourable 
to oil companies. 
     
f) Stability of petroleum operations.      
g) Membership of OPEC.      
h) NNPC’s commercial expertise.      
i) NNPC’s disclosure and transparency relating to 
production. 
     
j) NNPC’s disclosure and transparency relating to 
revenue. 
     
k) NNPC’s disclosure and transparency relating to cost 
of production. 
     
l) Existing laws governing oil and gas exploration and 
production in Nigeria. 
     
 
Section Two 
NNPC’s efficient management of upstream petroleum 
operations 
 
1. Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following 
statements regarding NNPC’s efficiency in their management of the 
upstream sector by ticking the appropriate box: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) NNPC has a robust administrative system for 
managing the upstream petroleum sector.  
     
b) NNPC in general make appropriate decisions for 
overseeing Nigeria’s upstream operations.  
     
c) NNPC has an appropriate number of qualified staff 
for monitoring upstream operations. 
     
 
2. Please indicate your view on the following statements regarding NNPC’s 
use of available funds for upstream activities: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) NNPC makes full use of its available finance for 
upstream operations. 
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b) NNPC ensures that funds released for upstream 
operations are spent as planned. 
     
c) NNPC’ has a good system for distributing funds for 
upstream operations. 
     
 
3. Please indicate the extent of your agreement that each of the following 
control tools is used efficiently by the NNPC in upstream operations: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Budgetary system.      
b) Authorisation for Expenditure (AFE).      
c) Compliance audit.       
d) Joint venture auditing.       
e) Procurement procedures.      
f) Auditing of Alternative-funded projects (Carry 
agreement) 
     
 
Section Three 
NNPC’s Effectiveness in upstream petroleum management 
 
1. The NNPC has been effective in meeting its targets in the following 
areas: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Growth in crude oil reserves.      
b) Monthly crude oil production targets.      
c) Operational cash flows.      
 
2. Please express the strength of your agreement that NNPC’s control over 
the following aspects of petroleum upstream operations has been effective: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Crude oil production.      
e) Sharing of oil.      
f) Oil lifting.      
 
3. Please indicate the strength of your agreement that NNPC’s control over 
the following petroleum upstream costs has been effective: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Direct Operating costs.      
b) Cost recovery in Production Sharing Contract (PSC).      
c) Monitoring costs.      
d) Development costs.      













4. Please indicate how you would respond to the statement that the NNPC 
has done well with respect to Nigerian content objective of the Nigerian 
government in the following areas:   
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Development of local skills.       
b) Use of local manpower.      
c) Transfer of technological expertise to local 
companies. 
     
d) Increased participation of local companies in 
upstream operations. 
     
 
5. Please express the strength of your agreement with the statement that 
the NNPC has been effective in monitoring the following aspects of 
upstream petroleum operations: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Compliance with provisions of JV (joint venture).      
b) Compliance with provisions of PSC (Petroleum 
Sharing Contract). 
     
c) Compliance with provision of alternative funding 
arrangements (Carry agreements). 
     
d) Compliance with petroleum laws and regulations.      
e) Compliance with industry best practice.      
f) Compliance with environmental laws and 
regulations. 
     
g) Compliance with joint operating decisions.      
h) Compliance with Health and Safety procedures.      
i) Compliance with Local Content Act.      
 
6. Please express the extent of your agreement with respect to each of the 
following statements: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) In general, there is effective communication 
between the NNPC and relevant stakeholders on all 
material issues relating to upstream operation.  
     
b) In general, NNPC makes good use of all feedback it 
receives relating to upstream operations.    
     
 
Section Four 




1. Please indicate the strength of your agreement with the statement that, 
in general, the cost of using the following petroleum contractual 
arrangements is optimum for the outcome achieved: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Joint ventures (JV).      
b) Production sharing contracts (PSC).      
c) Service contracts (SC).      
 
 
2. The NNPC’s monitoring role in the upstream petroleum sector has, in 
general, the potential to adversely affect the cost performance of the 
following categories of operators:  
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Private Indigenous oil companies.      
b) Multinational oil companies (MOCs).      
c) Service companies      
 
3. The NNPC’s monitoring role in the upstream petroleum sector has, in 
general, the potential to positively affect the performance of the following 
companies: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Private Indigenous oil companies.      
b) Multinational oil companies (MOCs).      
c) Service companies      
 
4. How would you respond to the suggestion that the NNPC has the 
capability of: 
 
(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Measuring cost performances of MOCs.      
b) Identifying problematic cost areas.      
c) Assisting with improving the cost performance of 
MOCs. 
     
 
Please use the space below to relate any further comments 









Questions used for interviews 
Broad Areas Questions 
1) Value adding 
indicators  
It is generally accepted that National oil companies should be 
evaluated on the basis of their own objective (Tordo et al., 2011; 
Al-Naimi, 2004). This stemmed from the argument that the 
recognition of value objectives is the first requirement for the 
measurement of organisational performance (Glendinning, 
2002).  
Can you please give your opinion on the outcomes that signify 




It is well recognised in the literature that an organisation’s value 
adding performance greatly depends on its interaction with the 
internal and external dynamic environments in which it operates 
(Tordo et al., 2011). 
Based on the findings of the analysis of my questionnaire, the 
experts seemed to hold the opinion that there are factors that 
have had positive and negative effect on NNPC’s development 
of hydrocarbon resources. Do you share this view? If so, can you 
please comment on the factors? 
3) Efficiency Efficiency represents the use of appropriate administrative 
principles and mechanisms to derive desirable value adding 
outcome (Murshid, 1988). This involves the structure, 
administrative system, financing network and control apparatus. 
From the analysis of the questionnaire earlier administered, it 
appears that the respondents believe that the NNPC has not 
managed its upstream operations efficiently. Do you share this 
view? If so, please can you mention the reasons for its 
managerial inefficiency? 
4) Effectiveness There is a general acceptance that effectiveness is the extent to 
which an organisation can achieve its pre-set goals/objectives 
(Aktas et al., 2011). 
The findings of my questionnaire suggest that NNPC have not 
done well in achieving its upstream goals and objectives. Do you 
have a similar opinion? If so, please can you comment on the 
reasons for the ineffectiveness? 
5) Economy Within the realm of VfM, the concept of economy can be 
considered as the minimisation of the cost of human, financial 
and material resources used for an activity while having regard 
to appropriate quality (Flynn, 2012). 
On a general note, the results derive from the analysis of my 
questionnaire suggests that NNPC did not ensure economy in the 
management of its upstream operations. Do you share this 
opinion? If so, can you please mention the where and why 
economy has not been ensured in the upstream sector? 
 
 
